Karnataka High Court
Mr Avnash Amarlal vs Deputy Director on 3 December, 2024
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 20.11.2024
Pronounced on : 03.12.2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 03RD DAY OF DECEMBER, 2024
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.26069 OF 2024 (GM - RES)
BETWEEN:
MR. AVNASH AMARLAL
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
S/O AMARLAL ASSARDAS
RESIDING AT FLAT NO.21B
KINGFISHER TOWERS
NO.44, KASTURBA CROSS ROAD
SAMPANGIRAMNAGARA
BENGALURU - 560 001.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI S.BASAVARAJ, SR. ADVOCATE A/W.,
SRI MAHENDRA G., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. DEPUTY DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT
BENGALURU
3RD FLOOR, B-BLOCK, BMTC BUILDING
SHANTINAGAR, TTMC, K.H.ROAD
BENGALURU - 560 027.
2
2. REGISTRAR
ADJUDICATING AUTHORITY
PMLA, ROOM NO.25, 4TH FLOOR
JEEVAN DEEP BUILDING
PARLIAMENT STREET
NEW DELHI - 110 001.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI K. ARVIND KAMATH, ADDL. SOLICITOR
GENERAL OF INDIA A/W.
SRI MADHUKAR DESHPANDE, ADVOCATE)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 528 OF
BHARATIYA NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA, 2023, PRAYING TO
QUASH THE O.A.NO. 1272/2024 DTD 13.07.2024 (ANNX-A) IN
ECIR/BGZO/28/2023 AND ALL CONSEQUENTIAL ACTION AS
ILLEGAL AND ABINITIO VOID IN SO FAR AS PETITIONER IS
CONCERNED AND ETC.,
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 20.11.2024, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner is before this Court calling in question an order
dated 13-07-2024 passed in O.A.No.1272 of 2024 by the
Enforcement Directorate, Bangalore in a proceeding instituted
3
under Section 17 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
('the Act' for short).
2. Heard Sri S. Basavaraj, learned senior counsel appearing
for petitioner and Sri K. Arvind Kamath, learned Additional Solicitor
General of India appearing for respondents.
3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:-
The petitioner who is a real estate developer purchases
certain agricultural lands through various sale deeds right from
25-10-2021 which would run through 26-08-2022. Conversion
orders would correspond to the lands that are concerned in the sale
deeds executed. Therefore, all the transactions between one
K.G. Krishna and his wife K.N. Jayalakshmi, a partnership ends in
2022 with the petitioner through his firm. Long after purchase of
lands by the petitioner from the hands of K.G. Krishna, a crime
comes to be registered by a complainant by name one Amaresh
against K.G. Krishna in Crime No.218 of 2023 registered on
20-08-2023 for offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 504
4
and 506 of the IPC. This was one of several crimes registered
against Sri K.G. Krishna by several complainants before respective
jurisdictional police stations. The investigation in all those crimes
have been stayed by this Court by orders passed by the coordinate
Bench in different criminal petitions. After the interim order of stay,
the Enforcement Directorate registers Enforcement Case
Information Report in No. ECIR/BGZO/28/2023 on 11-09-2023.
Pursuant to registration of ECIR, the impugned proceedings are
initiated against the petitioner invoking Section 17 of the Act, for
attachment of properties of the petitioner, on the ground that they
are proceeds of crime of Sri K.G. Krishna. The petitioner contested
the proceedings so initiated against him which results in the
impugned order dated 13-07-2024 whereby the attachment of sale
deeds executed in favour of the petitioner by K.G. Krishna are
ordered. It is this action that has driven the petitioner to this Court
in the subject petition.
4. The learned senior counsel Sri S. Basavaraj appearing for
the petitioner would vehemently contend that the petitioner is a
bona fide purchaser. He purchases lands from one Sri K.G. Krishna
5
beginning from the year 2021 by 12 sale deeds. The sale
transactions end in the year 2022. The petitioner enters into a Joint
Development Agreement ('JDA' for short) with M/s. Brigade
Enterprises Limited on 15-03-2023 and 17-03-2022. Long
thereafter, a crime comes to be registered against Sri K.G. Krishna.
