Jharkhand High Court
M/S Tata Engineering And Locomotive ... vs (I) Mrs. Duli Murmu on 12 November, 2024
Author: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
Bench: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(L) No. 6656 of 2006
M/s Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Limited, Now
known as M/s Tata Motors Ltd. through its duly constituted Attorney
Sri D.K. Thakur, S/o Late G.K. Thakur, resident of Telco Colony,
P.O. & P.S. Telco Town, Jamshedpur, Dist. East Singhbhum and
currently posted as Deputy General Manager (Finance) M/s Tata
Motors Ltd. ... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. (i) Mrs. Duli Murmu, wife (widow) of Late Kumar Krishna
Murmu
(ii) Joshen Kumar Murmu son of Late Kumar Krishna Murmu
(iii) Maisha Mahesh Kumar Murmu, son of late Kumar Krishna
Murmu
All resident of P.O. Karandih, P.S. Parsudih, District East
Singhbhum
(iv) Mrs. Lakhi Hembrom (daughter) of late Kumar Krishna
Murmu, resident of Kalyandih, P.O. Bitapur, P.S. Kharsawan,
District Saraikela Kharsawan
2. Sima Das Gupta, widow of Late Mrinal Das Gupta, resident of Qr.
No.66/T.A Indra Nagar, P.O. P.S. Telco, Town Jamshedpur,
District East Singhbhum ... ... Respondents
---
CORAM :HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY
---
For the Petitioner : Mrs. Rashmi Kumar, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Prabhash Kumar, Advocate
: Mr. Manish Sharma, Advocate
: Mr. Ganesh Ram, Advocate
---
14/12.11.2024 This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs:
"(i) For issuance of an appropriate Writ/Writs, Order/Orders, Direction/Directions quashing the order dated 18.1.2006, passed by Shri Rajesh Kumar Dubey, the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court Jamshedpur in M.J. Case No. 16 of 1998, whereby and where under the petitioner was directed to pay Respondents the amount against wages towards an amount equivalent to yearly increments with V.D.A. for the period of 27 years after fit-man (sic. fitment) of wages year wise, fixed annual bonus at the rate of 8.33%, earn leave equivalent to wage of 182 days and leave traveling concession allowance for 6 times.
(ii) For issuance of an appropriate Writ/Writs, Order/Orders, Direction/Directions quashing the entire proceedings recorded as M.J. Case No. 16 of 1998 on the ground that Respondents have also preferred Money Suit No. 13 of 1999 in the Court of Sub-Judge at Jamshedpur for compensation for damages to the tune of Rs. 50,00,000/- for almost same and similar relief as prayed for in M.J. Case No. 16 of 1998, when they could elect only one forum for agitating the matter.
(iii) For any other relief/reliefs as the petitioner may be found entitled to in the facts and circumstances of this case."
1Arguments of the Petitioner.
2. W.P.(L) No. 6656 of 2006 has been filed challenging the order dated 18.01.2006 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in M.J. Case No.16 of 1998 whereby the petitioner was directed to pay to the concerned workmen, the amount of wages equivalent to yearly increment with V.D.A. for the period of 27 years after fitment of wages year wise, fix annual bonus @ 8.33%, earned leave equivalent to wage of 182 days and leave travelling concession allowance for 6 times. The petitioner has been directed to calculate the amount and pay the same.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner while giving the background of the case has submitted that the present case involves only two workmen, namely, Kumar Krishna Murmu and Mrinal Das Gupta, both of them have expired and are represented before this Court through their legal heirs/successors.
4. The learned counsel submits that 9 persons including the aforesaid two workmen were employed by the petitioner and on some charges of criminal conspiracy, they were arrested and ultimately their services were terminated. So far as Kumar Krishna Murmu and Mrinal Das Gupta and one another employee are concerned, they were simplicitor discharged from service. All the nine workmen challenged their order of termination and a Reference Case No. 01/1974 was instituted before the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur. An award was passed on 13.07.1977 wherein it was held that discharge of 5 employees including Kumar Krishna Murmu and Mrinal Das Gupta was justified. Hence there was no order of reinstatement for them. A writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 38/1978(R) was filed by the petitioner challenging that part of the award dated 13.07.1977 whereby discharge of 4 employees was held to be invalid and were directed to be reinstated with back wages and further 5 employees whose discharge was held to be justified in terms of award dated 13.07.1977 also filed writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 140/1978(R). Both the writ petitions were ultimately disposed of by this Court vide judgment and order dated 21.01.1983. Thus, Kumar Krishna Murmu and Mrinal Das Gupta along with two others were directed to be reinstated with back 2 wages from the dates their services were terminated. The order passed by the writ Court has been placed on record in the supplementary affidavit vide Annexure-10. The matter was taken up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by the petitioner and the Special Leave Petition was ultimately dismissed vide Annexure-2 dated 16.07.1996.
