Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Anamika Kala Sangam Trust vs Kolkata Metropolitan Development ... on 31 January, 2018
Author: Mir Dara Sheko
Bench: Mir Dara Sheko
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONALWRITJURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
PRESENT:
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mir Dara Sheko
W.P. No. 6878(W) of 2012
Anamika Kala Sangam Trust
Vs.
Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority & Ors.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Abhrajit Mitra,
Mr. Satadeep Bhatttacharyya,
Mr. Ashok Bose,
Mr. Ajoy Gaggar,
Mr. Sanket Sarawgi
For the Respondents : Mr. S. Talukdar
Heard on : 10.01.2018 Judgment on : January 31, 2018.
Mir Dara Sheko, J. : 1. The petitioner, a society registered under Societies Registration Act, 1860 filed the writ petition seeking writ of mandamus and other reliefs assailing notice dated 14th February, 2012 issued by the Deputy Secretary, Works Cell, KMDA to the writ petitioner informing cancellation of allotment of a plot of land bearing no. IND-7A, Sector-K under EKADP measuring 30.80 cottahs as was communicated by earlier letter no.103/KMDA/Sectt/AD-122/2004 dated 16.07.2007 by deducting 20% of the premium as service charge.
2. Mr. Abhrajit Mitra learned Senior Counsel representing the writ petitioner submits that on the basis of expressed willingness the aforesaid land was allotted by letter dated 2nd May, 2007 by the KMDA against payment of agreed premium on leasehold basis for a period of 99 years at annual licence fee of Re. 1/- only per cottah on the agreed terms executed on 4th July, 2008 subject to satisfaction of payment of balance amount. Submits, that the writ petitioner was supposed start construction over the site within two years of execution of lease deed and ought to have completed the same within total 3 years from its execution. The writ petitioner thereby on completion several steps i.e. mutation, payment of property tax, drawing of building plan, collection of no objection certificate from West Bengal Fire and Emergency Services, obtained the plan recommending sanction on 14th March, 2009.
Submits further, that since the said allotted plot did not fall under East Kolkata Wetlands Management Authority, and the New Building Rules 2009 of Kolkata Municipal Corporation came into force, on taking permission of KMC the writ petitioner submitted new building plan on 13th May, 2010, and the KMC in turn recommended for sanction of said new plan but with some conditions. Mr. Mitra with reference to the documents marked P/11, P/12, P/13, P/15, P/16, P/17, P/18 submits that the writ petitioner tried to convince the KMDA about the reason of delay which took place for the situations beyond their control and ultimately though the period to complete the construction in the site has been extended by KMDA but penal charges with interest have been imposed.
Mr. Mitra submits that in the scheme, or, in the agreed terms of lease there was provision for extending period of construction at the option of the parties, but if the option is favoured to the lessee, there is no provision in the lease deed of imposing or awarding any penalty, or, penal charge interest. Mr. Mirta therefore submitting in favour maintainability of the writ petition on the basis of Haldiram case prays for quashing and rescinding said cancellation order dated 14.02.2012 and to allow the writ petition with the writ of mandamus as sought for. In support of above submissions he relied on the following cases:-
(i) Haldiram Ltd. Vs. The State of West Bengal (2009)1 CAL LT 158 (HC)
(ii)W.P. No. 449 (W) of 2010 Austin Distributors (P) Ltd.
& Anr. Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors. delivered on 31.03.2011.
(iii)W.P.23611 (W) of 2014 South City Project (Kolkata) Limited & Anr. Vs. Kolkata Metropolitan Development & Ors. delivered on 19.12.2017.
3. Mr. Talukdar representing respondent KMDA per contra argues that against the present nature of claim the writ petition is not maintainable, since the petitioner claimed about having no existence of contractual obligation, although the power and right as the case may be arose between the parties by virtue of the lease agreement, which may be enforceable only in the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction and not in the High Court within writ jurisdiction. Mr. Talukdar citing the case of Smt. Jayanti Paul & Ors. Vs. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority and Ors. submits that the Division Bench of this Court decided on 14th March, 2017 held the decision of Haldiram case as not a good law. Further relying on another judgment of Division Bench of this Court, The Secretary, Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority and Another Vs. Siddharth Co-operative Housing Society Limited and Anr. delivered on 31.08.2017, submits that there being any violation in terms of lease deed, or in the act dehors the terms of the lease deed the petitioner could have approached the said act in the civil Court, and the same having not been done the writ petition ex-facie being not maintainable is liable to be dismissed apart from having no merit for adjudication, since power of the authority is in-built in the Act followed by the instrument to realise fees in normal cases and charges either in the form of imposing fine or penalty or realisation of charges in case of regularising the act of the lessee/licensee who has not done the act within stipulated period, or done dehors the terms provided by the Authority.
