Himachal Pradesh High Court
Bimla Devi And Others vs Neter Prakash And Others on 2 April, 2019
Author: Sureshwar Thakur
Bench: Sureshwar Thakur
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA RSA No. 434 of 2003 .
Reserved on : 25.3.2019 Decided on: 2.4.2019 Bimla Devi and others ...Appellants Versus Neter Prakash and others Respondents Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sureshwar Thakur, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? yes _____________________________________________________ For the Appellants : Mr. Rajneesh K. Lal, Advocate.
For the respondent(s) : Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, Advocate, for the respondents No. 1 to 8.
Sureshwar Thakur, Judge The instant appeal is directed against the verdict recorded by the learned first appellate Court, upon Civil Appeal No. 35-CA/13 of 2002, wherethrough, the first appellate Court rather reversed the judgment and decree, pronounced by the learned trial Judge, and hence, decreed the plaintiffs' ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 2 suit. The defendants are aggrieved therefrom, hence motion this Court, through the instant RSA, and, for hence making an effort to get it quashed and set .
aside.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the plaintiffs have filed a suit for declaration and for joint possession. The original suit was field by Smt. Maina Devi, who died during the pendency of the suit and her LRs were brought on record, claiming shares in the property of Sh. Mehar Chand, situated in villages Bhagani and Kishan-Kot, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P., on the basis of being LRs of Mehar Chand. The plaintiffs have also alleged that Chetu defendant No. 1 filed one suit earlier against defendants No, 2 and 3, alleging that the Will, dated 12.7.1982 executed by Mehar Chand was fraudulent and false document having no effect on his right. The plaintiffs were also impleaded as proforma defendants in the suit who have filed separate written statement supporting the case of Chetu. Execution of Will, dated 12.7.1982 has been specifically denied, as no such document was ever executed by late Mehar Chand. The 2 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 3 Will was highly suspicious document and the same was got procured by defendants No. 2 and in order to grab the property and exclude other co-sharers. The earlier .
suit bearing No. 358/1 of 1988 was got compromised by the defendants No. 1 to 3, deleting the names of proforma defendants without any intimation to them.
As per compromise Ext. C-1 statements of Mela Ram, Duni Chand and Chetu were recorded by the Court and the earlier suit was compromised. The plaintiffs and proforma defendants being daughters of Mehar Chand are also equally entitled to inherit the property of their father according to their shares, and the compromise dated 1.3.1999 is totally wrong and illegal and not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs. The compromise and decree passed on the basis of wrong order is to be declared null and void as the same is collusive and fraudulent. They have also challenged the revenue entries and prayed for the decree of the suit.
3. The defendants No. 1 to 3 have contested the present suit by filing written statement wherein preliminary objections are taken that the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the present suit, and that the suit 3 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 4 is not maintainable as the decree passed on compromise cannot be challenged. On merits, they have denied that the suit land was owned by Mehar .
Chand only but stated that it was ancestral property and was owned and possessed by deceased Mehar Chand and his sons, i.e. defendants No. 1 to 3, having 1/4th share in the property. Mehar Chand executed the Will on 12.7.1982 excluding defendant No. 1 and the daughters which was challenged by defendant No. 1 Chetu and the matter went upto the Hon'ble High Court and ultimately it was compromised amicably on 1.3.1999. The revenue entries showing only Mehar Chand as owner in possession were contrary to the facts. They have further denied the compromise which was entered into between defendants No. 1 to 3. They have also denied that the Will dated 12.7.1982 was invalid, fraudulent, null and void. They have admitted that the plaintiffs were impleaded as proforma defendants to the suit but any decree passed in the suit was open to appeal but the plaintiffs have not filed any appeal and the decree has become final. They have denied the remaining contents of the plaint and alleged 4 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 5 that decree and compromise of suit No. 358/1 of 1988 is valid and binding on the plaintiffs. The defendants have taken additional plea that the suit is frivolous and .
has been filed with an ulterior motive and the same is liable to be dismissed and that in the event of proof of allegation in the plaint, suit No. 358 /1 of 1988 deserves to be restored.
