Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On : 20.05.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 23 May, 2025
Author: Virender Singh
Bench: Virender Singh
2025:HHC:15445 THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.MP(M) No.1077 of 2025 Reserved on : 20.05.2025 Decided on : 23.05.2025 Amit Kumar ...Applicant Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the applicant : Mr. Anirudh Sharma, Advocate. For the respondent : Mr. Tejasvi Sharma, Additional Advocate General, with Ms. Ranjna Patial, Deputy Advocate General, assisted by ASI Nishant Kumar, Police Station, Baddi.
Virender Singh, Judge By way of the present application, filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'BNSS'), applicant-Amit Kumar has sought his release, on bail, during the pendency of the trial, in case FIR No.200 of 2020, dated 29.07.2020, registered under Sections 302, 111, 202 and 34 of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the 'IPC'), with Police Station Baddi, District Solan, H.P. 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. According to the applicant, he is innocent person and has falsely been implicated and arrested by the police, in the present case.
3. The applicant has pleaded that he had earlier tried his luck by moving similar application, before the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nalagarh, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh. However, the same was dismissed, vide order dated 28.08.2024. 3.1. Thereafter, the applicant had moved bail application, bearing CrMP(M) No.2723 of 2024, before this Court. However, the said application was dismissed as withdrawn, vide order dated 13.12.2024.
4. The applicant has sought the relief of bail, on the ground that there is no direct or indirect evidence, collected by the police, in this case, to connect him with the crime in question.
5. Relief of bail has also been sought by the applicant, on the ground of undue delay, in conclusion of trial, against him.
6. Elaborating his stand, it is the further case of the applicant that the charges were framed, against him, on 09.04.2021 and case is now listed on 27.08.2025 for 3 2025:HHC:15445 prosecution evidence. The applicant is stated to be in judicial custody since 06.08.2020 and till date, out of 30 prosecution witnesses, only 4 prosecution witnesses have been examined.
7. All the above facts have been pleaded to show that the chances of conclusion of trial, against the applicant, in near future, are not so bright.
8. Apart from this, Mr. Anirudh Sharma, learned counsel, appearing for the applicant, has given certain undertakings, on behalf of the applicant, for which, the applicant is ready to abide by, in case, ordered to be released, on bail, during the pendency of the trial.
9. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to release the applicant on bail, during the pendency of the trial, by allowing the bail application.
10. When, put to notice, the police has filed the status report disclosing therein, that on 29.07.2020, ASI Nahenderjit Singh Khatta, along with other police officials, had visited the spot, in response to Rapat No.34. On the spot, complainant-Manish Kumar, S/o Harbans Lal, got recorded his statement, under Section 154 of CrPC, mentioning therein, that he is resident of the address, as 4 2025:HHC:15445 mentioned in the statement, and studying in 3rd year of B. Pharma Course at Baddi University.
10.1. As per the further statement, got recorded by the complainant, on 29.07.2020, at about 08:57 am, he was present at his home, then, he heard the commotion that dead body of an unknown person was lying in the field of Maan Singh, S/o Chand Ram, R/o Hirapur Sandoli, upon which, he reached at the spot. At the spot, he noticed that on the side of the field, in which, maize was sown, a young man of 29-30 years was lying dead. Adjoining to the said field, passage was there and as such, it has been thought by the complainant that some unknown person had killed that man and thrown him in the field. Consequently, he had informed the police. 10.2. On the basis of above facts, police registered the case, under Section 302 of IPC and criminal machinery swung into motion.
10.3. Thereafter, the investigation was conducted by ASI Nahenderjit Singh Khatta. Spot was visited and spot map was prepared. Control sample of soil was obtained. Aadhar Card and SIM No.89918660400107435240 110 of the deceased was taken into possession. The deceased was 5 2025:HHC:15445 identified by his maternal uncle (Mama), namely Shiv Shankar Upadhaya, as his nephew Abhishek Shukla. Thereafter, the dead body was sent to CHC Nalagarh for conducting the post-mortem. However, due to the restrictions, imposed on account of COVID-19 pandemic, the post-mortem of the deceased could not be conducted and thereafter, the dead body was sent to IGMC, Shimla, where, post-mortem of the dead body was conducted and the Medical Officer preserved the relevant physical evidence.
10.4. During the investigation, SIM No.78763-37147 was recovered from the clothes, which were worn by the deceased. With the help of Cyber-Cell, CDR and SDR of that number were obtained. The said SIM was issued in the name of Om Prakash, S/o Dharamendra, R/o H.No.256, Ram Complex, Baddi. Subsequently, said Om Prakash was associated in the investigation and during investigation, he has disclosed that deceased-Abhishek Shukla joined their company only for 3-4 days and as per the direction of the factory owner, Om Prakash kept deceased-Abhishek Shukla in his room. However, in the intervening night of 18.07.2020, the said person had stolen 6 2025:HHC:15445 mobile phone with SIM of said Om Prakash. Thereafter, the said person has not attended his duties. Said Om Parkash tried to search for his mobile phone, but, he could not find. 10.5. It is the further case of the police that during the investigation, it was found that deceased-Abhishek Shukla was working with Himpackwell Company, Katha and with the help of Cyber-Cell Team, CCTV footage of the area was checked and it was found that on 28.07.2020, at about 11:47 am, applicant was found coming out of the company, along with a bag and was moving towards Baddi, on foot. On the perusal of CCTV footage, installed at Coca Cola Company, Mahalaxmi Spinning Company, the applicant was found to be moving towards Baddi and at about 11:58 am, on the gate of Naina Food Pvt. Ltd., one motorcyclist met him and the said motorcyclist had handed over a packet to the Security Guard of the Company. During that period, deceased and said motorcyclist talked to each other and thereafter, the deceased also sat on the motorcycle and both of them left the spot on motorcycle towards Baddi side. 10.6. Thereafter, the Security Guards Jeevan Sharma and Kanwar Singh, Naina Food Pvt. Ltd., were associated 7 2025:HHC:15445 and on enquiry, both of them had disclosed that the person, shown in the CCTV footage, who was riding the motorcycle, was Amit Kumar (applicant) and working with Aanchal Stationery, Baddi, upon which, the owner of Aanchal Stationery, Baddi was associated in the investigation, who has disclosed that for the last 2 years, Amit Kumar (applicant) was working with him and supplying the articles in the field. Amit Kumar (applicant) was living in a rented accommodation in Haripur. 10.7. It is the further case of the police that thereafter, on 31.07.2020, police had raided the house of Amit Kumar (applicant) at 05:00 am. In the room, Amit Kumar (applicant), along with his friend Deepu and Sajid, was found present there, who were apprised about the investigation, conducted by the police and enquired from them.
10.8. During the investigation, Amit Kumar (applicant), Sajid and Deepu had made confession about the murder of Abhishek Shukla. As such, Sections 111 and 202 of IPC have been added, in this case. Subsequently, Amit Kumar (applicant), Sajid and Deepu Kumar were arrested. Amit Kumar (applicant) was arrested for the 8 2025:HHC:15445 commission of offence, punishable under Section 302 of IPC, whereas, accused Deepu Kumar was arrested for the offence, punishable under Section 111 of IPC and accused Sajid was arrested for the offence, punishable under Section 202 of IPC.
10.9. It is the further case of the police that on 01.08.2020, Amit Kumar (applicant) made a disclosure statement, under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, disclosing therein, that he was having the information, with regard to the mobile phone of the deceased and also disclosed that he could get recovered the weapon of offence, about which, he was having the information. 10.10. In pursuance of the said statement, Amit Kumar (applicant) got recovered steel rod, mobile and motorcycle, which were taken into police possession. Similarly, he has also got recovered his wearing apparels i.e. shirt and pants, which he had allegedly worn at the time of incident i.e. on 28.07.2020 and the same were also taken into police possession.
10.11. As per the report of the Medical Officer, following final opinion was given:-
"In our provisional opinion, the cause of death in this case is homicidal throttling, in a case of 9 2025:HHC:15445 blunt trauma, sustained to head leading to subarochnoid haemorrhage. The injuries are consistent with impact by a liner blunt object. The final opinion will be given after the chemical examination report from TOL, Junga."
10.12. After completion of the investigation, police has filed the charge-sheet against all the three accused in the competent Court of law.
10.13. Except the present case, no other case is stated to have been registered against the applicant. 10.14. It is further case of the police that in this case, 4 prosecution witnesses have already been examined and case is now listed for 28/29.07.2025 for recording the evidence of PWs 1, 3, 4 and 7.
10.15. As per the status report, co-accused, namely Deepu Kumar and Sajid, are stated to have been released, on bail, by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nalagarh, on 11.01.2021.
10.16. Lastly, it has been apprehended in the status report that due to the crime, committed by the applicant, there is lot of resentment in the society and in case, he is ordered to be released on bail, his life may be in danger.
11. On the basis of above facts, a prayer has been made to dismiss the application.
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12. As per the copies of zimni orders, annexed with the bail application, the learned trial Court has charged Amit Kumar (applicant) for the offence, punishable under Section 302 of IPC, whereas, accused Deepu Kumar has been charged for the offence, punishable under Section 202 of IPC. Thereafter, when, the learned trial Court could not procure the presence of accused Sajid, then, vide order dated 16.03.2023, the learned trial Court has declared accused Sajid as proclaimed offender.
13. The applicant, in the present case, has annexed the copies of zimni orders, passed by the learned trial Court, from 23.11.2020 till 11.04.2025.
14. Perusal of the zimni orders shows that the charges, against Amit Kumar (applicant) and accused Deepu Kumar, were framed, way back on 09.04.2021 and accused Sajid was declared as proclaimed offender on 16.03.2023. Thereafter, the case was listed for evidence of the prosecution witnesses.
15. In such situation, the material question, which arises for determination, before this Court, is about the fact, as to whether the relief of bail can be given to the 11 2025:HHC:15445 applicant on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial or not.
16. Mere delay in the trial does not entitle the applicant to seek the relief of bail, as, in order to get the relief of bail on the ground of violation of the fundamental right of speedy trial, as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the delay should be undue delay.
17. Learned counsel, appearing for the applicant, has pointed out that co-accused of the applicant, namely Sajid, was declared as proclaimed offender on 16.03.2023 and thereafter, matter was adjourned for 09.05.2023. Till date, only four prosecution witnesses could be examined by the prosecution and now, the learned trial Court has listed the matter on 28/29.07.2025 for recording the statements of only four prosecution witnesses.
18. On the contrary, learned Additional Advocate General has pointed out that the delay is not attributable to the prosecution, since, as per the zimni orders, placed on file, application for exemption of co-accused of the applicant, namely Deepu Kumar, had been moved on various dates.
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19. In this case, it cannot be ignored that the prosecution witnesses, summoned by the learned trial Court, who were present, before the Court, at that time, were not sent back unexamined by the learned trial Court, even on the point that co-accused of the applicant, namely Deepu Kumar, had moved the application for his exemption.
20. Besides this, two prosecution witnesses were examined on 16.02.2024 and thereafter, on 17.08.2024, two prosecution witnesses were examined and on the said dates too, co-accused of the applicant, namely Deepu Kumar, had moved the application for his exemption. As such, the delay cannot be attributed to the applicant, in this case.
21. It has rightly been argued by learned counsel, appearing for the applicant, that the fundamental right of the applicant for speedy trial, as envisaged, under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has been violated.
22. Right to speedy trial has been held to be fundamental right by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a case titled as Abdul Rehman Antulay and others versus R.S. Nayak and Another, 13 2025:HHC:15445 reported in (1992) 1 Supreme Court Cases 225. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the accused has right to speedy trial, which flows from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Relevant paragraph 86 of the said judgment is reproduced, as under:
"86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are:
(1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any the less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances.
(2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-
trial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view.
(3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are:
(a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction;
(b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and
(c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise.
(4) At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying 14 2025:HHC:15445 the proceedings. As is often pointed out, "delay is a known defence tactic". Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-
availability of witnesses, disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is -- who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not frivolous. Very often these stays are obtained on ex parte representation.
(5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on -- what is called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one.
(6) Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in Barker [33 L Ed 2d 101] "it cannot be said how long a delay is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate". The same idea has been stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell [15 L Ed 2d 627] in the following words:
'... the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than mere speed, as its essential ingredients; and whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances.' 15 2025:HHC:15445 However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case.
(7) We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the 'demand' rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be a plus point in his favour, but the mere non-asking for a speedy trial cannot be put against the accused. Even in USA, the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker [33 L Ed 2d 101] and other succeeding cases.
(8) Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors -- 'balancing test' or 'balancing process' -- and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case.
(9) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order -- including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded
-- as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case.
(10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of USA too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time-limit in 16 2025:HHC:15445 spite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer limit ineffectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial.
(11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis."
(self-emphasis supplied)
23. A three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in another case, titled as Raj Deo Sharma versus State of Bihar, reported in (1998) 7 Supreme Court Cases 507, has supplemented the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay's case (supra), by issuing the additional directions. Relevant paragraph 17 of the judgment in Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra) is reproduced as under:
"17. After deep consideration of the matter, we proceed to supplement the propositions laid down by the Constitution Bench in Antulay case [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] with the following directions:
(i) In cases where the trial is for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of a period of two years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the charges framed whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not within the said period and the court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case.
(ii) In such cases as mentioned above, if the accused has been in jail for a period of not less than one-half of the maximum period of punishment prescribed for the offence, the trial court shall release the accused on bail forthwith on such conditions as it deems fit.
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(iii) If the offence under trial is punishable with imprisonment for a period exceeding 7 years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of three years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the charge framed, whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not within the said period and the court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case, unless for very exceptional reasons to be recorded and in the interest of justice the court considers it necessary to grant further time to the prosecution to adduce evidence beyond the aforesaid time-limit.
(iv) But if the inability for completing the prosecution within the aforesaid period is attributable to the conduct of the accused in protracting the trial, no court is obliged to close the prosecution evidence within the aforesaid period in any of the cases covered by clauses (i) to (iii).
(v) Where the trial has been stayed by orders of the court or by operation of law, such time during which the stay was in force shall be excluded from the aforesaid period for closing the prosecution evidence. The above directions will be in addition to and without prejudice to the directions issued by this Court in "Common Cause" A Registered Society v. Union of India [(1996) 4 SCC 33 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 589] as modified by the same Bench through the order reported in "Common Cause" A Registered Society v. Union of India [(1996) 6 SCC 775 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 42]"
24. In case Dharmendra Kirthal versus State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, reported in (2013) 8 Supreme Court Cases 368, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held the right to speedy and fair trial to be an integral part of very soul of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Relevant paragraphs 30 to 33 of the judgment are reproduced, as under:
"30. Keeping the aforesaid enunciation in view, we shall presently proceed to deal with the stand and stance of both the sides. The first submission which
18 2025:HHC:15445 pertains to the denial of speedy trial has been interpreted to be a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. In Kartar Singh [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] , the majority, speaking through Pandian, J., has expressed thus: (SCC p. 638, paras 85-86) "85. The right to a speedy trial is not only an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration, to minimise anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation and to limit the possibility of impairing the ability of an accused to defend himself but also there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial. This right has been actuated in the recent past and the courts have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. In fact, lot of cases are coming before the courts for quashing of proceedings on the ground of inordinate and undue delay stating that the invocation of this right even need not await formal indictment or charge.
86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."
31. Be it noted, the Court also referred to the pronouncements in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] , Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admn. [(1978) 4 SCC 494 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 155] , Hussainara Khatoon (4) v. State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 98 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 40] , Hussainara Khatoon (6) v. State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 115 :
1980 SCC (Cri) 57] , Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [(1983) 2 SCC 104 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 361] , T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State of T.N. [(1983) 2 SCC 68 :
1983 SCC (Cri) 342] and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] .
32. The present provision is to be tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid constitutional principle. The provision clearly mandates that the trial under this Act of any offence by the Special Court shall have precedence and shall be concluded in 19 2025:HHC:15445 preference to the trial in such other courts to achieve the said purpose. The legislature thought it appropriate to provide that the trial of such other case shall remain in abeyance. It is apt to note here that "any other case" against the accused in "any other court" does not include the Special Court. The emphasis is on speedy trial and not denial of it. The legislature has incorporated such a provision so that an accused does not face trial in two cases simultaneously and a case before the Special Court does not linger owing to clash of dates in trial. It is also worthy to note that the Special Court has been conferred jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act to try any other offences with which the accused may, under any other law for the time being in force, have been charged and proceeded at the same trial.
33. As far as fair trial is concerned, needless to emphasise, it is an integral part of the very soul of Article 21 of the Constitution. Fair trial is the quintessentiality of apposite dispensation of criminal justice. In Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat [(2004) 4 SCC 158 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 999] , it has been held as follows: (SCC p. 183, para 33) "33. The principle of fair trial now informs and energises many areas of the law. It is reflected in numerous rules and practices. It is a constant, ongoing development process continually adapted to new and changing circumstances, and exigencies of the situation--peculiar at times and related to the nature of crime, persons involved-- directly or operating behind, social impact and societal needs and even so many powerful balancing factors which may come in the way of administration of criminal justice system."
