Jharkhand High Court
Gautam Dey vs The State Of Jharkhand on 5 September, 2022
Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
-1- Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020
Gautam Dey ..... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. Nishant Minz ..... ... Opposite Parties
--------
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
------
For the Petitioner : Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, Sr. Advocate
: Mr. Nishant Roy, Advocate.
For the State : Ms. Nehala Sharmin, A.P.P
For the O.P. No. 2 : Mr. H.K. Mehta, Advocate.
: Mrs. Manju Shree Patra, Advocate.
------
04/ 05.09.2022 Heard Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel appearing
for the petitioners, Ms Nehala Sharmin, learned A.P.P. for the State and
Mr. H.K. Mehta, learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2.
2. This petition has been filed for quashing of the entire criminal
proceeding and the order dated 01.02.2020 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, SC/ST, Dhanbad, in
connection with S.C./S.T. Case No. 90 of 2019 (arising out of C.P. Case
No. 3073 of 2019), by which cognizance for the offence under Sections
323 and 341 of IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act has been taken
against the petitioner, pending in the court of learned Additional Sessions
Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, SC/ST, Dhanbad.
3. The complaint case was lodged alleging therein that the
complainant has given a written report to O/C Panchet O.P. stating therein
that on 21.02.2019 at 09:00 PM while he was returning from Chirkunda to
his house by his bike and when he reached at H-Type Colony near Kali
Mandir, accused Gautam Dey came near the complainant lashed with iron
rod and told to stop the vehicle otherwise he will kill him, complainant
stopped the vehicle, then he told that being an Aadibasi you are doing
politics. Whole life of your family has been used as slave (Gulami) and
today you are doing politics, saying this he gave iron rod blow on his head
as a result he fell down and took out Rs. 1700/- from his pocket and fled
away. On getting information about the incident, his friends came and took
to Panchet O.P., thereafter he was hospitalized at Panchet Hospital.
Accordingly, he instituted an FIR being Chirkunda P.S. Case No. 33 of
2019 against the petitioner wherein police has submitted chargesheet
against the petitioner only under Section 323, 504 of the IPC and notice
was sent to the complainant for filing the objection but despite the fact that
notice was not duly served upon him, the record was transferred to the
-2- Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020
court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad. Hence the present
complaint petition has been filed.
4. Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner submits that the O.P. No. 2 has filed the FIR for the alleged
occurrence of 21.02.2019 and the said FIR was investigated by the police
and after investigation the police has submitted the final form under
Section 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code and the final form has not
been submitted under the SC/ST Act. He submits that after the final form,
the learned Additional Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, SC/ST,
Dhanbad, by order dated 29.07.2019 sent the matter to the learned court of
Magistrate, as it was triable by the Magistrate in view of the final form.
He further submits that the petitioner appeared in the concerned court,
pursuant to the summon, issued by the learned court by order dated
13.08.2019 and the petitioner is facing the trial in that case. He further
submits that the wife of this petition has filed an FIR against the O.P. No.
2, being Chirkunda P.S. Case No. 34 of 2019, in which, the police has
submitted final form under Sections 354 and 504/34 IPC and cognizance
has been taken against the O.P. No. 2 and the O.P. No. 2 is facing the trial.
5. Mr. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner draws the attention of this Court to the complaint petition and
submits that for the same occurrence dated 21.02.2019, the complaint case
has been filed and the learned court has taken the cognizance dated
01.02.2020 under the IPC as well as SC/ST Act and this is double
jeopardy to the petitioner. To buttress his arguments, he relied in the case
of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel Versus State of Gujarat & Ors.,
reported in (2012) 7 SCC 621, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
paras-14, 15 and 33 held as follows:-
"14. This court in Maqbool Hussain held that the
fundamental right which is guaranteed
under Article 20 (2) enunciates the principle of
"autrefois convict" or "double jeopardy" i.e. a
person must not be put in peril twice for the same
offence. The doctrine is based on the ancient
maxim "nemo debet bis punire pro uno delicto",
that is to say that no one ought to be twice
punished for one offence. The plea of "autrefois
convict" or "autrefois acquit" avers that the
person has been previously convicted or acquitted
on a charge for the same offence as that in respect
of which he is arraigned. The test is whether the
former offence and the offence now charged have
the same ingredients in the sense that the facts
-3- Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020
constituting the one are sufficient to justify a
conviction of the other and not that the facts
relied on by the prosecution are the same in the
two trials. A plea of "autrefois acquit" is not
proved unless it is shown that the verdict of
acquittal of the previous charge necessarily
involves an acquittal of the latter.