4. Replication has been filed, wherein contentions made in the written statement are denied and those made in the plaint are re-asserted. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed on 24.6.1997
1. Whether the plaintiffs and proforma defendants are co-owner in joint possession of the suit land as alleged ? OPP
2) Whether Will dated 12.7.1982 is false, suspicious and not genuine document and never executed by late Mehar Chand and not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs and proforma defendants, as alleged? OPP
3) Whether the compromise decree dated 1.3.1999 in Civil Suit No. 358/1 of 1988 are illegal, fraudulent, ineffective and not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs proforma defendants being the result of the collusive and fraud, as alleged? OPP
4) Whether the revenue entries related to the succession of late Sh. Mehar Chand showing total exclusion of plaintiffs and proforma defendants are wrong, fraudulent, null and void and not binding 5 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 6 on the rights of the plaintiffs and proforma defendants as alleged ? OPP
5) Whether the suit is not maintainable, as alleged ? OPD
6) Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from .
filing the suit by their own act, conduct and acquiescense as alleged ? OPD
7) Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action, as alleged ? OPD
8) Relief.
5. On an appraisal of evidence, adduced before the learned trial Court, the learned trial Court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. In an appeal, preferred therefrom by the plaintiffs/appellants before the learned First Appellate Court, the latter Court allowed the appeal and dis-affirmed the findings recorded by the learned trial Court.
6. Now the plaintiffs/appellants herein, have instituted the instant Regular Second Appeal before this Court, wherein they assailed the findings recorded in its impugned judgment and decree, by the learned first Appellate Court. When the appeal came up for admission, this Court, on 10.11.2003, admitted the appeal instituted by the appellant(s), against, the judgment and decree, rendered by the learned first 6 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 7 Appellate Court, on the hereinafter extracted substantial question(s) of law:-
(i) Whether the judgment and decree of the learned first .
appellate Court is based on misreading and misinterpretation of oral and documentary evidence, ignoring admission, written statement and compromise, Ext. P-11?
Substantial questions of Law
7. There is no wrangle interse the contesting litigants, qua compromise decree, borne in Ext. P-12, hence acquiring a conclusive and binding effect, (a) excepting the extant challenge hence cast thereon, by the aggrieved therefrom plaintiffs, who rather in the civil suit, whereon Ext.
P-12 was pronounced, stood therein arrayed as co-
defendants, No. 3 to 7. Evidently, the afore co-
defendants/plaintiffs herein, had instituted written statement, vis-à-vis, the plaint. Apparently, also a close perusal of Ext. P-12, unfolds a) that the testamentary disposition, made on 12.7.1982, by one Mehar Chand, being declared illegal, null and void, b) besides the parties, do not hold any quarrel, qua upon the afore declaration, being pronounced, thereupon the plaintiffs, and, the afore performa 7 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 8 defendants, all hence acquiring proportionate entitlement(s), vis-à-vis, the estate, of the afore Mehar Chand. However, in compromise deed, borne .
in Ext. P-11, the entitlement(s), of the aggrieved therefrom, and, emphasizingly, vis-à-vis, the estate of the afore deceased Mehar Chand, hence stand omnibously effaced, (c) thereupon a serious and grave prejudice, is, contended to be encumbered upon the plaintiffs. The learned counsel appearing, for the aggrieved defendants, has contended with much vigor, before this Court, that, the instant suit, for seeking relief, of, setting aside, of, Ext. P-12 rather was not maintainable, and, contrarily the recourseable remedy available, vis-à-vis, the aggrieved plaintiffs, stood comprised, hence within the domain of the Mandate of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC, provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter:
"Order XXIII Rule III-A CPC- Bar to suit:- No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful."8 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 9
and b) perusal whereof unfolds qua an absolute statutory bar being engrafted therein, against, the .
preferment or institution of a suit, for, setting aside a compromise deed. The afore submission is strived, by the learned counsel for the aggrieved defendants, to derive, the, fullest and optimum support, from, a judgment, of, the Hon'ble Apex Court, reported in 2012(5) Supreme Court Cases 525, rendered in case titled as "Horil versus Keshav and another,"
relevant paragraphs of which are extracted hereinafter:
"8. Against the orders passed by the Munsif and the District Judge, the defendants preferred a writ petition before the High Court and the High Court, as noted above, allowed the writ petition holding that the suit was not maintainable. It is a brief order in which the High Court referred to the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A, and relying upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition.
9. It is true that a compromise forming the basis of the decree can only be questioned 9 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 10 before the same court that recorded the compromise and a fresh suit for setting aside a compromise decree is expressly barred under Order 23 Rule 3-A. It is .
equally true that the expression "not lawful" used in Order 23 Rule 3-A also covers a decree based on a fraudulent compromise hence, a challenge to a compromise decree on the ground that it was obtained by fraudulent means would also fall under the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A.
