Central Administrative Tribunal - Ahmedabad
Soma Shekhar Shaka vs Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti on 21 February, 2024
::1 :: OANo.327/2018
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
AHMEDABAD BENCH
Original Application No. 327/2018
Dated the 21st day of February, 2024
Reserved on: 10.01.2024
Pronounced on: 21.02.2024
CORAM:
Hon'ble Dr. A. K. Dubey, Member (A)
Hon'ble Shri Umesh Gajankush, Member (J)
1. SOMA SHEKHAR SHAKA
Son of Shri Sambappa Shaka
Aged: 51 years (DoB being 02.10.1966)
(since terminated from the service as PET, JNV)
& presently residing at Quarter No.6,
JNV Campus, Kadvasan, Taluka: Kodinar,
District: Gir Somnath
GUJARAT 382 720
... Applicant
(By Advocate Mr. M.S. Rao)
V/s.
1. UNION OF INDIA Through,
NAVODAYA VIDYALAYA SAMITI
(through its Commissioner, NVS,
*Ministry of HRD & Deptt. Of Edn., Govt. of India,
Department of School Education & Literacy
B-15, Sector-62, Institutional Area,
Noida (U.P) 201 307.
2. THE CHAIRMAN, NAVODAYA VIDYALAYA SAMITI
(the designated Appellate Authority)
Ministry of Human Resources Development,
Government of India, UT-3 Section,
Shastri Bhavan,
New Delhi 110 001.
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
Pune Region,
Navodaya Vidayalaya Samiti
Pune Region
Sheti Mahamandal Bhavan (MSFC Ltd), 2nd Floor,
B-Wing, 270, Senapati Bapat Road,
::2 :: OANo.327/2018
PUNE 411 016.
4. THE SUMMARY TRIAL COMMITTEE
(purportedly Constituted under NVS's Notification
No. 14/2/93-NVS(Vig) dated 20.12;1993)
Notice to be served through Navodaya Vidayalaya Samiti
NVS Hqrs., B-15, Institutional Area, G.B.Nagar,
Sector-62, NOIDA, Uttar Pradesh 201 309.
5. SHRI V.B. LAMANI,
(Ex.Principal, Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya, Kalol, Dist.
Panchmahals)
Presently serving as Principal,
Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya,
Panchavati, Malgi, SH-69,
North Canara
PIN CODE 581 346
(By Advocate Mr. Joy Mathew for respondents no. 1 to 5)
... Respondents
::3 :: OANo.327/2018
ORDER
Per: Hon'ble Shri Umesh Gajankush, Member (J)
1. Present Original Application has been filed by the applicant under section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 challenging the impugned appellate order dated 09.04.2014 (Annexure A/1).
2. Brief facts which are necessary for decision of the present Original Application are as under :-
2.1 Based on a complaint against applicant about moral turpitude involving exhibition of immoral sexual behavior towards girl students and mental torture given by applicant's wife, received by Principal, Regional Office, Pune, District Collector, Panchmahal cum Chairman, Vidyalaya Management Committee, constituted an inquiry committee. Report of the Collector's inquiry was sent to the Commissioner, NVS, Headquarter, New Delhi and Deputy Commissioner, NVS, Regional Office, Pune who inquired from students into the correctness of the complaint. In-camera proceedings were also conducted by a committee comprising of two women Principals of JNV, Chandrapur and Kheda and necessary report was sent to the Dy. Commissioner, NVS, Regional Office, Pune. On examination of same, Director (now Commissioner, NVS) opined that it was not expedient and practicable to hold a regular inquiry under provisions of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 on account of likely embarrassment that it would have caused to d the student concerned and guardians and consequently terminated applicant's service under summary proceedings.
