Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
The Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam, ... vs M. Munikrishna Reddi (Died) And Ors. on 5 July, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2005(1)ALT578, AIR 2005 (NOC) 224 (AP), 2005 A I H C 725, (2005) 1 LACC 413, (2005) 1 ANDHLD 289, (2005) 1 ANDH LT 578
JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, C.J.
1. Common arguments were addressed in these appeals by the claimants as well as by the learned counsel appearing for Sri Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam (hereinafter referred to as TTD). Question involved in the appeals is about the market value of the land payable to the claimants, which was acquired under various notifications issued under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). Land was acquired for the benefit of TTD for public purpose under successive notifications issued under Section 4(1) of the Act on 22.7.1976, 31.1.1980, 19.6.1985, 23.12.1985, 26.5.1986, 29.8.1986, 15.1.1987, 25.3.1987, 20.5.1987, 25.5.1987, 5.8.1987, 21.8.1987, 31.10.1989, 15.11.1989 and 30.4.1992.
2. A.S. Nos. 1898 and 2033 of 1991 are the appeals filed by the TTD questioning the enhancement of market value from Rs. 10/- per sq. ft to Rs. 73/- per sq. ft by the award of the Reference Court dated 24.6.1991 in O.P.Nos.32 and 30 of 1982 respectively for the land acquired through the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act on 22.7.1976.
3. AS. No. 1973 of 2002 is an appeal by TTD questioning the enhancement in the market value of the land from Rs. 10/- sq. ft to Rs. 40/- sq. ft by the award of reference court dated 22.11.2001 in O.P.No.90 of 1991 for the land acquired through the notification issued under section 4(1) of the Act on 31.1.1980.
4. In appeal A.S. No. 726 of 2001 challenge by TTD is to the enhancement of market value of the land from Rs. 11/- per sq. ft. to Rs. 84/- per sq. ft. by the award of reference Court in O.P.No.89 of 1991 dated 31.8.2000 for the land acquired through notification dated 19.6.1985.
5. A.S. Nos.67 and 1849 of 2001 are two appeals preferred by TTD challenging the enhancement of compensation of the land from Rs. 11/- per sq. ft to Rs. 86/- per sq. ft for the land acquired through notification-dated 23.12.1985 in the awards of reference Court in O.P.Nos.74 and 85 of 1991 dated 25.4.2000 and 24.3.2001 respectively.
6. AS. Nos. 2031 of 2001 and 1304 of 2002 are the appeals by TTD questioning enhancement of compensation from Rs. 11/- to Rs. 88/- and Rs. 86/- per sq. ft respectively by awards of the reference court dated 16.8.2002 and 1.4.2002 in O.P.Nos.59 and 86 of 1991 respectively. Appeal A.S. No. 1145 of 2003 is by the claimant against award in O.P.No.59 of 1991 seeking further enhancement of the compensation at the rate of Rs. 300/- per sq. ft. The land was acquired through notification-dated 26.5.1983.
7. AS. No. 1279 of 1999 is an appeal by TTD questioning the enhancement of market value of land from Rs. 11/- per sq. ft. to Rs. 100/- per sq. ft. by award of the reference court dated 17.2.1998 in O.P.No.107 of 1990 for the land acquired through notification dated 29.8.1986. The claimants seeking further enhancement at the rate of Rs. 1000/- per sq. ft have filed cross objections in this appeal. In addition, there is also grievance as regards the extent of area acquired.
8. A.S. Nos. 2304 of 2002 and 155 of 2003 are two appeals filed by TTD and claimant respectively against the same award of the Reference Court dated 15.7.2002 in O.P.No.95 of 1991 by which the Reference Court enhanced the market value of the land from Rs. 11/- per sq. ft. to Rs. 86/- per sq. ft wherein the land was acquired through notification dated 15.1.1987. The claimant is seeking further enhancement at the rate of Rs. 1000/- per sq. ft. and has also disputed the extent of land acquired that it should be 5220 sq. ft. and not 4176 sq. ft. and value of structures ought to have been fixed at Rs. 11,07,001/-.
9. A.S. No. 1927 of 2001 is an appeal by the TTD questioning enhancement of market value of land from Rs. 11/- to Rs. 90/- per sq. ft through the award of the reference Court dated 24.3.2001 in O.P.No.94 of 1991 for the land acquired through notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act on 25.3.1987.
