National Green Tribunal
News Item Published In The Times Of India ... vs . Yashyashvi Rasayan Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.); on 1 February, 2022
Author: Adarsh Kumar Goel
Bench: Adarsh Kumar Goel
Item No. 03 (Court No. 1)
BEFORE THE NATIONAL GREEN TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
(By Video Conferencing)
Original Application No. 130/2021
(With report dated 28.01.2022)
In re : News item published in The Times of India dated 08.06.2021
titled "18, mostly women, killed in fire at Pune chemical unit"
Date of hearing: 01.02.2022
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, CHAIRPERSON
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHIR AGARWAL, JUDICIAL MEMBER
HON'BLE DR. AFROZ AHMAD, EXPERT MEMBER
Respondent: Mr. Raj Kumar, Advocate for CPCB
Ms. Manasi Joshi, Advocate for MPCB
Mr. Saurabh Kulkarni, Advocate for SVS Aqua Technologies
ORDER
1. Proceedings have been initiated in the present matter on the basis of the media report dated 08.06.2021 in 'The Times of India' under the heading "18, mostly women, killed in fire at Pune chemical unit"1 in the process of working of a chemical unit - SVS Aqua Technologies, Plot No. 1 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/pune/18-mostly-women-killed-in-fire-at- pune-chemical-unit/articleshow/83310219.cms 1 43/44/45 Gut No. 411 at Village Urawade, Taluka, Mulshi, District Pune, Maharashtra.
2. The matter was earlier considered on 16.06.2021 after advance notice to Maharashtra State Pollution Control Board (Maharashtra State PCB), Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB), District Magistrate, Pune, Director, Industrial Safety and Health (DISH) Maharashtra and SVS Aqua Technologies. The Tribunal considered the report of the District Magistrate, Pune and Director, Industrial Safety and Health (DISH) Maharashtra on the subject of circumstances leading to the accident and the steps taken by the administration. The Tribunal noted that the raw material used in the unit was covered by Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989 ("the 1989 Rules") which require the statutory safeguards to be followed. The Tribunal found it necessary to determine the issue of remedial action for violation of the Rules and also to prevent recurrence of such incident.
3. Accordingly, the Tribunal constituted a joint Committee comprising CPCB, Maharashtra State PCB, DISH, Maharashtra, District Magistrate, Pune and IIT Bombay (Chemical Engineering Department) to give a factual report to this Tribunal on the aspects of safety norms followed and remedial action required. The operative part of the order is reproduced below:-
2"3. Response has been filed on behalf of the District Magistrate, Pune and DISH Maharashtra. In the response dated 14.06.2021 filed on behalf of the District Magistrate, Pune following version has been mentioned:
"xxx.......................................xxx................................... xxx A Fire incidence occurred at a chemical factory in village Urawade, Tal. Mulshi, Dist. Pune on 07/06/2021. Total 15 Women and 2 Male labours were deceased in the said incidence. In view of the incidence occurred in the company namely SVS Acqua Pvt Ltd situated at village Urawade, Tal. Mulshi, Dist. Pune the District Magistrate took serious cognizance. The D.M. Pune being a President, Disaster Management Authority Pune by order dated 07/06/2021 constituted a committee under the Chairmanship of SDM Maval including, Additional Director, Industrial Safety and Health, Joint Director Industry, Deputy Commissioner Labour, Regional Officer MPCB, Executive Engineer MSEB (Rural), Fire Officer PMRDA and Tahsildar Mulshi. The D.M. Pune directed the committee to investigate deeply and to file a report. The order of constituting a committee is annexed for your kind perusal.
The said Committee inspected the site and each authority submitted the detail inquiry report on 09/06/2021.
The committee observed as follows:
The SVS Aqua Pvt. Ltd. is situated in Gat no.411/plot no.43, 44, and 45 at village Urawade, Tal. Mulshi, Dist. Pune. The factory is registered with the Department of Industrial Safety and Health. The factory is having a capacity of 48 workers. The factory is having permission of to produce Clo2 tablets and powder for water purification by formulation process. For that purpose they are having raw material such as sodium chlorite, sodium bisulphate, sodium bicarbonate, adipic acid and packing material. The MPCB has issued consent to operate on 10/09/2020 however the factory was running without any consent i.e. from year 2016 to 2020. The Additional Commissioner of Labour Pune Division stated in its report that, the said 3 factory is registered under the Factories Act, 1948 and produces chemical water purification tablets. On 07/06/2021 from 04.00 to 4.30pm there was a explosion and fire broke out in the packing department. The names of some deceased are not registered under the Employees State Insurance Scheme. The Fire Department and Office of Industrial Safety and Health submitted the same report.
After perusing the reports submitted by different departments, following discrepancies have been found at the factory place:
a) Except the permission granted by the Industry and Health Department flammable substances were stored in the place.
b) The factory was not informed about the large stock of flammable substances to the Industry and Health Department.
c) The flammable raw material storage place and work place are same and hence large number of chemicals exploded and fire went out of control.
d) The company not submitted self certification before the Electric Inspector Yervada.
e) The fire may increase higher due to the stock of sanitizer and due to the sodium chloride there were spread of black smoke and hence the labour cannot exit safely.
f) Company only received primary no objection certificate from Fire Department. The Company and the work already started in new building however this fact never brought to the notice of fire department. The primary no objection certificate is not the final NOC from the said department.
g) There is no final NOC from the Fire Department.
h) There was no any fire extinguisher in the premises.
i) There is a possibility of production flammable material other than the product mentioned in the consent letter issued by MPCB.
j) At the time of investigation the company owner stated that, they have started production in the year 2016 without consent of MPCB. From the available documents it seems that, the MPCB 4 issued consent on 10/09/2020 it means they have worked without any consent i.e. from year 2016 to 2020.
k) In view of the information received from Labour Department and the interview of the workers against the said company, necessary action will be taken under the provisions of law. The report submitted by the committee is annexed herewith for kind perusal.
The factory owner stated in written that, they are going to provide financial help of Rs. 5, 00,000/-per person to the legal heirs of the deceased. The State Government of Maharashtra, Chief Minister Relief Fund have granted Rs. 5,00,000/-per person to the legal heirs of the deceased. Further the Hon'ble Prime Minister has sanctioned Ex-gratia out of Prime Ministers Relief Fund of Rs. 2,00,000/-each to the legal heirs of the deceased. The Collector office assured that the same will be disbursed in to the account of the legal heirs as earlier as possible.
A FIR has been lodged against the owner of the factory and offence has been registered against them in Paud Police Station u/s 304, 285, 286 1/w of IPC. The factory owner is in police custody as on today."
4. On behalf of the DISH Maharashtra, following action taken report has been filed:
"i. This office received the information about the incidence of fire in M/s SVS Aqua Technologies LLP., Sr No.43/44/45, Gat No.411,Uravade, Taluka:- Mulshi, District : Pune, - 412111.at @ 5.45 pm. on mobile (whatsapp). In this incident of fire, 17 workers including 15 female workers and 2 male workers died and two workers are injured and major damage to the plant, machinery, raw material & finished goods has taken place.
ii. Our officers from Pune office visited the site on the same day i.e on 07.06.2021 at @ 6.30 pm. Officers observed that.
a) There was smoke at the place and cooling and rescuing operation was going on.5
b) During the visit, police and fire fighters informed that 17 workers were trapped in the fire and same were totally burnt.
c) Till 11.30 pm cooling operation was going on by fire brigade.
d) Shri S.P. Rathod, Director of Industrial Safety and Health, Maharashtra visited the site on 08.06.2021.
iii. The respondent industry ie M/s SVS Aqua Technologies LLP., Sr No.43/44/45, Gat No.411,Uravade, Taluka:- Mulshi, District : Pune made an application for grant of licence under Factories act 1948 on 04.03.2021. Factory is having license number 13841 for 50 workers and 100 HP installed power valid till December-2022. But it was learnt that factory was operational since last 2 to 3 years.
iv. The factory has taken permission from this Department for manufacturing of chlorine dioxide tablets, powder and gel by using Sodium Bisulphate, sodium chlorite, Sodium per sulphate and Magnesium Sulphate. But at the time of visit, substantial stock of alcohol (IPA) based plastic sanitizer bottles was found in the factory. That means sanitizer packing/filling was also carried out in this factory. Documents found at the site and statements also confirms this.
v. Name of Directors of the factory : i) Shri Nikunj Bipin Shah ii) Shri Bipin Jayantilal Shah iii) Shri Keyur Bipin Shah vi. About Incident of Fire : From site visit and statement of workers it was revealed that there were two rooms in the factory where manufacturing process was carried out. Commonly known as Process room-1 and Process room-2. On the day of accident workers reported factory at about 9:00 a.m. and started working in the process room-1 and room-2.
Workers were engaged in the filling of 5 kg pouches of Sodium Chlorite powder for making pouches of component A. On the day of accident 16 workers from the list of deceased workers were working in process room-2. One female worker was working in the laboratory located on first floor. In process room 2 components B of 5 Kg pouch packed in inner pouch was manufactured and stacked.
6At @ 3.45 pm suddenly a major fire was observed in room no 1 and it spread into room no 2 within fraction of seconds as the door between room no 1 and 2 was kept open.
The worker working in room-1 escaped from the room. All person working in process room-2 was unable to escape from the room inspite of two exits available one from room 1 and one from room2. Heavy fire made it impossible for workers to escape from room 2 and total 17 workers died due to burn injuries.
vii. This Directorate has passed a closure order under section 40(2) of Factories Act- 1948 on 09.06.2021 to the factory.
viii. This directorate is carrying out a detail enquiry of this incident by collecting the necessary evidence, regarding of worker statements, inspection of the accident site etc. ix. This directorate will be issuing show cause notice to the Occupier of this factory regarding the contraventions which will be observed during the course of enquiry and file the prosecution in the court of law under the Factories Act- 1948.
x. The management of factory has declared an ex-gratia amount of Rs. 5 lakh each to the legal heirs of the deceased. The Government of Maharashtra has declared an ex-gratia amount Rs. 5 lakh each to the legal heirs of the deceased and Rs. 50,000/- to the injured workers. The Central Government has declared an ex-gratia amount of Rs. 2 lakh each to the legal heirs of the deceased. This ex-gratia amount is in addition to legal compensation amount.
xi. Director of Industrial Safety and Health, Maharashtra and Additional Director (I/C) of Industrial Safety and Health, Pune will be joining the video conferencing on 16 the June 2021."
5. We have heard learned Counsel appearing for the CPCB, State PCB, District Magistrate, Pune and DISH, Maharashtra in person. According to the stand of the District Magistrate, the unit in question started functioning in the year 2016 but 'Consent to Establish' was taken only on 10.09.2020 from the State PCB. It is 7 further clear that 17 persons died in the incident dated 07.06.2021. The unit is using raw material as sodium chlorite, sodium bisulphate, sodium bicarbonate, adipic acid, chlorine some of which are specifically mentioned in Part-II of Schedule 1 and also Schedules 2 and 3 to the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989 ("the 1989 Rules") and thus covered by the definition of hazardous chemical under Rule 2(e) of the said rules. In such a case, the site has to be approved under Rule 7. Safety report has to be prepared and safety audits have to be conducted under Rule 10, onsite emergency plan is to be prepared under Rule 13 and off-site emergency plan is to be prepared under Rule 14. There is further requirement of conducting mock drills under Rule 13(4). The reports show that the cause of incident was explosion and fire in the packaging department. There were several deficiencies in functioning of the unit including storing flammable substances, not informing the concerned department about the same, not providing self-certification to the concerned authority, no final NOC has been taken from the fire department, there was no fire extinguisher. No compensation has been paid to the victims. There is no assessment of damage to the environment. The authorities have not shown what remedial measures are planned to prevent such incidents in future. Closure order has been passed under the Factories Act, 1948. Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Response) Rules 1996 are also attracted. Breach of statutory authorities in performing their duties is also a question. There may be several other units similarly placed having potential of such incidents.
6. We are informed by learned Counsel for the CPCB that all the State Boards/PCCs have been required to take precautionary measures in view of several recent incidents but the Maharashtra State PCB has failed to take requisite measures.
7. During the hearing, the DISH Maharashtra submitted that inspections are carried out only as per roster and thus no inspection was carried out in respect of the unit in question under the Factories Act. Attention of the officer has been drawn to the 1989 Rules under which the Chief Inspector of Factories is the authority specified for compliance of several Rules and the District Magistrate is the authority for preparation of off-site emergency plan and also for taking steps under the 1996 Rules. The District Magistrate is also the Chairman of the District Disaster Management Committee, apart from being head of the District Crisis Group under the 1996 Rules.
88. In view of above, substantial questions of environment relating to compliance of the 1989 and 1996 Rules, framed under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (EP Act), falling in schedule to the NGT Act, 2010 arise. It is necessary to determine the above questions and if necessary, award relief under Section 15 of the NGT Act to the victims and for restoration of the environment after determining the liability of the persons engaged in such activity as well as require remedial action to prevent measures to avoid recurrence of such incidents in future. Further, it is necessary to consider how the PCB should ensure action for not taking CTE and CTO before production and what conditions should be imposed in CTE/CTO to ensure that such units take appropriate Risk Policy to cover such risks so as to make available promptly insurance amount to the victims.
