Gujarat High Court
Dharoi Jalashya Matsya Udyog Sahakari ... vs Gujarat Kendriya Matsya Udyog Sanstha on 5 April, 1988
Equivalent citations: AIR 1988 GUJARAT 193
JUDGMENT A.P. Ravani, J.
1. Here there is a dispute between different co-operative bodies as to the meaning of term 'dispute.' Instead of co-operation, there is dispute as regards their business. Even so, in genuine spirit of co-operation they have assisted the Court (through their Counsels) in giving correct meaning to the expression 'dispute' occurring in Section 96 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. While disposing of the case, may I ask, will they not resolve their dispute in genuine spirit of co-operation instead of dragging their feet to Court every now and then?
Now the question be examined.
2. The petitioners are original-defendants who succeeded before the trial Court in resisting application Exh. 5 for injunction restraining them from catching fish from Dharoi Reservoir. The respondent-plaintiff filed suit and prayed that the aforesaid petitioners be restrained from catching fish from Dharoi Reservoir. Considering the pleadings, relevant documents placed on record and after hearing the paities the trial Court, as per its order dated December 31, 1987, rejected the application filed by the respondent-plaintiff. The plaintiff preferred civil Miscellaneous Appeal in the Court of District Judge, Banaskantha. The appeal was heard by the learned Assistant Judge who reversed the order passed by the trial Court and allowed the appeal as per his order dated February 5, 1988. Hence this revision application challenging the legality and validity of the order passed by the learned Assistant Judge, Banaskantha at Palanpur.
3. The plaintiff and the defendants are co-operative societies registered under the provisions of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. The plaintiff is an apex society of which members can be other societies as well as individuals. Defendant No. 21. e. Palanpur Vibhagiya Matsya Udyog Sahakari Mandli Ltd., is a member of the plaintiff-Society while defendant No. 1, i.e. Dharoi Jalashya Matsya Udyog Sahakari Mandli Ltd. is not a member of the plaintiff-society. It is an undisputed position that the main function of the plaintiff-society is to catch fish from the Government fishing lakes and to sell the same. Thus the business of the plaintiff is essentially that of catching fish and selling the same. Similarly the business of both the defendants-petitioners-Society is also to collect the fish from the lakes and sell the same. The plaintiff contended in the suit that by virtue of lease agreement with the Government it had exclusive right to catch fish from the Dharoi Lake Reservoir and the defendants were without the permission of the plaintiff catching fish unlawfully from Dharoi Lake Reservoir and, therefore, they should be restrained from catching fish from Dharoi Lake Reservoir. Before the trial Court several contentions were raised by the defendants, including the question with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The contention regarding jurisdiction was raised on the basis of the provisions of Section 93 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. The trial Court held that the plaintiff had prima facie failed to establish exclusive right for catching fish from Dharoi Lake Reservoir. The trial Court also held that the dispute between the parties is covered by the provisions of Section 96 of the Act. The lower appellate Court held that the plaintiff had exclusive right to catch fish from Dharoi Lake Reservoir and that the dispute between the parties was not touching the business of the Society and therefore the same was not covered by the provisions of Section 96 of the Act.
4. The learned Counsels appearing for the parties have confined their arguments on the point of jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain the suit and grant injunction in respect of the disputes between the parties. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-plaintiff contended that defendant No. 1 is not a member of the plaintiff-society and therefore provisions of Section 96 of the Act would not be attracted. However the contention cannot be accepted. For the applicability of the povision Section 96 of the Act it is not necessary that any other society with which there may be a dispute should also be a member of the plaintiff-Society. The dispute should be "touching the constitution, management or business of a society" and the parties thereto should be from amongst the persons (natural as well as juridical) mentioned in Clauses (a) to (e) of Section 96(1) of the Act. Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the Act reads as follows:
96(1)(e) any other society, or the Liquidator of such a society.
The aforesaid clause clearly covers the dispute with defendant No. 1 which is not a member of the plaintiff-Society but admittedly it is a society registered under the provisions of the Act. Therefore the contention that because defendant No. 1 Society is not a member of the plaintiff-Society the dispute is not covered by the provisions of Section 96 of the Act cannot be accepted'.
5. The learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff submitted that the term 'dispute' should be narrowly construed. In his submission, unless the dispute arises out of transactions entered into between the two it cannot be said that the dispute is touching the business of the Society. It is argued that in the instant case the dispute between the parties is as regards the right to explore the water of Dharoi Lake Reservoir for the purpose of catching fish. There is no dispute with regard to the transactions between the parties and therefore the provisions of Section 96 of the Act are not applicable. The aforesaid contention cannot be accepted. There is no reason why the term 'dispute' should be construed so narrowly. Dispute between two parties arise when one asserts a particular proposition and the other one denies the same. This may cover the entire range between genuine difference of opinion to fierce controversy. The meaning of the term 'dispute' as per Concise Oxford Dictionary is as follows:
Controversy, debate, heated contention, quarrel, difference of opinion.
6. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the term 'dispute' has not been defined under the Act. Therefore it has got to be given its ordinary dictionary meaning. There is no reason why either from the context or from the reading of the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the Act narrow meaning to the term 'dispute' be given. This is much more so when the term 'dispute' is prefixed by the word 'any'. The word 'any' which precedes the term 'dispute' indicates that each and every dispute which touches the constitution, management or business of the Society is covered by the provisions of Section 96(1) of the Act. Therefore the dispute between the parties though not arising out of any transactions entered into between the parties is covered by the term 'dispute' occurring in Section 96 of the Act.
7. The learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the second condition is not satisfied, namely, that the dispute is not touching the business of the Society. As observed by the trial Court in para 13 of its order the plaintiff itself has stated in para 2 of the plaint that the function of the plaintiff-Society is to catch fish from Government owned lakes and to sell the same. Similar observation is made by the learned Assistant Judge in para 3 of his order. On the other hand the defendants also stated that they are societies registered under the provisions of the Act of which the main function is to catch fish and to sell the same. Therefore it is abundantly clear that the main object with which all the three societies i.e. the plaintiff as well as the defendants Societies have been constituted is to do business in fish by catching the same from lakes and thereafter selling the same. The distinction sought to be made by the learned Extra Assistant Judge that the dispute is about the civil right of the parties and not with regard to the business of parties cannot be accepted. The question of deciding the civil right of the parties comes later on. Once the dispute between the parties is concerning the business of the Society the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be ousted. There is nothing in the Act to show that dispute should be regarding contractual rights of the parties. Such disputes can be with regard to their respective civil rights also. However, the same would be concerning the business of the Society. At this stage I am not entering into the controversy as whether the plaintiff has got exclusive right to catch fish from Dharoi Lake Reservoir. In fact both the learned Counsels appearing for the parties have requested me not to decide that question on merits. Therefore suffice it to say that once there is dispute concerning the business of the Society between the plaintiff and the defendant-societies it has got to be held that the dispute pertains to the business of the Society and therefore covered by the provisions of Section 96 of the Act.
8. The learned Counsel for the petitioners defendants has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat State Co-op. Land Development Bank Ltd. v. P.R. Mankad and Anr. 0 GLR 701. That case related to a dispute between an employee of a Co-operative Society and the Society. Therein the expression "any dispute touching the business of the Society" came up for consideration. The Supreme Court observed that the aforesaid expression is limited to dispute directy relating to the actual trading or commercial activities of a Society. The aforesaid expression does not take within its sweep a dispute between a society and its employee relating to the conditions of his employment which would include termination of his employment. The aforesaid observation made by the Supreme Court, though in different context, lends support to the interpretation given to the expression "any dispute touching the business of the society".
9. In the case of M.G. Patel & Co., Navsari v. Shri Alka Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. 21(2) GLR 498, a Division Bench of this High Court considered the expression "touching the business of society" and held that if purchase of land is one of the main objects of the society then any cause of action that has got a direct bearing with the purchase of land has to be considered as "touching the business of the society". The word 'touching' has been construed to mean 'concerning'. In above view of the matter on the first principles as well as on the basis of the aforesaid decisions there is no scope for giving a narrow interpretation to the term 'dispute' as well as to the words "touching the business of the society".
10. The learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. and Ors. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal A.P. . In that case certain disputes between the employess of a Co-operative Society and the Co-operative Society have not been held to be falling within the scope of the phrase "any dispute touching the business of the society". But the interpretation given and the principles laid down therein do not in any way run counter to the interpretation of Section 96 of the Act, as indicated hereinabove.
11. The learned Counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Dalichand Jugraj Jain and Ors. . Therein the question was regarding the dispute between the tenant of a member of the Bank in the building acquired by the Co-operative Bank. However, therein also the term 'business', even while interpreting in narrower sense has been interpreted to mean the actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the Society which the Society is authorised to enter into under the Act and the Rules and its bye-laws. This decision on the contrary helps the petitioners-original defendants. The interpretation given to the term 'business' and 'any dispute' hereinabove is in consonance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in this case.
12. The learned Counsel for the respondent plaintiff relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Co-opeartive Cane Union Federation Ltd. and Anr. v. Liladhar and Ors. . Therein the dispute had arisen out of the disciplinary proceedings taken against an employee by the Society. The disciplinary proceedings resulted in dismissal of a godown keeper of the Society. The Supreme Court held that such dispute cannot be said to be a dispute touching the business of the Society. The decision does not help the respondant-plaintiff.
13. No other contention is raised. In above view of the matter it is clear that the dispute between the parties is covered by the provisions of Section 96 of the Act and therefore Civil Court will not have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff.
14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Assistant Judge in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1 of 1988 is quashed and set aside and application Exh. 5 in Regular Civil Suit No 252 of 1987 stands rejected. Rule made absolute accordingly, with no order as to costs.
15. When the Order is, pronounced in the open Court today, the learned Counsel for the respondants requests that the operation and implementation of the aforesaid order be stayed for some time so as to enable the respondent to challenge the same before the appropriate forum. In the facts and circumstances of the case the aforesaid order shall remain in abeyance upto April 20, 1986.