10. AS. No. 1364 of 1998 is an appeal by TTD questioning the enhancement of market value of the land from Rs. 11/- per sq. ft to Rs. 106/- per sq. ft through the award of the Reference Court dated 25.3.1998 in O.P.No.90 of 1990 for land acquired through notification dated 20.5.1987.
11. In appeals A.S. No. 120 of 2001, A.S. Nos. 1983 and 1984 of 2001, A.S. Nos. 2421 of 2001 and 1074 of 2002, TTD is questioning the enhancement of the market value of the land from Rs. 11/- per sq. ft to Rs. 90/- per sq. ft. and Rs. 85/- per sq. ft through the impugned but separate awards of the Reference Court dated 25.11.2000, 16.8.2000, 28.3.2001 and 19.10.2001 in O.P.Nos.93, 34, 37 and 92 of 1991 respectively for the land acquired through notification dated 25.5.1987.
12. In A.S. No. 120 of 2001 Cross Objections are filed by the claimant seeking compensation at Rs. 150/- per sq. ft.
13. AS. Nos. 1701 and 1728 of 2001 are two separate cross appeals filed by the claimants against awards in O.P.Nos.34 and 37 of 1991 seeking further enhancement in the market value of the land from Rs. 11/- to Rs. 300/- per sq. ft and to further enhance the compensation for structures. Cross Objections are also filed by the claimant in A.S. No. 2421 of 2001 seeking compensation at Rs. 150/- per sq. ft. The land was acquired through notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act dated 25.5.1987.
14. A.S. No. 1778 of 2001 is an appeal preferred by TTD challenging the enhancement of the market value of the land from Rs. 11/- to Rs. 90/- by the Reference Court through its award-dated 28.3.2000 in O.P.No.96 of 1991. The Claimant filed Cross Objections claiming enhancement in the market value of the land at Rs. 150/- per sq. ft. The land was acquired through the notification-dated 5.8.1987.
15. A.S. No. 1808 of 2001 is an appeal by TTD questioning the enhancement of the market value of the land from Rs. 11/- to Rs. 94/- per sq. ft. by the Reference Court through award-dated 25.11.1990 in O.P.No.10 of 1992 for the land acquired through notification-dated 21.8.1989.
16. A.S. Nos. 1892 of 2002 is an appeal by TTD questioning the award of the Reference Court dated 1.4.2002 in O.P.No.47 of 1991 enhancing the market value of the land from Rs. 11/- per sq. ft. to Rs. 86/- per sq. ft. A.S. No. 1963 of 2002 is also an appeal by TTD questioning enhancement in market value from Rs. 11.00 per sq. ft. to Rs. 86/- per sq. ft. by the award of Reference Court in O.P.No.8 of 1992. Claimant has filed Cross Objections seeking further enhancement of the market value of the land at Rs. 300/- per sq. ft. The land was acquired through notification-dated 31.10.1989.
17. A.S. No. 1975 of 2002 is another appeal by TTD questioning the enhancement of the market value of the land by the Reference Court from Rs. 11/- per sq. ft. to Rs. 40/- sq. ft. through its award-dated 16.7.2002 in O.P.No.105 of 1999. A.S. No. 1411 of 2003 is cross appeal filed by the claimant against award in O.P.No.105 of 1999 seeking further enhancement in the market value of the land at Rs. 190/- per sq. ft. The land was acquired through notification-dated 18.5.1992.
18. The first two appeals under decision (A.S. Nos. 1898 of 1991 and A.S. No. 2033 of 1991) arise out of a common award dated 24.6.1991, by which the Reference Court (Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati) answered two references, namely O.P.Nos.32 and 30 of 1982 thereby determining the market value of the land acquired through notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act on 22.7.1976. In the batch of appeals before us this is the earliest notification by which land was acquired. The market value of the land as had been assessed by LAO at Rs. 10/- per sq. ft. was held to be totally inadequate. The same was enhanced to Rs. 73/- per sq. ft. by the Reference Court holding that the correct market value as on 22.7.1976 can be arrived at by allowing reasonable enhancement over the market value of the land which had already been determined in two earlier awards of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Chittoor in O.P.No.34 of 1964 dated 20.12.1967 and O.P.No.23 of 1969 and batch dated 17.8.1970 in respect of land situated in Tirumala.
19. In O.P.No.34 of 1964 the market value of land at Tirumala had been determined at the rate of Rs. 30/- per sq. ft. The land was acquired by notification-dated 22.3.1957 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. There is a dispute as regards the actual date with reference to which the market value was determined, which will be noticed by us later on.