15. The Constitution Bench of this Court
in S.A.Venkataraman v. Union of India & Anr.,
AIR 1954 SC 375, explained the scope of doctrine
of double jeopardy, observing that in order to
attract the provisions of Article 20 (2) of the
Constitution, there must have been both
prosecution and punishment in respect of the
same offence. The words 'prosecuted' and
'punished' are to be taken not distributively so as
to mean prosecuted or punished. Both the factors
must co-exist in order that the operation of the
clause may be attractive.
33. In view of the above, the law is well settled
that in order to attract the provisions of Article
20(2) of the Constitution i.e. doctrine of autrefois
acquit or Section 300 Cr.P.C. or Section 71 IPC
or Section 26 of General Clauses Act, ingredients
of the offences in the earlier case as well as in the
latter case must be the same and not different. The
test to ascertain whether the two offences are the
same is not identity of the allegations but the
identity of the ingredients of the offence. Motive
for committing offence cannot be termed as
ingredients of offences to determine the issue. The
plea of autrefois acquit is not proved unless it is
shown that the judgment of acquittal in the
previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal
of the latter charge."
6. By way of relying on this judgment, Mr. Mazumdar, learned
senior counsel submits that in light of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of
India as well as Section 300 Cr.P.C. and other Sections, when the
ingredients of both the cases are same, the second complaint was
unwarranted.
7. He further submits that the Trial court for more than one
offence for the same occurrence took place, was again the subject matter
in the case of State of Jharkhand through SP, Central Bureau of
Investigation Versus Lalu Prasad Yadav @ Lalu Prasad, reported in
(2017) 8 SCC 1,wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paras- 22, 23 and
24 held as follows:-
"22. Article 20(2) says that no person shall be
-4- Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020
prosecuted and punished for the same offence
more than once. This is called the doctrine of
double jeopardy. The objective of the Article is to
avoid harassment, which may be caused by
successive criminal proceedings, where the
person has committed only one crime. There is a
law maxim related to this, nemo debet bis vexari.
This means that no man shall be put twice in peril
for the same offence. There are two aspects of
doctrine of jeopardy viz. Autrefois convict and
Autrefois acquit. Autrefois convict means that the
person has been previously convicted in respect of
the same offence. Autrefois acquit means that the
person has been acquitted on a same charge on
which he is being prosecuted. Constitution bars
double punishment for the same offence. The
conviction for such offence does not bar for
subsequent trial and conviction for another
offence and it does not matter even if some
ingredients of these two offences are common.
23. Section 300 Cr.P.C. is extracted hereunder :
"Section 300. Person once convicted or
acquitted not to be tried for same offence.-- (1)
A person who has once been tried by a Court
of competent jurisdiction for an offence and
convicted or acquitted of such offence shall,
while such conviction or acquittal remains in
force, not be liable to be tried again for the
same offence, nor on the same facts for any
other offence for which a different charge from
the one made against him might have been
made under sub-section (1) of section 221, or
for which he might have been convicted under
sub- section (2) thereof.
(2) A person acquitted or convicted of any
offence may be afterwards tried, with the
consent of the State Government, for any
distinct offence for which a separate charge
might have been made against him at the
former trial under sub- section (1) of section
220.
(3) A person convicted of any offence
constituted by any act causing consequences
which, together with such act, constituted a
different offence from that of which he was
convicted, may be afterwards tried for such
last- mentioned offence, if the consequences
had not happened, or were not known to the
Court to have happened, at the time when he
was convicted.
-5- Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020
(4) A person acquitted or convicted of any
offence constituted by any acts may,
notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction,
be subsequently charged with, and tried for,
any other offence constituted by the same acts
which he may have committed if the Court by
which he was first tried was not competent to
try the offence with which he is subsequently
charged.
(5) A person discharged under section 258
shall not be tried again for the same offence
except with the consent of the Court by which
he was discharged or of any other Court to
which the first- mentioned Court is
subordinate.
(6) Nothing in this section shall affect the
provisions of section 26 of the General Clauses
Act, 1897, (10 of 1897) or of section 188 of this
Code."