4. Consulted the instrument, impugned notices, materials on record, the Act 1979 with Rules and the cases cited at Bar.
Question is involved whether claim of "Penal charge" for extension of time for completion of construction works of the project, issuing letter dated September 12, 2011 by KMDA was dehors the provision of the Act, and whether the letter of cancellation of said allotted plot is liable to be rescinded or revoked?
5. At the very outset the letter of approach in February, 2007 was submitted by the writ petitioner for allotment of land in their favour by giving consent even to advise them by informing the total amount to be paid with Penal interest. With reference to said approach the respondent KMDA authority issued one preliminary allotment letter dated July 16, 2007 with the terms and conditions mentioned therein, with indication at the end that "the terms and conditions as mentioned above are not exhaustive". It's Clause 4 however kept provision of "Penal Interest", which is set out hereunder:-
The allottee shall have to pay the instalment as scheduled even if there is any dispute, failing which penal interest will be charged for any delay in payment.
Document dated October 3, 2007 shows possession of the subject land measuring 30.80 cottahs as was handed over to the writ petitioner, following which the lease deed between KMDA and the writ petitioner was executed on July 4, 2008 with the terms and conditions laid down therein.
6. It appears from the impugned letter dated February 14, 2012 that the respondent KMDA authority indicating alleged violation of Clause 4(iii) of the deed of licence agreement cancelled the allotment of the aforesaid subject property by refunding the deposited amount to the writ petitioner by deducting 20% of the premium paid by them as service charge. Clause 4(iii) of said document has two phases, and prior to that Clause 4(ii) thereof may have some relevant bearing over the lis. For its appreciation hereafter with other materials, those Clause 4(ii) and 4(iii) which are the pivot of the issue are set out:-
4(ii):- To pay all rent, taxes and other impositions in respect of the aforementioned land and structures to be erected thereon which are or may be assessed to be payable by the owner or the occupier in respect thereof during the term of the License. 4(iii):- At the own cost of the Licensee within 24 months from the date of execution of license deed or within such further time as the Authority may as its option allow in writing or sufficient and reasonable grounds, to start Construction for the purpose of setting up of a Cultural Complex with the provision of a multi-use Auditorium Art and Culture Gallery Liberty, Seminar Conference Facilities and Activities in East Kolkata Area Development Project, with boundary walls, sewers and drains in accordance with plans, sanctions and specifications as shall be approved by the appropriate authorities on payment of such fees as required in accordance with the Building Rules of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation.
7. Admittedly, in the case on hand, as also reveals from letter dated September 19, 2011 of the writ petitioner addressed to the KMDA that though in terms of the document of licence the construction of the proposed project was supposed to be completed within 1st week of July, 2008 or at least by making the project operational in terms of Rule 8 of West Bengal Town and Country Planning (Development of Township Projects) Rule 2008, the time for completing the construction was granted in the year 2011 upto February 2014. The KMDA authority issued letter to the writ petitioner claiming total Rs. 2,18,10,282/- under 3 heads which are set out:-
(i) Penal charge for extension of time w.e.f. 04.07.2010 to 28.10.2014 (3 years 240 days) Rs. 1,93, 35,523/-
(ii) Balance amount of land value Rs. 15,40,000/-
(iii)Penal interest for delayed payment @ 15% p.a. w.e.f. 16.08.07 to 31.08.2011(i.e. 4 years 17 days) Rs. 9,34,759/-
Rs. 2,18, 10, 282/-
It is to be noted that the payment must be made within 30(thirty) days from the date of issue of this letter.
8. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of South City Project (Kolkata) Limited & Anr. (supra) with reference to the words "other impositions" available in Clause 4(ii) (supra) has given own expression which is set out:-
"Such a clause to my understanding recognizes the obligations of the first petitioner as the licensee to pay all taxes and impositions of third parties in respect of the land in question such as municipal or corporation rates, taxes and other outgoings. The opening words of clause 4 specify that, the first petitioner is agreeing to discharge the obligations as enumerated under the various sub-clauses in such clause to the MKDA. Sub-clause (ii) of clause 4, therefore, has to be read to mean that, the first petitioner has agreed to pay rent, taxes and other impositions in respect of the plot of land and the structures to be erected as may be legitimately demanded and imposed by third parties. The obligation to make such payment is noted and secured in sub-clause (ii) of clause 4. The word "any other impositions" used in sub-clause (ii) of clause 4 would, therefore, mean that, the first petitioner as the licensee, is agreeing to pay any other impositions, in respect of the plot of land in question, that may be legally payable to third parties by the first petitioner as a licensee in respect of such plot.
9. By laying above observation His Lordship declined to accept said terms "other impositions" in empowering the KMDA authority to impose penalty, and so to so also Clause 4(iii) of the deed. Of course His Lordship to lay above observations based on the case of Shree Bhagwati Street Rolling Mills, (2016) 3 Supreme Court Cases 643 and Austin Distributors (P) Ltd. & Another Vs. The State of West Bengal & Others W.P. No. 449 (W) of 2010 decided by another Co- ordinate Bench of this Court on March 31, 2011.
10. Since Mr. Mitra took exception to the terms "Penalty Charges" for extension of time let me set out the true meaning of the terms "Penalty" as available from the book namely Words & Phrases as interpreted by the Supreme Court of India (Second Edition) published by A.L. Dawra for Modern Law Publications, which are as follows:-
Penalty
(i) The words "where any penalty is imposed" in Rule 14(i) should actually be read as "where any penalty is imposable" because so far as the disciplinary authority is concerned it cannot impose a sentence. The word "penalty"
used in Rule 14(i) of the Rules of 1968 is relatable to the penalties to be imposed under the Rules rather than a penalty given by a criminal court.
(ii) Sometimes it means recovery of an amount as a penal measure even in a civil proceeding. An exaction which is not of compensatory character is also termed as penalty even though it is not being recovered pursuant to an order finding the person concerned guilty of a crime.
(iii) The expression "penalty" involves an idea of punishment [Contract].
(iv) The expression 'penalty' is a word of wide significance. Sometimes, it means recovery of an amount as a penal measure even in civil proceedings. An exaction which is not compensatory in character is also termed as a 'penalty'. When penalty is imposed by an adjudicating officer it is done so in "adjudicatory proceedings' and not by way of fine as a result of 'prosecution' of an 'accused' for commission of an 'offence' in a criminal Court.
(v) In common parlance the word 'penalty' is understood to mean a legal or official punishment such as a term of imprisonment.
In some context it is also understood to mean some other form of punishment such as fine or forfeiture for not fulfilling a contract. But gathering the meaning of this word in the context in which it is used is significant.
According to the legal dictionary the term "penalty" is the 'sum' payable as a punishment for a default, and it is not recoverable in a court of law. Equally meaning of the term "imposition" according to said "words & Phrases" is set out:-
Imposition The term "imposition" is generally used for the levy of a tax or duty by legislative provisions indicating the subject-matter of the tax and the rates at which it has to be taxed. [Constitution of India]. Assistant Collector or Central Excise, Calcutta Division v. National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 2563 : (1973) 1 SCR 822: (1972) 2 SCC 560 : 1978 ELT 416. Dt. 09.08.1972.