20. In O.P.No.23 of 1969 and batch the land had been acquired at Tirumala Hamlet of Tirupati, Chandragiri taluk to keep the surroundings of Sri Vari Temple clean. Notification was issued under section 4 of the Act on 27.6.1957. The L.A.O. by his award No.5 of 1965 dated 29.9.1965 had offered compensation @ Rs. 12/- per square feet. The Reference Court in O.P.No.23 of 1969 and batch enhanced the market value to Rs. 40/- per sq. ft. There is also a mistake of date as regards notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, which will be noticed later.
21. Thus assuming that the market value of the land in Mada Streets at Tirumala had been fixed in the year 1965 at Rs. 40/- per sq. ft. in the earlier award in O.P.No.23 of 1969, the Reference Court in O.P.Nos.30 and 32 of 1982 held that since in these two cases the land was acquired later on through notification dated 22.7.1976, in the same locality, by passage of time, there must have been some appreciation in the market value of the land. Allowing appreciation at the rate of Rs. 3/- per sq. ft. per year over the market value as was determined in O.P.No.23 of 1969, the market value of the acquired land was fixed at Rs. 73/- per sq. ft. by adding Rs. 33/- towards appreciation for eleven years on the market value to Rs. 40/-. Needless to add that in O.P.Nos.30 and 32 of 1982, the Reference Court wrongly took the market value as having been determined in O.P.No.23 of 1969 with reference to the year 1962, whereas actual notification under Section 4(1) was published on 27.6.1957.
22. In the other later awards also, which are under challenge before us, the basis for determination of the market value by various Reference Courts is the same ie the market value as was determined in O.P.No.23 of 1969 and batch at Rs. 40/- per sq. ft. In most of the cases, appreciation has been allowed at Rs. 2/- per sq. ft per year over and above the value fixed in O.P.No.23 of 1969. In some other cases, appreciation has been allowed at the rate of Rs. 3/- per sq. ft. In three cases, no appreciation has been allowed by the Reference Courts for reasons recorded therein, which are subject matters of A.S. Nos. 1973 and 1975 of 2002 and 1411 of 2003. Further enhancement in the market value of the land has been sought by the claimants in appeals and Cross Objections on the ground that there has been much appreciation in the market value of the land in Tirumala and due to rising trend in prices of the land in and around the acquired land the Reference Courts ought to have allowed appreciation uniformly at the rate of Rs. 3/- per sq. ft per year.
23. On behalf of the TTD it was submitted that the very approach of the Reference Courts in proceeding to determine the market value of the land acquired, by placing reliance upon the two decisions in the earlier reference cases, in the absence of any material evidence of appreciation in the market value of the land, is erroneous and is unjustified. The Reference Courts were not justified at all in proceeding to assume for itself that there must have been some appreciation, therefore, appreciation must be allowed in each case over and above the market value determined in earlier two cases. It was also submitted that no sale transactions in and around the vicinity took place. May be that Tirumala Hills had attained great importance by passage of time due to the visit of number of pilgrims to the Holy Place, but, that alone will not be sufficient to draw an inference about the rise in the market values of the land. Moreover, due to clog on the right to transfer the land in the area, it is unacceptable that there would have been any rise in the market value of the land. It was further urged that in the two cases also (O.P.Nos.34 of 1964 and 23 of 1969) market value had been determined not with reference to the correct date of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. Taking wrong date of notification had led in fixing higher market value. It was urged that correct market value had been shown in the sale deeds executed in favour of TTD by the vendors, which were erroneously ignored.
24. Before we deal elaborately with the arguments addressed before us on the question of market value of the land, it will be necessary for us to deal in detail with the two earlier awards, which formed the basis for determining the market value by the Reference Courts in all cases and which have also been relied upon on behalf of the claimants before us in these appeals and some other subsequent awards referred to by the Reference Courts. As the two awards form the basis for assessing market value in all the cases and the principle applied is the same, therefore, we thought it fit to decide all the appeals by a common order, primarily, with a view to avoid repetition of the same discussion in each appeal separately.
