Patna High Court
Karu Mandal vs The State Of Bihar on 5 May, 2026
Author: Chandra Shekhar Jha
Bench: Chandra Shekhar Jha
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CRIMINAL APPEAL (DB) No.634 of 2019
Arising Out of PS. Case No.-227 Year-2016 Thana- NATHNAGAR District- Bhagalpur
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KARU MANDAL Son of Sri Raju Mandal Resident of Village- Budhuchak,
Devi Mandal Lane, P.S.- Nathnagar, District- Bhagalpur.
... ... Appellant/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar
2. Lochan Mandal S/O Late Magali Mandal Resident of Village- Budhuchak,
Devi Mandal Lane, P.S.- Nathnagar, District- Bhagalpur.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Appellant : Mr. Ravindra Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Ram Niwas Prasad, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Ms. Shashi Bala Verma, APP
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BIBEK CHAUDHURI
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA SHEKHAR JHA
CAV JUDGMENT
(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BIBEK CHAUDHURI)
Date : 07-05-2026
Factual Matrix
The appellant, Karu Mandal, has approached this Court
in appeal against the judgment of conviction dated 16.04.2019 and
the order of sentence dated 23.04.2019 passed by the learned 1 st
Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (POCSO Act),
Bhagalpur in G.R. No. 2680 of 2016 arising out of Nathnagar
Police Station Case No. 227 of 2016. By the impugned judgment,
the learned trial court found the appellant guilty of the offence
punishable under Section 4 of the Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act, 2012 for having committed penetrative
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sexual assault as defined under Section 3(a) of the said Act upon a
minor girl aged about 9 years. He was sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for life together with a fine of Rs. 25,000/-,
with the default stipulation of further simple imprisonment for six
months.
2. The prosecution case, as unfolded in the written report
of the informant Lucho Mandal (PW-5) lodged on 09.08.2016, is
that on 08.08.2016 at about 12 noon, his youngest daughter, a
minor girl fictitiously named 'A', aged about 9 years, while
proceeding alone towards the agricultural field (Bahiyar) near
Bairiya Pul, was subjected to penetrative sexual assault by the
appellant at a secluded spot. The informant alleged that the
appellant forcibly took the minor girl, made her hold and shake his
penis, digitally penetrated her private part, and then committed
penile penetration, causing her severe pain and screaming. The
assault came to light when two cousin sisters of the victim,
Khushbu Kumari and Kumkum Kumari, who were passing by the
field, heard the cries, rushed to the spot, and saw the appellant
naked and lying on the naked victim. The appellant fled after
wearing his pants. The two girls dressed the victim, brought her
home, and she narrated the entire incident to her parents. The FIR
was registered the next morning, leading to investigation and
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submission of charge-sheet under Section 376(2)(i) IPC and
Section 4 POCSO Act.
3. The appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed false
implication due to previous land dispute and village enmity. He
examined no defence witness. The trial court, after a detailed
appreciation of the evidence of seven prosecution witnesses and
two documentary exhibits, recorded the conviction and imposed
the sentence, holding that the prosecution had proved its case
beyond reasonable doubt. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has
preferred the present appeal.
Prosecution Evidence
4. The prosecution examined seven witnesses in support
of its case. PW-1, Khushbu Kumari, and PW-2, Kumkum Kumari,
both aged about 12 years and cousin sisters of the victim (though
residing in the adjacent village of Shrirampur), emerged as the
most crucial eye-witnesses. They deposed in clear and consistent
terms that while proceeding to the field to pluck ladyfinger and
grass, they heard cries emanating from the spot. On reaching there,
they saw the appellant lying naked on the disrobed victim. The
appellant immediately wore his pants and ran away upon seeing
them. The victim, who was crying and had blood stains on her
half-pants, disclosed to them on the way home that the appellant
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had forcibly made her hold and shake his penis and thereafter
inserted it into her urinary organ. Both witnesses withstood cross-
examination without any material contradiction.
5. PW-3, Ramni Devi, the mother of the victim, and PW-
5, Lucho Mandal, the informant and father, provided hearsay
evidence of the immediate disclosure made by the victim upon
reaching home. PW-5 further proved the prompt lodging of the
FIR the next morning and admitted that a village panchayat had
been convened, though he clarified that the police were never
informed about it. Both parents categorically denied any land
dispute with the appellant.
6. PW-6, the victim herself, gave a clear, cogent and
natural account of the incident. She stated that she was sitting
alone under a banyan tree when the appellant approached her,
asked her to hold and shake his penis, beat her on refusal, opened
her pants, inserted his finger into her private part, threw her down,
and committed penile penetration. She screamed in pain. The
arrival of Khushbu, Kumkum and an old woman caused the
appellant to flee after wearing his pants. The rescuers dressed her
and took her home where she narrated everything to her parents.
Her testimony was fully consistent with her statement recorded
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under Section 164 Cr.P.C. on 10.08.2016 (Ext. 2), which was taken
merely two days after the occurrence.
7. PW-4, Dr. Sushila Chaudhary, who medically
examined the victim on 09.08.2016 at 3:00 p.m., found pain,
redness and an "angry look of mucosa" in the vagina, clearly
indicative of recent vaginal assault. The radiological examination
established the victim's age to be below 12 years (Ext. 1 and 1/1).
Although the vaginal swab report showed absence of spermatozoa,
the doctor firmly opined that the findings were consistent with
vaginal assault.
8. Finally, PW-7, Tej Narayan Rai, the Investigating
Officer, proved the FIR, the place of occurrence (described as Jago
Mandal's brinjal field with specific boundaries), the statements of
witnesses, the medical report and the charge-sheet. In cross-
examination, he admitted that no clothes of the victim were
produced by the informant and that no statements were taken from
the owners of the adjoining fields.
Defence Version and Statement under Section 313
Cr.P.C.
9. The appellant maintained a complete denial of the
occurrence. In his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C.,
he simply stated that he had heard the witnesses but denied the
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allegations and offered no further explanation or alternative
version. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that
the prosecution witnesses are all interested and related, that there
are contradictions regarding the exact place of occurrence, that the
clothes of the victim were never seized, that no DNA test was
conducted, that the panchayat members were not examined, and
that the case suffers from false implication due to land dispute.
Submissions & Relevant Legal Provisions
10. The POCSO Act, 2012 was enacted to provide a
special mechanism for the protection of children from sexual
offences. Section 3(a) defines penetrative sexual assault to include
penetration of the vagina by any part of the body of another
person. Section 4 prescribes rigorous imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life. Of equal importance is Section 29 of the
Act, which raises a statutory presumption against the accused once
the prosecution establishes the foundational facts.
11. The Counsel for the appellant strenuously argued
that there was delay of one day in lodging the FIR and that the
same is fatal to the prosecution case.
12. It is a settled principle of law that in cases of sexual
assault, particularly upon a minor girl, some delay in lodging the
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FIR is natural and cannot be viewed with suspicion. The trauma,
shock, societal stigma, and the need to consult family members
often cause such delay. In the present case, the incident occurred at
about noon on 08.08.2016. The victim was immediately rescued
by PW-1 and PW-2, brought home, and disclosed the incident to
her parents. The FIR was lodged the very next morning on
09.08.2016.
13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that in sexual offences, delay, ranging from a few days to even several months, is not fatal if the evidence otherwise inspires confidence. Reference in this regard may be made to Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa, (2003) 8 SCC 590, where the victim was a mentally challenged person, and the FIR was lodged after the delivery of her stillborn child. Emphasizing the sensitivities of rape cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court made the following observation:
"5. We shall first deal with the question of delay. The unusual circumstances satisfactorily explained the delay in lodging of the first information report. In any event, delay per se is not a mitigating circumstance for the accused when accusations of rape are involved. Delay in lodging the first information report cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for discarding the prosecution case and doubting its authenticity. It only puts the Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 8/44 court on guard to search for and consider if any explanation has been offered for the delay. Once it is offered, the court is to only see whether it is satisfactory or not. In case if the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is possibility of embellishment or exaggeration in the prosecution version on account of such delay, it is a relevant factor. On the other hand, satisfactory explanation of the delay is weighty enough to reject the plea of false implication or vulnerability of the prosecution case. As the factual scenario shows, the victim was totally unaware of the catastrophe which had befallen her. That being so, the mere delay in lodging of the first information report does not in any way render the prosecution version brittle"
14. In the instant case, delay of less than 24 hours stands satisfactorily explained by the victim's immediate disclosure to the family members and the natural hesitation of the informant in rushing to the police station with a minor girl who had undergone a traumatic experience. The delay, therefore, is neither inordinate nor fatal to the prosecution.
