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[Cites 4, Cited by 3]

Allahabad High Court

Muneshwari Devi vs Jitan Singh on 7 December, 1992

Equivalent citations: AIR1993ALL198, AIR 1993 ALLAHABAD 198, 1993 ALL. L. J. 612, 1993 (1) ALL RENTCAS 427, 1993 CIVILCOURTC 466, 1993 (1) ALL CJ 493, 1993 (21) ALL LR 568, 1993 (2) LJR 674, 1993 (2) ALL WC 792

ORDER

1. The short question arising in this revision is whether an application under order 9, Rule 4, C.P.C. to set aside dismissal of a suit and restore it to its original number, moved beyond the period of one month an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is necessary. Since the opposite party did not appear when this revision was called for hearing, it is being disposed of on merits on perusal of record and hearing the revisionist.

2. Admittedly, on 30-4-1983 the date fixed for issues the suit was dismissed for default of the parties under Rule 3 of the Order 9 C.P.C. The application for restoration of the suit under Rule 4 of Order 9 was moved on 1-8-1983. The said application was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge, Ballia, by the impugned order on the ground that it was barred by limitation and there was no application for condonation of delay under Section 5 Limitation Act.

3. The contention in the grounds of revision that Section 5 of Limitation Act is not applicable to proceedings for restoration of a suit under Order 9, Rule 4 C.P.C., is untenable. The limitation for restoration of a suit dismissed for default of appearance or for want of prosecution etc. is 30 days from the date of dismissal under Article 122 of the Limitation Act. Such being the position the application moved by the revisionist was beyond time and unless there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay, the same could not be entertained or accepted.

4. On facts, however, the alternative contention of the revisionist is correct that the learned lower court could not have disposed of the application for restoration, without enquiring into the question whether she was prevented by sufficient cause for appearing when the case was called on the date of hearing and till the date when the restoration application was moved.

5. Under law an oral prayer for condonation under Section 5 Limitation Act, of delay is also permissible. (See Indrasani Devi v. D.D.C, Varanasi, reported in 1981 All LJ 37).

6. In the instant case, the restoration was sought on twin grounds of the revisionist being ill from 30-4-1983 to 31-7-1983 and there being no intimation of date to her or her counsel. While a plaintiff could not take the plea of non-intimation of date of issues, once the plea of illness also as ground of default from the date of hearing till the moving of restoration application was taken, it amounted to a plea to explaining the default, within the meaning of Rule 4 of Order 9, C.P.C., as well as delay within the meaning of Section 5 Limitation Act. The restoration application thus could not be dismissed as not maintainable rather deserves to be disposed of on merits. The learned lower court acted illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction in so dismissing the restoration application.

7. The revision is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the learned court below directed to dispose of the restoration application on merits.

8. No order as to costs.

9. Revision allowed.