25. The first instance relied upon and referred to assess market value is the award rendered in O.P.No.34 of 1964 decided by the Principal Subordinate Judge, Chittoor Sri Venkataramana on 20.12.1967. On 22.5.1955, a proposal was made to acquire land with structures standing thereon located around Sri Swamy Pushkarni at Tirumala, in order to keep the surroundings of Sri Swamy Pushkarni clean. The Government sanctioned the proposal to acquire the land. Notification under section 4(1) of the Act was published in A.P. Gazette Part I on 22.3.1957. The Land Acquisition Officer made his award No.1 of 1964 on 31.1.1964 offering compensation for the land at the rate of Rs. 10/- per sq. ft, in addition to the value of super structures. The claimants feeling dissatisfied with the offer of compensation, sought references claiming higher compensation for the land besides higher compensation for the structures. Sri C.S. Srinivasulu Chetty sought one of such reference. The Land Acquisition Officer had assessed the market value at Rs. 10/- per sq. ft by placing reliance upon sale deed dated 4.3.1957 executed by one Sri Poliah Chetty and others in favour of TTD through which 176 sq. ft of land with structure thereon was said to have been sold for Rs. 2662/-. Deducting the value of super structures, the market value of the vacant site was fixed at Rs. 10/- per sq. ft. Claimants sought reference for enhancement. Before the Reference Court sale deed Ex.B.2 dated 29.6.1957 executed by one Smt Naveenathamma in favour of the claimant Sri C.S. Srinivasulu Chetty was relied upon. An extent of 84 sq. ft plot with zinc sheet godowns standing thereon was sold for a consideration of Rs. 2,500/-. Presuming the value of zinc sheet to be Rs. 200/-, the value of the site was stated to be at Rs. 30/- per sq. ft. On behalf of the TTD, objection was raised that the sale instance relied upon by the claimant cannot be accepted as a relevant piece of evidence in determining market value of the acquired land. It was urged that the sale was a post notification sale having been brought into existence only to inflate the market value of the land and being a sale between relations, does not reflect the true market value. The objection was turned down by the reference court on the ground that there was no evidence to show that the vendor and vendee were related to each other and there was no possibility of inflated value being shown in the sale deed inasmuch as V. Srinivasulu Chetty, husband of Navneethamma had purchased the same property through a registered sale deed dated 2.8.1920 for a consideration of Rs. 1500/-. It was thus observed that in case in the year 1920 the market value of the same land was Rs. 1500/-, the value of the same property in the year 1957 could not be less than Rs. 2500/-The reference court further observed that it was a common knowledge that between 1920 and 1957 the prices of the sites had gone up many fold. Thus, the market value of the vacant land reflected in sale deed was taken as Rs. 30/- per sq. ft. On behalf of the claimants, reliance was also placed on another sale deed Ex.B.4 dated 9.1.1951 executed by one G. Sundararajulu in favour of A. Krishnayya for a piece of land to an extent of 90 sq. ft. stated to be very near to the temple of Lord Sri Venkateswara. The site was sold for a consideration of Rs. 2000/-, which reflected the value of the site at about Rs. 22.00 per sq. ft. Reference was also made to Award No.2 of 1952 dated 9.4.1952 (Ex.B.13) by which site with building standing thereon situate near the temple of Lord Sri Venkateswara was acquired through notification in February, 1951. Compensation in that case was offered at Rs. 25/- per sq. ft. In award No.2 of 1952 (Ex.B.13) the market value had been determined on the basis of sale deed Ex.B.4 dated 9.1.1951. Thus taking the market value of similarly situated land in the year 1951 to be approximately Rs. 25/- pert sq. ft, the reference Court in O.P.No.34 of 1964 proceeded to hold that the market value of the acquired land as on 22.3.1957 was Rs. 30/- per sq. ft.
26. Next instance relied upon to determine market value is the award-dated 17.8.1990 in O.P.No.23 of 1969 and batch decided by Sri Y. Srikrishnamurty, Principal Subordinate Judge, Chittoor. Land at Tirumala was acquired to keep the surroundings of Sri Vari Temple clean. The draft notification under section 4(1) of the Act was approved by G.O.Rt.No.209 (S.W. & L Deptt.) dated 8.6.1957. It was published in A.P. Gazette dated 27.6.1957. Notices under Sections 4(1) and 5-A of the Act were issued by the Sub-Collector, Chandragiri on 11.9.1957, posting the enquiry to 14.10.1957. The Sub-Collector, Chandragiri conducted the enquiry on 14.10.1967 and 17.11.1957. Sub-Collector, Chandragiri, considered objections and submitted a report to the Collector, Chittoor over ruling the objections. In the meanwhile, the Executive Officer, TTD, Tirupati in his Letter dated 28.5.1957 and 2.9.1957, had intimated the Land Acquisition Officer that the Devasthanam had purchased the site and structures belonging to one Kola Poliah Chetty. As such that part of the property was deleted from the acquisition proceedings.