24. Section 300 refers to sections 220 and 221
Cr.PC. No doubt it appears that a person who has
been convicted or acquitted of the "same offence"
cannot be tried again considering the aforesaid
provisions. Section 220(1) provides that if one
series of acts is so connected together as to form
the same transaction, more offences than one are
committed by the same person, he may be charged
with and tried at one trial for every such offence.
Section 220(1) is extracted hereunder :
"220. Trial for more than one offence.--(1)
If, in one series of acts so connected
together as to form the same transaction,
more offences than one are committed by the
same person, he may be charged with, and
tried at one trial for, every such offence."
8. Relying on these judgments, learned senior counsel submits
that the case of the petitioner is fully covered in the light of
aforementioned judgments and the entire criminal proceedings may kindly
be quashed.
9. Per contra, Mr. H.K. Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the
O.P. No. 2 submits that in the first case, the final form has been submitted
under Sections 323 and 504/34 of the IPC and SC/ST Act has not been
added and in that view of the matter, the O.P. No. 2 was compelled to file
the second complaint. He submits that O.P. No. 2 has not received any
notice from the learned court. He further submits that the occurrence has
taken place and the medical report has also been brought on record by way
of filing the counter affidavit and in view of this fact, the second
-6- Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020
complaint is maintainable. To buttress his arguments, he relied in the case
of Samta Naidu & Anr. Versus State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. reported
in (2020) 5 SCC 378, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paras-10, 11
and 12 held as follows:-
"10. The parties thereafter exchanged pleadings
and the matter was heard. Mr. Devadatt Kamat,
learned Senior Advocate, appeared in support of
the appeal. Relying on the decision of this Court in
Talukdar, he submitted that the High Court was in
error in rejecting the revision applications. Ms
Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Advocate for the
respondent complainant also relied upon the same
decision and other decisions referred to by the
High Court, to submit that as new material was
found, the second complaint was rightly considered
and taken cognizance of.
11. The principal decision relied upon by both the
sides is one rendered by a Bench of three Judges of
this Court in Talukdar. Para 35 of the majority
decision authored by Kapur, J. discloses that a
complaint under Sections 467 and 471 read with
Section 109 IPC was preferred on the allegations
that an unregistered deed of agreement purportedly
executed on 19-1-1948, a transfer deed in respect
of 1000 shares purportedly executed on 5-2-1951
and the minutes of proceedings of the Board
meetings purporting to bear the signature of late
Sri Nalini Ranjan Sarkar were stated to have been
forged. The Chief Presidency Magistrate dismissed
the complaint against which revision was preferred
before the High Court of Calcutta. Said revision
petition was dismissed and the matter was carried
before this Court but the appeal was dismissed as
withdrawn. Thereafter, another complaint was
brought under very same sections. The Chief
Presidency Magistrate took cognizance of the
second complaint against which order, revision was
preferred in the High Court of Calcutta. The matter
came up before the Division Bench and the
additional material projected in support of the
submission that the second complaint was
maintainable was dealt with by the Division Bench.
The matter in that behalf was adverted to this
Court as under : (Talukdar case, AIR p. 898, para
45)
"45. ... In regard to the filing of a second
complaint it held that a fresh complaint could be
entertained after the dismissal of previous
complaint under Section 203 of the Criminal
-7- Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020
Procedure Code when there was manifest error or
manifest miscarriage of justice or when fresh
evidence was forthcoming. The Bench was of the
opinion that the fact in regard to the City
Telephone Exchange was a new matter and
because Pramode Ranjan Sarkar was not permitted
to take a photostat copy of the minutes book, it was
possible that his attention was not drawn to the
City Telephone Exchange which was not in
existence at the relevant time and that there was
sufficient reason for Pramode Ranjan Sarkar for
not mentioning the matter of City Exchange in his
complaint. It also held that the previous Chief
Presidency Magistrate Mr Chakraborty had
altogether ignored the evidence of a large number
of witnesses who were competent to prove the
handwriting and signature of N.R. Sarkar and he
had no good reasons for not accepting their
evidence. It could not be said therefore that there
was a judicial enquiry of the matter before the
previous Chief Presidency Magistrate; the decision
was rather arbitrary and so resulted in manifest
miscarriage of justice. The Court was of the
opinion therefore that there was no reason to differ
from the finding of the Chief Presidency Magistrate
Mr Bijoyesh Mukerjee and that there was a prima
facie case against the appellants."