Based upon the said crime, holding it to be a predicate offence,
Enforcement Directorate initiates proceedings against K.G. Krishna
and others. The petitioner is not an accused in any proceedings, but
summons were issued to the petitioner, his residence was searched
and found the sale deeds executed long before initiation of crime
and attached the property holding it to be proceeds of crime of
Sri K.G. Krishna. He would contend that all events that have
happened long before registration of crime even cannot be taken
note of against a bona fide purchaser. He would seek quashment of
entire proceedings.
5. Per contra, the learned Additional Solicitor General
representing the Enforcement Directorate would vehemently
contend that predicate offence would range from 2012 to 2023.
There are several complaints against Sri K.G. Krishna, the vendor of
6
the petitioner. Therefore, if the petitioner is holding the properties
that belong to Sri K.G. Krishna he will be holding the properties on
the proceeds of crime of Sri K.G. Krishna. He would further
contend that the impugned proceedings are civil proceedings and as
such the petitioner can avail of all remedies available to him in law
and cannot knock at the doors of this Court in the subject petition.
But the learned Additional Solicitor General would admit the fact
that the petitioner is not an accused in any crime, either in the
predicate offence or in the ECIR registered by the Enforcement
Directorate.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The petitioner
is a real estate developer. The petitioner intended to purchase 72
acres of land and the records of those lands would depict that a
partnership firm by name Sai Sristi had entered into an agreement
to purchase the land from Sri K.G. Krishna and his wife. The
7
petitioner after due diligence proceeds to purchase 12 packets of
lands by 12 different sale deeds from the partnership firm owned by
Sri K.G. Krishna and his wife. Those sale deeds are executed
between 25-10-2021 and 26-08-2022. This is a matter of record.
The petitioner after purchase of lands enters into a JDA with
Brigade Enterprises on 15-03-2023. All was well up to this point.
8. Several crimes come to be registered not against the
petitioner but against his vendor Sri K.G.Krishna and his wife in
Crime Nos. 112 of 2023, 113 of 2023, 218 of 2023 and 237 of 2023
all for offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 504 and 506 of
the IPC inter alia. These crimes have become subject matter of
different criminal petitions before this Court and a coordinate Bench
of this Court granted an interim order of stay in favour of Sri
K.G.Krishna in all the cases. The petitioner again is nowhere in the
picture. The Enforcement Directorate registers an ECIR against Sri
K.G. Krishna and others on 11-09-2023. The reason for registering
the said ECIR is the aforesaid four crimes registered before different
Police Stations. Alleging that there has been money laundering, the
proceedings are instituted. Pursuant to registration of ECIR, the
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Enforcement Directorate gets hold of certain sale deeds during
investigation, issues summons to the petitioner on 25-06-2024
under Section 50 of the Act and later the Enforcement Directorate
files an application under Section 17 of the Act to retain the seized
materials and sought permission from the 2nd respondent to hold it
to be proceeds of crime. The 2nd respondent is the Adjudicating
Authority under the Act. It is this that is called in question in the
subject petition.
9. The link in the chain of events and undisputed dates are
taken note of, what could be unmistakably gathered is, that the
petitioner is a bona fide purchaser. Having purchased the property
long before the crime even being initiated against the vendors of
the petitioner would not mean that the axe should fall on the
petitioner, that too for attachment of properties which have
changed hands after they are purchased by the petitioner. The
proceedings instituted by the Enforcement Directorate, though civil
in nature or the petitioner is having alternate remedy to challenge
the orders of attachment would not mean that this Court could
permit such an action to be taken against the petitioner, without
9
him being involved in any manner. If that would be permitted,
every purchaser who has purchased the property from a person
who gets indicted in the crime at a later stage would have to face
the proceedings for no fault of him.
10. In somewhat identical circumstances, the Apex Court in
the case of PAVANA DIBBUR v. DIRECTORATE OF
ENFORCEMENT1 upturning the order passed by this Court holds
that unless conspiracy is alleged, all and sundry cannot be drawn
into the web of proceedings under the Act. The Apex Court holds as
follows:
".... .... ....
