Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Udmi Ram And Ors. vs Dharam Singh And Ors. on 7 March, 1988
Equivalent citations: 1989CRILJ1522, 1988(2)WLN388
ORDER Jas Raj Chopra, J.
1. This revision petition Under Section 397, read with Section 401 Cr. P.C. has been filed against the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Churu, dt. 26-9-87, whereby the learned Sessions Judge has accepted the revision petition filed against the order of the learned S.D.M., Rajgarh, dt. 26-5-87 and has held that no proceedings Under Section 145 Cr. P.C. ought to have been initiated and, therefore, he has ordered that these proceedings be dropped.
2. Detailed arguments were advanced at the admission stage.
2A. The facts necessary to be noticed for the disposal of this revision, briefly stated are that Khasra Nos, 9 and 162, situated in village Mithi, which earlier formed part of Khasra No. 28, were recorded as Doli of Mandir Shri Thakurji in Samvat year 2018 to Samwat year 2021. At that time Shri Jaggu Ram was the Poojari of the temple and it transpires that he got this khasra No. 28 recorded in his khatedari. Jaggu Ram was later removed from the post of Poojari and one Shiv Ram was appointed as Poojari of the temple. Shri Shivram tried to cultivate these fields as Poojari of the temple but that attempt was resisted by Jaggu Ram and his son Dharam Singh. Therefore, he initiated proceedings Under Section 145 Cr. P.C. before the learned SDM, Rajgarh, in the year 1975 and those proceedings were dropped later. It is alleged that Shivram in his capacity as Poojari of Temple, Shri Thakurjee again filed proceedings Under Section 145 on 29-10-76. The learned SDM vide his order dt. 1-11-76 attached the disputed property but later after Jaggu Ram put in his appearance and filed his reply, those proceedings were dropped and it was ordered that the possession of the land attached, should be delivered back to Jaggu Ram. A revision was filed against this order, before the learned Sessions Judge, Churu, but that was also dismissed on 13-4-83. Thus in a dispute between these very parties the proceedings terminated in favour of Jaggu Ram and his sons. Later on it is alleged that one Hazari filed a revenue suit on behalf of Temple Shri Thakurjee before the SDM, Rajgarh claiming that the land should be recorded in the Khatedari of the temple and that suit was dismissed by the learned SDM on 13-4-83. An appeal against this decision was filed before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Bikaner, and that appeal was accepted by the Revenue Appellate Authority vide its judgment dt. 8-12-86 and it was ordered that this disputed land be recorded in the khatedari of the Mandir Shri Thakurjee. Jaggu Ram filed a revision before the Revenue Board against the decision of the Revenue Appellate Authority, Bikaner, and the Revenue Board, during the pendency of the revision, passed an order that status as it existed regarding possession of the land should be maintained. Prior to that Revenue Appellate Authority also stayed the execution of its own judgment up to 9-12-86. During the pendency of these proceedings before the Revenue Board, Shri Hazari filed an application Under Section 145 and 146 in the court of S.D.M, Rajgarh; on 15-5-87 and that complaint was enquired into by the S.H.O. Rajgarh and he filed his investigation report before the court on 23-5-87, on the basis of which a preliminary order Under Section 145(1) Cr. P.C. was drawn by the S.D.M., Rajgarh, on 26-5-87 and simultaneously the disputed land was ordered to be attached Under Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. It was against this order that this revision was preferred before the learned Sessions Judge.
3. While relying on certain authorities of the Supreme Court and this Court the learned Sessions Judge, Churu held that when a dispute is pending about the same property, before a revenue Court, in which an injunction of status quo has been granted by the Revenue Board, parallel proceedings Under Section 145, read with Section 146 Cr. P.C. cannot be instituted and, therefore, he passed the order under revision, as aforesaid and hence, Hazari, Udmi Ram, etc. have filed this revision petition before this Court.
4. Mr. K. C. Samdaria, appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the object of criminal proceedings is different from the civil proceedings about the same land. Even if some civil litigation is pending between the parties, but if breach of peace is contemplated about the possession of a piece of land, proceedings Under Section 134 Cr. P.C. can be initiated and can be allowed to be continued.
