Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Gajjala Rajeswara Reddy vs Gajjala Revathi on 18 July, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000(5)ALD124, 2000(5)ALT1, I(2001)DMC171
Author: B. Subhashan Reddy
Bench: B. Subhashan Reddy
ORDER Ghulam Mohammed, J.
1. This CMA is directed against the judgment and decree dated 23rd November, 1998 in OPNo.12 of 1996 on the file of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Cuddapah, wherein the Court below by the impugned order declined to grant divorce to the appellant-petitioner-husband on the ground of cruelty.
2. The appellant-husband instituted a petition under Section 13 (1) (a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, (for short 'the Act'), praying the Court to grant decree of divorce by dissolving the marriage with the respondent that had taken place on 28-1-1993 according to the Hindu Religious rites at Zeenath Kalyana Mantapam, Cuddapah, and was consummated- The appellant averred in the petition that the respondent's senior paternal uncle by name Obul Reddy suggested the appellant to allow the respondent-wife's younger brother and sister to slay in his house and provide them education. The appellant expressed his inability to agree with the said suggestion, due to which Mr. Obul Reddy became furious and he instigated the respondent-wife not to co-operative with the appellant's family. The respondent-wife being inexperienced and innocent has fallen prey to the evil advise of her senior paternal uncle and started giving trouble in the house by disrespecting the parents of the appellant. On 8-8-1994 the said Obul Reddy together with his kith and kin numbering about 25 rushed into the house of the appellant, in the absence of the appellant's father, and compelled the appellant and his mother at the threat of danger with their lives and took the respondent along with him without the permission of the appellant and his mother. On the same day the respondent's father gave a "Dawa" in Cuddapah Taluk Police Station and held a "Panchayat" and he advised the appellant to have a separate family. Accordingly the appellant took a separate house and lived with the respondent-wife for about 2V, months. Thereafter, Ihe respondent-wife suggested to join his parents' family as she is finding it difficult to spend time alone. Thereafter the appellant convinced his parents and shifted to his parent's house. After staying for some time the respondent-wife left the appellant's house and did not turn up. Then Ihe appellant gave a complaint to the Deputy Superintendent of Police. However, after some time the respondent herself came down to the separate house and started living along with the appellant. The respondent-wife was not co-operating with him causing mental agony, and she again went back to her senior paternal uncle Mr. Obul Reddy's house. On 26-12-1994 the appellant issued a notice. The respondent though received did not reply. However, on the intervention of the Inspector of Police, 1 Town, Cuddapah they started leading marital life. Thereafter, it is stated, the respondent went to her senior paternal uncle's house without informing the appellant.
3. Though the appellant filed OP No.27 of 1995 for restitution of conjugal rights, that was dismissed for non-prosecution of the appellant herein.
4. The respondent-wife filed a counter denying the allegations and contended that there are no bona fides in the petition and that the theory put forth by the husband that her senior paternal uncle suggested the appellant to allow her younger brother and sister in his house and provide them education was invented for the purpose of the divorce petition only. She further stated that in OP No.27 of 1995 she expressed her willingness to live with him and said OP was dismissed for non prosecution of the appellant on 29-1-1996, She further stated that at the time of her marriage her parents presented 20 'tulas' of Gold and Rs.80,000/-of cash to the appellant and they lead the marital life for some time. Thereafter, the appellant's parents and three sisters started to treat her with cruelty and demanded for additional dowry. She further stated that first sister of the appellant Vasanatha got first marriage with one Kolhuru person and divorced him within one month of the marriage and got 2nd marriage with Lakshmireddy of Bhakarapet and got one daughter and deserted him and living in the house of the parents of the petitioner and the 2nd daughter who married one Nagarmaii Reddy of Chennur is also living in the appellant's house. The 3rd daughter by name Sujatha was unmarried. She stated that the family members used to scold and beat her for delay and small mistakes in preparation of works and also used to abuse her by saying that she is a rustic woman. The appellant made cruel acts on her and she underwent treatment by Dr. Ashok Kumar, On 21-8-1994 at the intervention of the Sub Inspector of Police, separate family was put up at Kummaraveedhi in Nalivota and they lived happily for sometime and some time thereafter the appellant started beating her. On 5-2-1995 Ihe appellant and his sisters took away 20 tulas of Gold from her possession and necked out her from the house stating that they are going to conduct second marriage to the appellant and that she went to her parent's house and narrated the entire story to them.
5. The root cause, however, seeking for the divorce is a notice dated 30th July, 1995 issued by the respondent. According to the appellant in that notice the respondent made defamatory and scandalous statements against the family of the appellant, which, according to him, amounts cruelty and he therefore sought for divorce. However, it is pertinent to mention that the respondent-wife in the open Court in OP No.27 of 1995 on 17-1-1996, 24-1-1996 and 29-1-1996 has expressed her willingness to join the appellant.
6. To substantiate their respective averments, the appellant has examined PWs.l to 3 and marked Exs.Al to A9, the respondent examined RWs.1 to 3.