5. It has been submitted that as per the final order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 16.07.1996, Kumar Krishna Murmu and Mrinal Das Gupta joined the duty in the month of October, 1996, and Mrinal Das Gupta died within a few days after joining the duty.
6. It is submitted that thereafter on or about 30.07.1998, a petition was filed under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act read with Section 29 thereof claiming certain amount relating to back wages and interest thereon. The list of claims has been enlisted which is also apparent from Annexure-4 to the writ petition, the petition filed by the concerned workmen. The case was numbered as M.J. Case No. 16 of 1998.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has specifically argued that the petition itself was not maintainable in view of the stand taken by the management and the dispute raised by the management under each head. During the course of arguments, she has also submitted that otherwise also so far as the direction to fix annual bonus and pay the same is concerned, the bonus could not be included as a part of back wages and for that purpose, she has referred to the definition of "wages" as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and has also submitted that under the provisions of Section 8 of Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 unless employees work for 30 days, there is no entitlement of bonus. She has also submitted that the impugned order has not arrived at any computation.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in spite of the fact that the petitioner had disputed the liability to pay the amount as claimed, the learned labour court passed the impugned order directing payment on account of aforesaid heads. She has also submitted that the denial was item wise and by citing reasons. The reasons for denial have 3 been mentioned in the show cause filed by the petitioner as contained in Annexure-5.
9. The learned counsel submits that once the liability is disputed, there was no occasion for the learned court to pass the order under Section 33C (2) of the Act as the liability itself requires adjudication.
10. She has also submitted that the learned labour court has not even quantified the claim, rather the concerned workmen never filed any computation and the learned labour court has left the computation to be done by the petitioner although the petitioner has paid the entire amount as per their own calculation and understanding under different heads.
11. The learned counsel submits that there was a direction to pay back wages but what would go into the computation of back wages was still required to be adjudicated, and therefore, the petition under Section 33C (2) of the Act was fit to be dismissed and unless the entitlement under each head is not decided, the petition could not have been made under Section 33C (2) of the Act.
12. So far as the direction to pay interest upon computation is concerned, it has been submitted that such direction is not permissible under law. There is no scope for passing an order for payment of interest over and above whatever is due under the settlement or over and above whatever is due as per the award.
Arguments of the Respondents.
13. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, while opposing the prayer, has submitted that the heads under which the claim was made was admissible and the reason shown to deny the liability was not tenable in the eyes of law, and accordingly, the learned court has rightly passed the order under Section 33C (2) of the Act. He has further submitted that the direction to pay the back wages would include all the components which form part of the back wages and the components were in terms of the service rules governing the workmen. The learned counsel submits that there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned order calling for any interference by this Court in writ jurisdiction.
14. The learned counsel has also submitted that once the order for reinstatement with back wages has been passed, the benefits which has 4 been granted to the petitioner by the impugned order automatically flows from the same and there is no requirement to have a separate adjudication on the entitlement of the concerned workmen by entering into another industrial dispute. It was only a matter of computation and nothing more. Denial for the sake of denial is no denial in the eyes of law.
15. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, has also submitted that the impugned order has considered every aspect of the matter and in terms of the definition of "wages" as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act under Section 2(rr), "wages" included all allowance including dearness allowance and also includes travelling concessions.
16. So far as bonus is concerned, he has submitted that the ex- employees having been reinstated in service, it is deemed that they have worked, and therefore, they are entitled for bonus. He has also submitted that the objections, which were raised by the management was only for the sake of objection and there was no merit. The petition was maintainable as it was essentially by way of execution of the award of back wages in favour of the ex-employees. He has also submitted that the executing court can interpret the award while considering the petition under Section 33 C. Findings of this Court.