11.1. The issue was considered by the majority
judgment of this Court as
under : (Talukdar case, AIR pp. 898-99, para
48)
"48. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure the
subject of "complaints to Magistrates" is dealt
with in Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The provisions relevant for the
purpose of this case are Sections 200, 202 and
203. Section 200 deals with examination of
complainants and Sections 202, 203 and 204 with
the powers of the Magistrate in regard to the
dismissal of complaint or the issuing of process.
The scope and extent of Sections 202 and 203
were laid down in Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya
Dulaji Gha Digaonkar. The scope of enquiry
under Section 202 is limited to finding out the
truth or otherwise of the complaint in order to
determine whether process should issue or not
and Section 203 lays down what materials are to
be considered for the purpose. Under Section 203
of the Criminal Procedure Code the judgment
which the Magistrate has to form must be based
-8- Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020
on the statements of the complainant and of his
witnesses and the result of the investigation or
enquiry, if any. He must apply his mind to the
materials and form his judgment whether or not
there is sufficient ground for proceeding.
Therefore if he has not misdirected himself as to
the scope of the enquiry made under Section 202
of the Criminal Procedure Code, and has
judicially applied his mind to the material before
him and then proceeds to make his order it cannot
be said that he has acted erroneously. An order of
dismissal under Section 203 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, is, however, no bar to the
entertainment of a second complaint on the same
facts but it will be entertained only in exceptional
circumstances, e.g., where the previous order was
passed on an incomplete record or on a
misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint
or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or
where new facts which could not, with reasonable
diligence, have been brought on the record in the
previous proceedings, have been adduced. It
cannot be said to be in the interests of justice that
after a decision has been given against the
complainant upon a full consideration of his case,
he or any other person should be given another
opportunity to have his complaint enquired into.
Allah Dittav. KaramBakhsh; R.N. Choubey v. P.
Jain; Hansabai Sayaji Payagude v. Ananda
Ganuji Payagude and Doraiswami Ayyar v. T.
Subramania Ayyar. In regard to the adducing of
new facts for the bringing of a fresh complaint the
Special Bench in the judgment under appeal did
not accept the view of the Bombay High Court or
the Patna High Court in the cases above quoted
and adopted the opinion of Maclean, C.J. in
Queen Empress v. Dolegobind Dass affirmed by a
Full Bench in Dwarka Nath Mondul v. Beni
Madhab Banerjee. It held therefore that a fresh
complaint can be entertained where there is
manifest error, or manifest miscarriage of justice
in the previous order or when fresh evidence is
forthcoming."
11.2. It was observed in para 50 as under :
(Talukdar case, AIR p. 899, para 50)
"50. Taking first the question of fresh
evidence, the view of some of the High Courts that
it should be such that it could not with reasonable
diligence have been adduced is, in our opinion, a
correct view of the law. It cannot be the law that
-9- Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020
the complainant may first place before the
Magistrate some of the facts and evidence in his
possession and if he fails he can then adduce
some more evidence and so on. That in our
opinion, is not a correct view of the law."
11.3. The majority judgment in Talukdar case
thus accepted the challenge, allowed the appeal
and dismissed the complaint with the following
observations : (Talukdar case, AIR p. 903, paras 61
& 63)
"61. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion
that the bringing of the fresh complaint is a gross
abuse of the process of the Court and is not with
the object of furthering the interests of justice.
***
63. For these reasons, we allow the appeals, set
aside the order of the High Court and of the
learned Chief Presidency Magistrate and dismiss
the complaint."
11.4. The dissenting opinion in Talukdar case was
expressed by S.K. Das, J.
12. The law declared in Talukdar has consistently been followed, for instance, in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh it was observed : (Bindeshwari Prasad Singh case, SCC p. 59, para 4) "4. ... it is now well settled that a second complaint can lie only on fresh facts or even on the previous facts only if a special case is made out."
(emphasis supplied) The view taken in Bindeshwari was followed in A.S. Gauraya v. S.N. Thakur.
12.1. In Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit Kaur the issue was whether the first complaint having been dismissed for default, could the second complaint be maintained. The matter was considered as under :
(SCC pp. 572-74, paras 9 & 12) "9. There is no provision in the Code or in any other statute which debars a complainant from preferring a second complaint on the same allegations if the first complaint did not result in a conviction or acquittal or even discharge.