3. The aforesaid termination order dated 17.04.2009, was challenged by the applicant by filing O.A.433/2009, which was decided finally vide its order dated 02.12.2011 with following directions:-::4 :: OANo.327/2018
"In view of discussion made hereinabove, we are of the considered view that challenge made to Order dated 17-4- 2009 is premature. Applicant should first exhaust remedy of statutory appeal provided under the rules, We also observe that if such an appeal is preferred before competent authority within a period of three weeks from date of receipt of this order, the same shall be considered by the appellate authority overlooking the time limit prescribed for filing such an appeal, by passing reasoned speaking order. Such an exercise shall be undertaken within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the appeal. Accordingly, OA is disposed of. It is needless to observe that if applicant is aggrieved by order, so passed, he would be at liberty to take remedial steps strictly in accordance with rules and law."
4. That challenging the aforesaid order, the applicant submitted SCA no. 29/2012, before the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, which was disposed of vide order dated 25.01.2012 with following directions:-
"In view of the fact that the petitioner could not have and could not avail of the statutory remedy available to him because of the non- supply of committee report, we would expect appellate authority not to be technical on question of limitation provided for preferring appeal. The period, during which the petitioner was pursuing other remedies to obtain copy of the report of Summary Trial Inquiry Committee, has to be taken into account while considering the condonation of delay caused in preferring appeal."
5. In pursuance of the aforesaid order dated 25.01.201, when the copy of the report of Summary Trial Inquiry Committee was not provided to the applicant, he sent legal notice through his counsel dated 21.11.2012 to the authorities. Thereafter, along with order dated 04.12.12, Assistant Commissioner (Estt. I) supplied a copy of the aforesaid report. Thereafter applicant submitted an appeal dated 07.01.2013 before the Appellate Authority, raising various factual and legal submissions. In paragraph no. 5 of the appeal memo, applicant specifically requested for an opportunity of personal hearing.
6. Thereafter, Original Application 363/2013 was filed by the applicant raising a grievance that despite preferring an appeal in ::5 :: OANo.327/2018 January 2013, Appellate Authority did not take a decision. The aforesaid Original Application was disposed of vide order dated 31.10.2023 directing the Appellate Authority to dispose of appeal within a period of 4 weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order. Thereafter, official respondents sought extension of time to decide the appeal through M.A/447/2013 which was disposed of vide order dated 22.01.2014.
7. Later, the impugned order dated 09.04.2014 was passed by the Appellate Authority challenging the aforesaid order. Various pleas have been taken by the applicant in his Original Application. It was stated that whole impugned action had been taken against the applicant in a mala fide manner at the instance of respondent no. 5. It was also stated that the applicant had an apprehension that he may be trapped in the name of the girls and therefore communication dated 28.03.2007 was submitted to the Deputy Commissioner, NVS, RO, Pune. However, no steps were taken by the said authority and on the complaint, initially a Summary Inquiry was conducted and thereafter Summary Trial was conducted before the committee constituted by NVS headquarters on 07.10.2008. Thereafter, order dated 17.04.2009 was issued terminating the services of the applicant. It was submitted that Appellate Authority had failed erred in law by brushing aside the specific grievance in the appeal that the so called Committee admittedly comprising of 3 officers of the NVS did not have amongst them any outside NGO, even though the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in its ruling rendered in Vishakha case had ordained that such a committee shall comprise of a representative from outside organization/NGO. Thus, this is a case of total arbitrariness and audacity on the part of the Appellate Authority. It was further submitted that Appellate Authority while rejecting the appeal has not bothered to deal with specific contentions which the applicant herein had raised in paragraph no. E-1 to E-6 of the said ::6 :: OANo.327/2018 appeal, which clearly demonstrates that Appellate Authority has simply acted in a mechanical manner and has signed the note on the dotted lines as put up by the office of the respondent no.1. It was submitted that applicant's service record ever since his joining the NVS had been punctilious and impeccable and the Appellate Authority had failed to appreciate that the applicant herein had demonstrated with documentary evidence in his appeal that the respondent no.5 herein had gone to the extent of fabricating the documents with the sole objective of ensuring that the applicant herein was thrown out of services by hook or crook. Therefore, on the facts and grounds mentioned in the Original Application applicant has prayed for quashing of the impugned order with other consequential benefits.