17. After hearing the learned counsel of the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court finds that two workmen are involved in the present case, namely Kumar Krishna Murmu (hereinafter referred to as the employee no.1) and Mrinal Das Gupta (hereinafter referred to as the employee no.2). Both the workmen were arrested by the police in the month of May, 1970 and were discharged from services of the petitioner with effect from 10.06.1970 and 12.06.970 respectively. Their order of discharge was subject matter of consideration in Reference Case No.1 of 1974 and an award was passed on 13.07.1977 (Annexure - 9) wherein they were not granted any relief. The operative portion of the award is quoted as under:
"37. In the result, the AWARD 5 is that the discharge of Shri Karam Singh, B. N. Ghosh A. Bhattacharya, M. Das Gupta and K.K. Murmu, is justified and they are not entitled for re-instatement and/or any other relief. The discharge of Shri Balbindra Singh S. K. Mahapatra, K. P. L. Mazumdar and P. Das Gupta is illegal and unjustified and is set-aside and the company is directed to reinstate them and they are also entitled to full back wages and other benefits till their reinstatement as indicated in para 36 above. Tho period of their absence i.e. from the date of arrest till the date of statements of demand will be treated as special leave without wages and any other benefits."
18. The award was subject matter of challenge before the High Court, and ultimately, the matter was decided by the High Court in favour of the aforesaid two ex-employees and they were directed to be reinstated with back wages from the date their services were terminated with a further direction that any amount that was paid to them in pursuance of the provision of Standing Order No.47 be adjusted towards the dues before making any further payment. The finding of this Court in the writ petition being CWJC No.38 of 1978 with 140 of 1978 is quoted as under:
"15. In the result, C.W.J.C. No.38 of 1978 (R) is allowed and that part of the award by which the termination of the service of respondent nos.3, 4, 5 and 6 have been held to be bad by the labour court is set aside. C.W.J.C. No.140 of 1978 (R) is allowed in part so far the petitioner nos.1, 2 and 3 are concerned. The petitioner nos.1, 2 and 3 shall be re-instated with back wages from the dates their services were terminated. Any amount that has been paid to them in pursuance of the provisions of Standing Orde No.47 shall be adjusted towards their dues before making any further payment. The application of petitioner nos.4 and 5 is dismissed. There shall be no order for costs."
19. The matter travelled up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court and ultimately the special leave petitions were dismissed. Soon thereafter, the aforesaid two ex-employees were taken in service. The employee no.1 attained the age of superannuation after some time and the employee no.2 expired soon after rejoining the service.
20. Thereafter, the ex-employee no.1 and the widow of ex- employee no.2 filed a petition under Section 33C(2) read with Section 29 of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 which was numbered as MJ Case No.16 of 1998 and the claims were made under different heads in paragraph 10 and 11 which are as follows:
6"10. That in view of the above facts, the applicants are also entitled to get following items besides the above payment :-
a) Annual Bonus & Performance link payment with exgratia with effect from 1970 total 27 years.
b) One month leave wages for each year since 1970 in place of P/L & C/L by way of encashment of leaves total 27 months and C/L 182 days for encashment as per agreement with Unions.
c) Leave travelling assistant since 1972 as per agreement.
d) Education allowance from 1989 since my wards are not admitted in the Company School or Company added School.
e) Efficiency and additional Bonus from 1986.
f) Quality control. Allowance since the date of termination 1.2.1970.
g) Settlement benefits as per the memorandum of Settlement 1986.
h) Medical expenses for self and families from 1970 to 1996 (Vouchers are available for submission).
i) Benefit of Telco Pension scheme by way of 2% Basic & D. A. from both side deduction. See memorandum of Settlement 1982 effective from 1981 April.
j) Sick leave encashment from 1970 each year 10 days.
k) Variable quality control allowance prior to the 1986 and now quality control assurance allowance. That all these and other dues should have been fully cleared up in the year 1985 as per the interime order passed by the Supreme Court but Company has not yet paid up the dues fully.