7. Learned Judge based on the material available on record declined to grant decree of divorce. Hence, the appeal.
8. Sri. M. Narasimhct Reddy, learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the entire approach of the Court below is not correct and the learned Judge ought to have taken into account conduct of the respondent in filing petition under Section 498-A IPC and also the contents in Ex.A3 which amounts to cruelty and that the learned Judge basing on the said evidence ought to have granted decree of divorce. In support of his contentions the learned Counsel placed reliance on decisions reported in Alka v. R.K. Gautam, , K. Lalithakumari v Ramaprasada Rao, , V. Bhagal v. D.Bhagat, , Shobha Rani v. Madhitkar Reddi, and in Chiranjeevi v. Lavanya @ Sufatha, and has taken us through the relevant portions of the judgments, which are extracted hereunder.
"Hindu Marriage Act (25 of 1955), Section 13(l)(ia) - Divorce - Cruelty -Husband proved that general conduct and behavior of wife towards his parents, brother and sisters was indifferent, insulting and volcanic - Persistent resistance to sexual intercourse by her depriving husband of normal matrimonial pleasure - Act of wife in trying to jump from balcony on event of marriage in family amounted to gravest act of cruelty - In circumstances, husband would be entitled to decree of divorce".
......
In the celebrated English decision, King v. King, 1952 (2) All.ER 584, Lord Normand, observed while defining cruelty as under:
"The general rule in all questions of cruelty is that the whole matrimonial relationship must be considered, and that rule is of special value where the cruelty consists not of violent act but of injurious reproaches, complaints, accusations or taunts. Willful accusations may be made which are not true and for which there are no probable grounds and yet they may not amount to cruelty. To take an obvious example, they may have been provoked by the cruel conduct of the other spouse. There is in many cases no easy rule, no clear line of demarcation which divides cruelty from something which does not amount to cruelty."
In K. Lalithakumari's case (supra) it was observed as under:
"Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Act 25 of 1955) - Section 13(1)(ia) - Husband seeking relief of divorce on ground of cruelty by wife - Number of instances wherein wife humiliated and insulted husband and treated him most cruelty - Wife behaving with her husband in a most inhuman way abusing him on every occasion and humiliating and harassing him in numerous ways - Granting relief of divorce by trial Court on the ground of cruelty - Justified."
In V. Bhagat's case (supra) the Supreme Court has observed as under:
"Cruelty contemplated by the sub-clause is both physical and mental. We are concerned herein with the latter. It is not possible to define 'mental cruelty' exhaustively. As observed by Lord Reid in Gollins v. Gollins, 1964 AC 644 :
"No one has ever attempted to give a comprehensive definition of cruelty and I do not intend/try to do so. Much must depend on the knowledge and intention of the respondent, on the nature of his (or her) conduct, and on the character and physical or mental weaknesses of the spouses, and probably no general statement is equally applicable in all cases except the requirements that the party seeking relief must show actual or probable injury to life, limb or health. It is ease to see that the origin of this requirement is the decision in the well known case of Russel v. Russel, 1987 AC 395."
To the same effect are the observations of Lord Pearce (at P.695) :
"It is impossible to give a comprehensive definition of cruelty, but when reprehensible conduct or departure from normal standards of conjugal kindness causes injury to health or an apprehension of it, it is, 1 think, cruelty if a reasonable person, after taking due account of the temperament and all the other particular circumstances would consider that the conduct complained of is such that this spouse should not be called on to endure it...
1 agree with the Lord Merriman whose practice in cases of mental cruelty was always to make up his mind first whether there was injury or apprehended injury to health. In the light of that vital fact the Court has then to decide whether the sum total of the reprehensible conduct was cruel. That depends on whether the cumulative conduct was sufficiently weighty to say that from a reasonable person's point of view, after a consideration of any excuse which this respondent might have in the circumstances, the conduct is such that this petitioner ought not to be called on to endure it....
The particular circumstances of the home, the temperaments and emotions of both the parties and their status and their way of life, their past relationship and almost every circumstance that attends the act or conduct complained of may all be relevant".
In Shobha Rani's case (supra) the Supreme Court has observed as under:
"The word "cruelty" has not been defined and could not have been defined. It has been used in relation to human conduct or human behavior. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct of one which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. There may be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injuries effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted".
In Chiranjeevi's cases (supra) a Division Bench of this Court has observed as under:
'Hindu Marriag; Act, 1955 - Section 13(1)(1-a)
- Application for divorce filed by husband on the ground of cruelty and desertion on the part of the wife -Allegations and counter allegation made by both of the spouses against each other
- No love and affection between them -No guarantee that they would be able to live together as husband and wife - In the circumstances the Court cannot compel them to live together - Divorce ordered."