9. While issuing notice to SVS Aqua Technologies, District Pune, Maharashtra, MoEF&CC, CPCB, State of Maharashtra, DISH Maharashtra, Maharashtra State PCB and District Magistrate, Pune by e-mail, we constitute a five- member joint committee comprising of CPCB, Maharashtra State PCB, DISH, Maharashtra, District Magistrate, Pune and IIT Bombay (Chemical Engineering Department) to ascertain the cause of the incident, persons responsible, the extent of damage caused, the extent of compensation required to be paid for damage to the environment as well as for loss of lives, or the injuries and steps required to be taken for preventing any such occurrence in future on the same pattern as the Tribunal has dealt with such accidents in the recent past.2 The nodal agency for coordination and 2 i. Order dated 01.06.2020, relating to incident of gas leak dated 07.05.2020 in LG Polymers India Pvt. Limited at Vishakhapatnam, resulting in death of 11 persons and injuries to more than 100, apart from other damage (OA No. 73/2020, In re: Gas Leak at LG Polymers Chemical Plant in RR Venkatapuram Village Visakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh);
ii. Order dated 03.02.2021, relating to incident dated 03.06.2020 in a chemical factory, Yashyashvi Rasayan Pvt. Ltd. at Dahej, District Bharuch, Gujarat resulting in deaths and injuries and other damage (OA No. 85/2020) (Earlier OA 22/2020) (WZ), Aryavart Foundation through its President vs. Yashyashvi Rasayan Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.); iii. Order dated 19.02.2021, in relation to incident of oil well blow out on 27.05.2020 at Baghjan in the Tinsukia District of Assam resulting in deaths, injuries and damage to the environment (OA No. 43/2020(EZ), Bonani Kakkar vs. Oil India Limited & Ors.). iv. Orders dated 06.07.2020 and 22.12.2020, relating to incident dated 30.06.2020 on account of gas leakage at Sainor Life Sciences factory at Parawada in industrial area on the outskirts of Vishakhapatnam (OA No. 106/2020, News item published in the 9 local daily "Economic Times" dated 30.06.2020 titled "Another Gas Leakage at Vizag Factory kills two, critically injures four..."); v. Orders dated 08.07.2020 and 22.12.2020, dealing with the incident dated 01.07.2020 resulting in death of 6 person and injury to 17 due to blast of boiler in M/s Neyveli Thermal Power Station (NLCIL), Cuddalore (OA No. 108/2020, News item published in the "Indian Express" dated 01.07.2020 titled "Tamil Nadu Neyveli boiler blast: 6 dead, 17 injured") and;
vi. Orders dated 23.07.2020 and 22.12.2020, in relation to incident of fire engulfed the chemical plant of Visakha Solvents Ltd, Vizag on 13.07.2020 at Ramky CETP Solvents building in Pharma City resulting in injuries (OA No. 134/2020, News item published on 13.07.2020 in the local daily named "India Today" titled "Massive fire engulf Vizag chemical plant, explosions heard, injuries reported"). vii. Order dated 18.12.2020, in relation to incident of explosion in a plastic recycling factory at Sujapur in Malda on 1.12.2020 resulting in death of six persons, including two minors and serious injuries to four persons (OA No. 272/2020, News item published in the "Times of India" dated 20.11.2020 entitled "Six killed as blast tears through Malda Plastic recycling factory").
viii. Order dated 18.12.2020, in relation to incident of methane gas leak in a sugar factory called Lokenete Bapurao Patil Agro Industries Ltd. in Mohol Taluka of Solapur District, Maharashtra on 21.11.2020 resulting in deaths and injuries and other damage (OA No. 274/2020, News item published in the "Indian Express" dated 23.11.2020 entitled "Maharashtra: Two Killed, eight injured in methane gas leak in sugar factory"). ix. Order dated 08.01.2021, in relation to Gas Leak in Agro Company (O.A No. 107/2020, In RE: News item published in the local daily "Indian Express Sunday Express" dated 28.06.2020 titled "Gas Leak in Agro Company Claims life of one") x. Order dated 04.06.2021, in relation to News item published in Navbharat Times dated 24.12.2020 titled "Gas leaks in IFFCO Plant, 2 Officers dead" (O.A No. 04/2021, In re : News item published in Navbharat Times dated 24.12.2020 titled "Gas leaks in IFFCO Plant, 2 Officers dead") xi. Order dated 11.02.2021, in relation to accident of toxic gas leak in Rourkela Steel Plant in Orissa" (O.A. No. 09/2021, In re: News item published in The Indian Express dated 07.01.2021 titled "Four workers dead due to toxic gas leak in Rourkela Steel Plant") xii. Order dated 11.06.2021, in relation to accident of Virudhunagar firecracker factory blast (O.A. No. 44/2021, In re: News item published in The News Indian Express dated 12.02.2021 titled "At least 19 dead in Virudhunagar firecracker factory blast, more than 30 injured") xiii. Order dated 11.06.2021 in relation to accident of quarry blast in Hirenagavalli, Chikkaballapu, Karnataka (O.A. No. 59/2021, In re: News item published in Times Now News dated 23.02.2021 titled "Karnataka: Six killed in quarry blast in Hirenagavalli, Chikkaballapur") xiv. Order dated 11.06.2021 in relation to accident of fire at UPL plant, Jhagadia, District Bharuch, Gujarat (O.A. No. 60/2021, In re: News item published in The Hindu dated 23.02.2021 titled "Two dead, 5 missing in fire at UPL Plant") xv. Order dated 02.03.2021 in relation to accident of massive fire broke out at an illegal factory at Pratap Nagar, North Delhi (O.A. No. 65/2021, In re: News item published in The Times of India dated 28.02.2021 titled "Delhi: Man charred to death as illegal factory catches fire") xvi Order dated 16.03.2021 in relation to Incident of explosion of 3,000 kg reactor at the production wing of Tyche Industries Limited, on the outskirts of Kakinada, Andhra Pradesh (AP) on March 11, 2021 (O.A. No. 79/2021, In re: News item published in The Hindu dated 14.03.2021 titled "Safety lapses led to reactor blast at pharma unit") 10 compliance will be the CPCB and the State PCB. The committee may visit the site preferably within next two weeks and give its report within three months by email at [email protected] preferably in the form of searchable PDF/OCR Support PDF and not in the form of Image PDF. Simultaneously, the report may also be uploaded on the website of the State PCB to enable the concerned stakeholders to access the same and file their response, if any.
10. Except for visit to the site at least once, the Committee will be free to conduct its proceedings online. It will be free to take the assistance from any other expert/organization. The Committee may suitably interact with the stakeholders and, apart from considering the present incident, also consider remedial measures for preventing such incidents in the area or by other establishments even beyond the said area. The Committee may compile information about existence and working of onsite and offsite plans in terms of 1989 Rules and conducting of mock drills and safety SOPs., number of such units in the area and the carrying capacity of the area to sustain the same. Since in the recent past, the Tribunal has dealt with similar issues of industrial accidents resulting in deaths and injuries and Expert Committees in some of such accidents have given reports to this Tribunal, such reports may also be taken into account by the Committee to the extent relevant."
4. Accordingly, the Committee has given its report dated 28.01.2022 after undertaking visit to the site, study of industrial process, looking into the circumstances leading to the accident, action taken by the concerned Departments, extent of damage to environment and to human lives, compensation paid, status of compliance of the statutory Rules and the recommendations to prevent recurrence of such accidents.
xvii Order dated 23.03.2021 in relation to Incident of blast in chemical boiler factory at Pirana-Piplaj road in Ahmedabad, Gujarat (OA No. 258/2020, In Re: News item published in the "Indian Express" dated 04.11.2020 titled "Ahmedabad: Nine killed as godown collapses after factory blast") 11
5. The relevant extracts from the report are reproduced below:-
"5. ABOUT THE INDUSTRY- M/S SVS AQUA TECHNOLOGIES M/s SVS Aqua Technologies (SVSAT) is engaged in manufacture, trade and export of a wide range of chemical products, which includes Chlorine Dioxide, Air Diffuser and Bubble Diffuser, Iso-propyl Alcohol (IPA) based sanitizer (for which license was not obtained from concerned authorities). These products are commonly used in pharma, food & beverages and other industries which include chemical, plastics and agriculture. (Source:
https://www.svsaqua.co.in/) These products are available in different packing options. The firm is having its registered office located at Mahavir Palace, 520, New Rasta Peth, Pune. The partners of the firm are Shri Bipin Jayantilal Shah, Shri Nikunjand Shri. Keyur Bipin Shah, Shri. Nikunj Bipinchandra Shah was nominated as occupier of the factory.
The manufacturing unit of the firm is located at Plot No.43/44/45, Gat No.411, Uravade, Taluka- Mulshi, District: Pune. The area of the factory is 1421 square meter.
The area where the industry located is not a designated industrial area. As per the record available with MPCB, in Urawade/Pirangut area, total 54 nos. of industries are established, out of which 16 nos are in Red category, 21 nos. are in Orange category and 17 nos. are in Green category.
As per MPCB Consent (Annexure-II) (which is issued on 10.09.2020 and was valid up to 30.09.2021), the products are Chlorine di oxide powder: 25 MT/M, Chlorine di oxide Tablet: 15 MT/M & Chlorine di oxide gel: 05 MT/M. At above manufacturing unit manufacturing of Chlorine di oxide powder and tablet were carried out. Also, at the said place repacking of IPA based hand sanitizer from 500 ml filled bottles to 100 ml and 5 Liter pack size was undertaken. At manufacturing unit there was total up to 50 persons engaged; also, there were support functions such as finance, marketing, HR. At manufacturing unit, Shri. Gaurav Shah was heading the plant and Shri. Sanjay 12 Mahajan was working as Production manager and Shri. Sundaresan Mohan Electrical Engineer was responsible for maintenance function. He was nominated as Factory manager under Factories Act (1948). The industry obtained License (Annexure-III) under Factories Act- 1948 for the duration 01.12.2020 to 31.12.2022 for up to 50 workers and up to 100 HP installed power.
5.1 THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS:
The factory is engaged in manufacturing of Chlorine dioxide tablets, powder and gel. There are two components i.e. Component A- Sodium chlorite (80%) powder and other called components B- mixture of Sodium Bisulphate, Sodium per Sulphate and Magnesium Sulphate in the ration of 70%, 20% and 10 % by weight respectively, for Manufacturing of Chlorine dioxide powder While preparing component A the pack size is 100 gms, 200 gms, 500 gms and 5 Kg similarly component B is made of same weight in proportion as described above. While manufacturing component A the powder from 50 Kg size drum is weighed on the weighing scale and is filled in the plastic pouches called inner pouch. After filling this the pouch are sealed on band sealer then it is further packed in another aluminized packing pouch called outer pouch. Similarly, the component B is packed in inner pouch and then outer pouch. It was further revealed that except in case 500 gms pack the component A and Component B are separately packed either in corrugated box or barrel as per quantity or customer requirement. In case of 500 gms pack the Component A with outer pack and Component B with outer pack is packed in combo pack and then further packed in box or drum as per the customer specification /requirement.
These components (Component A and B) are mixed at the site where it is to be used and after mixing chlorine di oxide is released from the reaction which is used mainly for disinfection purpose.
For manufacturing of tablet manufacturing Adipic acid, Sodium Chlorite, Sodium Bi carbonate, SDIC 60% granules, Calcium chloride, Lactose Fonterra and silica gel are used. First sieving is done followed by mixing it homogenously. The mixture is then compressed on tableting machine to form 13 tablets. These tablets are packed on strip packing machine as per the requirement. These tablets are directly used for disinfection. Batch size for tablet was about 55 Kgs. There was no facility for manufacturing Chorine Di-oxide in gel form.
5.2 THE AIR HANDLING (AHU) SYSTEM The process area temperature is required to be not more than 27oC and humidity maintained at less than 40%. There are two Air Handling Units (AHU) serving the manufacturing area. The AHU is provided with cooling arrangement. To maintain the required humidity and temperature two portable dehumidifiers were used in the manufacturing area. The working principle of dehumidifier is as follows: room air is drawn in and pre-cooled by a heat exchanger, which is partially filled with liquid refrigerant. With the passage of air over the exchanger, the refrigerant boils and due to a change in state, it cools the room air. The air then moves across the main cooling coil, which cools the air to dew point - and a blower pushes it back over the upper half of the heat exchanger. This cooled air condenses the refrigerant and consequently heats up. Lastly, the condenser releases the heat and reduces the relative humidity.
5.3 THREE-PHASE VOLTAGE STABILIZER PROBLEM The factory was having a three-phase voltage stabilizer to regulate the voltage. As per the statement of workers it was revealed that there was problem in functioning of stabilizer which was there since about a week. Two days prior to accident there was failure of three tube lights in process room-1. Also, on the day of accident repair of the voltage stabilizer was going on due to which there was power failure at about 12:30 p.m. At the time of accident also the voltage regulator work was in progress.
5.4 HAZARDOUS PROPERTIES OF SODIUM CHLORITE The following key hazards are posed by sodium chlorite from its Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) ➢ It is a strong oxidizer. It intensifies fire.
14➢ As it is oxidizer if it is exposed heat or came in contact with flame cause fire to propagate in rapid way resulting in pressure built and supportive to intensify the fire.
➢ Its thermal decomposition generates corrosive vapors. Burning produces obnoxious and toxic fumes.
➢ Containers of sodium chlorite may explode when heated.
➢ Contact with combustible/organic material may cause fire. May ignite combustibles (wood paper, oil, clothing, etc.).
➢ Dry sodium chlorite can be explosive in contact with chlorine, acids or acid materials such as alum. Contamination by these materials may start a chemical reaction, causing generation of heat and emission of chlorine dioxide, a poisonous and potentially explosive gas.
➢ Run-off from fire-fighting should not enter drains or water courses.
For further details on potential hazardous properties of sodium chlorite one may refer to the following document / source:
https://www.cdhfinechemical.com/images/product/msds/101_20 95443146_SodiumC hlorite-CASNO-7758-19-2-MSDS.pdf)
6. DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT From site visit of the committee, interaction with stakeholders, CCTV footage and the accident investigation reports of Directorate of Industrial Safety and Health (Pune) it was revealed that there were two rooms in the factory where manufacturing process was carried out. There are two rooms, Process room-1 and Process room-2 (Commonly known as AHU -1 AHU-2 respectively).