18. In a given case, if the prosecution for the
scheduled offence ends in the acquittal of all the accused or
discharge of all the accused or the proceedings of the
scheduled offence are quashed in its entirety, the scheduled
offence will not exist, and therefore, no one can be
prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 3 of the
PMLA as there will not be any proceeds of crime. Thus, in
such a case, the accused against whom the complaint under
Section 3 of the PMLA is filed will benefit from the scheduled
offence ending by acquittal or discharge of all the accused.
Similarly, he will get the benefit of quashing the proceedings
of the scheduled offence. However, an accused in the PMLA
case who comes into the picture after the scheduled offence
is committed by assisting in the concealment or use of
proceeds of crime need not be an accused in the scheduled
1
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1586
10
offence. Such an accused can still be prosecuted under PMLA
so long as the scheduled offence exists. Thus, the second
contention raised by the learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellant on the ground that the appellant was not
shown as an accused in the charge-sheets filed in the
scheduled offences deserves to be rejected.
ACQUISITION OF THE FIRST AND SECOND PROPERTY
19. The allegation against the appellant in the
complaint is that she purchased the property worth crores,
though she did not have the source of income which would
generate enough money to buy the subject properties. The
allegation against the appellant is that she allowed and
facilitated accused no. 1- Madhukar Angur, to conceal the
siphoned/misappropriated amounts by using her bank
account. Another allegation is that she is shown to have
purchased the second property from accused no. 1, though
she did not have the resources to pay the consideration. The
allegation is that she allowed the accused no. 1 to use her
bank accounts to facilitate siphoning the proceeds of the
crime. Another allegation is that both the first and second
properties have been acquired out of the proceeds of crime.
The first property, ex-facie, cannot be said to have any
connection with the proceeds of crime as the acts
constituting the scheduled offence took place after its
acquisition. The case of the appellant is that she possessed a
substantial amount, as can be seen from the declaration
made by her under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 in
September 2016 and therefore, at the time of the acquisition
of the second property, more than sufficient money was
available with her to acquire the second property. The issue
of whether the appellant used tainted money to acquire the
second property can be decided only after the evidence is
adduced. This is not a case where any material is placed on
record to show that the sale consideration was paid from a
particular Bank Account of the appellant. Therefore, it is not
possible to record a finding at this stage that the Second
property was not acquired by using the proceeds of crime.
We also make it clear that we have considered the issue only
in the context of the applicability of the PMLA. We have not
dealt with the issues of valuation and legality of the sale
deeds.
11
INTERPRETATION OF THE FIRST ENTRY IN
PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE SCHEDULE
20. Now, we come to the third argument made by the
learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant based on
the interpretation of the Schedule. It must be noted here
that in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary1, even the
validity of the Schedule was under challenge. A perusal of
the said decision shows that this Court was not called upon
to interpret any entry in the Schedule and, in particular,
entry of Section 120-B in the Schedule. The challenge to the
Schedule is dealt with in paragraphs 453, 454 and 455 of the
said decision. The contention before this Court was that even
minor offences have been included in the Schedule, and even
compoundable offences form part of the Schedule. It was
submitted that the offences which do not have cross-border
implications have been included in the Schedule. In
paragraphs 454 and 455 of the said decision, this Court held
thus:
"454. This Schedule has been amended by Act
21 of 2009, Act 2 of 2013, Act 22 of 2015, Act 13 of
2018 and Act 16 of 2018, thereby inserting new
offences to be regarded as scheduled offence. The
challenge is not on the basis of legislative competence
in respect of enactment of Schedule and the
amendments thereto from time to time. However, it
had been urged before us that there is no consistency
in the approach as it includes even minor offences as
scheduled offence for the purposes of offence of
money-laundering, more so even offences which have
no trans-border implications and are compoundable
between the parties. The classification or grouping of
offences for treating the same as relevant for
constituting offence of money-laundering is a matter of
legislative policy. The Parliament in its wisdom has
regarded the property derived or obtained as a result
of specified criminal activity, being an offence under
the concerned legislation mentioned in the Schedule.
