Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Radhakrishna Yadav (Died Per Lrs) And ... vs G. Kalavati Bai on 21 February, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(3)ALD150, 2002(5)ALT750
ORDER Dubagunta Subrahmanyam, J.
1. This revision petition is filed by the tenant under Section 22 of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, (for short 'the Act') against the order dated 22-10-1998 in RA No. 314 of 1995 on the file of Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, confirming the order dated 10-4-1995 in RC No.247 of 1993 on the file of I Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad.
2. Necessary facts for the disposal of this revision petition are as follows:
Ranveer Singh was the owner of the petition schedule property. On 27-6-1992 he sold the said property under a registered sale deed Ex.A3 in favour of Smt. G. Kalavathi Bai. On the same day, general power of attorney holder of Ranveer Singh sold the same property to another lady by name Smt. Seshikala under a different registered sale deed. By that time the revision petitioner herein was the tenant in the petition schedule premises from a long time having taken the said premises on rent from Ranveer Singh. After purchase, Kalavathi Bai as well as Ranveer Singh in wirting informed the revision petitioner about the purchase of the property by Kalavthi Bai and asked him to pay the rent at the rate of Rs.250-00 per month to Kalavathi Bai. Meanwhile the other purchaser Smt. Seshikala also called upon | the revision petitioner to pay her the monthly rent at Rs.200-00. The revision petitioner issued notice to Smt. Kalavathi Bai and to Smt. Seshikala as well as Ranveer Singh asking both the purchasers to show him their respective sale deeds as rival claims were put forward by both of them regarding the rent. Meanwhile Smt. Seshikala filed eviction petition against the revision petitioner in RCC No.475 of 1992 seeking his eviction. Thereupon on 16-9-1992 the revision petitioner filed a petition under Section 9 of the Act before the Rent Controller. Thereafter during March, 1993, Smt. Kalavathi Bai filed eviction petition against the revision petitioner in RC No.247 of 1993. She sought the eviction of the tenant on three grounds, namely, (i) denial of title of the landlady by the tenant-revision petitioner is not bona fide; (ii) wilful default in payment of rent from 27-6-1992 to 27-4-1993; and (iii) bona fide requirement of the landlady for additional accommodation of her son who is a practising advocate. The Rent Controller ordered the eviction of the revision petitioner. Thereupon the revision petitioner filed an appeal in RA No.314 of 1995. The appellate Court by its order dated 22-10-1998 confirmed the orders of eviction passed by the Rent Controller in RC No. 247 of 1993. Aggrieved by the said order of the appellate Court, this revision petition is filed by the tenant.
3. In this revision petition the Court is not concerned with eviction petition filed by Smt. Seshikala in RC No.475 of 1992. The petition in RCC No.595 of 1992 filed by the revision petitioner under Section 9 was allowed by the Rent Controller by his order dated 25-3-1994. The plea taken in the present eviction petition against him is that the rent stipulated in Rs.200-00 per month and not Rs.250-00 per month. In the petition under Section 9 of the Act, the Rent Controller permitted the revision petitioner to deposit rent of Rs.200-00 per month in Court regularly on or before 10th of every month. He declared that none of the respondents are entitled to withdraw the said amount pending the settlement of the title dispute by a competent Court and they are entitled to approach the Rent Controller after settlement of their dispute by a decision of the competent Court.
The respondent in this revision petition Smt. Kalavathi Bat as well as her rival claimant Smt. Seshikala and the original owner Ranveer Singh are the respondents in RCC No.595 of 1992. The order under Section 9 passed on 25-3-1994 is not challenged in appeal by any of the respondents to that petition. The said order has become final and conclusive. In view of the order to be passed by this Court in this revision petition, it is not necessary for this Court to consider whether the denial of title of the landlord by the revision petitioner is bona fide or not. It is also not necessary to consider whether there is any wilful default on the part of the revision petitioner in payment of rents and whether the requirement of the landlady as additional accommodation for her practising son also need not be considered and decided in this revision petition. The fact remains that in RCC No.475 of 1992 the Rent Controller accepted the version of the present revision petitioner that there is bona fide doubt in the mind of the revision petitioner as to the person who is entitled to receive the rent for the suit premises.
4. It is the contention of the revision petitioner that after the order was passed by the Rent Controller in the petition filed under Section 9 by the revision petitioner, the only course left either to the present respondent or her rival claimant Seshikala is to approach the civil Court and get a declaration regarding the title and right to receive the rent from the revision petitioner. It is the further contention that as the respondent-landlady did not approach the competent civil Court and obtain necessary judgment and decree in her favour, she is not entitled to get the revision petitioner-tenant evicted from the suit premises on any ground whatsoever. At this juncture it is necessary to point out that it is not the case of the respondent-landlady that at any time subsequent to the order of the Rent Controller in RCC No.595 of 1992, the dispute was settled between the parties and as a result of that dispute, the respondent-landlady became entitled to receive the rent and thus she became entitled to seek the eviction of the tenant on any of the grounds provided in the Act. It is also necessary to point out at this juncture, as pointed out by the appellate Court in its order, that regarding her title the present landlady filed a suit in OS No. 1402 of 1992 and Smt. Seshikala filed two suits in OS No. 2050 of 1992 and OS No. 2427 of 1992. It is also necessary to point out that the present revision petitioner admittedly is not a party to any of those suits. The appellate Court in its order stated that the said civil litigation is still pending.