On the day of accident i.e., on 7 June workers reported to the factory at about 9:00 a.m. and started working in the process room-1 and room-2. There were four workers in process room 1 out of which Shri. Baban Margale and Shri Pravin Kavankar were engaged in the filling of 5 kg Pouches, Shri Sachin Sathe was engaged in pouch sealing work. They were given 21 drums weighing 50 Kg each of Sodium Chlorite powder for making 5 Kg pouches of component A. Shri 15 Rajendra Marne was repacking the damaged pouches of the last day packed tablets. About 2:30 p.m. they finished the work of making 5 Kg pouches. After which, making of 500 gms pouch of Component A was assigned to these workers; accordingly, Shri Pravin and Baban were filling the material in inner pouch; Shri Rajendra was sealing inner pouch, while Shri Sachin was sealing the outer aluminum pouch. The outer packet is an aluminum foil with plastic lamination. Two drums of 50 Kgs weight of sodium chlorite were issued. Filling of 500 gms pouches was in progress. At the same time, 15 workers except (out of 17 deceased workers) were working in process room-2. Additionally, Smt. Dhanshree Rajaram Shelar was working in the laboratory located on first floor.
In process room 2 components B of 5 Kg pouch packed in inner pouch was manufactured and stacked. At the same time there was packing of 100 gms pouches of Component A and packing of 500 gms size of component B. There was a large quantity (as seen in CCTV Footage) of material kept in process room -2 and 1150 kgs (21 drums of 50 Kgs. each) in process room 1. From CCTV footage and statement of workers it was further revealed that there were 3 band sealer machines in room-1 out of which one machines belt was not working and other two were in use. Out of these two machines one machine was having problem of overheating because of which the pouches were sticking to the machine due to high temperature at contact. The machine was operated by Shri Sachin Sathe. This problem was there since the previous fifteen days. In spite of reporting to supervisor and manager, the problem was not attended to and the workers were required to operate the defective machine. At the time of the accident the heating element of band sealer machine got overheated (as seen from reflection in SS cover of tablet machine in the CCTV footage) and the pouch under sealing caught fire. Both the pouch and the material inside pouch came in contact with heater and resulted in fire. Shri Rajendra Marne saw reflection of fire in the tablet machine cover placed in front of him and alerted other co-workers in the room. All the workers working in room-1 realizing that a fire had broken out rushed outside of the room.
There was no attempt to control the fire at this time, as the concerned workers self-evaucated. There were fire extinguishers available but from CCTV footage it is evident 16 that because of rapid spread of fire nobody tried to use them and tried to escape from the workplace. The fire thus intensified and spread to the pouches of sodium chlorite stored in the room. The entire powder filling was manual so there was a sizeable quantity of sodium chlorite spread on the floor and on the sealing machine. It is known that if sodium chlorite comes into contact with combustible materials, it can react rapidly and ignite. However, sodium chlorite will not normally burn by itself. Examples of combustible materials are oil or grease (such as from a forklift), wood (such as pallets), leather, cloth, paints, organics, and in some cases dirt. In the specific accident situation at SVS Aqua Technologies site, therefore, due to sudden combustion and as sodium chlorite is a strong oxidizer the fire spread in the area.
The stock of sodium chlorite in room no.1 was 1150 kgs, this huge quantity made fire more violent. As the doors of air lock present between these two rooms were open, possibly generated pressure wave and the burning sodium chlorite from room -1 reached the process room -2 very vigorously and all material kept in to the process room 2 where 16 workers were working also caught fire causing further increase in fire and pressure. As workers in process room-2 were also engaged in the filling of Sodium chlorite and Sodium per sulfate, both being oxidizing material, it possibly resulted in a heavy fire in the area causing entrapment of workers working in the process room -2.
Further, the workers were working in seating position so they were unable to escape from fire instantly. The fire engulfed most of the area in the room as it was filled with material resulted in enhancement of fire intensity within a very period of time (a few seconds, as seen from CCTV footage) due to the property of Sodium chlorite and Sodium Per Sulphate and other in process material The workers working in room-1 escaped from the room and the workers Shri Adinath Sathe and Shri Santosh Sathe who were transferring filled 5 Kg component from room-1 to room-2 escaped with burn injuries. All persons working in process room-2 was working in seating positions and were, therefore, unable to escape from the room in spite of two exits being available, one from room 1 and another from room 2. Heavy fire and excessive storage of material made it impossible for workers to escape 17 from room 2 and they died due to burn injuries. Fire also immediately reached to first floor lab area causing burn injuries to Smt. Dhanshree Rajaram Shelar. In spite of having second exit from first floor she was unable to escape due fire intensity and smoke. She also died due to burn injuries. Table 2 provides name & age of persons who faced fatality from the accident.
During the investigation oversights relating to electrical system malfunctions were also revealed. The factory was having a three-phase voltage stabilizer to regulate the voltage. As per the statement of workers it was revealed that there was problem in functioning of stabilizer which was there since about a week prior to the accident. Two days before the accident there was failure of three tube lights in process room-1. Also, on the day of accident repair of the voltage stabilizer was going on due to which there was power failure at about 12:30 p.m. At the time of accident also the voltage regulator work was in progress.
TABLE 2 NAME & AGE OF DECEASED PERSON
Sr. Name Age Sr. no. Name of the deceased Age
no. worker
1. Shri. Sachin Madan 24 10. Smt. Shital Dattatray 43
Ghodke Khopkar
2. Smt. Manda 49 11. Smt. Geeta Bharat 41
Bhausaheb Kulat Diwadkar
3. Smt. Surekha 45 12. Smt. Sarika 43
Manohar Chandrakant
Tupe Kudale
4. Smt. Archana Venkat 36 13. Smt. Seema Sachin 34
Kawade Borade
5. Smt. Mahadevi Sanjay 40 14. Smt. Dhanshree 22
Ambre Rajaram Shelar
6. Smt. Mangal Baban 29 15. Smt. Sangita Ulhas 43
Margale Gonde
7. Smt. Sunita Rahul 28 16. Shri. Atul Laxman Sathe 23
Sathe
8. Smt. Trishala 32 17. Smt. Suman Sanjay 38
Sambhaji Jadhav Dhebe
18
9. Smt. Sangita Maruti 43
Polekar
In addition to the fatalities, Shri. Santosh Sathe, Shri. Adinath Sathe received serious burn injuries (about 40%), whereas Shri. Pravin Kavankar received minor injuries.
The overall sequence of events during the accident (07.06.2021-08.06.2021) was as follows.
3:55 p.m.: Commencement of Fire.
4:15 p.m.: Arrival of Police personnel and of local Administration 4:25 p.m.: Fire tenders from PMRDA and MIDC reaches accident site (3 Fire tenders from PMRDA and 2 from MIDC) 6:30 p.m.: Fire brought under control and bodies of deceased workers removed from the site and handed over to police, injured workers taken to Sanjivani Hospital, Deccan, Pune 8:00 p.m.: Major Fire was extinguished, but minor fires continued 11.30 p.m: Minor fire extinguishing process was going on The photographs taken during the Committee visit on 09.09.2021 and earlier photos taken during the fire incident on 07.06.2021 are provided at Annexure-IV.
7. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT As mentioned earlier, the concerned factory site was engaged in the manufacturing of the Chlorine dioxide powder and tablet. The manufacturing was as per order and was intermittent. Unauthorized-packing of IPA based hand sanitizer was also carried out in the premises and at the time of accident a large stock of the IPA based sanitizer was kept in the factory. The bottles were stored in finished goods store and passage adjacent to the finished store area. The sanitizer bottle stock area measured. In finished store after fire, it was 5.4m(l) x 1.5m (height)x 2m(width) and 2.5m
(l)x1.5m(h)x3.0m (width) and in the passage at the exit from room 2 and finished store it was 1.9m(w)x1.5m (h)x1.5 m (l). The fire accident was initiated by ignition from the faulty, overheated band sealer. From analysis of the CCTV footage, 19 it was also evident that the fire spread with extreme rapidity, and images caught by the CCTV suggests the occurrence of a flash fire like situation.
There could be two possible reasons for this:
I. Sodium chlorite is extremely reactive and will explode in a violent reaction on contact with organic substances including basic items such as gloves and clothing, spillage control materials such as sawdust and cotton waste, or even oil and grease. Heat, friction or just impact can lead to an explosion. It is known to decompose rapidly at temperatures above 1300C, and can detonate if heated rapidly to 1000C. Also, contact with dust and other combustible material such as organic matter and sulfur can cause it to catch fire or explode. A possible scenario is an initial release of sodium chlorite followed by its ignition in contact with extraneous substances available on site and eventual escalation of fire into an explosion.
II. The other possibility is ignition of hydrocarbon (IPA) vapours present in reasonably large quantities in the work area due continuous leakages and volatilization from its handling processes. The work area was provided with Air Handling unit which constantly circulated air in the area, which could have caused a steady buildup of IPA concentration in air. Sodium chlorite, which is one of the products handled in the factory, being a strongly oxidizing material is also expected to be incompatible with IPA, and lead to ignition followed by flash fire As outlined earlier, the fire began in the defective band sealer machine causing Sodium Chlorite pouches to catch the fire and as there was large quantity of it present in room-1 where the fire began, there was a rapid escalation of the fire. This could have eventually led to ignition of the IPA in air in the room leading to a sudden escalation in the form of a flash fire. The CCTV footages reviewed suggests the occurrence of a sudden flame propagation via air from room 1 to room 2 where other workers were present, who suffered almost instantaneous engulfment by the fire. Also, in room 2 there was a large quantity of sodium chlorite containers and sodium per sulfate which could have contributed to the enhanced propagation of the fire which essentially entrapped 20 the workers making it practically impossible for them to escape, which eventually led to their fatality.
Unsafe work practices prevalent at the site seems to have also contributed to the escalation of the fire. The practice followed was to process large quantities of sodium chlorite and other material at the same time. This allowed a large inventory of partially packed hazardous materials to be available in room 1 where packet sealing machines - potential energy sources - were operated. Had the company decided to process a lower quantity of hazardous material, say handling a single 50kg container at a time for packing in pouches, the overall risk could have been significantly reduced. Awareness of the highly hazardous nature of sodium chlorite could have been low or non-existent, especially amongst the workers. Inculcation of such awareness and adoption of protective measures is a basic necessity, and a predominant responsibility of the organization's management. There appears to be a clear lacuna on this account with SVS Aqua Technologies.
During the investigation it was revealed that two band sealers were connected to an extension board and this board was connected to a socket with loose wire (no plug top was used); also, board was also not in proper condition. Such poor condition of electrical systems on site and allowing work when there was repair/maintenance required on electrical system suggests a disregard for safety within the company.
Also, that the faulty condition of the band sealers was reported by the workers to the supervisor a number of times well-ahead of the accident. But the concerned higher functionaries did not take timely maintenance measures to rectify the fault, forcing the workers to operate under hazardous conditions. Also, at the time of the accident an electrical maintenance of voltage stabilizer was in progress, but no responsible person was present such as electrical engineer or production manager or any other knowledgeable person. All these pre-conditions together are suggestive of a negligent attitude of the management towards safe work practices. This provision and maintenance of plant and systems of work in the factory was not safe. Also processing and storage of non-compatible material resulted in the accident.
21Therefore, to summarize, the principal root causes that led to the accident are as follows:
i. Unauthorized storage and handling of hazardous materials, i.e., IPA ii. Use of incompatible materials - such as IPA and sodium chlorite - on site without requisite measures or practices to control the potential hazards iii. Incompatible use of air handling unit in presence of a volatile, flammable substance such as IPA iv. A work practice that allowed presence of large inventories of hazardous materials on site, that heightened the risk of a large-scale fire v. Non-availability of trained personnel on site to manage emergencies vi. Negligent attitude of senior management to safe work practices such as defective band sealer machine causing Sodium Chlorite pouches to catch the fire & electrical system malfunctions, i.e., three-phase voltage stabilizer
8. PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACCIDENT The occupier of the factory is responsible for the said accident and it was his absolute responsibility to ensure safety and health of worker and safety of the premises. It was also his responsibility to comply with the provisions of the applicable laws. Occupier himself is a chemical engineer and is expected to have through knowledge of the chemicals those were being handled and stored in the premises. In spite of having all knowledge about the process, materials and associated hazards he failed to ensure that necessary measures for safe operation were in place. DISH office regularly circulates various precautionary measures to be undertaken to prevent accidents. A similar communication was made to a group of factories including SVS on 12/05/2021. There were directives about protective components to be placed in electric circuit and other instruction about flameproof fittings, mock drill etc. If 22 occupier had followed the guidelines, then the said accident may not have occurred.
9. ACTION TAKEN BY VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS & UNDER VARIOUS ACTS/RULES:
The District Magistrate of Pune being President, Disaster Management Authority Pune, constituted a committee under the Chairmanship of SDM including, Additional Director, Industrial Safety and Health, Joint Director Industry, Deputy Commissioner Labour, Regional Officer MPCB, Executive Engineer MSEB (Rural), Fire Officer PMRDA and Tahsildar Mulshi. The DM Pune directed the committee to investigate the accident and file a report. The said Committee inspected the site and each authority submitted the detailed inquiry report on 09.06.2021. The DM constituted Committee Report is given at Annexure- V, whereas the reports of the various departments are appended as Annexure-VI (Annexure-VI (A) Fire Dept PMRDA, Annexure-VI (B) Police Dept (SDOP), Annexure-VI (C) Merged Individual reports of State Govt Departments (Industrial Security, DISH, Electricity (Mahavitaran), Fire, MPCB & Labour Commissioner) and Annexure-VI (D)-DISH.
9.1 ACTION TAKEN BY DIRECTORATE OF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY & HEALTH (DISH) UNDER FACTORIES ACT- 1948:
DISH issued order under Section-8/Section- 40 (2) of Factory Act 1948 to the industry and also filed cases in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) Pune due to contraventions of various provisions of Factory Acts 1948. The copies of the order/court cases letters etc are attached as Annexure-VII. The details of cases filed, contraventions and reasons are provided in following Table 3.