11. That benefit of Telco Pension Scheme by way of 2% deduction from Basic and D. A. from workman and equal amount is being provided from the Company with effect from 1st April 1981 and last but not the least including basis fitman and other financial benefits in lieu of Promotion which I was supposed to have been promoted, in the event if, I had not been terminated by virtue of wrongful dismissal: The aforesaid benefits ought to be provided to me by the Company as per the provision and the memorandum of Settlement made with Union's representative time to time."
21. The petition was opposed by the petitioner, inter alia, by stating that the admissible amount was already paid to them and with respect to each head under which the claim was made, objections were raised. The learned court considered the case and the materials produced by the parties.
22. Altogether, four witnesses were examined on behalf of the applicants and certain documents were exhibited which included C.C. of orders Ext. 1 to 1/F, office order marked as Ext. 2, Death certificate marked Ext.3, Pay slip marked Ext.4, Medical certificate of death marked Ext.5, Payment voucher marked Ext.6, and payment advice settlement dues marked Ext.7.
23. On behalf of the management, only one witness was examined and Work Standing order marked Ext.A, Memorandum of Settlement 7 marked Ext.B, Office orders Ext.C to C/1 and payment of advice marked Ext.D.
24. The learned court considered the materials on record and ultimately allowed the petition and directed the petitioner to pay an amount equivalent to yearly increment with V.D.A for the period of 27 years after fitment of wages year wise, fix annual bonus @ 8.33%; payment of earned leave equivalent to 182 days and six leave traveling concessions allowance. So far as the claim with regard to education allowance, medical allowance and sick leave encashment are concerned, the same were rejected by inter alia stating that no evidence were produced to that effect.
25. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2005) 8 SCC 58 State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. vs Brijpal Singh, the provisions of Section 33C(2) were under consideration, and it has been held that the labour court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen's entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognized by the employer and thereafter for the purposes of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that power of interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court's power under Section 33C(2) like that of Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the purposes of its execution.
26. This Court finds that the entitlement for back wages from the date of termination stood decided in favour of ex-employees by virtue of the orders passed by this Court in the writ petition wherein the award passed by the Labour Court was under challenge. Consequently, the entitlement of ex-employees to receive back wages right from the date of their termination stood crystallized. In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the petition filed under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act was maintainable.
27. As back as in the year 1964, in the judgment reported in AIR 1964 SC 743 (The Central Bank of India Ltd vs P.S. Rajagopalan) 8 while considering the scope of proceeding under Section 33 C(2) of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, in paragraph no.18 of the judgement, it has been held that there can be no doubt that when the labour court is given the power to allow an individual workman to execute or implement his existing individual rights, it is virtually exercising execution powers in some cases, and it is well settled that it is open to the Executing Court to interpret the decree for the purposes of execution.
28. It has been held in LPA No. 379 of 2012 (Central Coalfields Limited Vs. Sri Siraj Mian and others) at paragraph no.31 as follows:
"31. In the judgment reported in AIR 1964 SC 743 while considering the scope of proceedings under Section 33 (C) (2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in Para-18, it has been held that there can be no doubt that when the Labour Court is given the power to allow an individual workman to execute or implement his existing individual rights, it is virtually exercising execution powers in some cases, and it is well settled that it is open to the executing court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. It is, of course, true that the executing court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it add to or subtract from the provision of the decree. These limitations apply also to the Labour Court, but like the executing court, the Labour Court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under Section 33(C) (2) of the Act. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that they felt no difficulty in holding that for the purpose of making the necessary determination under Section 33(C) (2), it would, in appropriate cases, be open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests."
29. Having held as aforesaid that the petition under Section 33 C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for claim of back wages in terms of the aforesaid judgement passed by this Court was maintainable, it is to be examined as to whether the learned court has rightly exercised its power for the relief which has been granted.
30. Although the relief was prayed for under different heads, but the learned Court has granted reliefs under certain heads and directed as follows: -
a. for making payment of amount equivalent to yearly increments with variable Dearness Allowance for the period of 27 years, after fitment of wages year wise, b. fix annual bonus at the rate of 8.33%, 9 c. earned leave equivalent to wage of 182 days, d. six leave travelling concession allowance.