9. On the other hand learned Counsel for the respondent Miss Sudtia, argued that the appellant-husband has failed to prove the cruelly and that no acts of cruelty was specified in the petition. She further contended that the grounds existing on the date of the filing of the divorce petition alone are criteria to decide the matter and subsequent grounds are not relevant. To substantiate her contention she has drawn our attention to decisions in Stiresh Kn/nai-v. Suman, AIR 1983 All. 225, Salekha v. Kamala Kanta, AIR 1980 Cat. 370, and in Sudha v. Mahesh Chand, . The relevant portions of the judgments reads as under:
In Suresh Kwnar's case (supra) it was held as under:
"Cruelly in order to be a ground for divorce must be some such conduct of the respondent as gives the petitioner a reasonable cause of apprehension of injury to body, mind or health in future. Past conduct is undoubtedly relevant as it forms the very basis of the reason for the apprehension of the injury or harm in the future. Cruelty can be mental; but when one speaks of mental cruelty as distinct from physical cruelty, the idea is to show that while in the case of physical cruelty, harm or injury inflicted is to the body directly, in the case of mental cruelty, the harm or injury caused is through the mind, but nevertheless it is a harm or injury caused to the human body. The injury when caused to the physical body is something which could be perceived by the senses but when it is caused mentally, the result of it may appear later on by affecting the health of the person to whom it is caused. Every mental tension cannot amount to infliction of mental cruelty. It must, however, be shown that the injury inflicted through the mind of the petitioner has affected his health, or that the future repetition of that injury is most likely to affect his health".
In Sulekha's case (supra) the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court has held as under:
"According to the provisions of Section 10(l)(b) of the unamended Act it was necessary for the petitioner to prove that the cruelty was of such a character as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his mind that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the other party. The amended Section 13 (1)(ia) says that a decree for divorce can be passed if the other party has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty. The position of a law is still the same though the amending Act of 1976 has come into force. Even after the amendment cruelty simpliciter will not suffice. The petitioner will have to prove that the cruelty is of a nature as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension in his mind that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the other party. Ordinarily a single act of violence is not sufficient for the purpose. But it is possible in the particular circumstances even for a single act of grossly violent character to constitute legal cruelty."
In Sudha's case (supra) it was held as under:
"The object of the R7 (iv) calling upon the appellant to give specific acts of cruelty by giving occasions and the place where the said acts were committed is only with a view to enable the respondent to know what case he had to meet and thus to prevent a surprise at the trial. Thus, where in a petition for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, there was a categorical allegations that immediately after the marriage, the respondent-husband told the appellant-wife that he had no mind to marry, he would never have any marital relations with her and that he made her to sleep separately from him and when requested by her to have marital relations with her, he used to threaten her with death, it was held that the trial Court was wrong in holding that the averments regarding cruelty were vague, when there was specification of place in the petition, being the matrimonial home and the occasion mentioned was immediately after the marriage. It was held further by the High Court that instead of going into merits, the case should be remanded to the trial Court for deciding on merits about the incidents of cruelty as given in the petition, which would enable also the parties to subject the doctors examining virginity of wife to cross-examination and enable the parties to have a finding by the trial Court on the allegations of cruelty in addition and which could be tested in appeal".
10. In this case the appellant who was examined as PW1 did not speak against his wife that she is not giving marital happiness to him. Further the respondent-RW1 has neither any grievance with her husband nor her father-in-law and her grievance is against appellant's mother and three sisters. PW2 father of the appellant in his cross-examination stated that it is true that the police advised them to put up a separate family in order to avoid their interference to live them happily. The trial Court, disbelieved the evidence of PW3 observing that he is not a trust-worthy witness. Considering the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned Judge rightly found that the story put forth by the appellant in the divorce petition to allow the younger brother and sister of the respondent to stay in his house for the purpose studying is not correct. The trial Court further found that there is no averment that the wife is not co-operating with the husband to lead a happy marital life and in OP No.27 of 1995 which was filed by the appellant herein seeking restitution of conjugal rights the respondent-wife expressed her willingness in the open Court to live with the appellant-husband and it is because of the non-appearance of the appellant the said OP was dismissed. The trial Court, therefore, rightly found that the wife had intention and desire to live with the husband to lead a happy marital life. As regards contents of Ex.A3 dated 30-7-1995 which was issued by an Advocate of the respondent, (he same does not amount any defamatory or scandalous allegations. Thus in the absence of any acts of cruelty which has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the trial Court rightly refused to grant decree of divorce to the appellant. In the circumstances, the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant have no application to the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, we are of the view that the trial Court has rightly dismissed the petition holding that the appellant has failed to establish cruelty and the contents of Ex.A3 do(es) not constitute mental cruelty. Therefore, filing of the petition under Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code subsequent to the filing of the divorce petition is of no consequence to grant divorce. The said findings in our view are based on the evidence available on record and the same do not suffer from any perversity or illegality. Further, the appellant, in the absence of proving any specific acts of cruelty against the respondent-wife, the order passed by the learned Judge needs to be confirmed.
11. In the circumstances, the appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs.