Patna High Court
Pandit Saligram Acharya vs Pandit Raghavacharya And Ors. on 18 July, 1968
Equivalent citations: AIR1969PAT118, 1969(17)BLJR224, AIR 1969 PATNA 118
JUDGMENT S.N.P. Singh, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the order dated the 13th of December, 1965, passed by the 2nd Additional District Judge, Bhagalpur, in Miscellaneous Case No. 37 of 1952. By the aforesaid order the learned 2nd Additional District Judge made an ad interim order of injunction restraining the present appellant from making disposal of the properties belonging to the temple of Sri Biharjiee absolute. He further passed an order for the appointment of a receiver for the temple of Sri Biharjiee and its properties pending the appointment of a new Shebait.
2. The order under appeal has been passed by the learned Additional District Judge in the following circumstances. On the 15th of September, 1952, the three respondents to this appeal filed an application in the court of the District Judge of Bhagalpur under Section 48 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar Act I of 1951). hereinafter referred to as "the Act", for the removal of the appellant from shebaitship, for rendition of accounts by him and for appointment of a new Shebait in his place on the ground of mismanagement of the trust properties, misappropriation of the trust funds, unauthorised transfers and mala fide acquisition by the appellant of properties in the Benami name of others with the income of the temple properties. That petition gave rise to Miscellaneous Case No. 37 of 1952. The appellant denied the allegations made by the respondents in their application and further urged that the Act was ultra vires and unconstitutional. Mr. Brahmadeva Narain, the then Additional District Judge of Bhagalpur, heard the case and by his order dated the 23rd February, 1957, found the appellant guilty of misfeasance. He held, inter alia, that the appellant wrongly diverted a part of the temple fund to finance a new Vidyalaya started by him; that his natural relations had all along received subsistence and help from the temple fund; that he pawned the ornaments of the deity and in order to cover his fault he instituted a false criminal case alleging theft of the ornaments and that he maintained no accounts for the years 1941 to 1947 and wrongly claimed some of the properties belonging to the deity as his personal properties. The learned Additional District Judge arrived at the conclusion that the appellant had acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the deity and took the view that in the interest of the trust, he should not continue as shebait of the temple in question. The learned Additional District Judge further held that the temple was a private temple but it came within the purview of the Act as the endowment created for the worship of the deity in the temple in question was a religious trust. On the constitutionality of Section 48 of the Act, he expressed the opinion that it was void and inoperative and accordingly he stated a case under Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the opinion of the High Court on the question whether the provision of Section 48 of the Act was void and inoperative and pending the decision of the High Court he reserved his findings on the questions whether the application under Section 48 of the Act was maintainable and whether the Act was ultra vires the Bihar Legislature.
3. The reference (Civil Reference No. 1 of 1957) made by the learned Additional District Judge was disposed of by the High Court on the 21st of October, 1959, and it was held that the provisions of Section 48 of the Act were constitutionally valid and operative. The opinion of the Court was forwarded to the Additional District Judge and the records were sent back to him for disposal in accordance with law. Thereafter the case was heard by Mr. Rash Bihari Prasad Sinha, another Additional District Judge of Bhagalpur, who, in the meantime, succeeded Mr. Brahmadeva Narain. The learned Additional District Judge by his order dated the 8th of December, 1959, allowed the miscellaneous case and directed the appellant to be removed from Shebaitship. He further gave a direction that the appellant would render accounts. Regarding the appointment of a new She-bait, the learned Additional District Judge passed the following order:
"A new shebayat will have to be appointed in place of the opposite party who has been ordered to be removed; this new appointment will take place as per direction contained in the deed of trust."