TABLE 3 ACTION TAKEN UNDER THE PROVISION OF FACTORIES ACT-1948 BY DISH OFFICE AGAINST THE OCCUPIER SHRI NIKUNJ SHAH Case Contraventions Reason number 23 S.C.C. Factories Act, System of work at factory was to process large 17663/ 1948 Section quantity of sodium chlorite and other material at 2021 7(A) (2)(a) a time. Instead of processing large quantity at a time, only one 50 Kgs container ought to have been packed in to inner and outer pouches and sent to storage. After completion of one container then only a new container was taken for pouching. This system of work was safer and allowed a low risk of operation. But the system of work at the time of accident was to process a large quantity of Sodium Chlorite simultaneously while keeping a large quantity of partially packed material in the production area. The severity of accident increased because of large quantity of material accumulation in the manufacturing area.
During enquiry it was revealed that two band sealers were connected to an extension board and this board was connected to a socket with loose wire (no plug top was used); in addition, the board was not in proper condition. There was thus a lack of proper maintenance of the electrical system. In spite of repeated reporting by worker about the problem of band sealing machine, its maintenance was not carried out and workers were required to work with the faulty machine.
Also, electrical maintenance of voltage stabilizer was in progress around the time of the accident, but no responsible person was present on site, such as electrical engineer or production manager or any other knowledgeable person. Thus, the occupier has not ensured the due maintenance of plant and systems of work in the factory that are safe and without risk to health to health of all workers while they are at work in the factory. Hence on the day of accident the occupier has contravened the provisions of section 7(A)(2)(a) of Factories Act-1948. S.C.C.175 Factories Act, The workers were not made aware about the 77/2021 1948 Section chemical names of materials processed and only 7(A) (2)(c) code name was shared. Also, there was no display of material safety data sheets on site. Workers were not made aware about the hazards associated with the chemicals used in the factory. Also, there was no training provided to the worker about safe work practices.24
S.C.C. 175 Maharashtra Repacking of 100 ml and 5 Liter pack size from 97/2021 Factories Rules, 500 ml size filled bottles of sanitizer was carried 1963 Rule 4(2) out without approval from this office.
DISH Office.
S.C.C. 175 Clause 6(1)(a) of Non-provision of flameproof fittings in the area 69/2021 Schedule XXIII where highly flammable liquids were stored/ Annexed with handled.
rule 114 of
Maharashtra
Factories Rules,
1963
S.C.C. 175 Maharashtra Factory was employing more than 20 workers
77/2021 Factories Rules, from March 2020 whereas application for
1963 Rule 4(3) registration and license was submitted from 01-
Dec-2020
9.2 ACTION TAKEN BY MAHARASHTRA POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD (MPCB) UNDER THE WATER (P & CP) ACT, 1974 & AIR (P & CP) ACT, 1981 MPCB issued closure direction dated 08.06.2021 which is appended as Annexure-VIII and directed that -The waste generated due to fire incident shall be disposed to CHWTSDF immediately and report the compliance with manifest as per Hazardous & other Waste (T & TM) Rules, 2016 forthwith.
i) You shall take scientific measures to avoid the nuisance due to generated waste in any form in the fire accident and dispose the same after suitable treatment, if necessary.
ii) You shall not carry out your manufacturing activities till you obtain prior permission of the Maharashtra Pollution Control Board and Directorate of Industrial Safety and health (DISH).
9.3 ACTION TAKEN BY OFFICE OF DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR Deputy Commissioner of Labour taken action/filed cases in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) Pune under various provision of various Labour acts against the occupier Mr. Nikunj Shah, such as Minimum Wages Act, 25 1948; Payment of Wages Act,1936; Payment of Gratuity Act,1972; Under H R A Act, 1983; Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 and Equal Remuneration Act,1976. The details of the case nos., contraventions & reasons are provided in Following Table 4.
TABLE 4 ACTION TAKEN BY OFFICE OF DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR Sr. Case Number Contraventions Reason No. 1 SSC 17158/ 1. Section 18(1) R/w 1.The muster roll cum wage 2021 Under Rule 27(1) register in form II is not Minimum 2. Section 18(1)R/w maintained. This is a breach of wages Rule 27(4) Section 18(1) R/w Rule 27(1). Act,1948 3. Rule 28
4. Section 18(3)R/w 2.The employer has not signed Rule 27(2) wage register. This is a breach
5. Rule 30 of Section 18(1) R/w Rule 27(4)
3. A well bound inspection book is not kept. This is a breach of Rule 28
4. The attendance card come which sleep are not provided.
This is a breach of Section 18(3) R/w Rule 27(2).
5.The record for last three years has not preserved. This is a breach of Rule 30.
2 SSC 17168/ 1. Section 5(1)(a) 1. Employer has not made 2021 Under 2. Rule 8 payment of wages is to the Payment of 3. Rule (20)2 workers as on before 7th day of Wages Act, 4. Section 13A (2) month. 1936 R/w Rule 6 5. Section 25 2. Employer has not displayed 6. Section 7 the notice indicating the date of payment. 3. Employer has not displayed the notice indicating the rate of wages. 26 4. Employer has not preserved the record for last 3 years. 5. Employer has not displayed the notice of abstract. 6. Wages paid some/all workers with unlawful deduction.
3 SSC 17175/ 1) Rule 3 (1) 1. Notice of opening of the 2021 Under 2) Rule 3 (2) establishment in Form A has Payment of 3) Section 6 (7) not been submitted to the Gratuity Act, R/W Rule 6 controlling authority of area 1972 (1) through statutory time limit of
4) Rule 4(1) 30 days has already expired.
5) Rule 20
6) Rule 8 (4) 2. Notice of change in Form B
7) Section 7 B (1)(a) intimating the change in the
0) Section 7 (2) name and address of employer Section 7 (3) business has not been submitted to the controlling authority of area even through a period of 30 days has expired.
3. The employer has not accepted the nomination forms filled by the employees and also not acknowledge the receipt to the employee.
4. The employer has not displayed the notice specifying the name of the officer with designation authority by him to receive on his behalf notice under this act for the rules.
5. The employer has not displayed abstract of the act and rules framed there under conspicuous place at or the main entrance of the establishment.
6. The employer has failed to issue notice in form L form M as the case may be to the application employee within 15 days receipt application endorsing copy to the controlling authority.
277. On demand details of persons resigned/retired/died/disabled during the last three years gratuity entitlement and amount of gratuity paid to them with date as per their entitlement not provided.
8. The employer failed to determine the amount of gratuity and give notice in writing to person whom gratuity is payable and also to the controlling authority.
9. The employer shall arrange to pay the amount of gratuity within thirty days from the date it becomes payable to the person to whom the gratuity is payable.
4 SSC 17191/ 1. Section 08 R/w 1. Register of house rent 2021 Under H Rule4 allowance in Form A is not RA Act, 1983 2. Section 8 r/w Rule maintained.
123. Section 8 R/w 2. Register of workmen in Form I Rule13 is not maintained.
3. Visit book is not maintained.
5 SSC 17194/ 1. Section 20 R/w 1. Maternity Benefit Register in 2021 Under Rule 12 (1) FORM 10 is not maintained. Maternity 2. Section 19 R/w Benefit Act, Rule 11. 2. Maternity Benefit Register is not 1961 3. Rule 15 produced for inspection.
4. Rule 16
5. Section 5(1) 3. Abstract of the Act and Rules
6. Section 8(1) R/w made there under in FORM 9 Rule 4(1) has not been displayed at
7. Section 15 conspicuous places.
8. Section 11 R/w Rule 6 4. Annual Returns in FORM 11 for
9. Section 9 R/w the year ending 2016 has not Rule 4(2) been sent to the competent
10. Section 9(a) authority before 15th Jan 2021.
11. Section 10 R/w Rule 4(2) 5. The records of last 3 years are not preserved.
286. The Employer has not paid the maternity benefit to the women employee/workers
7. The Employer has not paid the medical bonus to the employee /workers.
8. On demand, Employer has not produced the proof of maternity benefits given to the employee /workers.
9. Nursing breaks have not been given.
10. The Employer has not paid leave with wages for miscarriage.
11. The Employer has not paid the leave with wages for tubectomy operation.
12. The Employer has not paid the leave with wages for illness arising out of pregnancy.
6 SSC 17198/ 1. Section 09 (4) 1. Employer has not produced 2021 Under 2. Section 8 R/w Rule Muster Roll-Cum-Wages Equal 06 Register for Inspection. Remuneration 3. Section 06(5) Act,1976 2. Register in Form D is not maintained. 3. Employer failed to carry out such direction in respect of employment of women workers made by the appropriate government. 9.4 ACTION BY POLICE DEPARTMENT
Police department has filed R.C.C./2671/2021 against Shri Nikunj Bipin Shah, Shri Bipin Jayantilal Shah, Shri Keyur Bipin Shah (Partners), Shri Sanjay Mahajan Production Manager, and Shri 29 Sundarshen Mohan Maintenance Engineer under the provision of Indian Penal Code section 304(2), 285, 286, 34. As per report of SDPO, Haveli dated 10.07.2021 (Annexure-VI B), accused no.1 Shri Bipin Nikunj Shah, age 39 was arrested on 08.06.2021 and obtained Court permission for Police Custody up to 15.06.2021, and under Magistrate Custody at Yerwada Jail, Pune. Accused no.2, Shri Bipin Jayantilal Shah, Age 68 obtained pre-arrest bail before arrest from Court of Additional Session Judge Hon'ble S. B. Salunkhe Pune on 22.06.2021 with terms & conditions. Accused No. 3 Shri Keyur Bipin Shah (Partners), is presently residing in Dubai and now, therefore, look out notice communication has been made with FRO Branch Pune Gramin.
9.5 RESPONSES FILED IN HON'BLE NGT BY DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, PUNE, DISH MAHARASHTRA AND MPCB As mentioned in the Hon'ble NGT order dated 16.06.2021, reproduced below as...
"3. Response has been filed on behalf of the District Magistrate, Pune and DISH Maharashtra. In the response dated 14.06.2021 filed on behalf of the District Magistrate, Pune following version has been mentioned:
" xxx.......................................xxx.................................xxx A Fire incidence occurred at a chemical factory in village Urawade, Tal. Mulshi, Dist. Pune on 07/06/2021. Total 15 Women and 2 Male labours were deceased in the said incidence. In view of the incidence occurred in the company namely SVS Acqua Pvt Ltd situated at village Urawade, Tal. Mulshi, Dist. Pune the District Magistrate took serious cognizance. The D.M. Pune being a President, Disaster Management Authority Pune by order dated 07/06/2021 constituted a committee under the Chairmanship of SDM Maval including, Additional Director, Industrial Safety and Health, Joint Director Industry, Deputy Commissioner Labour, Regional Officer MPCB, Executive Engineer MSEB (Rural), Fire Officer PMRDA and Tahsildar Mulshi. The D.M. Pune directed the committee to investigate deeply and to file a report. The order of constituting a committee is annexed for your kind perusal.
The said Committee inspected the site and each authority submitted the detail inquiry report on 09/06/2021. The committee observed as follows:30
The SVS Aqua Pvt. Ltd. is situated in Gat no.411/plot no.43, 44, and 45 at village Urawade, Tal. Mulshi, Dist. Pune. The factory is registered with the Department of Industrial Safety and Health. The factory is having a capacity of 48 workers. The factory is having permission of to produce Cl2 tablets and powder for water purification by formulation process. For that they are having raw material such as sodium chlorite, sodium bisulphate, sodium bicarbonate, adipic acid and packing material. The MPCB has issued consent to operate on 10/09/2020 however the factory was running without any consent i.e. from year 2016 to 2020. The Additional Commissioner of Labour Pune Division stated in its report that, the said factory is registered under the Factories Act, 1948 and produces chemical water purification tablets. On 07/06/2021 from 04.00 to 4.30pm there was a explosion and fire broke out in the packing department. The names of some deceased are not registered under the Employees State Insurance Scheme. The Fire Department and Office of Industrial Safety and Health submitted the same report.
After perusing the reports submitted by different departments, following discrepancies have been found at the factory place:
a) Except the permission granted by the Industry and Health Department flammable substances were stored in the place.
b) The factory was not informed about the large stock of flammable substances to the Industry and Health Department.
c) The flammable raw material storage place and work place are same and hence large number of chemicals exploded and fire went out of control.
d) The company not submitted self-certification before the Electric Inspector Yervada.
e) The fire may increase higher due to the stock of sanitizer and due to the sodium chloride, there were spread of black smoke and hence the labour cannot exit safely.
f) Company only received primary no objection certificate from Fire Department. The Company and the work already started in new building however this fact never brought to the notice of fire department.
The primary no objection certificate is not the final NOC from the said department.
g) There is no final NOC from the Fire Department.
h) There was no any fire extinguisher in the premises.
31i) There is a possibility of production flammable material other than the product mentioned in the consent letter issued by MPCB.
j) At the time of investigation, the company owner stated that, they have started production in the year 2016 without consent of MPCB. From the available documents it seems that, the MPCB issued consent on 10/09/2020 it means they have worked without any consent i.e. from year 2016 to 2020.
k) In view of the information received from Labour Department and the interview of the workers against the said company, necessary action will be taken under the provisions of law. The report submitted by the committee is annexed herewith for kind perusal.
The factory owner stated in written that, they are going to provide financial help of Rs. 5, 00,000/-per person to the legal heirs of the deceased. The State Government of Maharashtra, Chief Minister Relief Fund have granted Rs. 5,00,000/-per person to the legal heirs of the deceased. Further the Hon'ble Prime Minister has sanctioned Ex-gratia out of Prime Ministers Relief Fund of Rs. 2,00,000/-each to the legal heirs of the deceased. The Collector office assured that the same will be disbursed in to the account of the legal heirs as earlier as possible.
A FIR has been lodged against the owner of the factory and offence has been registered against them in Paud Police Station u/s 304, 285, 286 1/w of IPC. The factory owner is in police custody as on today."
