Central Administrative Tribunal - Mumbai
Date Of Decision:05.08.2013 vs Union Of India on 5 August, 2013
1 OA NO.87/22012 CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL BOMBAY BENCH, MUMBAI. ORIGINAL APPLICATION NO.: 87 OF 2012 DATE OF DECISION:05.08.2013 CORAM:HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE A.K. BASHEER, MEMBER (J) HON'BLE SHRI R.C. JOSHI, MEMBER (A) Ramesh Chander Abbi Off: Textile Committee P. Balu Road, Prabhadevi Chowk, Prabhadevi, Mumbai 400 0 R/at. B-503, Prathamesh, Vrishi Complex, Holy Cross Road, I.C. Colony, Borivali (W) Mumbai 400 103. ... Applicant (By Advocate Ms. Peri Ushajee) VERSUS 1. Union of India. Through Secretary, Ministry of Textiles, Udyog Bhavan, New Delhi 110 011 2. Textiles Committee, P. Balu Road, Prabhadevi Chowk, Prabhadevi, Mumbai 400 025 3. Vice Chairman, Textiles Committee, P. Balu Road, Prabhadevi Chowk, Prabhadevi, Mumbai 400 025 ... Respondents (By Advocate Shri R.R. Shetty along with Smt. H.P. Shah) 2 OA NO.87/22012 O R D E R (ORAL) Per: Justice A.K. Basheer, Member (J)
Applicant is a former employee of Textiles Committee in Mumbai which is under the Administrative Control of the Ministry of Textiles, Government of India. He retired from service on November 30, 2001 while he was under suspension. He has filed this Original Application impugning the decision taken by the Textiles Committee not to grant him back wages for the period starting from July 18, 1978 till his retirement on November 30, 2001.
2. While assailing the above decision, the applicant prays for issue of a direction to the respondents to treat him as though he was in continuance service from July 18, 1978, the date on which he was placed under suspension, till his date of retirement on November 30, 2001 and to give him all service benefits including pay fixation, arrears of salary etc. with interest, after adjusting the subsistence allowance paid to him.
3. Applicant had joined the Regional Office of the Textiles Committee at Bombay in February, 1965 as an Inspector. It is not in dispute that the Central Bureau of Investigation had conducted a 3 OA NO.87/22012 raid at his residential premises in April, 1997 and seized certain incriminating materials indicating that he was in possession of assets disproportionate to the known source of his income. Accordingly, the Central Bureau of Investigation had registered R.C. NO.23/1977 against the applicant alleging commission of offences punishable under the Prevention and Corruption Act.
By Annexure A-2 order dated July 18, 1978, applicant was placed under suspension in contemplation of disciplinary proceeding with immediate effect.
4. It is on record that in October 1990, the applicant was convicted and sentenced by the Trial Court to under go rigorous imprisonment for four years and to pay fine of Rs.5000/-in the case registered by the CBI. Shortly thereafter, by Annexure A-8 order dated April 29, 1991, the Textiles Committee, the employer of the applicant had dismissed the applicant from service in view of the order of conviction and sentenced passed by the Trial Court. Applicant preferred Criminal Appeal No.895/1990 before the Bombay High Court against the said order passed by the Trial Court. By judgment dated February 15, 2005, the High Court 4 OA NO.87/22012 allowed the appeal and acquitted the applicant giving him the benefit of doubt.
5. According to the applicant, after his acquittal by the High Court, he had submitted several representations before his employer, apart from issuing a legal notice seeking an appropriate order to disburse all his service benefits including back wages for the period during which he was kept under suspension. It appears that the High Court of Bombay by judgment dated April 5, 2011 issued a direction to the Competent Authority to take a decision on the claim made by the applicant without any delay.
6. The Textiles Committee had, thereafter, considered the representations as directed by the High Court and taken a decision refusing to grant back wages to the applicant for the period during which he had remained under suspension till his retirement. However, the Textiles Committee decided to pay pension to the applicant taking into consideration the annual increments as admissible under the Rules right from his entry in service till the scheduled date of his retirement purely on compassionate ground. It was further decided that the arrears of pension shall be paid to him from 5 OA NO.87/22012 December, 2001. Similarly, gratuity as admissible under the rules was also ordered to be paid. All these payments were to be made on or before July 31, 2011.