Section 300 of the Code, which debars a second trial, has taken care to explain that "the dismissal of a complaint, or the discharge of the accused, is not an acquittal for the purposes of this section". However, when a Magistrate conducts an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code and dismisses the complaint on merits, a second complaint on the same facts cannot be -10- Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020 made unless there are very exceptional circumstances. Even so, a second complaint is permissible depending upon how the complaint happened to be dismissed at the first instance.
***
12. If the dismissal of the complaint was not on merit but on default of the complainant to be present there is no bar in the complainant moving the Magistrate again with a second complaint on the same facts. But if the dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 of the Code was on merits the position could be different. There appeared a difference of opinion earlier as to whether a second complaint could have been filed when the dismissal was under Section
203. The controversy was settled by this Court in PramathaNathTalukdar v. SarojRanjan Sarkar. A majority of Judges of the three-Judge Bench held thus : (AIR p. 899, para 48) '48. ... An order of dismissal under Section 203, Criminal Procedure Code, is, however, no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts but it will be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, e.g., where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings, have been adduced. It cannot be said to be in the interest of justice that after a decision has been given against the complainant upon a full consideration of his case, he or any other person should be given another opportunity to have his complaint inquired into.' S.K. Das, J. (as he then was) while dissenting from the said majority view had taken the stand that right of a complainant to file a second complaint would not be inhibited even by such considerations. But at any rate the majority view is that the second complaint would be maintainable if the dismissal of the first complaint was not on merits."
(emphasis supplied) 12.2. In Ranvir Singh v. State of Haryana the issue was set out in para 23 of the decision and the discussion that followed thereafter was as under :
(SCC p. 647, paras 23-26) -11- Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020 "23. In the instant case, the question is narrowed down further as to whether such a second complaint would be maintainable when the earlier one had not been dismissed on merits, but for the failure of the complainant to put in the process fees for effecting service.
24. The answer has been provided firstly in Pramatha Nath Talukdar case, wherein this Court had held that even if a complaint was dismissed under Section 203 CrPC, a second complaint would still lie under exceptional circumstances, indicated hereinbefore. The said view has been consistently upheld in subsequent decisions of this Court. Of course, the question of making a prayer for recalling the order of dismissal would not be maintainable before the learned Magistrate in view of Section 362 CrPC, but such is not the case in these special leave petitions.
25. In the present cases, neither have the complaints been dismissed on merit nor have they been dismissed at the stage of Section 203 CrPC. On the other hand, only on being satisfied of a prima facie case, the learned Magistrate had issued process on the complaint.
26. The said situation is mainly covered by the decision of this Court in Jatinder Singh case, wherein the decision in Pramatha Nath Talukdar case was also taken into consideration and it was categorically observed that in the absence of any provision in the Code barring a second complaint being filed on the same allegation, there would be no bar to a second complaint being filed on the same facts if the first complaint did not result in the conviction or acquittal or even discharge of the accused, and if the dismissal was not on merit but on account of a default on the part of the complainant." 12.3. In Poonam Chand Jain v. Fazru the issue whether after the dismissal of the earlier complaint had attained finality, could a second complaint be maintained on identical facts was considered as under : (SCC pp. 634-36, paras 14-20) "14. In the background of these facts, the question which crops up for determination by this Court is whether after an order of dismissal of complaint attained finality, the complainant can file another complaint on almost identical facts without disclosing in the second complaint the fact of either filing of the first complaint or -12- Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020 its dismissal.
15. Almost similar questions came up for consideration before this Court in PramathaNathTalukdar v. SarojRanjan Sarkar.
The majority judgment in PramathaNath3 was delivered by Kapur, J. His Lordship held that an order of dismissal under Section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short "the Code") is, however, no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts but it can be entertained only in exceptional circumstances. This Court explained the exceptional circumstances as:
(a) where the previous order was passed on incomplete record, or
(b) on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint, or
(c) the order which was passed was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish, or
(d) where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings.