4. On behalf of the DISH Maharashtra, following action taken report has been filed:
"i. This office received the information about the incidence of fire in M/s SVS Aqua Technologies LLP., Sr No.43/44/45, Gat No., Taluka:- Mulshi, District : Pune, - 412111.at @ 5.45 pm. on mobile (whatsapp). In this incident of fire, 17 workers including 15 female workers and 2 male workers died and two workers are injured and major damage to the plant, machinery, raw material & finished goods has taken place.
ii. Our officers from Pune office visited the site on the same day i.e. on 07.06.2021 at @ 6.30 pm. Officers observed that:32
a) There was smoke at the place and cooling and rescuing operation was going on.
b) During the visit, police and fire fighters informed that 17 workers were trapped in the fire and same were totally burnt.
c) Till 11.30 pm cooling operation was going on by fire brigade.
d) Shri S.P. Rathod, Director of Industrial Safety and Health, Maharashtra visited the site on 08.06.2021.
iii. The respondent industry ie M/s SVS Aqua Technologies LLP., Sr No.43/44/45, Gat No.411, Uravade, Taluka:- Mulshi, District : Pune made an application for grant of license under Factories act 1948 on 04.03.2021. Factory is having license number 13841 for 50 workers and 100 HP installed power valid till December-2022. But it was learnt that factory was operational since last 2 to 3 years.
iv. The factory has taken permission from this Department for manufacturing of chlorine dioxide tablets, powder and gel by using Sodium Bisulphate, sodium chlorite, Sodium per sulphate and Magnesium Sulphate. But at the time of visit, substantial stock of alcohol (IPA) based plastic sanitizer bottles was found in the factory. That means sanitizer packing/filling was also carried out in this factory. Documents found at the site and statements also confirms this.
v. Name of Directors of the factory: i) Shri Nikunj Bipin Shah ii) Shri Bipin Jayantilal Shah iii) Shri Keyur Bipin Shah vi. About Incident of Fire: From site visit and statement of workers it was revealed that there were two rooms in the factory where manufacturing process was carried out. Commonly known as Process room-1 and Process room-2. On the day of accident workers reported factory at about 9:00 a.m. and started working in the process room-1 and room-2. Workers were engaged in the filling of 5 kg pouches of Sodium Chlorite powder for making pouches of component A. On the day of accident 16 workers from the list of deceased workers were working in process room-2. One female worker was working in the laboratory located on first floor. In process room 2 components B of 5 Kg pouch packed in inner pouch was manufactured and stacked. At @ 3.45 pm 33 suddenly a major fire was observed in room no 1 and it spread into room no 2 within fraction of seconds as the door between room no 1 and 2 was kept open. The worker working in room-1 escaped from the room. All person working in process room-2 was unable to escape from the room inspite of two exits available one from room 1 and one from room2. Heavy fire made it impossible for workers to escape from room 2 and total 17 workers died due to burn injuries.
vii. This Directorate has passed a closure order under section 40(2) of Factories Act- 1948 on 09.06.2021 to the factory.
viii. This directorate is carrying out a detail enquiry of this incident by collecting the necessary evidence, regarding of worker statements, inspection of the accident site etc. ix. This directorate will be issuing show cause notice to the Occupier of this factory regarding the contraventions which will be observed during the course of enquiry and file the prosecution in the court of law under the Factories Act- 1948.
x. The management of factory has declared an ex-gratia amount of Rs. 5 lakh each to the legal heirs of the deceased. The Government of Maharashtra has declared ex-gratia amount Rs. 5 lakh each to the legal heirs of the deceased and Rs. 50,000/- to the injured workers. The Central Government has declared an ex-gratia amount of Rs. 2 lakh each to the legal heirs of the deceased. This exgratia amount is in addition to legal compensation amount.
xi. Director of Industrial Safety and Health, Maharashtra and Additional Director (I/C) of Industrial Safety and Health, Pune will be joining the video conferencing on 16 the June 2021."
10. EXTENT OF DAMAGE 10.1 DAMAGE TO ENVIRONMENT During the incident due to fire, emissions/smoke spread to the environment and water, which is used for the fire extinguishing, got contaminated. The contaminated water spread into the premises and in front of gate of industry in low laying area.
34MPCB, Sub-Regional Office, Pune-2 carried out Ambient Air Quality Monitoring at three locations and wastewater (generated due to firefighting operation) sampling outside the premises near the gate of the industry the during day of incident. The analysis results are given in Table 5 & Table 6, respectively, as below-
TABLE 5 RESULTS OF AMBIENT AIR QUALITY MONITORING Sr. Location(s) Parameter Concentration NAAQ No. (s) (µg/m ) 3 Standards# (µg/m3) 1 In the premises of SO2 23.15 80 M/s. Brinton Carpets NO2 28.91 80 PM10 60.19 100 2 Near M/s. Mahale SO2 8.33 80 Anand Filter Systems NO2 7.66 80 PM10 161 100 3 Near M/s. Praj SO2 8.16 80 Industries NO2 35.16 80 PM10 113 100 • The concentration of the pollution is expressed in µg/m3 • The monitoring carried out during the period 07.06.2021- 08.06.2021 (for 24 hrs) • #NAAQS- NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS Notification by CPCB dated 18th November, 2009 for Industrial, Residential, Rural and Other Areas for 24 hrs The analysis results of the ambient air quality, shows the concentration of PM10 exceeds the NAAQ Standards at two locations out of three and concentration of Pollutants- SO2 & NO2 are within the NAAQ Standards.
TABLE 6 RESULTS OF WASTEWATER SAMPLING Sr. No. Parameter (s) Results Standards$ 1 pH 1.4 5.5-9.0 2 BOD 11000.0 100 3 COD 25760.0 250 35 4 Oil & Grease 13.2 10 5 Suspended Solids 2194.0 100 6 Chlorides 4548.6 600 7 Sulphate 341.7 1000 8 TDS 11900.0 2100 • The values are expressed in mg/l except pH, • $- Standards prescribed for treated effluent disposal on land The analysis results of the samples show that contaminated water which is resultant from fire dousing operation and incidental having high BOD and COD which is more than the standards for land disposal. The contaminated water spread in the premises and found its way outside the premises on open land in front of the gate of the industry in low lying area. During the visit of the committee on 06.08.2021, due to vegetation and monsoon after the accident, the committee could not observe any visual impact. MPCB has given direction (para 9.2) that waste generated due to fire incident shall be disposed to CHWTSDF immediately and report the compliance with manifest as per Hazardous & other Waste (T & TM) Rules, 2016 and to take scientific measures to avoid the nuisance due to generated waste in any form in the fire accident and dispose the same after suitable treatment, if necessary. Accordingly, the compliance from industry is needed to be ascertained by MPCB.
10.2 DAMAGE INVOLVING LOSS OF LIVES OR INJURIES Due to incident, there is loss of 17 lives (15 -Females & 2- Males) as detailed in the Table 2. In addition to these fatalities, two persons sustained serious burn injuries (about 40%) whereas one received minor injuries. No loss to local animals are mentioned in any report.
11. COMPENSATION TOWARDS DAMAGE TO ENVIRONMENT AND DAMAGE TOWARDS LOSS OF LIVES OR THE INJURIES 11.1 COMPENSATION TOWARDS DAMAGE TO ENVIRONMENT:
Proper data/information viz stock of raw material/products before and after accident, are not available. It is informed by the Industry representative vide e-mail dated 18.10.2021 Annexure-IX to MPCB that physical documents have been destroyed in fire as entire office 36 file store room is burned & destroyed; and due to use of water & foam for the fire extinguishing process all the servers and computers peripherals have got burned, hence on-line data has been damaged and same can be provided after recovery. Further, unit is still waiting for insurance and court clearance for cleaning and removal or debris and burned wastage stock. The committee could not carry out the damage to environment based on the air quality data/emission due to burning of chemicals in the fire, because of non-availability of information on stock of raw materials/products.
However, as per report of the DM Constituted Committee (Annexure- V), the company started production in the year 2016 without consent of MPCB (as per statement of company owner) and MPCB issued consent in Sept 2020 i.e. industry operated without any consent i.e. from year 2016 to 2020. Further, the industry was engaged, in the bottling/handling of IPA alcohol-based sanitizer without license or consent up to date of accident i.e. 07.06.2021. Also various contraventions of provisions under Factory Acts, Labour Acts have been reported.
Considering the above non-compliance, committee finds it appropriate to compute damages for contravening mandatory provisions of environmental laws and use methodology/formula which is given in "Report of the CPCB In-house Committee on Methodology for Assessing Environmental Compensation and Action Plan to Utilize the Fund" for imposing environmental compensation on industrial units for violation of directions issued by regulatory bodies listing the instances for taking cognizance of cases fit for violation and levy environmental compensation. The same has also been referred by the Hon'ble NGT in its order (para 14 to 16) dated 28/8/2019 in the matter of Original Application No. 593/2017 titled Paryavaran Suraksha Samiti & Anr. Versus Union of India & Ors., and also used by various other committee's constituted by Hon'ble NGT in various other matters.
The instances considered for levying Environmental Compensation (EC) in the said report are:
a) Discharges in violation of consent conditions, mainly prescribed standards / consent limits.37
b) Not complying with the directions issued, such as direction for closure due to non-installation of OCEMS, non- adherence to the action plans submitted etc.
c) Intentional avoidance of data submission or data manipulation by tampering the Online Continuous Emission / Effluent Monitoring systems.
d) Accidental discharges lasting for short durations resulting into damage to the environment.
e) Intentional discharges to the environment -- land, water and air resulting into acute injury or damage to the environment.
f) Injection of treated/partially treated/ untreated effluents to ground water.
Though such listed instances may not be directly applicable in the current matter for arriving at the damages amount for contravening mandatory provisions of environmental laws (i.e. establishment & operation of the industry without consents under the Water ( P & CP) Act 1974 & Air (P & CP) Act 1981), an attempt is being made by this committee to assess the environmental compensation using the formula prescribed in the said CPCB report which may be taken as damages amount for contravening mandatory provisions of environmental laws. The same methodology/formula is used in other Hon'ble NGT matters. The formula takes into account of number of days violation took place, pollution index of unit, scale of operation, location factor based on population and an amount factor in Rupees including deterrent effect for repeated violations.
Environmental Compensation (EC) in Rupees as mentioned in the aforesaid CPCB report-
EC=PI x N x R x S x LF Where, EC Environmental Compensation in Rs. (INR) PI Pollution Index of industrial sector. It was suggested that the average pollution index of 80, 50 and 30 may be taken for calculating the Environmental Compensation for Red, Orange and Green categories of industries, respectively.
N Number of days of violation that took place R R is a factor in Rupees, which may be a minimum of 100 and maximum of 500. It is suggested to consider R as 250, as the Environmental Compensation in cases of violation.
38S Factor for scale of operation S could be based on small/medium/large industry categorization, which may be 0.5 for micro or small, 1.0 for Medium and 1.5 for large units.
LF Location factor could be based on population of the city/town and location of the industrial unit. For the industrial unit located within municipal boundary or up to 10 km distance from the municipal boundary of the city/town, following factors (LF) may be used.
Sl. No. Population*
Location
(million)
Factor#
(LF)
1 Less than 1 1.0
2 1 to <5 1.25
3 5 to <10 1.5
4 10 and above 2.0
*Population of the city/town as per the latest Census of India #LF will be 1.0 in case unit is located >10km from municipal boundary For critically polluted areas / Ecologically Sensitive areas, the scope of LF may be examined further.
The factors, considered for calculating Environmental Compensation for M/s SVS Aqua Technologies, are given in the following Table 7.
TABLE 7 FACTORS CONSIDERED FOR CALCULATING ENVIRONMENTAL COMPENSATION Factor Value PI Pollution Index of 80 Industrial Sector (Red Category Industry as per Consent issued by the MPCB) N Number of days the 1985 violation has taken (01.01.2016 to 07.06.2021 i.e. Date of place accident) As per report of the DM Constituted Committee, the company started production in the year 2016 without consent of MPCB (as per statement of company owner) and 39 MPCB issued consent in Sept 2020 i.e. industry operated without any consent i.e. from year 2016 to 2020. Further, the industry was engaged, in the bottling/ handling of IPA alcohol-based sanitizer without license or consent up to date of accident i.e. 07.06.2021.
R Factor of EC in Rs. 250
Rupees
S Factor for scale of 0.5
operation of (being small scale industry as per consent
industrial unit issued by MPCB)
LF Location Factor 1.0
(Population less than 1 million nearby
village)
Thus, Environmental Compensation (EC) calculated as:
EC (Rs.) = PI x N x R x S x LF EC (Rs.) = 80 x 1985 x 250 x 0.5 x 1 EC (Rs.) = 1,98,50,000 Thus, EC is Rs. 1,98,50,000/- (Rs. One crore ninety-eight lac fifty thousand only) towards damage to the environment due to non- compliances of provisions under Environmental Acts, i.e., operation without consent from MPCB, bottling/handling of IPA alcohol-based sanitizer without license or consent.
11.2 COMPENSATION TOWARDS LOSS OF LIVES Due to fire accident on 07.06.2021 at the industry, 17 people (Female-15, Male-02) lost their lives and two got injured. The information of deceased and injured persons provided by Sub-
Divisional Officer Maval-Mulshi, Sub-Div Pune, where details including name of person, age, salary, education etc., are provided as Annexure-X. Two injured persons were admitted to Sanjivani Hospital, Deccan Pune and discharged from hospital after stay for about a month in Hospital for the treatment of burn injury. Medical expenses have been provided by Factory Management (SVSAT). The information on nature of injury and disability, if any, have not been provided.
40There is no loss of non-human life, public & damage to other property as per any reports prepared by concerned State Govt. departments.