11. So the cumulated sense of the term of realisation of charges in the garb of "penalty" is to be construed in which context it is so extracted, and, this is significant as to why and what for such term (penalty) is used. Admittedly for this civil liability there cannot be a sentence order to impose punishment. But to compensate such civil liability penalty can be very much imposed in case of violation of terms of the instrument or allotment. In the case on hand, according to first phase of Clause 4(iii) if the licensee would fail to start and complete construction in the site then on approach of the licensee if the authority satisfies with sufficient and reasonable grounds then may extend further time at its option in writing. In the use of legal word like "penalty" the word "imposition" is also co-related. Though the term "imposition" generally is used for the levy, or, tax, or, duty by legislative provisions but it is never irrelevant when, or, if, it is used, such punishment is imposed, and/or, fine is imposed. Though in a disciplinary proceeding, as cited above, punishment is not diluted within the term of fine, but if such a proceeding ends into finding of guilt, then punishment is given by imposing penalty as available under law or rule relevant to the proceeding. As per Clause 4(ii) (supra) the meaning of "imposition" shall be interpreted in some more wider sense since the word is prefixed by the key word "other". Each and every key word of a covenant has relevant bearing to keep a meaningful impact to both the parties to the same, and due to failure or default or violation of any of the clauses by either of the parties it gives rises to an executable right to the other party to the deed of course not arbitrarily, but by the expression of said deed. It is obvious that 2nd part of Clause 4(iii) empowers the KMDA authority even to terminate the licence with the expressions "shall be terminated" on failure on the part of the licensee to complete the construction works of the project within the stipulated period from the date of execution of the deed. Of course, that would be the extreme step at the option of the authority. Therefore, when the failing clause comes for adjustment before the authority at its option only, then the person/party at fault simply may wait for its considered decision. Such consideration obviously may be compensatable in lieu of some charges, whatever its nomenclature may be, which may be dependent on the basis of act of promptitude or latitude and other act and activities, area so allotted, sufferance, if any, of the authority for not coming with the purported project within the stipulated period so on and so forth. Is this act of compensating or penalising the person/party at fault not coming within the term "other impositions" as provided in Clause 4(ii) of the covenant? Answer is and shall be yes and yes. Because when the person is at fault and failed to comply the agreed terms he is to suffer with adequate penalty or punishment, fee whatever it may be fixed at the option of the authority. The writ petitioner in the case on hand did not cite any case of discrimination before this writ court, to show the instance that it is sole and solitary case where the writ petitioner has been imposed with penalty due to failure in not completing the construction within given time, or it is imposed for extension of time whereas in some other's case though time was extended but no penalty was imposed in those cases. Rather from the cases of Austin Distributors (P) Ltd. & Another (supra) and South City Project (Kolkata) Ltd. (supra) or even Haldiram's case it was noticed that due to failure in completion of project work on approach time was extended in lieu of imposition of penalty. Those cases however will be dealt with appropriately.
12. This Court in the case of South City Project (Kolkata) Ltd. (supra) in dealing with Sections 13, 17, 18, 23 however observed "Section 13(i) (ii) (1) cannot be read to mean that KMDA has the authority to impose penalty. It does not have statutory power to impose penalty. That however, does not prevent it to enter into a contract which may contain a covenant empowering KMDA to impose penalty."
The Preamble of such Act 1979 indicates in brief that virtually the Act with its beneficiary and prohibitory provision has empowered the Authority under the Act so that maintaining naturality and restrictions thereon development of rural and urban areas can be effected as far as practicable. For that reason balance between the authority and its subject is required, so that the authority does not act on own whims arbitrarily, and similarly, the 'subject' may remain restricted within his given liberty and limitations so as to the subject cannot persuade the authority to go on lending undue advantage according to his desire and convenience. In the case on hand the tainted cause of action is noticed as a consequence of such an unbalanced whims of the writ petitioner. I have already indicated that the writ petitioner failed to show his case as an instance of discrimination i.e. this was the sole and only case where the authority in extending "further time" imposed penalty charges. It is not, that the KMDA under the Act has no authority to impose "penalty". Section 52, Section 123 of the Act 1979 can be cited as ready reference, though however imposition of penalty under those sections can be imposed on different eventualities. Even under Section 129 of the Act the Planning or Development Authority has the power to realise "Fine". So imposition of penalty or fine, or its realisation is not unknown in the Act.
13. In the case of Austin Distributors (P) Ltd. & Another (supra) this Court had taken note of and gone into factual aspects involving delay in starting construction after lease deed observing as follows:-
"There could be no question of commencement of construction until the requisite clearances, no objections and sanctions are obtained. In any case, delay in issuance of building permit and/or sanction of building plan by reason inter alia of interdepartmental pushing of files and exchange of correspondence and delay in clearances and statutory approvals, for reasons not entirely attributable to the lessee, would certainly constitute sufficient and reasonable grounds for extension of time to commence and complete construction."
