Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Umesh Zadgaonkar And Ors vs State Of Rajasthan And Anr on 2 April, 2013
Author: R.S. Chauhan
Bench: R.S. Chauhan
In the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur O R D E R S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.4332 of 2012. Umesh Zadgaonkar and Others VERSUS The State of Rajasthan and another Date Of Order ::: 02/04/2013. Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.S. Chauhan Mr. M.R. Singhvi, Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Ashwani Chobisa & Mr. Himanshu Maheshwari, Counsel for the Petitioners Mr. V.R. Bajwa, Counsel for the respondent
Mr. Peeyush Kumar, Public Prosecutor for the State Mr. Naresh Kumar, RPS/ACP, Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur [East] *** Reportable (Per Court ):
The petitioners have prayed for quashing of the F.I.R., namely F.I.R. No.597/2010, registered at Police Station, Gandhi Nagar, Jaipur City [East], Jaipur, for offences under Sections 384, 420, 406, 500, 504, 506/120-B I.P.C. read with Section 3 (1) & 3 (x) of the SC/ST [Prevention of Atrocities] Act, 1985.
The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner Nos.1 and 2, namely Umesh Zadgaonkar and Smt. Alka Zadgaonkar [husband and wife] claimed that they have invented a technology which could produce fuel from plastic waste. They had constituted a company in the name & style of M/s. Unique Waste Plastic Management and Research Company Private Limited. Since, the technology was a unique one, it was given wide publicity. Mr. Madan Dilawar was interested in having the technology transferred and established at Kota. For this purposes, he visited Nagpur, time and again, and held discussions with the petitioners. Thereafter, Mr. Madan Dilawar along with one Mr. Deepk, and Pawan Dilawar [the complainant in this case], constituted a company in the name & style of M/s. Jaipur Waste Management Company Private Limited. Subsequently, M/s. Jaipur Waste Management Company Private Limited entered into a MOU with M/s. Unique Waste Plastic Management and Research Company Private Limited. According to the MOU, the technology and the machinery used for extracting fuel from plastic waste was to be transferred to Kota. Henceforth, a factory would be established at Kota. For this purpose, the petitioners were to receive Rs.700,00,000/- from the complainant and his company.
It is the case of the petitioners that the entire amount was never given to them. However, they do admit that on 08.04.2006, they were paid Rs.6,00,000/- and Rs.9,00,000/-, and on 24.08.2006 they were paid Rs.1.25 crores. Thus, they were paid a total amount of Rs.1.40 croes. But subsequently, the entire contract fell apart. Hence, Mr. Pawan Dilawar lodged a criminal complaint. The said complaint was sent to the Police Station, Mahaveer Nagar, Kota. The Police registered a formal F.I.R., namely F.I.R. No.597/2010 for offences under Sections 384, 420, 406, 500, 504, 506 read with Section 120-B I.P.C., and read with Section 3 (1) 3(x) of the SC/St [Prevention of Atrocities] Act.
Initially, after the investigation, the Police submitted a negative Final Report before the Court. However, on the request of the complainant, the said negative Final Report was returned and further investigation was ordered. Thus, a negative Final Report was sent to S.P. Jaipur [East], Jaipur who, in turn, forwarded the same to Police Station, Gandhi Nagar, Jaipur [East], Jaipur. The case was re-registered, as F.I.R., namely F.I.R. No.597/2010, for offences under Sections 384, 420, 406, 500, 504, 506 read with Section 120-B I.P.C., and further read with Section 3 (1) 3 (x) of the SC/St [Prevention of Atrocities] Act. The petitioners have, thus, come before this Court for quashing of the F.I.R.
Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has vehemently raised the following contentions before this Court: firstly, the entire case revolves around a breach of contract entered between two companies. Thus, the entire case is of civil nature. According to him, this was the very conclusion drawn by the Police at the initial stage. However, the case has been given a criminal colour by the complainant.
Secondly, by declaration and solemn affirmation dated 06.09.2010 [Anx.-12], and by solemn affirmation dated 08.09.2010 [Anx.-13], the complainant himself had declared that he is accepting two cheques -- one cheque of Rs.50,00,000/-, and another cheque of Rs.70,00,000/- as full and final payment. In the complaint, he claimed that he had received Rs.50,00,000/- through e-banking, and Rs.70,00,000/- through a cheque, namely cheque No.033873 dated 07.09.2010. Thus, the entire financial dispute between the two companies stood settled. Hence, no offence under Section 420 I.P.C. is made out. After all, the complainant has agreed to accept an amount of Rs.1.40 crores, as full and final settlement. Therefore, he cannot claim that he has suffered any wrongful loss caused by the petitioners.
Thirdly, there is an inordinate delay of almost two months in lodging the complaint, after the full and final settlement reached between the parties. The inordinate delay itself would cast doubt on the veracity of the statement of the complainant, and on the veracity of the F.I.R. Therefore, the F.I.R. deserves to be quashed by this Court.