The fact that some of the offences may be
noncognizable offences under the concerned legislation
or regarded as minor and compoundable offences, yet,
the Parliament in its wisdom having perceived the
cumulative effect of the process or activity concerning
12
the proceeds of crime generated from such criminal
activities as being likely to pose threat to the economic
stability, sovereignty and integrity of the country and
thus, grouped them together for reckoning it as an
offence of money-laundering, is a matter of legislative
policy. It is not open to the Court to have a second
guess at such a policy.
455. Needless to underscore that the 2002 Act
is intended to initiate action in respect of money-
laundering activity which necessarily is associated with
the property derived or obtained by any person,
directly or indirectly, as a result of specified criminal
activity. The prosecution under this Act is not in
relation to the criminal activity per se but limited to
property derived or obtained from specified criminal
activity. Resultantly, the inclusion of criminal activity
which has been regarded as non-cognizable,
compoundable or minor offence under the concerned
legislation, should have no bearing to answer the
matter in issue. In that, the offence of money-
laundering is an independent offence and the persons
involved in the commission of such offence are
grouped together as offenders under this Act. There is
no reason to make distinction between them insofar as
the offence of money-laundering is concerned. In our
opinion, therefore, there is no merit in the argument
under consideration."
21. In this case, we are not called upon to decide the
validity of the Schedule or any part thereof. The question is
whether the offence under Section 120-B of IPC, included in
Paragraph 1 of the Schedule, can be treated as a scheduled
offence even if the criminal conspiracy alleged is to commit
an offence which is not a part of the Schedule. This issue did
not arise for consideration in the case of Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary1.
22. Section 120-A of IPC defines "criminal conspiracy",
which reads thus:
"120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.--
When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be
done,--
(1) an illegal act, or
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(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such
an agreement is designated a criminal
conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an
agreement to commit an offence shall amount
to a criminal conspiracy unless some act
besides the agreement is done by one or more
parties to such agreement in pursuance
thereof.
Explanation.--It is immaterial whether the
illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or
is merely incidental to that object."
23. Section 120-B of IPC provides for punishment for
a criminal conspiracy which reads thus:
"120B. Punishment of criminal
conspiracy.- (1) Whoever is a party to a criminal
conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with
death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment
for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no
express provision is made in this Code for the
punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the
same manner as if he had abetted such offence.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy
other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence
punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term not
exceeding six months, or with fine or with both."
24. Now, we turn to the Schedule to the PMLA. We
find that many offences, which may generate proceeds of
crime, have not been included in the Schedule. We are
referring to only a few of such offences only by way of
illustration:--
a. Section 263A of IPC, which deals with the offence of
making or possessing fictitious stamps is not a part of
the Schedule;
b. Though offences punishable under Sections 392 to 402
regarding robbery and dacoity have been included in
14
part A of the Schedule, the offence punishable under
Section 379 of committing theft and the offence
punishable under Section 380 of theft in a dwelling
house are not made a part of parts A and B of the
Schedule. The theft of both categories can be of a very
large amount running into crores. The said two
offences become scheduled offences by virtue of
clause (3) of part C of the Schedule only if the
offences have cross-border implications;
c. The offence punishable under Section 403 of dishonest
misappropriation of property does not form part of the
Schedule. The said offence becomes a scheduled
offence by virtue of clause (3) of part C of the
Schedule only if the offence has cross-border
implications;
d. The offence under Section 405 of criminal breach of
trust, which is punishable under Section 406, is not a
part of the Schedule The said offence becomes a
scheduled offence by virtue of clause (3) of part C of
the Schedule only if the offence has cross-border
implications;
e. Though the offence under Section 417 of cheating has
been made a scheduled offence, the more stringent
crime of forgery for the purposes of cheating under
Section 468 is not a part of the Schedule, and
f. Though the offences under Sections 489A to 489C
regarding forging or counterfeiting currency notes are
part of the Schedule, the offence under Section 489D
of making or possessing instruments or materials for
forging or counterfeiting currency notes is not a part
of the Schedule.