10. In Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi this Court examined the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A in some detail and in the light of the amendments introduced in the Code and in para-7 of the judgment came to hold as follows: (SCC p. 585) "7. By adding the proviso along with an Explanation the purpose and the object of the amending Act appears to be to compel the party challenging the compromise to question the same before the Court which had recorded the compromise in question. That court was enjoined to decide the controversy whether the parties have arrived at an adjustment in a lawful manner. The Explanation made it clear that an agreement or a compromise which is void or voidable under the 10 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 11 Contract Act shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said rule. Having introduced the proviso along with the Explanation in Rule 3 in order to .
avoid multiplicity of suit and prolonged litigation, a specific bar was prescribed by Rule 3-A in respect of institution of a separate suit for setting aside a decree on the basis of a compromise saying:
"3-A Bar to suit- No suit lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful."
11. It was further held in Banwari Lal in paras 13 and 14 as follows: (SCC pp. 588-89) "13. When the amending Act introduced a proviso along with an Explanation to Rule 3 of Order 23 saying that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, ' the Court shall decide the question', the Court before which a compromise, has to decide the question whether an adjustment of satisfaction had been arrived at on basis of any lawful agreement. To make the enquiry in respect of validity of the agreement or the compromise more comprehensive, the 11 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 12 Explanation to the proviso says that an agreement or compromise ' which is void or voidable under the Contract Act..' shall not be deemed to be lawful within .
the meaning of the said Rule. In view of the proviso read with the Explanation, a Court which had entertained the petition of compromise has to examine whether the compromise was void or voidable under the Contract Act. Even Rule 1(m) of Order 43 has been deleted under which an appeal was challenging a compromise can file a petition under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23, or an appeal under Section 96(1) of the Code, in which he can now question the validity of the compromise in view of Rule 1-A of Order 43 of the Code.
14.... The court before which it is alleged by one of the parties to the alleged compromise that no such compromise had been entered between the parties that Court has to decide whether the agreement or compromise in question was lawful and not void or voidable under the Contract Act. If the agreement or the compromise itself is fraudulent then it shall be deemed to be void within the meaning of the Explanation to the proviso to Rule 3 and as such not lawful. The learned Subordinate Judge was 12 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 13 perfectly justified in entertaining the application filed on behalf of the appellant and considering the question as to whether there had been a lawful .
agreement or compromise on the basis of which the Court could have recorded such agreement or compromise on 27.2.1991. Having come to the conclusion on the material produced that the compromise was not lawful within the meaning of Rule 3,there was no option left except to recall that order."
a) and on anvil thereof, he further contends that rather, the available, and, recourseable remedy, vis-
à-vis, the aggrieved plaintiffs, for, setting aside Ext.
P-12, was hence comprised in theirs motioning the Court, rather rendering the compromise decree, borne in Ext. P-12. However, for the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, the afore submission warrants rejection, b) given the arrayed therein defendants No. 3 to 7, and, who nowat stand arrayed, as, plaintiffs, rather instituting a written statement, to the plaint, through counsel, one Shri I.S. Chauhan, c) consequently, for the compromise decree, borne in Ext. P-12, to attain conclusivity, and, also for hence 13 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 14 it rather operating, as, resjudicata, excepting qua it being ingrained with a vice of entrenched nullity, sparked by it, being evidently founded, upon, fraud .
or misrepresentation d) thereupon, for hence the afore submission addressed before this Court, by the counsel for the aggrieved herebefore defendants, being rather well-founded, it was imperative, as propounded, in a judgment reported in AIR 1991 Supreme Court 2234, rendered in case titled as, Byram Pestonji Gariwala versus Union Bank of India and others, relevant paragraph whereof stands extracted hereinafter:
"40. Accordingly, we are of the view that the words in writing and signed by the parties', inserted by the CPC (Amendment) Act, 1976, must necessarily mean, to borrow the language of O.III, R.1, C.P.C.
"any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader, appearing, applying oracting as the case may be, on his behalf:14 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 15
Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person".
43. A judgment by consent is intended to .
stop litigation between the parties just as much as a judgment resulting from a decision of the Court at the end of a long drawn out fight. A compromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment. As stated by Spencer Brower & Turner in Res judicata, second Edition, page 37:
"Any judgment or order which in other respects answers to the description of a res judicata in nonetheless so because it was made in pursuance of the consent and agreement of the parties... Accordingly, judgments orders, and awards by consent have always been held no less efficacious as estoppels than other judgments, orders, or decisions, though doubts have been occasionally expressed whether, strictly, the foundation of the estoppel in such cases is not representation by conduct, rather than res judicata.
44. The consent decree made on 18.6.1984 remained unchallenged. None questioned it. The appellant never raised any doubt as to its validity or genuineness. He had no case that the decree was vitiated by 15 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 16 fraud or mis-representation or his counsel lacked authority to enter into a compromise on his behalf.