15. The law relating to appreciation of evidence in cases of sexual assault upon children is well settled. The testimony of a child victim, if found reliable, cogent and consistent, does not require corroboration as a matter of law. The Hon'ble Supreme Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 9/44 Court in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 has laid down that evidence of a victim of sexual assault is entitled to great weight and is to be treated on par with the evidence of an injured witness. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Relevant para 8 of the said judgment is reproduced below:
"8. The grounds on which the trial court disbelieved the version of the prosecutrix are not at all sound. The findings recorded by the trial court rebel against realism and lose their sanctity and credibility. The court lost sight of the fact that the prosecutrix is a village girl. She was a student of Xth class. It was wholly irrelevant and immaterial whether she was ignorant of the difference between a Fiat, an Ambassador or a Master car. Again, the statement of the prosecutrix at the trial that she did not remember the colour of the car, though she had given the colour of the car in the FIR was of no material effect on the reliability of her testimony. No fault could also be found with the prosecution version on the ground that the prosecutrix had not raised an alarm while being abducted. The prosecutrix in her statement categorically asserted that as soon as she was pushed inside the car she was threatened by the accused to keep quiet and not to Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 10/44 raise any alarm, otherwise she would be killed. Under these circumstances to discredit the prosecutrix for not raising an alarm while the car was passing through the bus adda is a travesty of justice. The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. The trial court fell in error for discrediting the testimony of the prosecutrix on that account. In our opinion, there was no delay in the lodging of the FIR either and if at all there was some delay, the same has not only been properly explained by the prosecution but in the facts and circumstances of the case was also natural. The courts cannot overlook the fact that in sexual offences delay in the lodging of the FIR can be due to variety of reasons particularly the reluctance of the prosecutrix or her family members to go to the police and complain about the incident which concerns the reputation of the Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 11/44 prosecutrix and the honour of her family. It is only after giving it a cool thought that a complaint of sexual offence is generally lodged. The prosecution has explained that as soon as Tirlok Singh PW 6, father of the prosecutrix came to know from his wife, PW 7 about the incident he went to the village Sarpanch and complained to him. The Sarpanch of the village also got in touch with the Sarpanch of Village Pakhowal, where in the tubewell kotha of Ranjit Singh rape was committed, and an effort was made by the panchayats of the two villages to sit together and settle the matter. It was only when the Panchayats failed to provide any relief or render any justice to the prosecutrix, that she and her family decided to report the matter to the police and before doing that naturally the father and mother of the prosecutrix discussed whether or not to lodge a report with the police in view of the repercussions it might have on the reputation and future prospects of the marriage etc. of their daughter. Tirlok Singh PW 6 truthfully admitted that he entered into consultation with his wife as to whether to lodge a report or not and the trial court appears to have misunderstood the reasons and justification for the consultation between Tirlok Singh and his wife when it found that the said circumstance had rendered the version of the prosecutrix doubtful. Her statement about the manner in which she was Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 12/44 abducted and again left near the school in the early hours of next morning has a ring of truth. It appears that the trial court searched for contradictions and variations in the statement of the prosecutrix microscopically, so as to disbelieve her version. The observations of the trial court that the story of the prosecutrix that she was left near the examination centre next morning at about 6 a.m. was "not believable" as "the accused would be the last persons to extend sympathy to the prosecutrix" are not at all intelligible. The accused were not showing "any sympathy" to the prosecutrix while driving her at 6.00 a.m. next morning to the place from where she had been abducted but on the other hand were removing her from the kotha of Ranjit Singh and leaving her near the examination centre so as to avoid being detected. The criticism by the trial court of the evidence of the prosecutrix as to why she did not complain to the lady teachers or to other girl students when she appeared for the examination at the centre and waited till she went home and narrated the occurrence to her mother is unjustified. The conduct of the prosecutrix in this regard appears to us to be most natural. The trial court overlooked that a girl, in a tradition-bound non-permissive society in India, would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect upon her chastity had occurred, being conscious of Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 13/44 the danger of being ostracized by the society or being looked down by the society. Her not informing the teachers or her friends at the examination centre under the circumstances cannot detract from her reliability. In the normal course of human conduct, this unmarried minor girl, would not like to give publicity to the traumatic experience she had undergone and would feel terribly embarrassed in relation to the incident to narrate it to her teachers and others overpowered by a feeling of shame and her natural inclination would be to avoid talking about it to anyone, lest the family name and honour is brought into controversy. Therefore her informing her mother only on return to the parental house and no one else at the examination centre prior thereto is in accord with the natural human conduct of a female. The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 14/44 bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self-inflicted, is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit, Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 15/44 the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain [(1990) 1 SCC 550 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 210] Ahmadi, J. (as the Lord Chief Justice then was) speaking for the Bench summarised the position in the following words: (SCC p. 559, para 16) Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 16/44 "A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 17/44 adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence."