16. This Court in Pramatha Nath made it very clear that interest of justice cannot permit that after a decision has been given on a complaint upon full consideration of the case, the complainant should be given another opportunity to have the complaint enquired into again. In para 50 of the judgment the majority judgment of this Court opined that fresh evidence or fresh facts must be such which could not with reasonable diligence have been brought on record. This Court very clearly held that it cannot be settled law which permits the complainant to place some evidence before the Magistrate which are in his possession and then if the complaint is dismissed adduce some more evidence. According to this Court, such a course is not permitted on a correct view of the law. (para 50, p. 899)
17. This question again came up for consideration before this Court in Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit Kaur. There also this Court by relying on the principle in Pramatha Nath held that there is no provision in the Code or in any other statute which debars a complainant from filing a second complaint on the same allegation as in the first complaint. But this Court added when a Magistrate conducts an enquiry under -13- Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020 Section 202 of the Code and dismisses a complaint on merits a second complaint on the same facts could not be made unless there are "exceptional circumstances". This Court held in para 12, if the dismissal of the first complaint is not on merit but the dismissal is for the default of the complainant then there is no bar in filing a second complaint on the same facts. However, if the dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 of the Code was on merit the position will be different.
18. Saying so, the learned Judges in Ranjit Kaur held that the controversy has been settled by this Court in Pramatha Nath and quoted the observation of Kapur, J. in para 48 of Pramatha Nath : (AIR p. 899, para 48) '48. ... An order of dismissal under Section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is, however, no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts but it will be entertained only in exceptional circumstances e.g. where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings, have been adduced. It cannot be said to be in the interest of justice that after a decision has been given against the complainant upon a full consideration of his case, he or any other person should be given another opportunity to have his complaint enquired into.'
19. Again in Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy, a three-Judge Bench of this Court considered this question in para 19 at p. 740 of the Report. The learned Judges of this Court held that a second complaint is not completely barred nor is there any statutory bar in filing a second complaint on the same facts in a case where a previous complaint was dismissed without assigning any reason. The Magistrate under Section 204 of the Code can take cognizance of an offence and issue process if there is sufficient ground for proceeding. In Mahesh Chand this Court relied on the ratio in Pramatha Nath and held if the first complaint had been dismissed the second complaint can be entertained only in exceptional circumstances and thereafter the exceptional circumstances -14- Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020 pointed out in Pramatha Nath were reiterated. Therefore, this Court holds that the ratio in Pramatha Nath is still holding the field. The same principle has been reiterated once again by this Court in HiraLal v. State of U.P. In para 14 of the judgment this Court expressly quoted the ratio in Mahesh Chand discussed hereinabove.
20. Following the aforesaid principles which are more or less settled and are holding the field since 1962 and have been repeatedly followed by this Court, we are of the view that the second complaint in this case was on almost identical facts which was raised in the first complaint and which was dismissed on merits. So the second complaint is not maintainable. This Court finds that the core of both the complaints is the same. Nothing has been disclosed in the second complaint which is substantially new and not disclosed in first complaint. No case is made out that even after the exercise of due diligence the facts alleged in the second complaint were not within the knowledge of the first complainant. In fact, such a case could not be made out since the facts in both the complaints are almost identical. Therefore, the second complaint is not covered within exceptional circumstances explained in Pramatha Nath. In that view of the matter the second complaint in the facts of this case, cannot be entertained."
(emphasis supplied) 12.4. In Udai Shankar Awasthi v. State of U.P., where the earlier complaint was dismissed after the examination of witnesses on behalf of complainant, the matter was dealt with as under : (SCC p. 451, para 47) "47. The instant appeals are squarely covered by the observations made in Kishan Singh and thus, the proceedings must be labelled as nothing more than an abuse of the process of the court, particularly in view of the fact that, with respect to enact the same subject-matter, various complaint cases had already been filed by Respondent 2 and his brother, which were all dismissed on merits after the examination of witnesses. In such a fact situation, Complaint Case No. 628 of 2011 filed on 31-5-2001 was not maintainable. Thus, the Magistrate concerned committed a grave error by entertaining the said case, and wrongly took -15- Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020 cognizance and issued summons to the appellants."
12.5. In Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh the matter was considered from the standpoint whether a frustrated litigant be permitted to give vent to his frustration and whether a person be permitted to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. The discussion was as under : (SCC pp. 258-60, paras 26-27 & 33) "26. While considering the issue at hand in Shivshankar Singh v. State of Bihar this Court, after considering its earlier judgments in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit Kaur, Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy and Poonam Chand Jain v. Fazru held : (Shivshankar Singh case, SCC p. 136, para 18) '18. ... it is evident that the law does not prohibit filing or entertaining of the second complaint even on the same facts provided the earlier complaint has been decided on the basis of insufficient material or the order has been passed without understanding the nature of the complaint or the complete facts could not be placed before the court or where the complainant came to know certain facts after disposal of the first complaint which could have tilted the balance in his favour. However, second complaint would not be maintainable wherein the earlier complaint has been disposed of on full consideration of the case of the complainant on merit.'