Apparently, the wages without increments were already paid. Amount equivalent to yearly increments with variable Dearness Allowance for the period of 27 years, after fitment of wages year wise
31. The corresponding discussion under this head is in paragraph no.12 of the impugned award which is as under:-
"12. So far is the yearly increment is concerned, I find that would have been given to the above workmen if they would have been in service for period of non-employment due to their termination of service. On perusal of Ext. C and C/1, I find nothing has been given by the O.P. against the yearly increment and arrear of V.D.A. rather they were fited in the same scale' as revised scale against the scale they were drawing at the time of their termination of service. The O.P is bound to pay yearly increment and fit the workmen accordingly in the revised pay scale."
32. After going through the aforesaid findings in paragraph no.12, this Court is of the considered view that the same is a well-reasoned finding based on the materials on record and there could be no dispute with regard to entitlement of the annual increments. The Dearness Allowance is specifically included in the definition of "wages" as defined under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Consequently, the said direction to pay annual increments with variable Dearness Allowance for the period of 27 years, after fitment of wages year wise does not call for any interference.
Bonus.
33. The corresponding discussion under this head is at paragraph no.13 of the impugned award which is quoted as under: -
"13. So far is the annual bonus is concerned and performance link payment with the exgratia w.e.f. date of termination of service is concerned, I find the workmen has brought this application after their retirement in case of applicant No.1 and after death in case of applicant No. 2. If the above workmen would have been in service, then they must would have been paid by the O.P. to the above Workmen performance link payment with exgratia, since it is linked with over all production and annual bonus must would have been paid to them yearly. Accordingly, O.P.was oblige to pay the amount arising out of fix bonus and performance link payment year wise and exgratia at the time retirement or death."10
34. This Court finds that the learned Court, while considering the grant of aforesaid relief, has not at all considered the definition of "wages" as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act,1947 which specifically excludes payment of bonus. In this connection, it is also relevant to refer to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2007) 05 SCC 281 (M/S. Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories vs Deputy Labour Commr. & Ors.) wherein, it has been clearly held that back wages payable under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 does not include bonus. In the said case, there was a direction by the Labour court for payment of 50% back wages and it has been held that definition of "wages" within the meaning of the Act does not include bonus; it however includes allowances. In the said case, detail discussion has been made in connection with entitlement of bonus under back wages in connection with award passed by the Labour court under Industrial Disputes Act and after considering all provision of law, it has been held that bonus is not included in the definition of back wages.
35. This Court finds that the learned court has not taken into consideration the definition of "wages" as defined under Industrial Disputes Act and therefore, on this count, the impugned judgment suffers from perversity. The direction to give bonus in the facts of this case is also contrary to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/S. Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories vs Deputy Labour Commr. & Ors (supra) and accordingly, such direction issued under section 33 (C) (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act ,1947 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, which is hereby set aside. Earned leave.
36. So far as the earned leave is concerned, it was objected to by the management before the learned court that since the ex-employees had not worked and therefore, there was no question of any earned leave. The learned court has given specific finding in paragraph no.14 with respect to earned leave , which is quoted as under:
"14. If applicant would have been in service then they must would have been earned leave wages in each year since 1970 which on dalcalculation become wage of 182 days. O.P. must pay the wage of 182 days as incashment leave."11
37. This Court finds that the said finding and consequent direction does not call for any interference.
Leave Travelling Concession (LTC).
38. So far as the leave traveling allowances is concerned, specific finding has been recorded in paragraph no.15 which is quoted as under:
"15. If workmen would have been in service then must have avail the leave travelling allowance as per the Rules. Consequently at the interval of 4 years accordingly they must should have avail six time leave travelling allowance. The O.P. is bound to pay six leave travelling allowance to the above workman."
39. This Court finds that in the definition of "wages" as defined under section 2(rr), the traveling concession has been specifically included. The reason for opposition of such claim was also only on the ground that the ex-employees did not apply for any leave. This Court is of the view that since the ex-employees were out of employment, there was no occasion for them to apply for any leave and the definition of "wages" specifically includes the benefit. Therefore, the finding of the learned court with regard to grant of leave traveling concession also does not call for any interference.
40. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings, all the directions, except the direction to fix annual bonus @ 8.33%, are upheld. The direction to pay interest is separately considered below.