The appellant then filed a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being M. J. C. No. 910 of 1959. That application was dismissed by the judgment and order of this Court dated the 14th of December, 1960. The appellant then preferred an appeal (Civil Appeal No. 645 of 1964) to the Supreme Court. It appears that during the pendency of the appeal, their Lordships of the Supreme Court stayed further proceedings in Miscellaneous Case No. 37 of 1952, in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Bhagalpur, on the following terms:--
"An inventory of the property shall be made and the ornaments of the Idol shall be kept in the bank to be taken out for ceremonial use if necessary, with the permission of the court of the District Judge, Bhagalpur. The appellant undertakes not to alienate or dispose of any property pending decision in this appeal, and to keep regular accounts of his dealings with regard to the estate of temple and offerings and to submit the accounts once every two months to the Court of the District Judge, Bhagalpur. Liberty to the respondents to inspect the accounts so submitted once every two months. The appellant will be at liberty to keep Rs. 500/- (in cash) in hand for the expenditure of the temple; the excess amount shall be deposited in the bank. If the appellant needs to withdraw any amount in excess of the amount allowed, he can do that with the permission of the court Hearing of the appeal is "expedited."
The appeal in the Supreme Court was dismissed with costs on the 4th of November, 1965. and the judgment of the High Court was upheld.
4. Thereafter on the 12th of November, 1965, respondents 1 and 2 filed a petition in the court of the Additional District Judge for appointment of a Commissioner for taking accounts, for making local inspections and for submitting reports regarding crops. They further prayed that an ad interim order may be passed for preservation of the properties pending disposal of the matter and the appellant be injuncted and restrained from making any disposal of the properties pending delivery of possession. The learned Additional District Judge passed an order of ad interim injunction restraining the appellant from harvesting the crop and also damaging or disposing of the properties of the trust in any other way till the final disposal of the application. On the 15th of November, 1965, the learned Additional District Judge appointed an advocate as Commissioner for holding local inspection and reporting as to what crops were standing in what portion of the land and directed that he should submit his report by the 22nd of November, 1965. On the 15th of November, 1965, respondents 1 and 2 filed another application in the court of the Additional District Judge in which they made a prayer for the appointment of a receiver for the temple and its properties. The appellant filed a rejoinder to the two applications which had been filed by respondents 1 and 2. The matter was ultimately heard and disposed of by the learned Additional District Judge by the order under appeal dated the 13th of December, 1965. As I have already stated, the learned Additional District Judge made the ad interim order of injunction restraining the present appellant from making disposal of the properties of the temple, absolute and further passed an order for the appointment of a receiver for the temple and its properties pending the appointment of a new Shebait.
5. Mr. S.C. Ghose, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, did not challenge the legality or propriety of the order of injunction restraining the appellant from making disposal of the properties of the temple Sri Biharijee. He confined his argument only on the question of the appointment of a receiver for the temple and its properties pending the appointment of a new Shebait and challenged the propriety and legality of this part of the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge. Learned counsel raised the following contentions:
(1) That the appellant, in spite of the order of removal from the shebaitship, has got interest in the temple and its properties till a Shebait of Ramanuj Sampradaya takes over charge of the temple and its properties;
(2) That there are inadequate materials before the Court for the appointment of a receiver and as such it is not just and convenient to appoint a receiver;
(3) that the learned Additional District Judge while acting under Section 48 of the Act had no power to order the appointment of a receiver; and (4) That the provisions of Order 41, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not apply in a case of religious denomination in view of Clause (b) of Article 26 of the Constitution of India.