(self-emphasis supplied)
25. Similar view has been taken by a two Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in case, titled as Hussain and another versus Union of India, reported in (2017) 5 Supreme Court Cases 702. Relevant paragraphs 9 to 12 of the judgment are reproduced, as under:
"9. As already noticed, speedy trial is a part of reasonable, fair and just procedure guaranteed under Article 21. This constitutional right cannot be 20 2025:HHC:15445 denied even on the plea of non-availability of financial resources. The court is entitled to issue directions to augment and strengthen the investigating machinery, setting up of new courts, building new court houses, providing more staff and equipment to the courts, appointment of additional Judges and other measures as are necessary for speedy trial [Hussainara Khatoon (4) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 98, para 10 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 40].
10. Directions given by this Court in Hussainara Khatoon (7) v. State of Bihar, (1995) 5 SCC 326 :
1995 SCC (Cri) 913, to this effect which were left to be implemented by the High Courts are as follows:
(SCC p. 328, para 2) "2. Since this Court has already laid down the guidelines by orders passed from time to time in this writ petition and in subsequent orders passed in different cases since then, we do not consider it necessary to restate the guidelines periodically because the enforcement of the guidelines by the subordinate courts functioning in different States should now be the responsibility of the different High Courts to which they are subordinate. General orders for release of undertrials without reference to specific fact situations in different cases may prove to be hazardous. While there can be no doubt that undertrial prisoners should not languish in jails on account of refusal to enlarge them on bail for want of their capacity to furnish bail with monetary obligations, these are matters which have to be dealt with on case-to-case basis keeping in mind the guidelines laid down by this Court in the orders passed in this writ petition and in subsequent cases from time to time. Sympathy for the undertrials who are in jail for long terms on account of the pendency of cases has to be balanced having regard to the impact of crime, more particularly, serious crime, on society and these considerations have to be weighed having regard to the fact situations in pending cases.
While there can be no doubt that trials of those accused of crimes should be disposed of as early as possible, general orders in regard to Judge-strength of subordinate judiciary in each State must be attended to, and its functioning overseen, by the High Court of the State concerned. We share the sympathetic concern of the learned counsel for the petitioners that undertrials should not languish in jails for long spells merely on account of their inability to meet monetary obligations. We are, however, of the view that such monitoring can be done more effectively by the High Courts since it 21 2025:HHC:15445 would be easy for those Courts to collect and collate the statistical information in that behalf, apply the broad guidelines already issued and deal with the situation as it emerges from the status reports presented to it. The role of the High Court is to ensure that the guidelines issued by this Court are implemented in letter and spirit. We think it would suffice if we request the Chief Justices of the High Courts to undertake a review of such cases in their States and give appropriate directions where needed to ensure proper and effective implementation of the guidelines. Instead of repeating the general directions already issued, it would be sufficient to remind the High Courts to ensure expeditious disposal of cases."
11. Deprivation of personal liberty without ensuring speedy trial is not consistent with Article 21. While deprivation of personal liberty for some period may not be avoidable, period of deprivation pending trial/appeal cannot be unduly long. This Court has held that while a person in custody for a grave offence may not be released if trial is delayed, trial has to be expedited or bail has to be granted in such cases [Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 731, para 15 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 39].
12. Timely delivery of justice is a part of human rights. Denial of speedy justice is a threat to public confidence in the administration of justice. Directions of this Court in Noor Mohammed v. Jethanand, (2013) 5 SCC 202, are as follows: (SCC p. 217, para
34) "34. ... Therefore, we request the learned Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan as well as the other learned Chief Justices to conceive and adopt a mechanism, regard being had to the priority of cases, to avoid such inordinate delays in matters which can really be dealt with in an expeditious manner. Putting a step forward is a step towards the destination. A sensible individual inspiration and a committed collective endeavour would indubitably help in this regard. Neither less, nor more."