27. Meanwhile, one Kalahasthi Krishnbaiah alias A. Krishnaiah, one of the parties affected by the acquisition proceedings, filed Writ Petition in this Court and prayed to suspend the operation of the notification dated 8.6.1957. By Order in CMP.No.2112 of 1958 dated 7.5.1958, stay of the proceedings was ordered until further ordeRs. In view of these orders of this Court, further proceedings under Land Acquisition Act were suspended. Finally, Writ Petition No.420 of 1958 was dismissed on 29.11.1960. The petition filed by Kalahasthi Krishnaiah alias A. Krishnaiah for grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India was dismissed on 3.8.1961. The draft notification under section 6 of the Act was thus approved on 28.5.62 and it was published in A.P. Gazette dated 14.6.1962.
28. As discrepancies were noticed in the notifications published the Spl. Dy. Collector proposed errata to the notifications, which were approved by the Government on 3.4.1963. Still there were some printers' mistakes in the erratum to the notification published. Therefore, a further erratum to the above notification was approved on 31.7.1963 and was published in A.P. Gazette on 22.8.1963. The draft notification under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act had already been published at page 1262 of Part I of A.P. Gazette, dated 27.6.1957. The Collector, Land Acquisition in his awards Nos.3 and 5 of 1965 dated 29.9.1965 offered compensation for the land at the rate of Rs. 12/- per sq. ft. with reference to the rates prevailing on the date of the above notification, namely 27.6.1957.
29. The claimants sought references, which were registered as O.P.Nos.23, 24, 25, 32 and 33 of 1969 and were decided by a common order. The evidence relied upon by TTD and accepted by LAO about the market value in the year 1957 reflected in sale deed ExA.5 dated 5.3.1957 executed by Poliah Chetty in favour of TTD was discarded by the reference Court holding that the LAO grossly erred in relying upon this sale transaction. There was no presumption that the Executive Officer of the temple would not enter into a fraudulent transaction for obtaining wrongful benefit to the TTD. Reference Court observed that Poliah Chetty held two ankanams of site and building equivalent to 72 sq.ft and TTD paid a consideration of Rs. 2,262/-. The sale deed itself did not reflect the value of the building and the land separately. The LAO thus erred in taking the value of the structures at Rs. 902/-. The Reference Court held that even after deducting the said amount of Rs. 902/- the market value reflected in the said sale deed would be Rs. 24.47 per sq. ft and not Rs. 10/- as was taken by the LAO. The Reference Court held that the recital in the sale deed that it was a sale of 176 sq. ft with a stone slab yantapan and zinc sheet roofing was not correct and believed the version of the claimants that since Poliah Chetty by sale deed dated 5.9.1914 had acquired property which was only two ankanams (72 sq.ft.) of site, therefore, it must be presumed that no additional land was purchased by him subsequently. The reference Court thus observed that as in the year 1914 Poliah Chetty possessed only two ankanams of land, therefore, it must be taken that the recital in the sale deed that area sold was 176 sq.ft was incorrect. Fraudulently the area was inflated and incorporated in the sale deed with a view to reduce the market value. Thus, discarding the evidence produced by TTD, the reference Court relied upon the sale instance relied upon by the claimants i.e. sale deed Ex.B.5 dated 29.6.1957 executed by Smt. Navneethamma in favour of Srinivasulu Chetty (which has already been discussed above) reflecting sale consideration at the rate of Rs. 30/- per sq. ft. Reliance was also placed on the award of reference Court made in O.P.No.34 of 1964. The claimants had claimed the value of the site at Rs. 50/- per sq. ft. Therefore, striking a balance between the market value reflected in sale deed dated 29.6.1957, the amount awarded in O.P.No.34 of 1964 at Rs. 30/- per sq. ft and the amount claimed by the claimants at Rs. 50/- per sq. ft, the reference Court proceeded to hold that the market value of site should be taken as Rs. 40/- per sq. ft. as in the year 1962. The reference Court thus proceeded on an erroneous assumption that notification under Section 4(1) was published in the year 1962 whereas the correct date of publication of notification is 27.6.1957. Sale instance Ex.B.5 dated 29.6.1957 relied upon to assess market value was also a post notification sale i.e. executed two days after publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. This mistake committed by the Reference Court had led to influence subsequent awards.
30. Sri N. Basavaiah Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati answered most of the references after Sri K. Satyanand, Principal Senior Civil Judge had fixed the market value at Rs. 73/- per sq. ft in O.P.Nos.30 and 32 of 1982 against which appeals (A.S. Nos. 1898 and 2033 of 1991) are pending. He also allowed appreciation at the rate of Rs. 3/- per sq. ft per annum on the market value reflected in the award in O.P.No.23 of 1969 and batch.