25. Now, coming to Part B of the Schedule, it includes
only one offence under Section 132 of the Customs Act,
1962. The offence under Section 132 of the Customs Act of
making a false declaration, etc., becomes a scheduled
offence in view of sub-clause (ii) of Clause (y) of sub-section
(1) of Section 2 of the PMLA only if the total value involved
in the offence is Rs. 1 crore or more. Part C of the Schedule
15
provides that any offence specified in Part A having cross-
border implications becomes a part of Part C. More
importantly, all the offences against the property under
Chapter XVII of IPC having cross-border implications become
scheduled offences. As pointed out earlier, the offences
punishable under Sections 379 (theft), 380 (theft in dwelling
house), 403 (dishonest misappropriation of property) and
405 (criminal breach of trust) are part of Chapter XVII.
Though the said offences are not included in Part A, they
become scheduled offences by virtue of Part C only if they
have cross-border implications. Thus, it can be said that
many offences capable of generating proceeds of crime do
not form a part of the schedule.
26. The learned Additional Solicitor General argued
that as Section 120-B of IPC is included in Part A to the
Schedule, even if the allegation is of making a criminal
conspiracy to commit an offence which is not a part of the
Schedule, the offence becomes a scheduled offence. As
stated earlier, many offences under Chapter XVII of IPC are
not included in Parts A and B. They become scheduled
offences only if the same have cross-border implications.
Thus, the offences of dishonest misappropriation of property
or criminal breach of trust or theft can become a scheduled
offence, provided they have cross-border implications. If the
argument of the learned Additional Solicitor General is
accepted, if there is a conspiracy to commit offences under
Section 403 or Section 405, though the same have no cross-
border implications, the offence under Section 120-B of
conspiracy to commit offences under Sections 403 and 405
will become a scheduled offence. Thus, if any offence is not
included in Parts A, B and C of the Schedule but if the
conspiracy to commit the offence is alleged, the same will
become a scheduled offence. A crime punishable under
Section 132 of the Customs Act is made a scheduled offence
under Part B, provided the value involved in the offence is
Rupees One Crore or more. But if Section 120-B of IPC is
applied, one who commits such an offence having a value of
even Rs. 1 lac can be brought within the purview of the
PMLA. By that logic, a conspiracy to commit any offence
under any penal law which is capable of generating proceeds,
can be converted into a scheduled offence by applying
16
Section 120-B of the IPC, though the offence is not a part of
the Schedule. This cannot be the intention of the legislature.
27. The penal statutes are required to be strictly
construed. It is true that the penal laws must be construed
according to the legislative intent as expressed in the
enactment. In Chapter 1 of GP Singh's Principles of Statutory
Interpretation (15th Edition), it is observed that:
"The intention of the Legislature, thus,
assimilates two aspects : In one aspect it carries
the concept of "meaning", i.e. what the words
mean and in another aspect, it conveys the
concept of "purpose and object" or the "reason
and spirit" pervading through the statute. The
process of construction, therefore, combines
both literal and purposive approaches. In other
words the legislative intention, i.e., the true or legal
meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the
meaning of the words used in the enactment in the
light of any discernible purpose or object which
comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the
enactment is directed." In the words of A Driedger,
Construction of Statute, 2nd Edn, 1983 : The words
of an Act are to be read in their entire context
and in their grammatical and ordinary sense
harmoniously with the Scheme of the Act, the
object of the Act, and the intent of the
Parliament. This formulation later received the
approval of the Supreme Court and was called the
"cardinal principle of construction"." In both
Constitutional and statutory interpretation, the court is
supposed to exercise discretion in determining the
proper relationship between the subjective and
objective purposes of the law and help the law achieve
its purpose."
(Emphasis added)
28. While giving effect to the legislature's intention, if
two reasonable interpretations can be given to a particular
provision of a penal statute, the Court should generally adopt
the interpretation that avoids the imposition of penal
consequences. In other words, a more lenient interpretation
of the two needs to be adopted.