16. Similarly, in Phool Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 2 SCC 74, the Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated that in POCSO cases the testimony of the child victim, if it inspires confidence, can form the sole basis of conviction, and that minor discrepancies or absence of certain scientific evidence do not vitiate the prosecution case when the oral evidence is trustworthy. Relevant paras 8 to 11 of the said judgment are reproduced below:
"8. In Ganesan [Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 76], this Court has observed and held that there can be a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the deposition of the prosecutrix is found to be trustworthy, unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality. In the aforesaid case, this Court had an occasion to consider the series of judgments Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 18/44 of this Court on conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix. In paras 10.1 to 10.3, it is observed and held as under : (Ganesan case [Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 76] , SCC pp. 578-82) "10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in Vijay [Vijay v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 639] , it is observed in paras 9 to 14 as under : (SCC pp. 195-98) '9. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain [State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 210] this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under : (SCC p. 559, para
16) "16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 19/44 witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence."
10. In State of U.P. v. Pappu [State of U.P. v. Pappu, (2005) 3 SCC 594 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 780] this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 20/44 conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under :
(SCC p. 597, para 12) "12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony.
Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do."
11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316] , this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court is duty-bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 21/44 prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under : (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) "8. ... The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. ... The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. ... Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. ... Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 22/44 requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. ...
***
21. ... The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations."
12. In State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra [State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra, (2002) 9 SCC 86 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1080] , this Court held that rape is not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence.
13. In State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh [State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 622 : 1993 SCC (Cri) Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 23/44 674] , this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid Khan v. State of M.P. [Wahid Khan v. State of M.P., (2010) 2 SCC 9 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1208] placing reliance on an earlier judgment in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan [Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, 1951 SCC 1213 : AIR 1952 SC 54 : 1952 SCR 377] .
14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix.' 10.2. In Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana [Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 61] , it is observed and held by this Court that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality.
10.3. Who can be said to be a "sterling witness", has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 24/44 Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 750] . In para 22, it is observed and held as under : (SCC p. 29) '22. [Ed. : Para 22 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./48/2012 dated 18-8-2012.] In our considered opinion, the "sterling witness" should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 25/44 the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a "sterling witness" whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.' "
(emphasis in original)
9. In Pankaj Chaudhary [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary, (2019) 11 SCC 575 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 264] , it is observed and held that as a general rule, if credible, conviction of the accused can be based on sole testimony, without corroboration. It is further observed and held that sole testimony of the prosecutrix should not be doubted by the court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. In para 29, it is observed and held as under : (SCC p. 587) "29. It is now well-settled principle of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 217] ]. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that there is no rule of law or practice that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be relied upon without Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 26/44 corroboration and as such it has been laid down that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the "probabilities factor" does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K., (2000) 5 SCC 30 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 898] ]."