On the other hand, Mr. V.R. Bajwa, the learned counsel for the complainant-respondent, has contended that the jurisdiction of this Court in interfering with the F.I.R. is extremely limited one. At the initial stage of interfering with the F.I.R., the Court is duty bound to consider the allegations in the F.I.R. as unrebuted facts. If the ingredients of the offences are made out, then this Court should refrain itself from interfering with the F.I.R. Secondly, according to the complainant both the solemn declarations were signed under duress. Because of his claim, the F.I.R. was registered for offences under Sections 328 and 506 I.P.C.
Thirdly, even if the two different conclusions were drawn by the Police, even then this Court cannot interfere with the same.
Lastly, there are allegations of offence under Section 3 (1) and 3 (x) of the SC/ST Act. The said allegations have not been challenged. According to him, therefore, the F.I.R. cannot be quashed in part.
In rejoinder, Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned Senior Counsel, submits that in the initial investigation carried out by the Police, the Police was of the opinion that no offence under Section 3 (1) and 3 (x) of the Act was made out. Therefore, the allegations leveled by the complainant are absolutely baseless. Hence, even for offence under Section 3 (1) and 3 (x) of the Act, the F.I.R. deserves to be quashed by this Court.
It is, indeed, trite to state that the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for interfering with the F.I.R. is an extremely limited one. In catena of cases, the Apex Court has held that the Court should take the F.I.R. as the truth for the time being. In case, the ingredients of the alleged offence are prima-facie made out, then the Court should not interfere with the F.I.R. For, investigation is the arena of the Police; the veracity of the F.I.R. can be investigated only by the Police. Therefore, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., the High Court should refrain from entering into the said arena. Furthermore, while exercising its power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., at the initial stage of investigation, the High Court is not permitted to consider the evidence, which may be produced by the defense during the course of the trial. At the initial stage, when the investigation is in progress, to enter into defense evidence would be a premature step. Therefore, the High Court should be weary of interfering with the investigation and in quashing the F.I.R. at the out set.
Considering the principles established by the Apex Court in catena of cases, this Court has to accept the allegations made in the F.I.R. as unrebutted truth.
A bare perusal of the F.I.R. clearly reveals that according to the complainant, the petitioners and the complainant companies had entered into a MOU for establishment of factory and for transfer of technology. For this purposes, according to the complainant, he had paid Rs.1.40 crores to the petitioners. However, subsequently, there was a breach of contract committed by the petitioners.
Secondly, subsequently it was discovered that the petitioners did not have the technology to convert plastic waste into fuel. Thus, obviously, prima-facie petitioners made a statement, which they knew to be false. Thus, they caused a wrongful loss to the complainant, and wrongful gain for themselves. Hence, prima-facie, an offence under Section 420 I.P.C. is made out.
Even if the contentions raised by Mr. M.R. Singhvi were accepted, for the sake of arguments, that these are two solemn declarations signed by the complainant, even then according to the complainant, such declarations have been signed neither voluntarily, nor under free-consent, but under duress. Therefore, the allegations made by the complainant that the solemn declarations were under duress would have to be accepted by this Court, at present.
The issue whether they were signed out of free-will, or under duress is an issue which this Court cannot comment upon at the initial stage. After all, this issue is to be tried and tested, appreciated and adjudicated upon by the learned trial Court. It is, too, early in the day for this Court to express any opinion with regard to the said issue.
Although, it is true that initially the Police had concluded that the case was of a civil nature, but in the progress report submitted today before this Court by the Investigating Officer, the Police has concluded that offences under Sections 420 and 406 I.P.C. are made out. The Court in its inherent jurisdiction cannot sit as a Court of appeal over decision of an Investigating Officer. Moreover, this Court cannot substitute its opinion, in place of the opinion of the Investigating Officer. Since the investigation is a domain of the Police, this Court cannot interfere with the decision of the Investigating Officer, unless it is pleaded that the decision is either arbitrary, or mala-fide. Therefore, this Court is not in a position to express any opinion on the merits and demerits of the case, on the two different decisions made by the Police Department.
As far as the issue with regard to offence under Section 3 (1) and 3 (x) of the Act are concerned, again, it is a matter of appreciation by the trial Court. At this juncture, all that can be said is that there is an allegation made by the complainant that they were subjected to certain aspersions relating to their caste. Thus, taking that allegation for the time being as a unrebutted truth, prima-facie the offence under Sections 3 (1) & 3 (x) of the Act is made out.
For the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any merit in this petition: the petition is, hereby, dismissed.
However, by way of abundant caution, it is hereby clarified that any observations made herein above by this Court shall neither influence the final out-come of the investigation, nor influence the final decision of the trial Court. After all, the observations made above are only primary and based on prima-facie appreciation of the allegation made in the F.I.R. This Court does expect from both the Investigating Officer and the trial Court to objectively assess the evidence and to take steps strictly in accordance with law.
Upon dismissal of the main petition, the stay application, filed therewith, does not survive; the same is also dismissed.
[R.S. Chauhan] J.
ashok/ Certificate - All corrections have been incorporated in the judgment/order being emailed.
Ashok Kumar Songara/P.A.cum J.W