11.2.1 INTERIM COMPENSATION/EX-GRATIA AMOUNT DECLARED/PAID TO THE DECEASED The status of compensation/ex-gratia paid and also in process are given as per letter from Tahsildar, Ta- Mulsahi to District Magistrate, Pune dated 10.07.2021 (Annexure -XI) (regarding Govt of Maharashtra announced compensation/ex gratia amount) and Report of Labour Deputy Commissioner (Annexure- XII) with respect to amount paid and undertaking of factory management for education expenses and job to family members of deceased, as follows:-
• The Government of Maharashtra has given Rs.5, 00,000/- to the legal heir of deceased workers (Rs,1,00,000/- from Chief Minister Relief Fund & Rs. 4,00,000/-State Disaster Fund) and have also paid (ex gratia) Rs.12700/- to the two seriously injured workers (Annexure- XI) • The Government of India has declared ex-gratia payment of Rs. 2,00,000/- to the heir of deceased workers. It is informed by Sub-Divisional Officer Maval-Mulshi, Sub-Div Pune SDO that the ex-gratia payment is yet to be received from Central Govt and the District Administration is following up the matter with Central Govt. The same will be disburse to them as soon as it receives.
• The factory management has agreed to pay Rs. 10,00,000/- to legal heir of deceased workers out of which Rs. 5, 00,000/- is paid and cheque of Rs. 5,00,000/- is issued having date of Month of Dec- 2021. The factory management has undertaken to pay the fees of children of the deceased workers till their graduation. Further they agreed to give a job to a family member of deceased worker after restart of the factory. (Annexure-XII). Thus, total ex-gratia/compensation as per announcement of State Govt /Central Govt and undertaking of Factory Management to the kin of each deceased person is Rs, 17,00,0000/-. Out of which, till now Rs. 15,00,0000/- to kin of each deceased person is paid (as declared/announced by State and Factory Management) and Rs. 2,00,000/- (as declared/announced by Central Govt) is remaining. The details of ex-41
gratia/compensation are provided at provided at Annexure- XIII.
11.2.2 COMPENSATION ASSESSMENT BY THE COMMITTEE FOR THE DECEASED PERSON Seventeen persons lost their lives due to the unfortunate incident on 07.06.2021 due to fire accident. Two persons sustained injuries. All innocent workmen sustained injuries not on account of their act of neglect or while discharging their duties came in contact with machinery or the chemicals but died due to negligent attitude of senior management to safe work practices; such as operation of defective band sealer machine causing Sodium Chlorite pouches to catch the fire & electrical system malfunctions ( three-phase voltage stabilizer), and also illegal, unauthorized storage and handling of hazardous materials, i.e., IPA, use of incompatible materials (such as IPA and sodium chlorite) on site without requisite measures or practices to control the potential hazards, incompatible use of air handling unit in presence of a volatile, flammable substance such as IPA, work practice that allowed presence of large inventories of hazardous materials on site, that heightened the risk of a large-scale fire and non-availability of trained personnel on site to manage emergencies.
The committee referred Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 and Hon'ble Supreme Court Cases (Sarla Verma (supra), National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 etc) for assessment of compensation in line with various accidents matters dealt by Hon'ble NGT (orders & committee reports) as mentioned in para 09 of the order dated 16.06.2021, in this present matter (OA No.130 of 2021).
As per of order of Hon'ble NGT in O.A. No. 85/2020 (Earlier O.A.No.22/2020 [WZ)] (Aryavart Foundation through its President v/s Yashashvi Rasayan Pvt. Ltd &Anr) reads as: "...32. In view of frequent accidents resulting in deaths and injuries, the Chief Secretaries of all the States/UTs may evolve a mechanism to ensure that the companies dealing with hazardous substance must forthwith pay compensation for deaths and injuries to the victims at least as per Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 wherever applicable or the principle of restitution laid down in Sarla Verma (supra), National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 to the victims either directly or through the District Magistrate.
42A. COMPENSATION AS PER EMPLOYEE'S COMPNESATION ACT 1923 As per Employee's Compensation Act 1923 & amendments thereof, the compensation to the deceased persons have been calculated and are provided in the Table 8.
TABLE 8 COMPENSATION AS PER EMPLOYEE'S COMPENSATION ACT 1923 & AMENDMENTS THEREOF Sr. Name of Deceased Salary# Compensation Age Factor* no. Person(S) (INR) Amount (INR) Shri. Sachin Madan 1 24 218.47 15000 16,38,525 Ghodke Smt. Manda 2 49 156.47 15000 11,73,525 Bhausaheb Kulat Smt.Surekha 3 45 169.44 15000 12,70,800 Manohar Tupe Smt. Archana 4 36 194.64 15000 14,59,800 Venkat Kawade Smt. Mahadevi 5 40 184.17 15000 13,81,275 Sanjay Ambre Smt. Mangal Baban 6 29 209.92 15000 15,74,400 Margale Smt. Sunita Rahul 7 28 211.79 15000 15,88,425 Sathe Smt. Trishala 8 32 203.85 15000 15,28,875 Sambhaji Jadhav Smt. Sangita Maruti 9 43 175.54 15000 1316550 Polekar Smt. Shital 10 43 175.54 15000 1316550 Dattatray Khopkar Smt. Geeta Bharat 11 41 181.37 15000 1360275 Diwadkar Smt. Sarika 12 Chandrakant 43 175.54 15000 1316550 Kudale Smt. Seema Sachin 13 34 199.4 15000 1495500 Borade Smt. Dhanshree 14 22 221.37 15000 1660275 Rajaram Shelar Smt. Sangita Ulhas 15 43 175.54 15000 1316550 Gonde Shri. Atul Laxman 16 23 219.95 15000 1649625 Sathe 43 Smt. Suman Sanjay 17 38 189.56 15000 1421700 Dhebe Note:
*as per Employee's Compensation Act-1923, Schedule IV # as per Notification S.O.71 (E) dated 03/01/2020 The Central government has changed the amount of wages to be considered for calculation of compensation to workers under the Employee's Compensation Act 1923 vide notification S.O.71 (E) dated January 3, 2020. The amount of wages considered previously for the calculation of compensation was just Rs 8,000. Now, it will be Rs 15,000, according to the notification by the Ministry of Labour and Employment.
The computation of compensation under the Act is done as per provisions on Section 4 of the Act:
1. In case of accidents resulting in death: an amount equal to fifty per cent. of the monthly wages of the deceased multiplied by the relevant factor; or an amount of Rs 1,20,000, whichever is more;
....
B. COMPENSATION AS PER HON'BLE SUPREME COURT CASES ➢ The committee referred following Hon'ble Supreme Court Cases for assessment of compensation with different components, in line with various accidents matters dealt by Hon'ble NGT (orders & committee reports) as mentioned in para 09 of the order dated 16.06.2021 in this matter.
➢ Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, Sarla Verma & Ors vs Delhi Transport Corp.& Anr on 15 April, 2009, Author:
R.V.Raveendran, J Bench: R.V. Raveendran, J Lokeshwar Singh Panta J, CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO 3483 OF 2008(Arising out of SLP [C] No.8648 of 2007 ➢ Supreme Court of India Amrit Bhanu Shali & Ors vs National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors on 4 April, 2012 Author: J. Bench: G.S. Singhvi, Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3397 OF 2012 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.27751 OF 2011) 44 ➢ Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, National Insurance Co. Ltd vs Pranay Sethi on 31 October, 2017, Author: M. Dipak CJI, Bench-. CJI. (Dipak Misra ) J. (A.K. Sikri ) J. (A.M. Khanwilkar ) J. (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud ) J. (Ashok Bhushan ) New Delhi; , CIVIL APPELALTE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 25590 OF 2014 with other Civil Appeals & Special Leave Petitions ➢ Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, Sunita Tokas vs New Inda Insurance Co. Ltd. on 16 August, 2019 Author: Hon'Ble Ms. Malhotra,J Bench: Hon'Ble Ms. Malhotra J, Sanjiv Khanna, J, CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6339 OF 2019(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 2859 of 2018) • As per para 5 of Judgement in case- Hon 'ble Supreme Court of India, Sunita Tokas vs New Inda Insurance Co.
Ltd. on 16 August, 2019 Author: Hon'Ble Ms. Malhotra,J Bench: Hon'Ble Ms. Malhotra J, Sanjiv Khanna, J, CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6339 OF 2019(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 2859 of 2018).
.....5. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the compensation awarded to the Appellants is being enhanced as follows:
Income : 12,000/ PM
Future Prospects : 4,800/ (i.e. 40% of the
Deduction towards personal : income)
50%
expenses
Total income : 8,400/ (i.e. 50% of12,000 +
Multiplier : 4,800)
18
Loss of future income : 18,14,400/ (i.e.8,400 x 12 x
Loss of love and affection : 18) 2,00,000/
Rs.
Loss of estate and funeral : Rs. 50,000/
expenses
Total Rs. 20,64,400/
• The factors considered for assessment of compensation in
the present case is described as below;
i. Monthly salary/Income of the deceased person
Permanent employee- as per the information provided by District Administration/Industry for Lab technician/helper -monthly salary 45 or total monthly wages as per information provided by Govt Labor Officer, Pune as per Govt of Maharashtra, whichever is higher.
ii. Addition to Income for Future prospects We referred following paragraphs of National Insurance Co. Ltd vs Pranay Sethi on 31 October, 2017 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, CIVIL APPELALTE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 25590 OF 2014 National Insurance Company Limited Petitioner(s) Versus Pranay Sethi and Ors. Respondent(s).
61. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we proceed to record our conclusions: -
(i) The two-Judge Bench in Santosh Devi should have been well advised to refer the matter to a larger Bench as it was taking a different view than what has been stated in Sarla Verma, a judgment by a coordinate Bench. It is because a coordinate Bench of the same strength cannot take a contrary view than what has been held by another coordinate Bench.
(ii) As Rajesh has not taken note of the decision in Reshma Kumari, which was delivered at earlier point of time, the decision in Rajesh is not a binding precedent.
(iii) While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax.
(iv) In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warranted where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary 46 method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component.
(v) For determination of the multiplicand, the deduction for personal and living expenses, the tribunals and the courts shall be guided by paragraphs 30 to 32 of Sarla Verma which we have reproduced hereinbefore.
(vi) The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table in Sarla Verma read with paragraph 42 of that judgment.
iii. Deduction for personal and living expense The committee has considered following criteria referring the judgement order of Sarla Verma & Ors Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr., Para 14, "Having considered several subsequent decisions of this court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be one-third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4 th) where the number of dependent family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (1/5 th) where the number of dependent family members exceed six" and para15 "Where the deceased was a bachelor and the claimants are the parents, the deduction follows a different principle. In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor would tend to spend more on himself.........", iv. Multiplier Multiplier considered as per para 44 of Judgment in the case- Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, National Insurance Co. Ltd vs Pranay Sethi on 31 October, 2017, Author: M. Dipak CJI, Bench-. CJI.(Dipak Misra ) J. (A.K. Sikri ) J. (A.M. Khanwilkar ) J. (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud ) J. (Ashok Bhushan ) New Delhi; , CIVIL APPELALTE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 25590 OF 2014 with other Civil Appeals & Special Leave Petitions.
44. As far as the multiplier is concerned, the claims tribunal and the Courts shall be guided by Step 2 that finds place in paragraph 19 of Sarla Verma read with paragraph 42 of the said judgment. For the sake of completeness, paragraph 42 is extracted below:-
4742. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in column (4) of the table above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie), which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M- 16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M- 11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.
v. Loss of love & affection and loss of Estate & Funeral Expenses-
The committee considered the para 5 of latest judgement in case Sunita Tokas vs New India Insurance Co. Ltd. on 16 August, 2019 out of four cases for the Loss of love & affection Rs.2,00,000/- & loss of Estate & funeral Expenses- Rs. 50,000/-
COMPUTATION OF COMPENSATION:-
(Income per month (considering the total monthly wages applicable in the state of Maharashtra, or income per month whichever is higher) + Income for Future prospects - Deduction for personal and living expense) x 12 months = Yearly compensation x Multiplier = Loss of Future Income + loss of love & affection+ Loss of estate & funeral expenses= Total Compensation.
Considering the above methodology and the information regarding deceased person- name, age, salary etc by SDO Office, Ta- Mulashi Dist Pune (Annexure-IX) and total monthly wage for skilled/unskilled labours by Govt Labour Officer, Pune (Annexure- XIV), the committee assessed compensation for the deceased persons are provided as Annexure-XV.
Thus, compensation as per assessment of committee considering Employee's Compensation Act, Hon'ble SC cases and ex- gratia/compensation paid/to be paid (as declared by the State Govt/Central Govt /industry) to the kin of each deceased person are tabulated in following Table-9.
48TABLE-09 DETAILS OF EX-GRATIA/COMPENSATION DECLARED/PAID TO KIN OF DECEASED PERSONS & COMPENSATION ASSESD BY THE COMMITTEE Sr. Name of Age M/F Total Compensation (INR) Declared by Compensation Compensation No. Deceased Persons State/Central Govt/industry Amoun t (INR) (INR) AS per (INR 17 lacs: INR 5 lacs-State+ INR 2 lacs As per Hon'ble SC Central + INR 10 lacs-Industry) Employee matter Compensation Compensation Compensation Total (INR) paid- (INR) Act State to be paid-
Govt/industry Central Govt
I
A B C D E F = (D+E) G H
(H-F)
Sachin Madan 60 M 1500000 200000 1700000 1638525 14,92,000 -
1
Ghodke
Manda Bhausaheb 27 F 1500000 200000 1700000 1173525 24,60,340 7,60,340
2
Kulat
Surekha Manohar 50 F 1500000 200000 1700000 1270800 17,14,892 14,892
3
Tupe
49
Archana Venkat 36 F 1500000 200000 1700000 1459800 22,00,300 5,00,300
4
Kawade
Mahadevi Sanjay 42 F 1500000 200000 1700000 1381275 18,27,576 1,27,576
5
Ambare
Mangal Baban 34 F 1500000 200000 1700000 1574400 23,30,320 6,30,320
6
Margale
7 Sunita Rahul Sathe 30 F 1500000 200000 1700000 1588425 24,60,340 7,60,340
Trishala Sambhaji 38 F 1500000 200000 1700000 1528875 22,00,300 5,00,300
8
Jadhav
Sangita Maruti 58 F 1500000 200000 1700000 1316550 11,47,138 -
9
Polekar
Sheetal Dattatray 48
10 F 1500000 200000 1700000 13165,50 17,14,892 14,892
Khopkar
Geeta Bharat 49
11 F 1500000 200000 1700000 1360275 17,14,892 14,892
Diwalkar
Sarikha 43
12 Chandrakant F 1500000 200000 1700000 1316550 18,27,576 1,27,576
Kudale
Seema Sachin 60
13 F 1500000 200000 1700000 1495500 11,47,138 -
Borade
50
Dhanashri Rajaram 27
14 F 1500000 200000 1700000 1660275 33,10,000 16,10,000
Shelar
Sangita Ulhas 50
15 F 1500000 200000 1700000 1316550 17,14,892 14,892
Gonde
16 Atul Laxman Sathe 36 M 1500000 200000 1700000 1649625 22,30,000 5,30,000
Suman Sanjay 42
17 F 1500000 200000 1700000 1421700 18,27,576 1,27,576
Dhebe
(Refer Annexure-IX, XII for deceased persons Details-Name, Age, Salary/Wages and Para 11.2.2 (B) for factors taken in computation) 51 11.3 COMPENSATION TOWARDS THE INJURIED PERSONS The State Govt has paid Rs. 12,700/- (Rs. Twelve thousand seven hundred only) to the two seriously injured workers though Rs. 50,000/- declared, as mentioned in the Para 9.2 above, as per order of Hon'ble NGT in this matter.