8. After notice, official respondents have filed reply contesting the claim of the applicant and supporting the impugned order. It was stated that present Original Application was filed with unexplained delay of about 3 years and therefore only on this ground official respondents have prayed for dismissal of the Original Application.
9. On merits it was stated that Original Application filed by the applicant was seeking to re-assess the evidences on record and to come to a different conclusion before the Competent Authority decided the matter, which was not within the scope or power of judicial review of this Tribunal as held repeatedly by the Hon'ble Apex Court. It was submitted that at every stage the applicant was given reasonable opportunity to defend his case and opportunity of personal hearing was also granted. Therefore, on the basis of reply, official respondents have prayed for dismissal of the Original Application.
10. In respect of the constitution of the committee it was submitted by the respondents that members as also head of the Summary Trial Committee were all the serving employees of NVS and there was no representation from outside NGO is not correct. The aforesaid ::7 :: OANo.327/2018 committee was constituted by the Competent Authority as per the norms of NVS. So far as PF entitlement was concerned, it was stated that as per the prevailing norms, the applicant was entitled to get his own share of CPF standing at his credit as on the date of termination of service, for which he had to submit his claim in prescribed format but till date the applicant had not applied for the same. Soon after the receipt of his claim, the authority would initiate action for release of the dues.
11. In respect of personal hearing before the Appellate Authority, it was stated that it was not obligatory on the part of the Appellate Authority to afford an opportunity of hearing to the applicant. In respect of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case of Visakha, it was stated that Summary Trial Committee of the NVS against the applicant was constituted in accordance with the provision of Samiti's notification dated 20.12.1993. It was also mentioned that the case of Visakha was not relevant to the present case. It was further submitted that provision of Summary Trial as contained in Samiti's notification had been considered and upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Avinash Nagra Vs. NVS & Ors. reported in 1997 (2) SCC 534, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a similar situation upheld the exercise of power by the Director of dispensing with a full scale inquiry. Further the official respondents relied upon the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Director, NVS Vs. Babban Prasad Yadav reported in (2004) 13 SCC 568 therefore, it was submitted that once Director (now Commissioner) NVS had come to the conclusion that the charged officer was prima facie guilty of moral turpitude after such inquiry as he deemed fit and appropriate under the circumstances of the case, and it was not expedient to hold a regular inquiry, Commissioner could take a decision in accordance with the provisions of notification dated 20.12.1993 by recording ::8 :: OANo.327/2018 of reasons in support of his decision. Therefore, on the basis of reply, respondents prayed for dismissal of the Original Application.
12. Rejoinder was filed by the applicant reiterating that opportunity of personal hearing before the Appellate Authority was not granted and elaborating that why the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Avinash Nagra and also in Babban Prasad Yadav could not be relied on in this matter.
13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
14. Learned counsel for the applicant Mr. M.S. Rao taking us through the records of the case and various documents to show that in calculated manner at the instance of respondent no.5, the allegation of moral turpitude had been made against the applicant. In fact, the applicant had an apprehension after some time of the posting of the respondent no.5 as the Principal in the school, that the applicant may be trapped in case of sexual harassment and that apprehension was duly informed to the Deputy Commissioner but of no avail. It was submitted that prerequisite of dispensing with the regular inquiry was not complied with even in terms of notification dated 20.12.1993 which provides that regular inquiry shall be dispensed with provided that the Director is of the opinion that it is not expedient to hold regular enquiry on account of serious embarrassment to the students or his guardian or such other practical difficulties. The Director shall record in writing the reasons under which it is not reasonably practicable to hold such an enquiry. In the present case, no reasons had been recorded and therefore termination was unsustainable as the said aspect was not taken into consideration by the Appellate Authority and therefore impugned appellate order was liable to set aside.