6. Mr. Ghose founded his first contention on some of the recitals in the deed of endowment of Swami Ramprapanna-charya to Sri Thakur Biharijee dated the 28th of June, 1940. There is a recital in the deed that the executant came to Bhagalpur to deliver sermon on Vaisnavism and desired to set up a Thakurbari of Vaishnav Sampradaya of Ramanuj and to install a Thakurjee therein. Paragraph 3 of the deed of endowment reads as follows:
"I the executant considered it advisable that I should dedicate the properties mentioned in schedule No. 5 to Sri Sri Thakur Sri Beharijee, so that this Kirti (renowned act) may remain intact for ever. Now, I, the executant of my own accord and free will, without pressure, coercion and illegal inducement and in sound state of body and mind wanted to dedicate the property mentioned in Schedule 5 to Sri Sri Thakur Biharijee and to appoint an able Sebait in my lifetime. But I do not find any able Birakt Shri Vaishnava amongst my disciples. Therefore, I, the executant of my own accord and free will, without pressure, coercion and inducement dedicated the properties mentioned in Schedule 5 to Sri Sri Thakur Biharijee installed in Thakurbari Sri Radha Raman Kunj Bhawan Divyadesh, situate in Mahalla Malchak, Chuni-hartoli lane within Bhagalpur town and I, the executant shall remain shebait of Shri Thakur Biharijee aforesaid so long I am alive, and I appointed Sriman Pandit Saligramacharya Sastrijee son of Rishi-kesh Pandey deceased, resident of Bhawanipur, District Bhagalpur, at present residing at Tripura Bhairvi Sri Laxmi Banktesh Temple No. 5/37 in the town of Kashi, by caste Kankubj Saryuparin Brahmin, by occupation a servant etc. of God and Bhagwat to become my successor shebait of Shri Thakur Biharijee aforesaid after my death. He will during my lifetime, perform Nitya Aradhan, Naimitik Aradhan, Tadiya Aradhan monthly and annual celebration etc. as prescribed by me according to the practice in vogue and will continue to do them accordingly after my death. He will be competent to effect improvement according to my desire to the temple and Radha Raman Pathshala by giving meals to the students and others, and after the death of me the executant shall enter into upon possession of all the properties of Shri Thakur Sri Biharijee aforesaid and apply the proceeds thereof in meeting the cost of ragbhog pujapath service to the guests and pathshala etc. and he should get the names of Sri Thakur Biharijee recorded in land records office. In short, whatever rights and interest I, the executant had till today, has been acquired by Shri Thakur Biharijee aforesaid."
In paragraph 6 of the deed of endowment provisions have been made for the nomination of a new Shebait Mahant by the appellant. The qualifications of the Shebait Mahanth to be nominated by the appellant have also been laid down, one of the qualifications being that he should be a follower of the Ramanuj Srivaishnav Sampradaya. Mr. Ghose submitted that Swami Ramprapanacharya appointed the appellant a Shebait of Sri Thakur Biharijee not only for the purpose of looking after the management of the temple and its properties but to propagate the cult of Ramanuj in this part of the country and to initiate disciples to that cult and as such as long as another trustee of Ramanuj cult is not appointed, the appellant has an interest in the trust property. The contention raised by learned counsel appears to be ill-founded. The appellant might have interest as a disciple of Swami Ramprapannacharya and as a follower of the Ramanuj Srivaishnav Sampradaya in the temple and the properties of the trust as any other disciple of the Swamiji and a follower of the said cult has. After the order of his removal from the shebaitship passed by the learned Additional District Judge, which has been ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court, he has no interest left as a trustee of the temple and its properties. There is, therefore, no substance in the above contention raised by learned counsel.
7. According to Mr. Ghose, in the petition filed on the 15th of November, 1965 for the appointment of a receiver respondents Nos. 1 and 2 simply made the allegation that in view of the disposal of the appeal by the Supreme Court it was likely that the entire Aghani and Kartika paddy crops standing on the land of the temple were likely to be lost to the temple if the appellant or his men, relations and underlings were allowed to harvest the paddy crops and that allegation was specifically denied by the appellant in paragraph 6 of his rejoinder petition. Learned counsel submitted that the Supreme Court passed the order of stay on certain terms as far back as on the 18th of February, 1961, and in absence of any complaint that the appellant had violated the order of the Supreme Court, the learned Additional District Judge should have rejected the prayer of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for the appointment of a receiver and should have allowed the appellant to manage the temple and its properties till the appointment of a new Shebait. This contention is also without substance. As an appeal arising from the order of the learned Additional District Judge removing the appellant from the Shebaitship was pending in the Supreme Court, their Lordships of the Supreme Court pending that appeal stayed further proceedings in Miscellaneous Case No. 37 of 1952 and permitted the appellant to be in charge of the temple and its properties after imposing certain stringent conditions. After the disposal of the appeal by the Supreme Court, the order of stay passed by the Supreme Court stood automatically vacated. In view of the fact that the order of removal had been passed by the learned Additional District Judge on his finding that the appellant had committed various acts of dishonesty in the management of the temple and its properties, the learned Additional District Judge could not have allowed him to remain in possession of the properties of the temple for the matter became final on the dismissal of the appeal of the appellant in the Supreme Court. As pointed out by the learned Additional District Judge, the appointment of a new Shebait is likely to take sometime as the same has to be done in accordance with the directions contained in the deed of endowment. In view of the past conduct of the appellant in the matter of the management of the temple and its properties, the learned Additional District Judge was justified in holding that it was not desirable that the appellant should remain in possession of the properties any longer. On the facts stated above, the learned Additional District Judge has arrived at a correct conclusion that it is just and convenient, that a receiver be appointed.