5. In this respect, he placed reliance on a single Bench decision of this Court in Subhkaran v. State of Rajasthan (1987) 1 Rajasthan LR 81. The learned Judge has held that there is a scramble for possession between the parties regarding the disputed property, the document produced by the parties, not even prima facie establish the rights of any party and, therefore, the A.D.M.'s order continuing the attachment of the property and the order of appointment of receiver made by him were maintained. This was a case in which one Subhkaran alleged himself to be the tenant of the Manohar Devi Jankalyan Trust and he filed a suit before the Addl. Civil Judge, Jaipur, for declaration and injunction and claimed that he is in possession of the premises as lawful tenant and, therefore the defendants be restrained from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. In that suit, the petitioner filed an application for injunction under Order 39 Rule 2 C.P.C. The learned Addl. Civil Judge No. 1, Jaipur, after hearing both the parties, by its order dt. April 7, 1986, restrained the opposite party Chandan Mal Duggar and his descendants from disturbing the possession of Subhkaran, over the said property, otherwise than in accordance with law. In spite of this injunction, existing in favour of Shri Subhkaran and against Shri Chandan Mal Duggar and his legal heirs, the court thought it fit that proceedings Under Section 145 could be initiated and attachment could be made Under Section 146 and that attachment could be continued. In this case, the attention of the learned Judge was drawn to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ram Sumer Puri v. State of U.P. but that decision was distinguished. With all due regards to the learned Judge, I am unable to agree with the ratio of this decision in view of this authority of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ramsumerpuri's case (supra) and the overwhelming authorities of this Court. When a civil Court in suit for declaration and injunction has passed an ad interim injunction after hearing both the parties, wherein the question of possession was very much involved, how can a contrary order be passed by a criminal court, disturbing the possession of a particular party, which has been prima facie held to be in possession by a civil court about the same property. That virtually negatives the dictum laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ramsumer Pun's case (supra). Their Lordships in this case, were dealing with a dispute where the rights of the parties were decided by a civil court. But in spite of it their Lordships. observed as under (para 2):
There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the civil court is, binding on the criminal court in a matter like, the one before us. Counsel for respondents 2-5 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the civil court, the criminal court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction, particularly when possession is are in a position to approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation.
(emphasis supplied by me).
6. Their Lordships, therefore, observed that even in a pending litigation where question of possession is being examined by a civil court, the parties can approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver, for adequate protection of the property.
7. In the case in hand, the question of possession was very much in dispute and it was contended that this land has wrongly been recorded in the Khatedari of Jaggu Ram It is a Doli of the temple and its Khatedari should be recorded in favour of Mandir Shri Thakurji. The Revenue Board has passed art order to maintain the status quo as it existed on that day. When that was the order passed about the possession, no parallel criminal proceeding should have been initiated as per the decision of their Lordships' of the Supreme Court in Ram Sumerpuri's case (1985 Cri LJ 752) (supra). This decision was later on followed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Arvind Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1986 Raj Cri C 290 and it was observed by the learned Judge that right, title and interest have to be finally adjudicated upon by the Civil Court and such an adjudication would be binding on parties and the Civil Court is equally competent to pass an interior order in connection with the protection for alleged right, title and interest of the parties and also in connection with the protection of the properties in question. If by any interim order passed by the Civil Court, any party feels aggrieved, then a regular remedy is available to the party in law and the parties should not be allowed to invoke the criminal jurisdiction. This decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court and the aforesaid authority of the Rajasthan High Court was followed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Meghraj v. State 1986 Cri LR (Raj) 395. I have also followed these two authorities, while sitting singly in S.B. Criminal Revision No. 70/87 Narain Lal v. Slate of Rajasthan decided on 2-11-87. In this case also proceedings Under Section 145 were taken twice between the parties. Once the proceedings were dismissed and on the second occasion, they were dropped, after the filing of reply by Jaggu Ram and it was ordered by the Criminal Court that the possession of Jaggu Ram should not be disturbed by the opposite party. Moreover, dual and parallel proceedings have been held to be misuse of the process of court by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Ali Mohd. v. State of Rajasthan 1986 Raj Cri C. 166.