5. For proper appreciation and just disposal of this revision petition, it is necessary to extract the relevant provisions in the Act. Section 9 deals with the right of the tenant to deposit rents in certain cases. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 9 deal with the cases where the address of the landlord or his authorised agent is not known to the tenant. Sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of Section 9 deal with the situation where the tenant has any bona fide doubt regarding the person who is entitled to receive the rent or a dispute arises as to the person who is entitled to receive the rent for the building concerned. Section 10 of the Act provides various grounds on which the landlord can seek the eviction of the tenant. The provisions in Sections 10, 12 and 13 deal with various types of grounds on which the eviction of the tenant can be sought for by the landlord. There is a proviso to Section 10 (1) of the Act. That proviso deals with a situation where the tenant denies the title of the landlord and then on that ground, the landlord seeks the eviction of the tenant. For the purpose of this revision petition, I am hereunder extracting the provisions contained in Section 9(3), 9(4) and 9(5) and Section 10(1) and proviso to Section 10(1) of the Act.
"Where any bona fide doubt or dispute arises as to the person who is entitled to receive the rent for any building the tenant may deposit such rent before such authority and in such manner as may be prescribed and shall report to the Controller the circumstances under which such deposit was made by him and may continue to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building before the same authority and in the same manner until the doubt is removed or the dispute is settled by the decision of a competent Court or by as settlement between the parties or until the Controller makes an order under Clause (b) of Sub-section (4) as the case may be."
"(a) The Controller to whom a report is made under Sub-section (3) shall, if satisfied that a bona fide doubt or dispute exists in the matter, direct that, pending removal of the doubt, or settlement of the dispute as aforesaid, the deposit be held by the authority concerned.
(b) If the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall forthwith order payment of the amount deposited to the landlord.
"Where the Controller passes an order under Clause (a) of Sub-section (4) any amount or amounts deposited under Sub-section (3) may be withdrawn only by the person who is declared by a competent Court to be entitled thereto, or in case the doubt or dispute is removed by a settlement between the parties, only by person who is held by the Controller to be entitled to the amount or amounts in accordance with such settlement"
"A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section or Sections 12 and 13.
Provided that where the tenant, denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Controller shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if he records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil Court and the Court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in the said section, notwithstanding that the Court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded".
6. A reading of the provisions in Sub-section (3), (4) and (5) of Section 9 of the Act indicates that if the tenant entertains a bona fide doubt as to the person who is entitled to receive the rent of any building or if dispute arises in this regard, the tenant may deposit the rent before the Rent Controller until the doubt is removed or the dispute is settled by the decision of a competent Court or by settlement between the parties or until the Controller makes an order under Sub-clause (b) of Sub-section (4) of Section 9. If the Controller feels satisfied that a bona fide doubt or dispute exists in the matter, pending removal of the doubt, or settlement of the dispute, he may order the deposit be held by the authority concerned. Clause (5) is an important provision. It comes into operation after the Rent Controller passes the order on the petition filed by the tenant under Section 9 of the Act. It lays down that the amount deposited by the tenant may be withdraw only by the person who is declared by a competent Court to be entitled thereto. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner that the competent Court referred to in Sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section 9 is a civil Court. On the other hand, it is the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent-landlady that the competent Court referred to in Section 9 is the Rent Controller himself. He contended that though the Rent Controller under Section 9 permitted the tenant to deposit the rents till the decision is made by a competent Court, subsequently the Rent Controller in the present eviction filed by the landlady in RC No. 247 of 1993 held that the tenant is liable to be evicted on the ground that his denial of the title of the landlady is not bona fide and the decision in RC No.247 of 1993 is to be treated as a decision of the competent Court referred to in Section 9 of the Act.
7. There is a fallacy in the contention that the decision in RC No. 247 of 1993, is to be treated as a decision of the competent civil Court referred to in Section 9 of the Act. The fallacy is evident for a simple reason. In the above order the Rent Controller did not consider and give any finding regarding the title of the landlord in the said petition over the disputed property. What he did was he found that the denial of title of the landlord by the tenant is not bona fide. That finding does not amount that he gave the finding that the landlord has title over the disputed property. Further, any dispute regarding title is to be decided in a suit or proceeding to which all the rival claimants to the disputed property are parties. In RCC No.247 of 1993 the other rival claimants to the disputed property are not parties. In RCC No.247 of 1993 the other rival claimant Smt. Seshikala is not a party. In her absence as one of the parties to the said proceedings, even if it is presumed that the Rent Controller has got power and jurisdiction to decide title to immovable property, the disputed title between Smt. Seshikala and the claimant cannot be decided.