As per Hon'ble NGT order dated 18.12.2020 (para 15 & 16) in OA No. 274 of 2020, which are reproduced here, and also in similar accident matters/orders of Hon'ble NGT-
"15. ".....6. ... we assess interim compensation for death to be 15 lacs each(considering multiplier of around 16 and loss of earning of about one lac a year, taking the minimum wage, apart from conventional sums), for grievous injury Rs. 5 lac per person, for other injuries of persons hospitalized Rs. 2.5 lac per person and for displacement at Rs. 25000/- per person."
16. Accordingly, the said scale needs to be applied to the present case. Final compensation may be suggested by the Committee, including for restoration of environment. The industrial unit may deposit appropriate "
As mentioned above, Rs.5 lac in case of grievous injury and Rs. 2.5 lac in case of other injury to be paid to injured (grievous/ minor injury) persons.
Therefore, the injured (grievous & minor) needs to get Rs. 5,00,000/- & Rs. 2,50,000 as interim compensations respectively, and based on the nature of injury/disability certificate further compensation to be provided to them.
11.4 PENSION & OTHER LEGAL DUES Employee's State Insurance Corporations (ESIC) (Ministry of Labour & Employment, Govt of India) pension disbursement status to the legal heirs of deceased workers and injured workers as per the ESI Act - 1948, are provided in letter dated 11.08.2021 from Sub- Regional Office, ESI Corporation, Pune to Additional Director, DISH, Pune (Annexure-XVI) Legal dues (difference of minimum wages, bonus etc) paid to the deceased and injured workers by Factory management are provided in following Table 10 and as per letter from Govt Labor Officer which is attached as Annexure-XIV.
TABLE 10 LEGAL DUES PROVIDED BY THE INDUSTRY Name of Deceased M/F Legal Dues (INR) from Sr No Person Industry 1 Sachin Madan Ghodke M 72,024.00 2 Manda Bhausaheb F 20,898.00 Kulat 52 3 Surekha Manohar Tupe F 31,639.00 4 Archana Venkat F 60,094.00 5 Kawade Mahadevi Sanjay F 22,671.00 6 Ambare Mangal Baban Margale F 31,962.00 7 Sunita Rahul Sathe F 24,767.00 8 Trishala Sambhaji F 20,898.00 9 Jadhav Sangita Maruti Polekar F 22,026.00 10 Sheetal Dattatray F 20,737.00 11 Khopkar Geeta Bharat Diwalkar F 20,414.00 12 Sarikha Chandrakant F 17,029.00 13 Kudale Seema Sachin Borade F 21,220.00 14 Dhanashri Rajaram F 15,000.86 15 Shelar Ulhas Gonde Sangita F 31,317.00 16 Atul Laxman Sathe M 23,059.00 17 Suman Sanjay Dhebe F 30,994.00 Total 4,86,748.86 As compensation/ex-gratia Rs 17 lacs (Industry+ State Govt+ Central Govt) declared for kin to each deceased person, out which Rs. 15 lacs already been paid to kin to each deceased person whereas Rs. 2 lacs yet to be paid.
In total, Rs. 2.55 Crore (Rs. Two Crore fifty-five lacs) i.e. Rs. 1.7 Crore by Industry & Rs. 85 lacs by State Govt) paid to the deceased persons (17 Nos) and Rs 25,400/- (Rs. Twenty-five thousands four hundred) injured persons (2nos.). The medical expenses (Medicine & hospital charges) for all injured persons have been given by the industry. The industry has paid total Rs. 4,86,748 towards legal dues to the deceased persons.
The committee recommends to give the compensation/ex- gratia amount which comes out to be maximum out of three compensations/ex-gratia amount viz (I) compensations/ex-gratia amount declared by State, Central & Industry Management (para 11.2.1) (II) As per Employee Compensation Act 1923 (para 11.2.2 (A)) (III) As per Hon'ble Supreme Court matters (para 11.2.2 (B), as given in Table 9). Accordingly, committee would request to Hon'ble NGT to consider additional compensation where it exceeds compensation/ex- gratia (i.e. Rs. 17 lacs) declared by State, Central Govt & Industry Management, as shown in Column I in Table 9 above, to the kin of deceased persons.
As very meagre amount (Rs. 12,700/- each) has been paid to the injured (grievous/minor) person, Rs. 5,00,000 in case of grievous injury and Rs. 2,50,000 in case of minor injury to be paid as interim compensations and final compensation may be paid based on the nature of injury/disability certificate by the District Administration.
5312. APPLICABILITY OF MANUFACTURE, STORAGE AND IMPORT OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL RULES, 1989 (MSIHC RULES 1989) AND PROVISIONS THERE OFF It is mentioned in the para 5 of the Hon'ble NGT order dated 16/06/2021 that "The unit is using raw material such as sodium chlorite, sodium bisulphate, sodium bicarbonate, adipic acid, chlorine some of which are specifically mentioned in Part-II of Schedule 1 and also Schedules 2 and 3 to the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989 ("the 1989 Rules") and thus covered by the definition of hazardous chemical under Rule 2(e) of the said rules. In such a case, the site has to be approved under Rule 7. Safety report has to be prepared and safety audits have to be conducted under Rule 10, onsite emergency plan is to be prepared under Rule 13 and off-site emergency plan is to be prepared under Rule 14. There is further requirement of conducting mock drills under Rule 13(4)."
Products, raw material (Chemicals) used by the Industry and its name as per list of chemicals part-1 Schedule-3 of MSIHC Rules 1989 & threshold quantity specified in the column 3 & 4 of Schedule-3 MSIHC Rule 1981 are given in following Table-11.
TABLE 11 PRODUCTS, RAW MATERIAL (CHEMICALS) USED BY INDUSTRY Sr. Product(s)/ Quantity Sr No. of Thresholdquantity No. Raw per month chemical as per specified in the Material(s) list of chemicals column 3 & 4 of part-1 Schedule- Schedule 3 MSIHC Rule 3 of MSIHC 1981 Rules 1989 PRODUCT(S) 01 Chlorine 25 MT/M Not Listed. Not Listed.
Dioxide Powder 02 Chlorine 15 MT/M Not Listed. Not Listed.
Dioxide Tablets 03 Chlorine 5 MT/M Not Listed. Not Listed.
Dioxide Gel-
RAW Not Listed. Not Listed.
MATERIAL(S)
01 Sodium 11 MT/M, Not Listed. Not Listed.
Bisulphate
02 2 Blend 1 MT/M Not Listed. Not Listed.
Adipic Acid
54
03 Sodium 4 MT/M Not Listed. Not Listed.
Bicarbonate
04 SDIC 60% GR MT/M, Not Listed. Not Listed.
05 Calcium 4MT/M, Not Listed. Not Listed.
Chloride
Lactose
06 3 MT/M, Not Listed. Not Listed.
Fonterra
Sodium
07 2 MT/M Not Listed. Not Listed.
Chlorite
Sodium
08 1 MT/M, Not Listed. Not Listed.
Persulphate
MgSo4-
09 Magnesium 1 MT/M Not Listed. Not Listed.
Sulphate
Copper
10 0.6 MT/M, Not Listed. Not Listed.
Sulphate
11 Emulsifier 150 Kg/M, Not Listed. Not Listed.
Urea 400
12 Not Listed. Not Listed.
Technical Kg/M,
Sodium Meta
13 300 Kg/M Not Listed. Not Listed.
Silicate
14 Sodium CMC 260 Kg/M Not Listed. Not Listed.
Talk Soap
15 100 Kg/M Not Listed. Not Listed.
Stone
Sodium
16 200 Kg/M Not Listed. Not Listed.
Citrate
Sodium
17 200 Kg/M Not Listed. Not Listed.
Pyrophospate
18 Soda ash 200 Kg/M Not Listed. Not Listed.
Caustic Soda
19 150 Kg/M Not Listed. Not Listed.
Prills
Sodium Poly
20 80 Kg/M Not Listed. Not Listed.
Acrylate
Cross
21 150 Kg/M Not Listed. Not Listed.
Providin
Sodium
22 120 Kg/M Not Listed. Not Listed.
Sulphate
Very highly
Approxim Part II Sr. no. 3
23 flammable 10,000 Ton
ate 5 MT. 1500 Ton
liquids
55
The industry was using the hazardous chemicals like Sodium chlorite, Sodium Dichloro Iso Cyanurate 60%, Sodium Per Sulphate which meets the criteria laydown in the Part I of Schedule-1 and chemical Sodium Hydroxide which is listed in Part II of Schedule 1. Thus, all these chemicals are hazardous chemicals as per the rule 2(e) of Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989.
In addition, there was refilling and storage of Iso Propyl Alcohol- based sanitizer at the time of accident which is "very highly flammable liquids" as per part I of Schedule 1. Other than IPA although the chemicals satisfy the criteria mentioned in Part I of Schedule 1 and out of which Sodium Hydroxide is listed in Part II of Schedule 1, but the chemical other than IPA are not listed in Part I or Part II Schedule 3. Also, the quantity of chemical (IPA) is much less than threshold quantity mentioned in the said schedule.
In this regard, it is to submit that as per the Sub-rule 1 of Rule 6 of MSIHC Rules, 1989 "Rules 7 to 15 shall apply to - (a) an industrial activity in which there is involved a quantity of hazardous chemical listed in Column 2 of Schedule 3 which is equal to or more than the quantity specified in the entry for that chemical in Column 3 & 4 (Rules 10-12 only for Column 4); and (b) isolated storage in which there is involved a quantity of a hazardous chemical listed in Column 2 of Schedule 2 which is equal to or more than the quantity specified in the entry for that chemical in Column 3 [3 & 4 (rules 10-12 only for column 4).
As per information provided in Table 11, it can be inferred that threshold quantity of hazardous chemical used/stored in the industry was less than threshold quantity specified in the column 3 & 4 of Schedule 3 appended to MSIHC Rules, 1989, therefore, rules 7 to 15 of said MSIHC Rule are not applicable to the industry. The industry is not a Major Accident Hazard (MAH) unit. The Rules 7 to 15 of the said Rules are:
7. Approval and notification of sites
8. Updating of the site notification following changes in the threshold quantity
9. Transitional provisions
10. Safety Reports and Safety audit reports
11. Updating of reports under rule 10
12. Requirement for further information to be sent to the authority
13. Preparation to on-site emergency plan by the occupier
14. Preparation of off-site emergency plan by the authority
15. Information to be given to persons liable to be affected by a major accident
13. THE OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN (DMP) FOR PUNE DISTRICT: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 56 A detailed offsite disaster management plan (DMP) for Pune district is available with the DISH authorities. The plan is prepared in accordance with the provisions of Rule 14 of The Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989. There are 59 Major Accident Hazard unit (MAH Unit) installed across the Pune district. Details pertaining to each MAH unit, the chemicals handled and stored, are also available. The DMP also contains the names of the key agencies, of responsible persons, along with their contact details. The DISH office also has fact sheet for each MAH installation which provides details about the hazard mitigation infrastructure available with respective MAH unit. There are two MAH Units are as detailed in following Table-12 in the Mulshi Taluka of Pune District where the Industry where fire incident took place.
TABLE:12 MAH UNITS IN MULSHI TALUKA DIST PUNE SR. NAME OF THE MAH HAZARDOUS MAIN INCIDENT NO. INSTALLATIONS MATERIAL CONTROLLE CONTROLL STORED/USED R/ PHONE ER (MAXIMUM QTY) NO.
1 Adient India Pvt. Toluene Di- Mr. Satish Mr. Shrikant
Ltd., Plot No.1, isocyanate- 60 Kulkarni H.R. Bhosale
Sr.No.235 & 245, Ton Manager HSE& E
Hinjewadi, Mulshi, 02066738766 02066738729
Dist-Pune - 411 057.
2 Dimple Chemicals Ethylene Oxide- 7 Mr. Yogesh Mr. Haresh
and Services Pvt. Ton Jadhav Patil
Ltd, Gat. No. 281, 9850055963 8308835125
Village Ghotawade,
Tal. Mulshi, Dist.
Pune.
There is also District Crisis Group in accordance with Rule 8 of The Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Response) Rules - 1996. Further, there are 5 Local Crisis Groups formed according to the geographical densities of the industries. Contact details of the concern members are included in the list mentioned in the plan. Functions of various crisis groups are also described in the plan. Control measures in event of leakage of widely used chemicals are provided in the plan. Also, there is a directive to all stakeholders to install WISER mobile app which gives information regarding most of the chemicals along with dos and don'ts during an emergency.