14. In the case of Austin Distributors (P) Ltd. & Another (supra) this Court however referred to a few decisions of the apex court, of course, which are academic and policy wise there cannot be any second thought in the matter of catching hold the Act of arbitrariness or violation of natural justice, taking note of specially paragraphs 3 & 4 from the case of Haldiram Ltd. Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 2009 Vol. I Calcutta Law Times 158 before coming to the conclusion, viz, "in the instant case, it is admitted that there is no power to impose penalty under the contract. It cannot, therefore, be said that the source of exercise of power to impose penalty is only the contract. The judgment in Haldiram Ltd. (supra) is not only clearly distinguishable on facts, but also leads support to the contention of the writ petitioners that the writ petition is maintainable in the facts and circumstances of this case".
In view of above discussion at least two decisions of our High Court, though of the Co-ordinate Bench, as cited before this Court apart from the case of Haldiram Ltd. (supra), the ratio decidendi came down that within the covenant while there was no clause empowering the KMDA authority to impose penalty in lieu of extension of further time to start with and complete the construction of the project after the execution of the lease/licence, the act of imposition is arbitrary and without jurisdiction and so the Co-ordinate Bench in those cases disapproved such act.
15. This is an undenying fact that the writ petitioner while had taken allotment of the plot, governed under the particular Act and Rules and covenant executed by and between the parties then the writ petitioner was supposed to know all pros and cons including all hazardous tasks on getting the building plan sanctioned in their name within the stipulated period mentioned in the covenant. So they cannot take alibi that they could not start with the construction due to non-completion of those formalities. During foregoing discussion it has been indicated that under the Act, 1979 apart from realisation of fine the authority is also empowered to impose penalty, of course, on different eventuality.
16. Since Mr. Talukdar placed the case of Jayanti Paul reported in AIR 2017 Cal 142: (2017) 2 Cal LT 273: (2017) 2 CHN 352 (DB) and also another unreported case MAT 1320 of 2017, both being decided by Division Bench of this Court let me now deal with the same. Amongst those two cases of Jayanti Paul was decided on March 14, 2017 while the later on 31st August, 2017. In the former, the case of Haldiram as was referred to also taken note of by the Division Bench.
17. The Preamble of the Act, 1979 has given clear indication that it has been created to keep the Planning and Development Town in the State in order without distributing or sacrificing the existing rich bio- diversity of flora and fauna etc. which are having not only medicional value but also has have cohesion with eco-system. This development and planning under the Act has been entrusted upon the different authorities specified in the Act. Since the Division Bench this Court in the case of Jayanti Paul (supra) has dealt with the case of Haldiram paragraph 7, 8(20), 9 and 10 are set out:-
Paragraph 7:- Even when a public body deals with its tenants, it must act in public interest and an infraction of that duty is amenable to examination either in civil suit or in writ jurisdiction. The decision rendered by the KMDA
- which was the subject matter of challenge before the Writ Court - had to be a reasonable decision and taken only upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest and not otherwise. Where there is arbitrariness in State action, Article 14 springs in and judicial review strikes such an action down. Every action of the executive authority must be subject to rule of law and must be informed by reason. So, whatever be the activity of the public authority, it should meet the test of Article 14. Every activity of a public authority must be informed by reason and guided by public interest. All exercise of discretion or power by public authorities even when dealing with lessees cannot be treated separately and distinctly. Even in contractual matters, if it fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, such action in that event would be unconstitutional. In this context, we may take notice of the observations made by the Supreme Court in Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay reported in (1989) 3 SCC 293 :
AIR 1989 SC 1642.
Paragraph 8(20):- Having regard to the nature of the transaction, we are of the opinion that it would be appropriate to state that in cases where the instrumentality of the state enters the contractual field, it should be governed by the incidence of the contract.
Paragraph 9:- The judgment referred to and relied upon by the learned Single Judge [i.e., Haldiram's case (supra)] cannot be an authority for the proposition that even in an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or its instrumentality arising out of a contractual obligation is not maintainable even if there is arbitrariness present in such an action which emanates from a right under the contract. Paragraph 10 :- We can safely conclude that Haldiram's case (supra) is not good law for the proposition that in an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or its instrumentality arising out of a contractual obligation is not maintainable even if there is arbitrariness present in such an action which emanates from a right under the contract.