8. It appears from paragraph 15 of the order under appeal that a contention was raised on behalf of the appellant to the effect that a receiver cannot take up the duties of a Shebait as his duties among other things include the duty of performing Puja. The learned Additional District Judge overruled the contention and observed as follows:
". . . . .But I do not think there is any point in the objection. It is true that a receiver will not be able to perform the pujas himself. But he can certainly get the puja done by the proper person. There must be some pujaries performing the pujas. He may get the pujas done through them or through such other person as he considered proper, but certainly according to the directions if any contained in the trust deed and the religious usage."
In this Court learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that Pujas are performed in the temple of Sri Biharijee by the Pujaries and not by the appellant himself. The appointment of a receiver, therefore, will not in any way affect the performance of Puja in the temple by Pujaris who are at present performing the Pujas.
9. I will now consider the point whether the learned Additional District Judge, while acting under Section 48 of the Act, had the power to order the appointment of a receiver or not. Mr. Ghose submitted that Section 48 of the Act does not specifically confer power on the District Judge to appoint a receiver as does Section 72 of the Act and as such the Additional District Judge while acting under Section 48 of the Act had no power to order the appointment of a receiver. I am not inclined to agree with the above submission of learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down as follows:
"The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction."
Chapter IX of the Act in which Section 48 occurs is headed "Judicial Proceedings." Section 48 of the Act reads as follows:
"48. Power of District Judge to remove trustee or appoint trustee.--(1) The Board, or with the previous sanction of the Board, any person interested in a religious trust, may make an application to the District Judge for an order --
(a) removing the trustee of such religious trust, if such trustee --
(i) acts in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the said trust; or
(ii) defaults on three or more occasions in the payment of any amount payable under any law for the tune being in force in respect of the property or income of the said trust or any other statutory charge on such property or income; or
(iii) defaults on three or more occasions in the payment of any sum payable to any beneficiary under the said trust or in discharging any other duty imposed upon him under it; or
(iv) is guilty of a breach of trust.
(b) appointing a new trustee;
(c) vesting any property in a trustee;
(d) directing accounts and inquiries; or
(e) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require. (2) The order of the District Judge under Sub-section (1) shall be final."
The above provisions of Section 48 of the Act make it abundantly clear that a proceeding under that section is of civil jurisdiction. No procedure is prescribed in the Act itself in respect of a proceeding under Section 48 of the Act. Apart from the restriction regarding appeal as contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the Act, no other restriction has been imposed anywhere regarding the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure in a proceeding under section 48 of the Act. I am, therefore, of the opinion that a proceeding under Section 48 of the Act is a proceeding of the kind contemplated by Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure and as such the Additional District Judge while acting under that section had the power to appoint a receiver under Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure pending the appointment of a new Shebait.