The DMP describes the necessity of the mitigation of disasters and the roles of various stakeholders that is required to be performed during an emergency. The MAH installations conduct mock drills as per their onsite emergency plan; also, there is an involvement of NDRF team in few mock drills as its base camp is located in Pune Districts. Such drills are equivalent to the offsite drill. Other than district crisis group 57 members contact details of other important contact numbers are included in the plan. The complete details of the DMP are included as an Annexure-XVII.
14. CONCLUSIONS Based on the Hon'ble NGT aforesaid order, the present report attempts to document the key aspects of the major chemical accident that occurred on 7th June 2021 at the site of M/s. SVSAT situated in the village of Urawade, Tal. Mulshi, Dist. Pune, which claimed the life of 17 employees. The immediate physical cause of the accident was an ignition which originated in a defective sealing machine, and escalated into a major fire due to the presence of an array of oxidizing and flammable substances that were available onsite. The root causes were identified to be human errors which issued out of a management failure to address the problem of the defective sealant machine ahead of the actual accident, in spite of sufficient a priori indications, that were also communicated by the employees to the senior officers. Post-accident investigations have revealed a significant number of non- compliances by the M/s. SVSAT, including unlicensed handling and trading in Iso-Propyl Alcohol (highly flammable substance) which is likely to have contributed to the escalation of the accident, received primary NOC but not obtained the final NOC from Fire Department, the work already started in new building without bringing in the knowledge of fire department etc Various non-compliances observed, enlisted and different departments have initiated action, as above in para 9.0, against industry/owner under violations of various provisions under Acts/Rules such as Factories Acts 1948, Water (P & CP) Act 1974 & Air (P & CP) Act 1981, HOW (M & TM) Rules 2016, Labour Acts such as Minimum Wages Act, 1948; Payment Of Wages Act,1936; Payment of Gratuity Act,1972; Under H R A Act, 1983; Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 and Equal Remuneration Act,1976. The cases are filed by DISH and Labour Department in CJM Pune against industry/owner under violations of various provisions under Acts/Rules such as Factories Acts 1948 and Labour Acts such as Minimum Wages Act, 1948; Payment Of Wages Act,1936; Payment of Gratuity Act,1972; Under H R A Act, 1983; Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 and Equal Remuneration Act,1976.
Considering the non-compliance of provisions under Environmental Acts i.e. establishment & operation of the industry, bottling/handling of IPA alcohol-based sanitizer without consents under the Water (P & CP) Act 1974 & Air (P & CP) Act 1981, the committee has found appropriate to calculate Environmental Compensation (EC) as per CPCB Methodology/formula. Accordingly, EC i.e. Rs. 1,98,50,000/- (Rs. One crore ninety-eight lac fifty thousand only) is 58 calculated, and is recommended to impose towards damage to the environment. Further, waste generated due to fire incident shall be disposed to CHWTSDF immediately and report the compliance with manifest as per Hazardous & other Waste (T & TM) Rules, 2016 and to take scientific measures to avoid the nuisance due to generated waste in any form in the fire accident and dispose the same after suitable treatment.
Due to fire accident, 17 people (Female-15, Male-02) lost their life and two got injured. Two injured persons were admitted to Sanjivani Hospital Deccan Pune and discharged from hospital after stay for about a month's time in Hospital. Medical expenses have been provided by Factory Management. There is no loss of no-human life, public & damaged to other property.
As compensation/ex-gratia Rs 17 lacs (Industry+ State Govt+ Central Govt) declared for kin to each deceased person, out which Rs. 15 lacs already been paid to kin to each deceased person whereas Rs. 2 lacs yet to be paid which is not yet received by District Administration for the disbursement. In total, Rs. 2.55 Crore (Rs. Two Crore fifty-five lacs) i.e. Rs. 1.7 Crore by Industry & Rs. 85 lacs by State Govt) paid to the deceased persons (17 Nos) and Rs 25,400/- (Rs. Twenty-five thousands four hundred) injured persons (2nos.). The industry has paid total Rs. 4,86,748 towards legal dues to the deceased persons.
The committee recommends to give the compensation/ex- gratia amount which comes out to be maximum out of three compensations/ex-gratia amount viz (I) compensations/ex- gratia amount declared by State, Central & Industry Management (para 11.2.1) (II) As per Employee Compensation Act 1923 (para 11.2.2 (A)) (III) As per Hon'ble Supreme Court matters (para 11.2.2 (B), as given in Table 9). Accordingly, committee recommended to consider additional compensation where it exceeds compensation/ex-gratia (i.e. Rs. 17 lacs) declared by State, Central Govt & Industry Management, as shown in Column I in Table 9 above, to the kin of deceased persons.
As very meagre amount (Rs. 12,700/- each) has been paid to the injured (grievous/minor) person, Rs. 5,00,000 in case of grievous injury and Rs. 2,50,000 in case of minor injury to be paid as interim compensations and final compensation may be paid based on the nature of injury/disability certificate by the District Administration.
Legal dues (difference of minimum wages, bonus etc) paid to the deceased and injured workers by management of industry. Employee's State Insurance Corporations (ESIC) (Ministry of Labour & Employment, Govt of India) has processed the pension 59 disbursement to the legal heirs of deceased and injured persons as per the ESI Act - 1948.
As per information provided in Table 11 it may be inferred that threshold quantity of hazardous chemical used/stored in the industry was less than threshold quantity specified in the column 3 & 4 of Schedule 3 appended to MSIHC Rules, 1989, therefore, the rules 7 to 15 of said rule are not applicable to the industry. The industry is not a Major Accident Hazard (MAH) unit.
It is gathered that Urawade/Pirangut area are having sizable amount of industries, however, they are devoid of basic infrastructure such as road, health care centres / ambulance services, hospitals and fire stations which are very much essential in such accident cases.
Based on the findings of the present investigation, a set of future remedial measures and select general recommendations for systemic improvement in respect of all other similar factories in the region have been formulated. These are expected to be supported by the existent Disaster Management Plan for the Pune district.
15. RECOMMENDATIONS • Actions against the owners of the industry for the various non-compliances should be expedited by respective departments.
• Considering the non-compliance of provisions under Environmental Acts i.e. establishment & operation of the industry, bottling/handling of IPA alcohol-based sanitizer without consents under the Water (P & CP) Act 1974 & Air (P & CP) Act 1981, Environmental Compensation (EC) Rs. 1,98,50,000/- (Rs One crore ninety- eight lac fifty thousand only) towards damage to the environment may be recovered from the industry. • Waste generated due to fire incident shall be disposed to CHWTSDF immediately and to take scientific measures to avoid the impact due to generated waste in any form and dispose the same as per Hazardous & other Waste (T & TM) Rules, 2016.
• Additional compensation where it exceeds compensation/ex-gratia (i.e. Rs. 17 lacs) declared by State, Central Govt & Industry Management, as shown in Column I in Table 9, to the kin of deceased persons may be considered based on the maximum out of three compensations/ex-gratia amount viz (I) compensations/ex- gratia amount declared by State, Central & Industry Management (para 11.2.1) (II) As per Employee Compensation Act 1923 (para 11.2.2 (A)) (III) As per Hon'ble Supreme Court matters (para 11.2.2 (B), as given in Table
9).
• Injured persons with grievous & minor injury should be paid Rs. 5,00,000/- & Rs. 2,50,000 as interim 60 compensations respectively, and based on the nature of injury/disability certificate further compensation may be computed and may be provided to them, as Rs. 12,700/- paid to each injured person only.
16. SUGGESTED FUTURE REMEDIAL MEASURES This section outlines a set of plausible remedial measures and recommendation to avoid similar accidents in future in respect of the factory under consideration. They are enumerated below.
a. SVSAT need to restructure the work process so that the minimum possible hazardous raw materials are brought to the production area, and also need to ensure and after completion of the production process (i.e., packing) the same is transferred to a separate storage area so that there is no accumulation of hazardous materials in the production area.
b. Flameproof fittings shall be used where highly flammable liquids or other materials are used/handled/stored/processed.
c. MSDS of Chemicals used shall be displayed in work area in the language understood by majority of workers. Compatibility of chemical storage shall be checked as per MSDS of the chemical.
d. In the event of any maintenance and / or repair activity which can affect the normal functioning of all/any equipment, all related equipment shall be shut down. Only when the maintenance activity is concluded satisfactorily and the necessary repair is undertaken should all other equipment be operated.
e. During all maintenance/repair and normal operation a competent person with the requisite experience must be present at site. The same or additional person also need be available to manage any abnormality or emergency arising during operation.
f. If there is change in production process the necessary approval from all concern departments shall be obtained. g. Periodic training of worker on normal and emergency management shall be conducted.
Safety audit shall be conducted as per safety audit rules- 2014.
17. GENERAL RECOMMENDATION FOR SYSTEMIC IMPROVEMENT IN RESPECT OF ALL OTHER SIMILAR FACTORIES Hon'ble NGT order suggests for the development of a common set recommendations that may apply to all other factories engaged in similar operation and/or structure. While being specific to an extent, the measures mentioned in section 8 are generally applicable to all similar industries to improve internal process of safety management. However, these need to be coupled with broad systemic improvements for better 61 governance. Accordingly, the following additional recommendations are proposed.
• Appropriate degree of co-ordination between the various concerned government agencies needs to be ensured so that all necessary compliances that need to be achieved by the industry in question are tracked and verified. The authorities need to be approached in the following order:
District Administration, District Industries Centre, State Electricity Board, State Pollution Control Boards and Department of Industrial Safety and Health (DISH). On receiving any application from a prospective industry all agencies need to become informed simultaneously. An online portal may be developed to enable this information sharing.
• Provisions for fire prevention and fighting are more rigorous and hence updated in the Maharashtra Fire Prevention and Life Safety Measures Act, 2006 than provisions of Factories Act- 1948. Therefore, any manufacturing in a factory dealing with hazardous materials shall not be permitted unless final "No Objection"
certificate is issued by respective authorities under said act.
• Approvals for establishment of an industrial unit shall be granted in the following sequence so as to ensure all necessary compliances: Consent to Establishment / Provisional Fire NOC / Plan Approval from DISH / Approval of Layout Drawing by local Planning Authority (such as Industrial Development Corporation and Regional Development Authority) / Plan approval by FDA (In case of Pharmaceutical and Food processing units). Drawing approval by PESO (If applicable) can occur in parallel. For allowing production to commence Consent to Operate followed by final Fire NOC, PESO approvals, FDA approval if applicable and finally license by DISH must be secured. Also, intimation need be given to ESIC and PF authorities for enrolment of workers for social security facilities.
• DISH Maharashtra is presently working with one third manpower of sanctioned post. There are two levels of the inspectors one is Deputy director and another is Assistant Director. For deputy director against sanction of 60 only 33 officers are on board. For the post of Assistant Director (sanction of 45 Posts) there is no officer available presently. This situation renders regulatory enforcement difficult and inefficient by the relevant enforcement departments. It is suggested that the Government of Maharashtra takes the necessary steps to recruit the necessary number of officers and also ensure their empowerment.
• Areas where Industrial development took place other than notified industrial area (MIDC) needs basic infrastructure such as road, health care centres/ ambulance services, hospitals and fire stations."62
6. The unit in question has filed its response on 30.01.2022 opposing the recommendations in the report. It is stated that the land was purchased in 2014, decision to construct the factory was taken in 2016 for manufacturing of Chlorine Dioxide Tablets, Chlorine Dioxide Powder, Chlorine Dioxide Gel, Animal and Dairy Hygiene, ether treatment plant.
The said molecule is a unique molecule and the same is not produced/manufactured anywhere in the country. Permission from Directorate of Industries, Maharashtra was taken in 2020. Consent to operate was granted in 2020. There was no manufacturing activity earlier, only research development and import trading was conducted. Accident took place on 07.06.2021 but no damage to environment was caused.
Accident was due to storage of chemicals for distribution. Compensation of Rs. 1,70,00,000/- has been given to the heirs of the deceased with the rate of Rs. 10 lakhs each deceased. Medical expenses had been paid for the injured. Job offers has been given to eligible persons of the deceased apart from some other expenditure. The Committee has taken wrong date of starting of the manufacturing activities and environmental compensation assessed by the Committee is not called for.
7. We have heard learned Counsel for the industrial unit and for CPCB.
The report of the Committee quoted above clearly establish that hazardous chemicals were being used by the industrial unit which was engaged in manufacturing activities without requisite safeguards which led to the accident. Workers were engaged in handling such hazardous chemicals in various processes, including packing and repacking. There was overheating of the machines in the process which resulted in the accident.
Safety measures such as fire extinguishers were not effective. There was huge quantity of hazardous materials stored without requisite safeguards.
63Absence of escape routes for the workers added to the problem. Electric systems were mal-functional. Unsafe work practices escalated the fire.
Trained personnel were not available. The Committee has suggested remedial measures to be followed by the unit and the authorities in future apart from compensation for the past violations. Options considered for compensation level should be the one by which highest compensation is worked out as per law. The liability of the industrial unit for compensation has to be de hors the ex-gratia payments made by the State. We accept the report with all the recommendations for past violations and for future safeguards by the unit and the authorities. We place on record our appreciation for the exhaustive report prepared by the Committee which may be conveyed to the Members of the Committee by CPCB. Report may be kept on the website of CPCB for six months for perusal by any stakeholder/researcher. Payment of compensation be ensured by the State PCB and the District Magistrate, if necessary, by coercive measures, including closure till compliance.
8. We direct the Chief Secretary, Maharashtra to look into the recommendations and take remedial action for preventing any such incident in future in coordination with concerned Departments of the State for which a meeting be called within one month. Compliance report in the matter may be filed by the Chief Secretary, Maharashtra, State PCB and the District Magistrate with the Registrar, Pune Bench, NGT within three months by e-mail. If any direction is found necessary, the Registrar may place the matter before the Bench.
The application is disposed of.
64A copy of this order be forwarded to the Chief Secretary, Maharashtra, CPCB, State PCB and District Magistrate, Pune by e-mail for compliance.
Adarsh Kumar Goel, CP Sudhir Agarwal, JM Dr. Afroz Ahmad, EM February 01, 2022 Original Application No. 130/2021 SN 65