18. The case of Haldiram was decided by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court on September 19, 2008 from which paragraph 60 is set out:-
Paragraph 60:- In my view, the test that should be applied for getting answer to the question is what is the basis of the action complained of. If the action is taken in exercise of any power or right the sole source whereof is not the contract itself, then a writ petition questioning the action is maintainable. On the other hand, if the action leading to the impugned decision is taken in exercise of a right conferred on the State by the contract, then no writ petition questioning such action and decision is maintainable. When any action leading to a decision is taken by a statutory authority in exercise of a right conferred on it by an ordinary contract, the authority does not act in the discharge of its any public law or statutory power, duty, or obligation conferred on it by any provision of the Constitution or any statute, nor does it act in the discharge of its any executive or administrative duty, obligation or function, but it acts wholly in exercise of its pure private law contractual right, and in such case the remedy of the aggrieved party, qua a party to the contract, is before the ordinary Civil Court or any other forum, if provided by the contract. A public law right or obligation is one the source whereof is the Constitution or a statute, or an executive or administrative decision or instruction, and for enforcing it a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution can be filed. But, for enforcing a right or obligation the source whereof is a pure ordinary non-statutory contract a writ petition under Article 226 is not maintainable., even if one of the parties to the contract is a State within the meaning of Article
12. In such case remedy, if any, of the aggrieved party is before the ordinary Civil Court or the forum provided by the contract.
19. Since the Division Bench of this Court ultimately concluded that the statutory authority having also the power for its exercise on failure of contractual obligation and if there is a complain of arbitrariness present in such action emanating from the right under the contract then the writ petition as is held not maintainable the case of Haldiram has been declared by the Division Bench as not a good law.
20. In the case of The Secretary Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority & Anr. Vs. Siddharth Co-operative Housing Society Limited (supra) same issue was raised before the Division Bench since penal charges were claimed for delayed construction along with service tax and Swach Bharat cess. There is no doubt that the project of the writ petitioner for which the allotment of the subject plot was obtained purely on a commercial lease agreement for its use for commercial purpose. While the allotment was taken the writ petitioner as lessee was well-aware of its terms and conditions including the period within which they were supposed to start with and complete the construction of the project by fulfilling all incidental formalities thereinbefore, so that there would not be any violation of the terms for which they have to apply before the authority again for its condonation. Therefore, within the stipulated period it was supposed that obtaining no objection from different authorities including obtaining sanction of plan so on and so forth ought to have been completed within the subject plot within the stipulated period. While the writ petitioner having failed to comply with the said time is now bound with all condition in starting the project work and such of their failure of course cannot be excused at free of cost or without making any charges whatever its name may be. In the alternative the writ petitioner would have exercised their liberty in surrendering the allotted area to the authority. Therefore, when further time has been extended on approach of the writ petitioner, and, while the writ petitioner failed to show any instance of discrimination that anyone was ever set free by the KMDA without charging the penalty in lieu of extending further time likewise the instant case, the element of arbitrariness or violation of natural justice cannot be complained of.
21. The Writ Court is supposed to overview the Act of the statutory authority whether in the discharge of statutory obligations or duties there is any violation or departure in dispensation of natural justice but in over viewing the entire sequence as well as the cases cited at the Bar and particularly the decision of Division Bench of this Court when the case of Haldiram, which was also made basis by the Co-ordinate Bench to decide the case of Austin Distributors (P) Ltd. (supra) as was also referred to in the case of South City Project (Kolkata) Limited & Anr. (supra), has been declared as no more a good law, in maintaining judicial discipline and also taking note of the principles enunciated within both the cases of the Division Bench as pat on the point on the case on hand. I hold that the petition is not entertainable within writ jurisdiction, which may be agitated before competent court of civil jurisdiction, if there is grievance over assessment of quantum of penalty charges, if it has not become otherwise barred by law, and the writ petition since is liable to be dismissed is dismissed accordingly.
22. No order as to costs.
23. Urgent certified copy be supplied on priority basis if applied for.
(MIR DARA SHEKO, J.)