15. It was further contended that the decision in the case of Avinash Nagra (supra) by the Hon'ble Supreme Court came prior to ::9 :: OANo.327/2018 Vishakha judgment. It was contended that since Summary Trial Committee was not constituted as per guidelines and judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Vishakha (supra), any finding recorded by the said committee was unsustainable and any consequential action based upon said report of said committee was illegal and unsustainable. It was submitted that the judgment order in case of Babhan Prasad Yadav (supra) was post Vishaka's judgment and according to the learned counsel it appears that the Hon'ble Supreme Court was satisfied that the constituted committee in the said case was constituted on the lines of guidelines of Vishakha case. To substantiate the aforesaid contention during the course of arguments, learned counsel for the applicant submitted a circular dated 17.04.2003 issued for NVS in which composition of committee is prescribed to be of five persons, whereas as per the committee's report in the present case (Annexure A/7), the said committee comprised of only three members. According to the learned counsel for the applicant, the report of the committee in the present case (Annexure A/7) being in respect of year 2006-2007, is unsustainable in view of the circular dated 17.04.2003.
16. Learned counsel for the applicant further contended that no personal opportunity of hearing was granted to the applicant in respect of specific request which was contrary to the proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It was further submitted that impugned order issued by the Appellate Authority was non-speaking, without application of mind and a cyclostyled one. To substantiate the aforesaid contention, during the course of arguments learned counsel produced the copy of another order dated 09.04.2014 passed in case of one Shri. Kamlesh J. Mehta on this account. On this basis, the Appellate order was liable to be set aside, the counsel argued.
::10 :: OANo.327/201817. On the other hand learned counsel representing respondents Mr. Joy Mathew, with equal vehemence supported the impugned order dated 09.04.2014 it was submitted that while passing the termination order dated 17.04.2009, in terms of NVS notification dated 20.12.1993, reasons had been recorded by the Director for dispensing with the regular Departmental Inquiry. It was also submitted that in view of the orders passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Avinash Nagra and Babban Prasad Yadav the challenge made by the applicant in respect of constitution of committee was not sustainable. The Appellate Authority by taking into consideration all aspects of the matter, rightly passed the impugned order. He argued that this court was not required to reassess the evidence and there was a very limited scope of judicial review to interfere in the impugned order/action. He had relied on the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India & Ors. 1995 SCC (6) 749 and in the State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Ranjit Singh in Civil Appeal Nos. 2049-2050 of 2022. It was also contended that present Original Application was liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.
18. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusal of the record it clearly emerges that challenging the impugned order dated 09.04.2014, present Original Application has been filed by the applicant in the year 2017. At the relevant point of time, the same was presented before the Mumbai Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal and vide order dated 29.11.2017 notices were issued on M.A.666/2017 and O.A. also. Thereafter from 03.08.2018 the proceedings came up before the Ahmedabad Bench. In reply of the official respondents objection with respect to delay in filing Original Application has been taken. However, no reply to M.A.666/2017 was filed. In M.A.666/2017 which is an application for condonation of delay, the applicant has submitted ::11 :: OANo.327/2018 cause for delay, primarily averring that is due to financial crunch he could not file O.A within the prescribed limitation.
19. During the pendency of the present Original Application, the applicant filed M.A.11/2014 producing certain documents on record in which letter dated 17.01.2020 which was sent by the authority in respect full and final payment of provident fund has been produced. In fact, record further shows that sanction order was issued on 02.01.2020 in this regard. And thereafter, the official respondents sought details of the bank account from the applicant in which said amount could be disbursed/released. This fact shows that the cause shown by the applicant in his application in respect of financial crunch was acceptable to an extent. Even otherwise although in reply to Original Application, official respondents contested the question of delay, no separate reply was filed. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case we are of the opinion that delay in filing the Original Application has been sufficiently explained and accordingly it is condoned in the interest of justice.
20. To decide the controversy on merits this Tribunal finds that following points are required to be considered by this Tribunal:-
(i) Whether before passing impugned appellate order dated 09.04.2014, it was obligatory on the part of the Appellate Authority to provide personal hearing.
(ii) Whether the constitution of Summary Trial Committee was legal and proper?
(iii) While issuing impugned termination order dated 17.04.2009, whether the Competent complied with clause B of the notification dated 20.12.1993.