17
29. The legislative intent which can be gathered from
the definition of the scheduled offence under clause (y) of
sub-Section (1) of Section 2 of the PMLA is that every crime
which may generate proceeds of crime need not be a
scheduled offence. Therefore, only certain specific offences
have been included in the Schedule. Thus, if the submissions
of the learned Additional Solicitor General are accepted, the
Schedule will become meaningless or redundant. The reason
is that even if an offence registered is not a scheduled
offence, the provisions of the PMLA and, in particular,
Section 3 will be invoked by simply applying Section 120-B.
If we look at Section 120-B, only because there is a
conspiracy to commit an offence, the same does not become
an aggravated offence. The object is to punish those involved
in conspiracy to commit a crime, though they may not have
committed any overt act that constitutes the offence.
Conspiracy is an agreement between the accused to commit
an offence. If we look at the punishments provided under
Section 120-B, it becomes evident that it is not an
aggravated offence. It only incorporates the principle of
vicarious liability. If no specific punishment is provided in the
Statute for conspiracy to commit a particular offence, Section
120-B treats a conspirator of the main accused as an abettor
for the purposes of imposing the punishment. The
interpretation suggested by the ED will defeat the legislative
object of making only a few selected offences as scheduled
offences. If we accept such an interpretation, the statute
may attract the vice of unconstitutionality for being
manifestly arbitrary. It cannot be the legislature's intention
to make every offence not included in the Schedule a
scheduled offence by applying Section 120-B. Therefore, in
our view, the offence under Section 120-B of IPC included in
Part A of the Schedule will become a scheduled offence only
if the criminal conspiracy is to commit any offence already
included in Parts A, B or C of the Schedule. In other words,
an offence punishable under Section 120-B of IPC will
become a scheduled offence only if the conspiracy alleged is
of committing an offence which is otherwise a scheduled
offence.
30. Coming back to the facts of the case, in the
chargesheets filed in the alleged scheduled offences, there is
no allegation of the commission of criminal conspiracy to
18
commit any of the offences included in the Schedule. As
pointed out earlier, except for Section 120B of the IPC, no
other offence in the schedule has been applied. Therefore, in
this case, the scheduled offence does not exist at all. Hence,
the appellant cannot be prosecuted for the offences
punishable under Section 3 of the PMLA.
CONCLUSIONS
31. While we reject the first and second submissions
canvassed by the learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant, the third submission must be upheld. Our
conclusions are:
a. It is not necessary that a person against whom the
offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is alleged, must
have been shown as the accused in the scheduled
offence;
b. Even if an accused shown in the complaint under the
PMLA is not an accused in the scheduled offence, he
will benefit from the acquittal of all the accused in the
scheduled offence or discharge of all the accused in
the scheduled offence. Similarly, he will get the benefit
of the order of quashing the proceedings of the
scheduled offence;
c. The first property cannot be said to have any
connection with the proceeds of the crime as the acts
constituting scheduled offence were committed after
the property was acquired;
d. The issue of whether the appellant has used tainted
money forming part of the proceeds of crime for
acquiring the second property can be decided only at
the time of trial; and
e. The offence punishable under Section 120-B of
the IPC will become a scheduled offence only if the
conspiracy alleged is of committing an offence which is
specifically included in the Schedule."
19
The appellant PAVANA DIBBUR, before the Apex Court, was not
an accused in the predicate offence. But the money trail has led to
the proceedings instituted under the Act. The Apex Court holds
that unless offence punishable is under Section 120B of the IPC and
there is material to draw the accused therein, the proceedings
under the Act cannot be permitted to be continued.
11. Though in the case at hand, in one of the crimes so
registered there is offence punishable under Section 120B of the
IPC, but that cannot drag the petitioner into the web of those
proceedings, as all the transactions that the petitioner is projecting
have happened long before initiation of predicate offence even.
Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that the impugned
proceedings are unsustainable, in the peculiar facts of this case.
Resultantly the petition deserves to succeed.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Writ Petition is allowed.
20(ii) Order dated 13-07-2024 passed by the Enforcement Directorate in ECIR/BGZO/28 of 2023 stands quashed qua the petitioner.
Sd/-
(M. NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE bkp CT:SS