10. In support of his contention that the learned Additional District Judge while acting under Section 48 of the Act had no power to appoint a receiver, learned counsel appearing for the appellant referred to the decisions in Gyanananda Asram v. Kristo Chandra Mukher-ji, (1901) 8 Cal WN 404; Kanhaiya v. Kanhaiyalal, AIR 1924 All 376; Assardas Manghumal v. Mt Thakurbai, A;R 1927 Sind 237 and Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Tek Chand Dolwani, AIR 1953 SC 298. In the case of (1901) 8 Cal WN 404 it was held that in a suit brought under the Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863). a Civil Court has no power to appoint a receiver or manager of debutter properties except under Section 5 of the same Ad On the basis of the above decision, Mr. Ghose submitted that Section 72 of the Act corresponds to Section 5 of the Religious Endowments Act and as such in a suit filed under Section 72 of the Act only a receiver can be appointed by the Court and not otherwise. In that case Maclean, C.J. had further observed as follows:
"If the plaintiff wished to have a Receiver appointed and to have the trust property administered under the directions of the Court, his proper course would have been to have proceeded under Section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which he could not do without the previous sanction of the Advocate-General."
Section 92 of the present Code of Civil Procedure corresponds to Section 539 of the old Civil Procedure Code. As provided under Section 4(5) of the Act, Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been made inapplicable to a Hindu religious trust in the State of Bihar. Most of the reliefs which could have been granted In a properly constituted suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be granted in a proceeding under Section 48 of the Act. That being the position, the decision in the case, referred to above, does not support the contention of learned counsel that no receiver can be appointed in a proceeding under Section 48 of the Act.
11. In the case of AIR 1924 All 376, the point for consideration was whether the provisions of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure were applicable to proceedings under Succession Certificate Act. The learned Judges came to the conclusion after examining the provisions of the Succession Certificate Act that the provisions of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not applicable to that Act. As the provisions contained in the Act are not similar to the provisions contained in the Succession Certificate Act, the decision in the Allahabad case cannot be an authority for the proposition that the provisions of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to proceedings under Section 48 of the Act.
12. In the case of AIR 1927 Sind 237 It was held that a Court cannot appoint a receiver in a proceeding under Section 74 of the Trusts Act for the removal of a trustee and the appointment of a new trustee. It was observed in that case that Section 74 of the Trusts Act affords only an alternative summary remedy for removal of a trustee and that it is open to the beneficiaries or to the co-trustees, if any, to file a regular suit for the removal and for recovery of property if they apprehend that the trust property is likely to disappear and to get a receiver appointed in that suit on payment of proper court-fees. The provisions of Section 48 of the Act are not analogous to Section 74 of the Trusts Act. Apart from that, the question whether the provisions Of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable or not in a proceeding under Section 74 of the Trusts Act was not considered and decided in that case. In that view of the matter, the Sind case is absolutely of no assistance in deciding the point under consideration.
13. In the case of AIR 1953 SC 298 their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that a Custodian of evacuee property is not a Court although the proceedings before him are of a quasi-judicial nature. It was further held that the provisions of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable in proceedings before the Custodian of evacuee property. There is no similarity between the provisions of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950 and the provisions of the Act. On the authority of the decision in the Supreme Court it cannot, therefore, be held that the provisions of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure are inapplicable to proceedings under Section 48 of the Act 13a. Mr. Thakur Prasad, learned counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 1 and 2, in course of his argument referred to the decisions in Amode Lal Burman v. Girija Sankar Chaudhury AIR 1944 Cal 157; Mohammad Ali Khan v. Ahmad Ali Khan, AIR 1945 All 261 (FB) and Nagarchand v. Surendranath, ILR 24 Pat 616 = (AIR 1946 Pat 70). In the case of AIR 1944 Cal 157 a suit had been brought by some of the interested persons for the removal of the Shebait and for possession of the Debutter properties alienated by him. The suit was decreed. In the second appeal, which was preferred in the High Court, the learned single Judge, who heard the appeal, directed that a receiver should be appointed to take possession of the disputed properties pending the appointment of another Shebait. Defendant No. 1 of that suit filed an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent which was heard by a Division Bench. One of the points mooted out in the appeal under the Letters Patent was that the order of the learned single Judge directing the appointment of a receiver of the disputed property pending the appointment of a Shebait was bad in law. The learned Judges who heard the appeal rejected the contention and observed as follows:
"..... in view of the events that have happened in the present case, we are not prepared to say that the learned Judge was wrong in appointing a receiver of the disputed properties pending the appointment of another Shebait."