7. It is contended by the applicant that Textiles Committee committed serious illegality in refusing to pay him back wages for the period during which he was kept under suspension, especially since he was found not guilty and acquitted by the High Court later.
8. We have heard Mrs. Usha Perijee who appears for the applicant and Shri R.R. Shetty who represents the respondents and perused the entire materials available on record.
9. It has been noticed already that applicant was placed under suspension with effect from July 18, 1978. On his conviction by the Trial Court in the case registered by the Central Bureau of Investigation, he was dismissed from service on April 19, 1991. In this context, it may be noticed that the applicant had never challenged the said order of dismissal before any Statutory Authority or Judicial Forum. He attained the age of superannuation on November 30, 2001.
6 OA NO.87/2201210. It is true that he was acquitted by the High Court in 2005. But, a perusal of the judgment passed by the High Court will show that the applicant was acquitted giving him the benefits of doubt. In other words, the acquittal of the applicant was not an 'honourable one. According to the learned counsel, the respondents ought to have treated the entire period of suspension of the applicant starting from July 18, 1978 till the date of his retirement on November 30, 2001 as duty and paid him back wages in view of the order of his acquittal. We are unable to agree.
11. Learned counsel has invited our attention to two decisions of the Apex Court in Union of India and Others Vs. Jaipal Singh, (2004) 1 Supreme Court Cases 121 and in U.P. State Brassware Corporation Limited and Another Vs. Uday Narain Pandey, 2006 SCC (L&S) 250 in support of the above contention. In Jaipal Singh (supra) the respondent-employee was initially found guilty by the Trial Court of the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Court along with his brother. However, the High Court acquitted them. On his acquittal, the applicant sought reinstatement in service with backwages. This order was 7 OA NO.87/22012 challenged by Union of India before the Supreme Court. The appeal was allowed in part and it was held that the appellants cannot be made liable to pay wages for the period during which they could not avail of the services of the respondent. However, the Apex Court directed the appellants to reinstate the applicant in service. The above judgment, in our view, will not in any way come to the aid of the applicant herein. On the contrary, it will negative the claim of the applicant. The decision in Uday Narain Pandey (supra) has no application to present case on hand.
12. In Inspector General of Police Vs. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598, the Supreme Court has held that mere acquittal of the employee in the criminal case will have no impact on the disciplinary inquiry initiated by the department. While considering the expression, honourable acquittal, their Lordships had quoted the following observations made by Lord Williams J. in Robert Stuart Wauchope Vs. Emperor.
8. ...'The expression honourably acquitted is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extrajudicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant, believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the 8 OA NO.87/22012 appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term honourably acquitted.' (Robert Stuart case9,ILR pp.188-89)
13. Their Lordships had, after referring to the decisions in R.P. Kapur Vs. Union of India, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 787 and RBI Vs. Bhopal Singh Panchal, 1994 (1) SCC 541 made the following observations in S. Samuthiram which are apposite in this case;
24. The meaning of the expression honourable acquittal came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions honourable acquittal, acquitted of blame, fully exonerated are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. IT is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression honourable acquitted. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.
14. It has already been noticed that applicant in this case was acquitted by the High Court giving him the benefit of doubt. Admittedly, he was 9 OA NO.87/22012 dismissed from service in 1991 after affording him full opportunity to be heard. The said order was passed by the respondents when the Trial Court convicted and sentenced the applicant in the case registered by the Central Bureau of Investigation under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The said order of dismissal was never challenged by the applicant at any point of time. Admittedly, applicant had not rendered any service to his master right from July, 1978 till his date of dismissal in 1991 or until he superannuated in 2001. Therefore, the respondents, in our view, were justified in refusing to grant him back wages for the period during which he did not work for his employer. The principle of no work no pay is well settled. Any how, it can be seen from Annexure A-1 order that the respondents have shown sufficient indulgence towards the applicant by granting him pension, gratuity etc. In addition to the above, his pension has been fixed reckoning the annual increments right from his entry in service. Respondents have shown sufficient indulgence and leniency towards the applicant.
15. Keeping in view the entire facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any merit 10 OA NO.87/22012 in any of the contentions raised by the applicant.
16. The Original Application fails and it is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.
(R.C. Joshi) (Justice A.K. Basheer) Member (A) Member (J) ma.