Nevertheless, after six years he
.
questioned its validity by means of chamber summons. This was an unsuccessful challenge by reason of delay, estoppel or res judicata, and was rightly so held by the High Court."
that hence, a) Ext. P-12 rather carrying thereon, the, signatures either of Mr. I.S. Chauhan, the counsel engaged by the aggrieved defendants No 3 to 7, plaintiffs herein, or Ext. P-12, carrying the signatures, of, the aggrieved plaintiffs, b) or either the counsel of the aggrieved plaintiffs or the aggrieved plaintiffs, rendering their respective statement(s), before the learned trial Judge concerned, in pursuance whereof Ext. P-12 hence stood rendered. The afore expostulation(s) are also borne in a judgment reported in AIR 1988 Supreme Court, 400, rendered in case titled as, " Gurpreet Singh versus Chatur Bhuj Goel, relevant paragraphs whereof are extracted hereinafter:
16 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 17" 7. In support of the appeal Shri S.N. Kacker, learned counsel for the appellant contends that the requirements of O.XXIII R. 3 of the Code are mandatory and the .
claim in the suit for specific performance having been settled by a lawful compromise within the meaning of R.3, the learned Judges were not justified in directing that appeal be placed before another Bench for decision on merits. The learned counsel submits that O. XXIII, R.3 of the Code is in two parts. According to him, the words " in writing and signed by the parties' qualify the words ' any lawful agreement or compromise' appearing in the first part and these words cannot obviously be read into the second part at all. It is urged that the first part of O. XXIII, R.3 of the Code refers to an adjustment or settlement of the claim in suit by a lawful agreement or compromise outside the Court, meaning thereby that where the parties make a statement before the Court that the dispute betweenthem has been settled on certain terms and the statements so made form part of the proceedings of the Court, there is no legal requirement to have an agreement in writing embodying the terms of the compromise.17 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 18
9. According to the grammatical construction, the word 'or' makes the two conditions disjunctive. At first blush, the argument of the learned counsel appears .
to be plausible but that is of no avail. In our opinion, the present case clearly falls within the first part and not the second. We find no justification to confine the applicability of the first part of X. XXIII, R. 3 of lthe Code to a compromise effected out of Court. Under the rule prior to the amendment, the agreement compromising the suit could be written or oral and necessarily the Court had to enquire whether or not such compromise had been effected. It was open to the Court to decide the matter by taking evidnce in the usual way or upon affidavits. The whole object of the amendment by adding the words inwriting and signed by the parties' is to prevent false and frivolous pleas that a suit had been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, with a view to protract or delay the proceedings in the suit."
8. Consequently, both Ext. P-12, and, also the statements rendered before the learned trial Judge concerned, whereafter it proceeded to render, 18 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 19 a compromise decree, borne in Ext. P-12, were all enjoined, to carry thereon, the, signatures of Mr. I.S. Chauhan, Advocate, the counsel engaged by the .
defendants No. 3 to 7, or, also the signatures, of, the afore defendants. However, neither the afore counsel Mr. I.S. Chauhan, as engaged by the aggrieved therefrom hence defendants No. 3 to 7, plaintiffs herein, nor the latter, appended their respective signatures on Ext. P-11, nor the afore counsel Mr. I.S. Chauhan, or the afore co-defendants, rendered their respective statements, before the learned Civil Judge concerned. Want(s) thereof, when construed in entwinement, with the, factum, (a) that an application for deleting, the afore defendants, from the array of defendants, stood allowed, under orders hence recorded/borne in Ext. P-12, (b) and when thereat, the presence of Mr. I.S. Chauhan, Advocate, the counsel engaged by defendants No. 3 to 7, rather remains un-echoed, c) thereupon with the afore mandate encapsulated in the afore judgment(s) hence remaining unsatiated, d) thereupon, the compromise decree, borne in Ext. P-
19 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 2012, does not, acquire any conclusive or binding effect, vis-à-vis, the plaintiffs herein, and, who in the earlier suit , whereon the afore compromise decree .
hence stood rendered, rather were arrayed as co-
defendants No 3 to 7, (e) whereupon the apt remedy available for recoursing(s), by the aggrieved plaintiffs, was, comprised not in their hence motioning the learned Civil Judge concerned, who, rendered Ext. P-
12, f) conspicuously, when evidently the compromise decree, borne in Ext. P-12, stood visibly rendered behind their back, and, without their knowledge(s),
g) importantly when the innate nuance, of, the statutory mandate, encapsulated in Order 23 Rule 3- A CPC, is qua, the, recoursing(s) of the mandate thereof by the aggrieved, (h) rather emanating, only upon, the latter evidently, and, in the afore manners, rather participating, in the relevant proceedings, in succession whereof, the apt compromise decree, stands pronounced, (i) or when even in pursuance, of, his or her hence appending rather his/her purportedly forged signatures, on, their respectively recorded statement(s), rather the compromise decree 20 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 21 stands rendered (j) whereas contrarily hereat, when in sharp contradistinction, vis-à-vis, the factual scenario, rather prevailing, the mandate .