10. In Sham Singh v. State of Haryana [Sham Singh v. State of Haryana, (2018) 18 SCC 34 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 129] , it is observed that testimony of the victim is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It is further observed that seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. In paras 6 and 7, it is observed and held as under :
(SCC pp. 37-38) "6. We are conscious that the courts shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations or sexual assaults.
[See State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316] (SCC p. 403, para 21).] Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 27/44
7. It is also by now well settled that the courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. (See Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam [Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam, (1998) 8 SCC 635 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1725] .)"
11. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand and as observed hereinabove, we see no reason to doubt the credibility and/or trustworthiness of the prosecutrix. She is found to be reliable and trustworthy. Therefore, without any further corroboration, the conviction of the accused relying upon the sole testimony of the prosecutrix can be sustained."
17. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the Investigating Officer failed to get the appellant medically examined under Section 53A Cr.P.C. to ascertain whether there was any injury on his private part which could have been caused while thrusting the same into the private part of the minor girl whose private part was not fully developed. It was argued that such examination was necessary to determine whether Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 28/44 the appellant was physically capable of committing the alleged sexual offence.
18. This contention deserves to be rejected outright. Section 53A Cr.P.C. provides for medical examination of the accused in cases of rape to ascertain the commission of the offence and the nature of injuries. However, in the instant case, the specific allegation against the appellant, as consistently deposed by the victim (PW-6) and corroborated by the eye-witnesses (PW-1 and PW-2), is that the appellant not only made the victim hold and shake his penis but also inserted his finger into her vagina before committing penile penetration.
19. It is well settled that under Section 3 of the POCSO Act, penetrative sexual assault includes penetration of the vagina by any part of the body of another person, including a finger. It is not mandatory that penile penetration must be proved in every case. Even if the accused were incapable of penile penetration for any reason, insertion of a finger would still constitute penetrative sexual assault. Since a finger does not normally sustain visible injuries while being inserted into the vagina, non-examination of the appellant under Section 53A Cr.P.C. is neither mandatory nor fatal to the prosecution case in the facts of this case. Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 29/44
20. Another ground urged by the appellant was that the age of the victim was not determined in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. It was submitted that when the victim is on the verge of majority, strict compliance with Section 94 of the JJ Act is mandatory.
21. Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 provides the procedure for determination of age of a child in conflict with law or a child in need of care and protection. It gives preference to school certificates or matriculation certificate, and only in their absence, directs medical examination through ossification test or other scientific methods.
22. In the present case, the victim (PW-6) stated that she was aged about 9 years. Her parents (PW-3 and PW-5) also stated her age to be 9 years. Dr. Sushila Chaudhary (PW-4), after radiological examination, opined that the victim was below 12 years (Ext. 1/1). Even if the benefit of the two-year margin of error is given in favour of the appellant, the victim's age would still be between 10 and 14 years. In either case, she remains a "child" within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of the POCSO Act. Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 30/44
23. The failure of the Investigating Officer to strictly follow the procedure under Section 94 of the JJ Act is not fatal to the prosecution case when the age is otherwise proved by consistent oral evidence of the victim and her parents and is corroborated by the medical opinion. At this point it would be relevant here to refer to State of Madhya Pradesh v. Anoop Singh, (2015) 7 SCC 773. In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court restored the conviction under Sections 363, 366, and 376 I.P.C. after the High Court had acquitted the accused partly on grounds of procedural issues with age proof documents. The trial court had relied on multiple documentary proofs (including a birth certificate and school records) showing the prosecutrix was below 16 at the time of the incident. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
16. In the present case, we have before us two documents which support the case of the prosecutrix that she was below 16 years of age at the time the incident took place. These documents can be used for ascertaining the age of the prosecutrix as per Rule 12(3)(b). The difference of two days in the dates, in our considered view, is immaterial and just on this minor discrepancy, the evidence in the form of Exts. P-5 and P-6 cannot be discarded. Therefore, the trial court was correct in relying on the documents.