(self-emphasis supplied)
26. A three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in case, titled as Union of India versus K.A. Najeeb, reported in (2021) 3 Supreme Court Cases 713, 22 2025:HHC:15445 has held that when a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the Courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge accused on bail. Relevant paragraphs 11 and 15 of the judgment are reproduced, as under:
"11. The High Court's view draws support from a batch of decisions of this Court, including in Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 :
1996 SCC (Cri) 366 , laying down that gross delay in disposal of such cases would justify the invocation of Article 21 of the Constitution and consequential necessity to release the undertrial on bail. It would be useful to quote the following observations from the cited case: (SCC p. 622, para 10) "10. Bearing in mind the nature of the crime and the need to protect the society and the nation, TADA has prescribed in Section 20(8) stringent provisions for granting bail. Such stringent provisions can be justified looking to the nature of the crime, as was held in Kartar Singh case [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] , on the presumption that the trial of the accused will take place without undue delay. No one can justify gross delay in disposal of cases when undertrials perforce remain in jail, giving rise to possible situations that may justify invocation of Article 21."
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15. This Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v.
Union of India [Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 731, para 15 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 39] , it was held that undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained pending trial. Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences of his acts unless the same is established before a neutral arbiter. However, owing to the practicalities of real life where to secure an effective trial and to ameliorate the risk to society in case a potential criminal is left at large pending trial, the courts are tasked with deciding whether an individual ought to be released pending 23 2025:HHC:15445 trial or not. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail."
(self-emphasis supplied)
27. Considering the facts of the case, in the light of the above legal proposition of law, this Court is of the view that the chances of conclusion of trial, against the applicant, in near future, are not so bright, as such, keeping the applicant in judicial custody, would be nothing, but, pre-trial punishment, which is prohibited under the law. Moreover, the applicant is presumed to be innocent till his guilt is proved by the prosecution, during the trial.
28. Apart from this, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, according to which, the involvement of the applicant has been found, on the basis of the allegedly recovery of weapon of offence, mobile and motorcycle, in pursuance of his disclosure statement, made under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, which would be proved during the trial, no useful purpose would be served by keeping him in the judicial custody, that too, for the indefinite period.
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29. During the course of arguments, it has been pointed out by learned Additional Advocate General that the applicant is the resident of Bihar and may not be available for the trial, in case, ordered to be released on bail. However, for those apprehensions, reasonable conditions can be imposed upon the applicant, in case, he is ordered to be released on bail.
30. In view of the discussions, made hereinabove, this Court is of the view that the bail application is liable to be allowed and is accordingly allowed.
31. Consequently, the applicant is ordered to be released, on bail, in case FIR No.200 of 2020, dated 29.07.2020, registered under Sections 302, 111, 202 and 34 of IPC, with Police Station Baddi, District Solan, H.P., on his furnishing personal bonds in the sum of Rs.1,00,000/-, with two sureties of the like amount, to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court. However, this order shall be subject to the following conditions:-
a) The applicant shall regularly attend the trial Court on each and every date of hearing and if prevented by any reason to do so, seek exemption from appearance by filing the appropriate application;
b) The applicant shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence nor hamper the investigation of the case in any manner whatsoever;
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c) The applicant shall not make any inducement, threat or promises to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade them from disclosing such facts to the Court or the Police Officer;
d) The trial Court/police, before releasing the applicant on bail, may satisfy itself about the permanent address of the applicant.
e) The applicant shall furnish his fresh address to the learned trial Court/IO/SHO, Police Station Baddi, District Solan, H.P., in case, there is any change in his abode."
32. In addition to this, the applicant is also directed that in case, he intends to leave the territory of Himachal Pradesh, in that eventuality, he will intimate the same to learned trial Court/IO/SHO, Police Station Baddi, District Solan, H.P.
33. Any of the observations, made hereinabove, shall not be taken, as an expression of opinion, on the merits of the case, as these observations are confined, only to the disposal of the present bail application.
34. It is made clear that respondent-State is at liberty to move an appropriate application, in case, any of the bail conditions is found violated by the applicant.
35. The Registry is directed to forward a soft copy of the bail order to the Superintendent of Jail, Model Central Jail, Kanda, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, through e-mail, 26 2025:HHC:15445 with a direction to enter the date of grant of bail in the e- prison software.
36. In case, the applicant is not released within a period of seven days from the date of grant of bail, the Superintendent of Jail, Model Central Jail, Kanda, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, is directed to inform this fact to the Secretary, DLSA, Shimla. The Superintendent of Jail, Model Central Jail, Kanda, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, is further directed that if the applicant fails to furnish the bail bonds, as per the order passed by this Court, within a period of one month from today, then, the said fact be submitted to this Court.
( Virender Singh ) Judge May 23, 2025 ( Gaurav Thakur ) Digitally signed by RAJNI Date: 2025.05.23 11:50:38 IST