8. Mr. Kewal Chand Samdaria, also placed reliance on Full Bench decision of this Court in Tikuda v. State 1961 Raj LW 461 : 1961-2 Cri LJ 552. In para 4 of the judgment, the Full Bench has observed as under:
For instance, in a case like that of Rugga where a suit for declaration and injunction is pending in a revenue court or if a similar case is pending in a civil court, and if a temporary injunction against one party has already been given by that court, then it is evident that the said court has already considered that party in possession of the immovable property in whose favour the injunction has been granted and if in spite of that temporary injunction the other party is bent upon dispossessing the first party and a breach of peace is imminent, then the proper course is to bind down the party which is not in possession of the property, to keep peace for the requisite period.
9. It was of course observed by the Full Bench that simply because a suit about the immovable property is already pending in a Civil Court, it does not mean that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to proceed Under Section 145 is ousted, but at the same time it was observed that if a litigation about the immovable property is pending in the civil or revenue court and an injunction has been granted in favour of a party and against the opposite party then, if any breach of peace is contemplated, proceedings Under Section 107 read with Section 116 Cr. P.C. should be taken and not Under Section 145 Cr. P.C., and if it is a case regarding appointment of a receiver etc., that can safely be agitated before a Revenue Court or the Civil Court concerned, as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ramsumerpuri's case (1985 Cri LJ 752) (supra), which was later followed in Arvind Singhs's case (1986 Raj Cri C 290) (supra).
10. Mr. Samdaria also referred to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sajjan Singh s/o Jagannath Singh v. Sajjan Singh s/o Bhairu Singh 1969 WLN Part III, 75 where in a civil litigation pending between the parties, an injunction was issued in favour of Sajjan Singh s/o Jagannath Singh and against Sajjan Singh s/o Bahairu Singh. Proceedings were initiated about the same disputed land before a Criminal Court Under Section 145 Cr. P.C. The Sub-Divisional Officer appointed a receiver regarding that property. Reference was made by the learned Sessions Judge against that order to the High Court. High Court set aside that order of attachment of the house as also the order of the appointment of the Receiver. An appeal was preferred before their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Although their Lordships felt that the matter should again go back to the criminal court for deciding whether in the proceedings instituted in the year 1967, there still exists likelihood of breach of peace in the year 1969 and it was further directed that the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate should decide whether the receiver should be continued or not. In addition to these orders, their Lordships further observed that in any event the SDM should not disturb the possession of Sajjan Singh, s/o Jagannath Singh, so long as the temporary injunction is outstanding and pending the decision of the proceedings Under Section 145 Cr. P.C., with a view to handing over the possession to the other side, which clearly means that if any injunction has been passed by a Civil Court, then that injunction has to be honoured. This was the view of their Lordships even in the year 1969, which has of course undergone some change and the latest view of their Lordships on the point is contained in the aforesaid decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ramsumerpuri's case (1985 Cri LJ 752) (supra).
11. Mr. Samdaria also referred to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mathuralal v. Bhanwarlal . This decision has no application to the facts of the present case. There the point raised was whether after proceedings Under Section 145 Cr. P.C. are initiated and an order Under Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. is issued regarding the disputed property, whether the dispute has to be settled by the civil court or the Magistrate can still proceed with the proceedings and it was held by their Lordships that the Magistrate still has jurisdiction to decide as to who was in possession of the property and to whom the possession should be handed over. Thus, this authority has no application to facts of the present case.
12. The upshot of the entire discussion is that where a civil or revenue litigation is pending between the parties about the disputed property in which question of possession of property is very much involved, he party must approach the civil or revenue court, as the case may be, for grant of interim injunction or for appointment of a Receiver. If such an ad interim injunction has already been granted or a Receiver has already been appointed by those courts then none of those parties should be permitted to initiate parallel criminal proceedings about the possession of that property Under Section 145 Cr. P.C. Multiplicity of litigation is neither in the interest of parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. That will certainly amount to misuse of the process of court and deserves to be discouraged with a firm hand. If in spite of an injunction existing in favour of one party, if the opposite party still tries to disturb peace, the proper course is to proceed against such party Under Section 107 read with Section 116 Cr. P.C. and not Under Section 145/146 Cr. P.C.
13. Moreover, in this case such proceedings have already taken place and the possession has been restored to the opposite party. Under these circumstances, the parties must litigate their rights before the Revenue Board or before any competent civil court. Criminal Court is not the proper forum for redressing their grievance about the possession of this property.
14. I, therefore, hold that this revision petition is not fit to be admitted and, therefore, it is dismissed at the admission stage.