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 31/44
24. The Court reversed the acquittal, finding the age sufficiently proved despite any procedural compliance issues raised regarding the documents.
25. It is apposite to remind oneself that procedure is the handmaiden of justice, and therefore, when the evidence clearly establishes that the victim is a minor, technical non-compliance with the age determination procedure shall not vitiate the conviction.
26. Of particular relevance to the facts of the present case is the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Veerendra v. State of M.P., (2022) 8 SCC 668. This case involved a brutal rape and murder of a minor girl. The Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasising the sancitity of the testimony of the child victim and the limited impact of certain investigative lapses when the ocular evidence is trustworthy, observed that minor discrepancies in description of the place or absence of certain scientific evidence do not vitiate the conviction when the direct evidence of the victim and eye-witnesses is consistent and inspires confidence.
27. Section 53(A) of Cr.P.C. enables medical examination of a person accused of rape for the purpose of collecting scientific evidence such as semen, blood, hair samples or DNA profile. The Hon'ble Court pointed out, that the provision Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 32/44 is facilitative in nature and not mandatory and therefore, failure to conduct DNA profiling cannot by itself be treated as fatal to the prosecution case. The judgment underscores that in heinous offences against the children, the Court must adopt a sensitive approach while ensuring that the prosecution has discharged its burden beyond reasonable doubt. The relevant paras 46 and 53 of the said judgment are reproduced below:
"46. There can be no doubt with respect to the position that a fair investigation is necessary for a fair trial. Hence, it is the duty of the investigating agency to protect the rights of both the accused and the victim by adhering to the prescribed procedures in the matter of investigation and thereby to ensure a fair, competent and effective investigation. Even while holding so, we cannot be oblivious of the well-nigh settled position that solely on account of defects or shortcomings in investigation an accused is not entitled to get acquitted. In other words, it also cannot be the sole reason for interference with a judgment of conviction if rest of the evidence is cogent enough to sustain the same.
53. In view of the nature of the provision under Section 53-ACrPC and the decisions referred to, we are also of the considered view that the lapse or omission (purposeful or otherwise) to carry out DNA profiling, by itself, cannot be Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 33/44 permitted to decide the fate of a trial for the offence of rape especially, when it is combined with the commission of the offence of murder as in case of acquittal only on account of such a flaw or defect in the investigation the cause of criminal justice would become the victim. The upshot of this discussion is that even if such a flaw had occurred in the investigation in a given case, the court has still a duty to consider whether the materials and evidence available on record before it, are enough and cogent to prove the case of the prosecution. In a case which rests on circumstantial evidence, the Court has to consider whether, despite such a lapse, the various links in the chain of circumstances form a complete chain pointing to the guilt of the accused alone in exclusion of all hypothesis of innocence in his favour."
Appreciation of Evidence
28. This Court has meticulously examined the entire evidence on record. The testimony of the victim (PW-6) stands as the cornerstone of the prosecution case. Her account, both in court and in the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. recorded barely two days after the incident, is clear, consistent and inspires complete confidence. She has given a vivid description of the entire sequence, right from the approach by the appellant, the demand to Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 34/44 hold and shaking his penis, the beating on refusal, digital penetration, penile penetration, the pain and screaming, and to the timely arrival of the rescuers. There is no material contradiction between her court testimony and the 164 statement. Minor variations regarding the precise description of the spot (banyan tree versus brinjal field) are natural in the testimony of a child who had undergone a traumatic experience and do not affect the core of the prosecution story.