On the point of interest.
41. So far as the direction to pay interest is concerned, the same is squarely covered by a judgement passed by this Court in W.P.(L) No. 6969 of 2017 (BCCL Vs. Shail Kumari Devi) decided on 19.06.2023 wherein it has been held that there is no scope for passing an order for payment of interest over and above whatever is due and payable. If the settlement or award provides for payment of interest, the same would be computed for payment / realisation, but the court would have no jurisdiction to direct payment of any amount of interest over and above whatever is computed and found payable. However, in case, the computed amount is sought to be recovered through any certificate 12 proceedings, the statutory interest, as applicable to the certificate proceedings will be payable in accordance with law. Paragraph 27 to 29 of the aforesaid judgement is quoted as under: -
"27. So far as the payment of interest is concerned, the learned court below has directed for payment of simple interest @ 6% from the date of death till the date of actual payment within 60 days from the date of the order and on default interest @ 9% has been directed to be paid from the date of expiry of 60 days. As per the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, Section 33C deals with recovery of money from an employer which becomes due from the employer under a settlement or under an award. Such provision is without prejudice to any other mode of recovery and if the appropriate government is satisfied that the money is so due, a certificate is to be issued for the amount to the Collector who is to proceed to recover the amount in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. Sub-Section 2 of Section 33C of the Act further provides that if a question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question is to be decided by the labour court. This Court finds that provisions of Section 33C deals with recovery of money which has already been quantified or if so required, capable of being computed by the labour court and is in the nature of execution proceedings.
28. This Court is of the considered view that there is no scope for passing an order for payment of interest over and above whatever is due under the settlement or over and above whatever is due as per the award. If the settlement or award provides for payment of interest, the same would be computed in terms of Section 33C, but the court would have no jurisdiction to direct payment of any amount over and above whatever is computed as per the settlement or as per the award.
29. The award of interest by the learned labour court in the instant case is not arising out of any settlement or award and even as per the learned counsel for the Respondent No.1, interest has been awarded 12 only as a part of equitable relief. This court is of the considered view that the learned court below had no jurisdiction to award any interest in equity as it was bound to determine and quantify payable amount only in terms of the pre-existing right on the basis of any award or settlement. In absence of any such pre-existing right to claim any interest on ex-gratia amount of Rs.5 lakhs in terms of the aforesaid provisions of National Coal Wage Agreement and the circular, which is the basis of the claim, the award of interest by the learned court below on payment of ex-gratia amount of Rs.5 lakhs is wholly without jurisdiction and is accordingly not sustainable in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the impugned order directing payment of interest in exgratia amount of Rs.5 lakhs is set-aside. However, in case the computed amount is sought to be recovered through any certificate proceedings, the statutory interest, as applicable to the certificate proceedings will be payable in accordance with law."
In view of the aforesaid judgement, the direction in the impugned order to pay interest @ 6% per annum is not sustainable in the eyes of law and is accordingly set aside.
Computation of payable amount.
42. This Court further finds that the learned court has not computed the amount payable and it appears that none of the parties had furnished computation. Section 33C of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 13 provides under sub-section (3) that for the purposes of computation of the money value of a benefit, the labour court may, if so deem fit, appoint a commissioner who shall, after taking such evidence as may be necessary, submit a report to the labour court the labour court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the commissioner and other circumstances of the case. Even this power has not been exercised by the learned labour court. This Court is of the considered view that under section 33C(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the money payable is required to be quantified.
43. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, after having upheld the finding and direction of the learned labour court to the aforesaid extent, this Court is of the view that the amount is required to be computed.
44. The parties are directed to appear before the learned labour court at Jamshedpur on 16.12.2024 at 11.00 A.M. and upon their appearance the learned labour court is directed to do the needful in terms of section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to compute the entitlement of the concerned ex-employees and pass appropriate order in accordance with law.
45. It is also observed that it will be open to the parties to bring to the notice of the learned labour court regarding the payment already made. There is already an observation by the Court that the amount paid under Standing Order No.47 was required to be adjusted. Any further amount paid thereafter is also required to be adjusted. The needful be done within a period of three months from the date of their appearance.
46. This writ petition is accordingly disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
47. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is closed.
Saurav/- (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)
14