21. So far as point no.(i) is concerned, it is clear from the para 5 of the appellate memo (Annexure A/8) that the applicant had specifically prayed for an opportunity of personal hearing. Therefore, the ::12 :: OANo.327/2018 question before us is whether in a given case, the applicant is entitled for personal hearing at the appellate stage and not providing it is violative of the principles of natural justice. This point came up for consideration by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case of Ram Chander Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1986 SC 1173 and relevant paragraph is reproduced herein below:-
"In the absence of a requirement in the statute or the rules, there is no duty cast on an appellate authority to give reasons where the order is one of affirmance. But, R. 22(2) of the Railway Servants Rules in express terms requires the Railway Board to record its findings on the three aspects stated therein. R. 22 (2) provides that in the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in R. 6 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said rule, the appellate authority shall "consider" as to the matters indicated therein. The word "consider" has different shades of meaning and must in R. 22 (2), in the context in which it appears, mean an objective consideration by the Railway Board after due application of mind which implies the giving of reasons for its decision. Case-
law discussed.
It is of utmost importance after the Forty-Second Amendment as interpreted by the majority in Tulsiram Patel's case [(1985) 3 SCC (398) that the Appellate Authority must not only give a hearing to the Government servant concerned but also pass a reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised by him in the appeal. Reasoned decisions by tribunals, such as the Railway Board in the case, present will promote public confidence in the administrative process. An objective consideration is possible only if the delinquent servant is heard and given a chance to satisfy the Authority regarding the final orders that may be passed on his appeal. Considerations of fairplay and justice also require that such a personal hearing should be given."
In view of the aforesaid proposition of law, applicant was entitled for personal hearing before the Appellate Authority prior to passing of the impugned order dated 09.04.2014.
22. Regarding point no.(ii) this provision of Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Avinash Nagra and Babban Prasad Yadav and the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the provisions of NVS.
::13 :: OANo.327/201823. In the case of Kasim Ibrahim Sumra Vs. Union of India & Ors.
similar arguments in respect of visakha case guidelines were considered by this Tribunal in O.A.386/2012 decided on 06.05.2016 of which, the relevant paragraph no. 10 is reproduced herein below:-
"The offence that the applicant is accused of is of the most heinous kind and cannot be excused on any account. However, it is also necessary to ensure that all procedures are scrupulously followed as the punishment imposed put an abrupt end to the career advancement of an employee of several years standing. The judgment cited by the learned counsel for the applicant relates to sexual harassment at work place. Here the context is different. Also even if no NGO representative was involved in the inquiry, the authorities had taken care to include teachers/officials from other schools/regions. Shri M.S.Rao by placing emphasis upon Vishaka (supra) vehemently argued that the very fact that the Complaints Committee does not involve NGO itself vitiates the entire action against the applicant. To appreciate this submission, we have carefully gone through the judgment in. Vishaka (supra). No doubt at paragraph 16 of Vishaka (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under
16. ......... the absence of enacted: law to provide for the effective enforcement of the basic human right of gender equality and guarantee against sexual harassment and abuse, more particularly against sexual harassment at work places, we lay down the guidelines and norms specified hereinafter for due observance at all work places or other institutions, until a legislation is enacted for the purpose. This is done in exercise of the power available under Art. 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of the fundamental rights and it is further emphasised that this would be treated as the law declared by this Court under Art. 141 of the Constitution."
One of the guidelines prescribed therein relates to the Complaints Committee, which is as under:
Complaints Committee "The Complaints Committee should be headed by a woman and not less than half of its member should be women. Further, to prevent the possibility of any undue pressure or influence from senior levels, such Complaints Committee should involve a third party, either NGO or other body who is familiar with the issue of sexual harassment." The above portion of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vishaka (supra) makes it clear that involvement of a NGO is not a watertight compartment. It is flexible. What is required in Vishaka (supra) is either to involve NGO or a third party or other body familiar with the ::14 :: OANo.327/2018 issue of sexual harassment. In the instant case, the harassment is not at a place of work, but is at a school Considering this fact as well the fact that the harassment is against the pupil in the school, the Commissioner thought it fit to constitute a Committee involving third party. Hence, the mere fact that the Complaints Committee does not involve NGO will in no way improve the case of the applicant."