encapsulated, in a judgment reported in 2012(5) Supreme Court Case, 525 (supra), rather hence ensued (k) and, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court, has expostulated, that, the aggrieved, vis-à-vis, the authenticity of his/her signatures, borne in the apt compromise deed or in their respectively rendered statement(s), hence holding the statutory leverage, to, hence recourse, the mandate borne in Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC (l) thereupon conspicuously, the apt starked contradiction, interse, the factual scenario, prevailing therein, and, the one prevailing hereat, rather surges forth, and, is embodied in the trite factum, qua no signatures of either the counsel, of, the aggrieved plaintiffs or of the aggrieved plaintiffs hence existing on Ext. P-12, nor any of the afore evidently render their respective statement(s), before the learned trial Judge concerned, hence when hereat the apposite decree, is, hence visibly pronounced, behind their back, (m) thereupon, 21 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 22 hence rather the mandate embodied in the judgment(s) reported in 2012(5) Supreme Court Cases 525, rendered in case titled as "Horil versus .
Keshav and another," and, in a judgment reported in AIR 1991 Supreme Court 2234, rendered in case titled as, Byram Pestonji Gariwala versus Union Bank of India and others, stands palpably infracted, (n) whereupon the judgment and decree borne in Ext. P-12, does not, obviously, acquire any aura of conclusive or binding effect, vis-à-vis, the arrayed therein performa defendants No. 3 to 7, who, in the extant suit, rather stand impleaded as plaintiffs (o) thereupon, the verdict appealed before this Court, is not amenable for interference, and, it is maintained and affirmed. Furthermore, emphasizingy also, the occurrence, of, even purportedly forged signatures, of, a litigant, on the compromise deed, or in their/his respectively recorded statement(s) is a contested fact, and, when the purportedly forged signatures, of, a contesting litigant, as, exist on the apposite compromise deed, or in his statement, rather enables recoursing(s), 22 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 23 being made only, vis-à-vis, the Court(s) concerned, hence rendering it, (p) importantly, given the Court, rendering the decree, hence, ingrained with the afore .
infirmities, rather holding all records appertaining therewith, and when it alone is seized with the jurisdiction, to, on proof thereof, hence draw appropriate proceedings, in accordance with law, against the errant litigants. As corollary, in consonance therewith, rather the mandate borne in order 23 Rule 3-A CPC, is, to be construed, as any contra thereof construction, would erode the salutary worth thereof, embedded in the dire necessity of participation, of, a litigant in the lis . However, when extantly, there rather exist(s) no signature, either authentic or purportedly forged, of, any of the contesting litigants, on, the compromise deed, nor in the statements, as, drawn preceding, the, rendering, of, the compromise deed, (q) thereupon when the decree is rendered behind their back, and, without the knowledge of the aggrieved therefrom contesting litigants, thereupon, the remedy available, vis-à-vis, the aggrieved, is, through a civil suit.
23 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 249. Be that as it may, the ratio propounded in the afore referred contradistinctive in the factual scenario encapsulated in the judgment, rendered by .
Hon'ble Apext Court, reported in 2012(5) Supreme Court Cases 525, case titled as "Horil versus Keshav and another,", vis-à-vis, the factual scenario prevailing hereat, rather renders the ratio decidendi, propounded in Horil's case (supra), to hold clout and sway, only within, the domain of the factual scenario, prevailing thereat, and, the expanse and amplitude of the ratio decidendi, propounded therein, hence is upon, the contra-distinct therewith factual matrix prevailing hereat, rather not encompassed within domain thereof. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
10. The above discussion unfolds the fact that the conclusion as arrived by the learned first appellate is based upon a proper and mature appreciation of evidence on record. While rendering the findings, the learned first appellate Court has not excluded germane and apposite material from consideration.
24 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP 2511. In view of the above discussion, the present Regular Second Appeal is dismissed. In sequel, the judgment and decree rendered by the .
learned first appellate Court is maintained and affirmed. All pending applications also stand disposed of. No order as to costs.
(Sureshwar Thakur) Judge 2.4.2019 Kalpana 25 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2019 21:58:32 :::HCHP