27. In Chandrapal Singh v. Maharaj Singh this Court has held that it is equally true that chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by enabling them to invoke the jurisdiction of criminal courts in a cheap manner. In such a fact situation, the court must not hesitate to quash criminal proceedings.
***
33. The High Court has dealt with the issue involved herein and the matter stood closed at the instance of Respondent 1 himself. Therefore, there can be no justification whatsoever to launch criminal prosecution on that basis afresh. The inherent power of the court in dealing with an extraordinary situation is in the larger interest of administration of justice and for preventing manifest injustice being done. Thus, -16- Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020 it is a judicial obligation on the court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice and to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. It may be so necessary to curb the menace of criminal prosecution as an instrument of operation of needless harassment. A person cannot be permitted to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. Ex debitojustitiae is inbuilt in the inherent power of the court and the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which the courts exist. Thus, it becomes the paramount duty of the court to protect an apparently innocent person, not to be subjected to prosecution on the basis of wholly untenable complaint."
10. Relying on this judgment, learned counsel submits that at this stage, this Court may not interfere in the matter under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as the case is made out.
11. Mrs. Priya Shrestha, learned Spl.P.P. appearing for the State submits that there is no illegality in the impugned order and this Court may not interfere in the matter under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
12. In light of above submissions of learned counsel appearing for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials available on record and finds that admittedly for the same occurrence dated 21.02.2019, the FIR has been registered, which was investigated by the police and after investigation, the police has submitted the final form under Sections 323 and 504 of the IPC and in the light of this final form, the learned Sessions Judge has sent back the matter to the learned Magistrate, as those Sections were triable by the learned Magistrate, considering that the final form has not be submitted under the SC/ST Act. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner was summoned by the learned court and he has appeared before the Court and facing the trial. It is an admitted fact that the wife of the petitioner has filed a case, which was registered as Chirkunda P.S. Case No. 34 of 2019 against the O.P. No. 2, which was investigated and final form has been submitted and summons have been issued and cognizance has been taken, wherein the O.P. No. 2 is facing the trial in that case.
13. The Court has perused the complaint case and finds that in the complaint itself, it has been disclosed that for the same occurrence, the FIR has been registered, however, since the final form has not been submitted under the SC/ST Act, the complaint case has been registered and this fact has been disclosed in the complaint petition. The learned court has taken the cognizance by order dated 01.02.2020 under Sections -17- Cr.M.P. No. 1325 of 2020 323 and 341 of IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. The chargesheet submitted by the police, in which, the Sections of SC/ST Act were found not true, however, the court has taken the cognizance under the SC/ST Act, however, what are the prima facie materials are there against the petitioner must be disclosed in the matter, which is lacking in the case in hand. For the same occurrence, the petitioner is facing the trial in connection with Chirkunda P.S. Case No. 33 of 2019 corresponding to G.R. No. 1121 of 2020, which amounts to double jeopardy and the case of the petitioner is fully covered by the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel (Supra) and State of Jharkhand through SP, Central Bureau of Investigation (Supra).
14. The judgment relied by Mr. Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the O.P. No. 2 speaks of the second complaint case is maintainable on the similar facts, which will be entertained only in exceptional circumstances i.e. where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings have been adduced and only on this ground, the second complaint can be maintained, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Samita Naidu & Anr. (Supra), as relied by Mr. Mehta. The facts of the present case is different and the entire materials were there and the chargesheet has been submitted in the first case and thereafter the learned court has taken the cognizance. As such the judgment relied by Mr. Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the O.P. No. 2 is not helping the O.P. No. 2.
15. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis, the entire criminal proceeding and the order dated 01.02.2020 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, SC/ST, Dhanbad, in connection with S.C./S.T. Case No. 90 of 2019 (arising out of C.P. Case No. 3073 of 2019), by which cognizance for the offence under Sections 323 and 341 of IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act has been taken against the petitioner, pending in the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, SC/ST, Dhanbad, are hereby, quashed.
16. This petition is allowed and disposed of.
(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Amitesh/-