29. The evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, the two eye-
witnesses, provides powerful corroboration. They actually saw the appellant naked and on top of the naked victim. Their immediate rescue of the victim and the spontaneous disclosure made by her on the way home further strengthen the prosecution case. The fact that these witnesses are related to the victim as cousins does not render their testimony unreliable. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the evidence of related witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground of relationship if it is otherwise trustworthy and inspires confidence. Reliance in this regard may be placed on Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 288. The relevant paras 26 and 28 of the said judgment are reproduced as under:
"26. Merely because the witnesses were closely related to the deceased persons, Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 35/44 their testimonies cannot be discarded. Their relationship to one of the parties is not a factor that affects the credibility of a witness, more so, a relation would not conceal the actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person. A party has to lay down a factual foundation and prove by leading impeccable evidence in respect of its false implication. However, in such cases, the court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse the evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible evidence. (Vide Dalip Singh v.
State of Punjab [(1953) 2 SCC 36 : AIR 1953 SC 364 : 1953 Cri LJ 1465] , Masalti v. State of U.P. [AIR 1965 SC 202 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 226] , Lehna v. State of Haryana [(2002) 3 SCC 76 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 526] and Rizan v.
State of Chhattisgarh [(2003) 2 SCC 661 :
2003 SCC (Cri) 664] .)
28. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with an in-built guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. "Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness." (Vide State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand [(2004) 7 SCC 629 :
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 36/44 2004 SCC (Cri) 2021] , Krishan v. State of Haryana [(2006) 12 SCC 459 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 214] , Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan [(2008) 8 SCC 270 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 472] , Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [(2009) 9 SCC 719 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107] , Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan [(2009) 10 SCC 477 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 302] , Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy v. State of A.P. [(2009) 12 SCC 546 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 630 : AIR 2009 SC 2661] and Balraje v. State of Maharashtra [(2010) 6 SCC 673 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 211] .)"
30. Another significant issue that arises for consideration is whether the evidence of PW-3 (mother) and PW-5 (father), which is essentially hearsay in nature, can be relied upon. After the incident, the victim immediately narrated the entire sequence of events to PW-1 and PW-2, who brought her home. She then disclosed the same facts to her parents.
31. The evidence of the parents cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they are hearsay witnesses. Their testimony is clearly admissible under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 on the principle of res gestae. Section 6 provides that facts which form part of the same transaction are relevant, even if they are not in issue. The immediate disclosure by the victim to her parents immediately after the occurrence forms Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 37/44 an integral part of the same transaction. Such spontaneous statements made soon after the incident carry high probative value as they are free from the risk of tutoring or concoction.
32. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gentela Vijayavardhana Rao v. State of A.P., (1996) 6 SCC 241, explaining the intricacies of the Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, held that statements made immediately after the occurrence explaining the circumstances of the transaction are admissible as res gestae evidence. The relevant para 15 of the said judgment is reproduced below:
"15. The principle of law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act is usually known as the rule of res gestae recognised in English law. The essence of the doctrine is that a fact which, though not in issue, is so connected with the fact in issue "as to form part of the same transaction" becomes relevant by itself. This rule is, roughly speaking, an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The rationale in making certain statement or fact admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act is on account of the spontaneity and immediacy of such statement or fact in relation to the fact in issue. But it is necessary that such fact or statement must be a part of the same transaction. In other words, such statement must have been made contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 38/44 offence or at least immediately thereafter. But if there was an interval, however slight it may be, which was sufficient enough for fabrication then the statement is not part of res gestae. In R. v. Lillyman a statement made by a raped woman after the ravish-ment was held to be not part of the res gestae on account of some interval of time lapsing between the act of rape and the making of the statement. Privy Council while considering the extent up to which this rule of res gestae can be allowed as an exemption to the inhibition against hearsay evidence, has observed in Teper v. R. thus:
"The rule that in a criminal trial hearsay evidence is admissible if it forms part of the res gestae is based on the propositions that the human utterance is both a fact and a means of communication and that human action may be so interwoven with words that the significance of the action cannot be under-stood without the correlative words and the dissociation of the words from the action would impede the discovery of the truth. It is essential that the words sought to be proved by hearsay should be, if not abso lutely contemporaneous with the action or event, at least so clearly associated with it that they are part of the thing being done, and so an item or part of the real evidence and not merely a reported statement."