24. Aforesaid order of Tribunal was challenged in Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in case of Kasim Ibrahim Sumra Vs. Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan in C/SCA/1382/2018 decided on 06.03.2018.
The Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, while considering arguments, was pleased to observe as follows:-
"14. Learned advocate for the petitioner has assailed the order of the tribunal on the ground that the tribunal has erred in law on interpreting the ruling of the Apex Court rendered in case of Vishaka and others V/s State of Rajasthan and others reported in (1997) 6 SCC 241. He also submitted that the tribunal has erred in placing reliance on the ruling of the Apex Court in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan V/s J. Hussain reported in (2013) 10 SCC 106.
16. Learned advocate submitted that the tribunal ought to have taken into consideration the guidelines laid by the Apex Court in case of Vishaka (Supra) and that it would have been necessary that the complaints committee appointed for inquiry consisted of a third party or an NGO in absence of these constituents in the complaints committee the procedure adopted by the authority was not in consonance with the guidelines of the Apex Court in the case of Vishaka (Supra).
20. This Court finds that the tribunal has given proper reasons while dismissing the application of the petitioner. The Court also finds that the reliance placed by the tribunal on the judgment of J. Hussain (Supra) was justified and that the reliance on the observations of the Apex Court in case of Vishaka (Supra) is justified. The Court is in agreement with the observations of the tribunal regarding the applicability of the guidelines in case of Vishaka (Supra) to the facts of the present case to the extent that merely because no NGO or independent third party is not part of the committee, which inquired would not vitiate the report of the committee or the inquiry procedure."
25. Therefore in view of the judgment passed in case of Kasim Ibrahim Sumra (supra), the arguments raised by the applicant is not acceptable and therefore point no.(ii) decided negatively.
::15 :: OANo.327/201826. So far as point no.(iii) is concerned, while answering point no.(ii) this Tribunal came to the conclusion that applicant was not afforded an opportunity of personal hearing by the Appellate Authority and therefore this Tribunal is inclined to remit the matter to the Appellate Authority. Under these circumstances, while considering the appeal afresh, the Appellate Authority is also required to see that while issuing the impugned termination order, the Competent Authority had properly complied with condition specified in clause B of the notification dated 20.12.1993 or not. For the said purpose, the Appellate Authority is expected to call for original record/file from the respondent no.3 to verify the record of satisfaction prior to issuance of termination order to see whether only the phraseology was reproduced in order dated 17.04.2009.
27. At this juncture, it is relevant here to consider another contention/prayer of the learned counsel for the applicant that if this Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the Appellate Order is liable to be set aside, than the validity of the said order may be examined on merits by the Tribunal itself without remitting the matter to the Appellate Authority because the applicants had already suffered a lot on passage of time due to incorrect and false allegations. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid aspect. However, we are unable to accede to the prayer of learned counsel for the applicant on the ground that this Tribunal while answering point no. (i) framed herein above, has come to the conclusion that appellate order is liable to be set aside on the ground of not providing opportunity of personal hearing to the applicant. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents and in view of the proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this regard, matter is required to be remitted to the Appellate Authority which is in a better position to dwell upon the factual and legal aspect of the matter as this ::16 :: OANo.327/2018 Tribunal in its limited jurisdiction is not inclined to assess and re- assess the factual findings.
28. Thus, in view of the aforesaid the present Original Application is partly allowed to the extent indicated (infra):-
(i) Impugned appellate order dated 09.04.2014 is set aside.
(ii) Appellate Authority is directed to restore the appeal after providing an opportunity of personal hearing and the observations stated herein above, decide the appeal by reasons and speaking order within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.
29. With the aforesaid, present Original Application is allowed in part to the extent indicated above. Pending MA, if any, shall stands disposed of. There is no order as to costs.
(Umesh Gajankush) (A K Dubey)
Member(J) Member(A)
PV