8. In support of his contention that the competent Court is a civil Court and not the Rent Controller, the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner invited the attention of the Court to the proviso to Section 10(1) of the Act. Section 10(1) comes to play when the eviction petition is filed by the landlord seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground that the denial of title of the landlady by the tenant is not bona fide. This proviso lays down that if the Controller records a finding to the effect that the denial of title of the landlord by the tenant is bona fide, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil Court and the Court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in the said section, notwithstanding that the Court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded. According to the learned Counsel for the revision petitioners direct reference to a civil Court in the proviso to Section 10(1) of the Act indicates that the reference to a competent Court in Section 9 of the Act refers to the civil Court and not to the Rent Controller. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner contends that there, is a direct reference to civil Court in the proviso to Section 10(1) and in contrast, there is no reference to civil Court as a competent Court in Section 9 and it makes the different and therefore, the competent Court referred to in Section 9(3) and Section 9(5) of the Act is not regular civil Court but is Rent Controller.
9. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the respective contentions advanced by both the parties. Under Section 9(5), the rent deposited before the Court can be withdrawn by the landlord after the Rent Controller passes the final orders under Section 9(4) of the Act if the landlord satisfies one of the two alternative situations covered by the said provision. One situation is the amount can be withdrawn only by the person who is declared by a competent Court to be entitled thereto. The other situation is if the doubt or dispute present at the time of the tenant instituting the proceedings under Section 9(3) of the Act is later removed by a settlement between the parties, such person who is held by the Controller to be entitled to the amount or amounts in accordance with such settlement. The liberty is given to the Rent Controller to pay the amount in deposit before the Rent Controller if the dispute or doubt is removed by a subsequent settlement between the parties. If any of the parties report to the Controller that the doubt or dispute present at the time of institution of the proceedings was subsequently removed by settlement between the parties, the Rent Controller has got an authority to inquire into the matter further and decide as to the person entitled to receive the amount. In the present case there is no such settlement between the parties. There is no removal of the doubt expressed by the tenant at the time of institution of the proceedings under Section 9(3) of the Act. If that situation does not arise, the withdrawal can be made only by a person declared by a competent Court to be entitled to receive the amounts. In the present case either this landlady or the other landlady, namely, Smt. Seshikala will be entitled to receive the amount deposited by the tenant if there is an order of a competent Court entitling any of them to withdraw the amount. Therefore, the competent Court referred to in Section 9(3) and Section 9(5) of the Act means only a competent civil Court.
10. If the intention of the Legislature is only to empower the Rent Controller to decide the dispute relating to the title of the premises covered by the petition, the Act would have straightaway empowered the Rent Controller himself to decide that title dispute and order the person so held by the Rent Controller to be the title owner to receive the amounts deposited from time to time by the tenant before the Rent Controller under Section 9(3) of the Act. It is a well known principle of law that the tenancy Court is not competent to decide disputes relating to the title to the petition schedule properties if there is a dispute relating to the title of the property concerned. As per the proviso to Section 10(1), if the Rent Controller finds that the denial of the title of the landlord is bona fide, the landlord has no alternative except to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil Court. In the present case the Rent Controller in the petition filed by the tenant held that the denial of the title of the landlord by the tenant is bona fide. That order is prior to the eviction order passed in RC No. 247 of 1993 by the Rent Controller. The order under Section 9(3) of the Act in favour of the tenant is anterior to the order of the Rent Controller in RC No. 247 of 1993. It is also to be stated that the present landlord instituted RCC No. 247 of 1993 after the tenant filed the petition in RCC No. 595 of 1992. Therefore, in the present RCC No. 247 of 1993, in view of the earlier decision by the Rent Controller in RCC No. 595 of 1992, the Rent Controller ought not to have given any finding on the denial of title by the present tenant and should have asked the landlord to seek appropriate relief from a competent civil Court. The Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to pass the present eviction order in view of the decision by the Rent Controller in RCC No. 595 of 1992. The only recourse left to the landlady in the present eviction petition is to approach a competent civil Court, get her title to the suit property declared and obtain orders of the civil Court to withdraw the amounts being deposited by the tenant in RCC No. 595 of 1992 and also if she still desires to evict the tenant, to obtain orders of eviction from the civil Court concerned. Till she obtains such orders from the civil Court, the landlady is not entitled to evict the tenant from the petition schedule premises. Therefore, I hold that the orders of the appellate Court as well as the Rent Controller are bad in law and without jurisdiction and therefore both the orders are liable to be set aside.
11. In the result, the civil revision petition is allowed. The orders of the Rent Controller in RCC No.247 of 1993 and the appellate Court in RA No. 314 of 1995 are set aside. No costs.