33. The correct legal position stated above needs no further elucidation.
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 39/44
34. Here, the act of the accused defiling the victim during the middle of the day, the victim's rescue by PW-1 and PW- 2, her narrating the incident to her parents, are all circumstances so inter-twined with each other by proximity of time and space that the disclosure by the victim to her parents becomes part of the same transaction. Hence, the evidence of PW-3 and PW-5 is both admissible and reliable.
35. The medical evidence furnished by PW-4 fully corroborates the ocular testimony. The finding of vaginal pain, redness and "angry look of mucosa" within 27 hours of the incident is a clear indicator of recent penetrative assault. In Parminder v. State of Delhi, (2014) 2 SCC 592, the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to hold, that absence of spermatozoa in vaginal swab does not demolish the prosecution case. The relevant para 11 of the said judgment is reproduced below:
"11. Section 375 IPC defines the offence of "rape" and the Explanation to Section 375 IPC, states that penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. This Court has accordingly held in Wahid Khan v. State of M.P. [(2010) 2 SCC 9 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1208] that even the slightest penetration is sufficient to make out an offence of rape and depth of penetration is immaterial. In the Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 40/44 aforesaid case, this Court has relied on the very same passage from Modi in Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology (22nd Edn.) quoted above. In the present case, even though the hymen of the prosecutrix was not ruptured the High Court has held that there was penetration which has caused bleeding in the private parts of the prosecutrix as would be evident from the fact that the underwear of the prosecutrix was stained by blood. In our considered opinion, the High Court was right in holding the appellant guilty of the offence of rape and there is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that there was only an attempt to rape and not rape by the appellant."
36. Further, the Hon'le Supreme Court, in Gurmeet (Supra) has ruled that non-seizure of clothes and other investigative lapses do not have a detrimental effect on the prosecution's case. Relevant para 21 of the said judgment is reproduced below:
"21. Of late, crime against women in general and rape in particular is on the increase. It is an irony that while we are celebrating woman's rights in all spheres, we show little or no concern for her honour. It is a sad reflection on the attitude of Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 41/44 indifference of the society towards the violation of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must remember that a rapist not only violates the victim's privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical assault -- it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The courts, therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 42/44 may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations."
37. In the instant case, the two eye-witnesses saw the act in broad daylight, the victim herself gave a consistent account, and medical findings support penetration. The absence of spermatozoa or non-seizure of clothes, therefore, does not create any reasonable doubt.
38. The alleged discrepancy regarding the place of occurrence and the non-examination of panchayat members or boundary witnesses are also not fatal. The place described by all witnesses falls within the same general area near Bairiya Pul and the brinjal field. Such minor variations are inevitable and do not shake the credibility of the witnesses. The panchayat, even if held, was not a formal proceeding and its non-examination does not undermine the direct evidence. The Investigating Officer (PW-7) has proved the chain of custody of documents and the place of occurrence. The appellant's own denial of any land dispute when Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 43/44 questioned by the IO further weakens the defence plea of false implication.
39. In the light of the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, once the foundational facts of the victim being a child below 12 years and the commission of penetrative sexual assault are established by reliable evidence, the burden shifts to the accused to rebut the presumption. The appellant has failed to discharge that burden.
Conclusion
40. After a careful and anxious consideration of the entire evidence on record, this Court is of the firm opinion that the learned trial court has correctly appreciated the evidence and has rightly recorded the conviction. The prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of the victim and the two eye-witnesses is reliable, consistent and trustworthy. The medical evidence provides adequate corroboration. The alleged lapses in investigation are not of such a nature as to create any reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court. The sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the trial court is commensurate with the gravity of the offence and does not call for any interference.
41. Accordingly, the criminal appeal is dismissed. The judgment of conviction dated 16.04.2019 and the order of sentence Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.634 of 2019 dt.07-05-2026 44/44 dated 23.04.2019 passed by the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (POCSO Act), Bhagalpur are hereby affirmed. The appellant shall serve the sentence.
(Bibek Chaudhuri, J) I agree.
Chandra Shekhar Jha, J :
(Chandra Shekhar Jha, J) suraj/-
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