The decision in the above-mentioned case no doubt supports the contention of learned counsel on the question of propriety of the appointment of a receiver in the present case but it is of no assistance in deciding the point under consideration.
14. In the case of AIR 1945 All 261 it was held by the Full Bench that the District Judge as a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in exercise of his powers as a Kazi has no power in a summary proceeding, that is by means of a mere application, to remove a Mutwalli for misconduct or breach of trust and appoint a new Mutwalli in his place. The Mutwalli can only be removed by means of a suit properly instituted in the Civil Court. Two of the learned Judges further held that jurisdiction to protect property pending the ascertainment of rights was inherent in any Court which once had cognizance in any form of a dispute involving the execution of a trust or the administration of assets and the Court had not merely jurisdiction but a duty to safeguard them. Wali Ullah, J. after considering a number of decisions held that the Court had ample power for making an appointment of receiver under Section 94 read with Order 40 of the Civil Procedure Code, or, in the alternative, under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The above decision fully supports the contention of learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 that a receiver can be appointed in proceedings other than suits.
15. In the case of ILR 24 Pat 616 = (AIR 1946 Pat 70) the point for consideration was whether the Court has the power of appointing a receiver in a proceeding under the Arbitration Act, 1940, when an application is made under Section 20 of the Act, though notices of the application have not been served on all the parties and the actual arbitration has not commenced. A Division Bench of this Court held that the Court has the power of appointing a receiver in such circumstances viz. before the service of notice on the parties and before the commencement of the actual arbitration proceeding. In my opinion, the point for consideration in that case was quite different from the point which is under consideration in the instant case and as such that decision is of no assistance in deciding the point under consideration.
16. From the various decisions which have been cited at the bar the following principles are deducible:
(a) That a receiver can be appointed even in proceedings other than a suit.
(b) That such proceedings must be in a Court of Civil jurisdiction.
(c) That the provisions of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable only in respect of proceedings to a Court of Civil jurisdiction.
I have already given my reasons for holding that the proceedings under Section 48 of the Act are proceedings of Civil jurisdiction in the Court of the District Judge and as such the provisions of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable. In my considered opinion, therefore, the learned Additional District Judge, had the power to appoint a receiver while acting under Section 48 of the Act.
17. Now remains to consider the last contention of learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Mr. Ghose submitted that under the Constitution of India every religious denomination or any section thereof has been given the freedom to manage its own affairs in matters of religion and certain other freedoms. He referred to Article 26 of the Constitution which reads as follows:
"Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right--
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes:
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law."
Learned counsel submitted that under Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure a receiver may be appointed who may or may not belong to a particular denomination and as such in view of Article 26 of the Constitution no receiver can be appointed under Order 40, Rule 1 in a case of religious denomination. I find it difficult to appreciate the argument of learned counsel. We are informed by the parties that one Sri Kamleshwari Sahay has been appointed a receiver by the subsequent order of the learned Additional District Judge. We are not concerned in the present appeal about the propriety of the appointment of Sri Kamleshwari Sahay and we have been given to understand by the parties that no appeal has been preferred by either party against the order of the learned Additional District Judge appointing Sri Kamleshwari Sahay as the receiver. It was open to the appellant to have objected to the appointment of Sri Kamleshwari Sahay on the ground that he does not belong to the particular denomination. It is, however, difficult to accept the contention of learned counsel that in a case of religious denomination no receiver can be appointed under Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I, therefore, do not find any substance even in the last contention which has been raised by learned counsel appearing for the appellant.
18. As all the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant fail, this appeal is dismissed with costs. The order of stay passed by this Court stands automatically vacated. It is desirable that the learned Additional District Judge will expedite the appointment of a new Shebait of the temple and its properties.
Kanhaiyaji, J.
19. I agree.