31. In Award No.45/1990-91 of LAO relating to the land acquired on the basis of notification-dated 15.1.1987, which is subject matter of appeals (A.S. Nos. 2304 and 155 of 2003), the LAO had offered compensation at Rs. 11/- per sq., ft. The LAO relied on sale deeds dated 25.4.1984, 21.7.1984, 11.9.1984, 22.11.1984 and 27.3.1984 which reflected the rate ranging from Rs. 9.48 to Rs. 10.25 per sq. ft. for sites of land measuring 360 sq. ft to 1687 sq. ft situated at Tirumala Hill and adjacent to the acquired property and discarded the other sale deeds which were either properties located far away or which were having super structures of considerable value.
32. Sri P. Dayakar Reddy, Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati in O.P.No.107 of 1990 fixed market value of the site acquired at Rs. 100/- sq. ft by his judgment-dated 17.2.1998. Land in that case was acquired by notification-dated 29.8.1986. Property covered by the said reference was located to the northeast corner of the property, which is subject matter of A.S. No. 2304 of 2002 and A.S. No. 155 of 2003. These two appeals (A.S. No. 2304 of 2002 and A.S. No. 155 of 2003) arise out of award in O.P.No.95 of 1991 dated 15.7.2002 of Shri M. Ramadasu, Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati and pertain to the property acquired through subsequent notification dated 15.1.1987. In order to determine market value the Reference Court in O.P.No.95 of 1991 took note of the fact that appeal had been preferred against the award rendered in O.P.No.107 of 1990 and there was stay operating against the said award. As such, the reference Court did not fix the same market value but proceeded to determine the market value at Rs. 86/- sq. ft by adding Rs. 46.00 towards appreciation as was allowed in O.P.No.86 of 1991 (A.S. No. 2304 of 2002) by placing reliance upon the market value of Rs. 40/- per sq. ft.
33. In O.P.No.107 of 1990 decided by Sri P. Dayakar Reddy, the Reference Court proceeded on the assumption that though there is ban with regard to sales in Tirumala still there was abnormal increase in prices of lands and there was great demand for sites in and around temple. This inference he drew from a circumstance that there has been abnormal increase in pilgrims to Tirumala as compared to 1965 and, therefore, it must be presumed that there is heavy demand for sites in Tirumala. He also made reference to the award in O.P.No.30 of 1982 and observed that in the said case LAO had admitted that the value of the properties situated at Mada Streets were valuable and that P.W.1, the L.A.O had admitted that there is appreciation in the market values of land in the locality at Rs. 3/- per sq. ft. per annum. He thus held that increase of Rs. 3/- per sq. ft. per year would meet the ends of justice. Thus adding additional amount @ Rs. 3/- per year to Rs. 40/- per sq. ft. towards appreciation, he fixed the market value.
34. Learned counsel appearing for TTD drew our attention to the statement of P.W.1 in O.P.No.30 of 1982 in support of his submission that the observations of the learned Judge that the LAO had admitted that the appreciation in land values was @ Rs. 3/- per sq. ft per year is not factually correct. Sri K.R. Dandapani, Retired Deputy Collector who gave evidence as P.W.1 in O.P.No.30 of 1982 stated that he worked as LAO, TTD during the period from 3.4.1980 to 20.4.1982 and assessed the market value. He stated that he took into consideration number of sale transactions including the sale deed dated 3.7.1974 and adopted valuation of the said sale deeds. The distance between the sites covered by the said sale deeds and the acquired land was about two furlongs and sale deed reflected market value at Rs. 4/- per sq. ft, therefore, he fixed the market value of the land acquired at Rs. 10/- per sq. ft because of the time gap. He referred to a sale transaction covered by item No.16 of sales statistics produced before the Court and stated that for the time gap of two years from the date of sale of item No.16 and the date of Section 4(1) notification he gave an appreciation of Rs. 3/- per sq. ft. per annum to fix market value at Rs. 10/- per sq. ft. Nowhere in the statement he admitted that there was increase of Rs. 3/- per square ft. per annum in the market values of sites in Tirumala. Only with respect to a particular year while comparing the site of property of sale instance item No.16 with the acquired site he proceeded to fix the market value by allowing appreciation. Learned Counsel for TTD urged that the reference Courts in almost all cases erroneously adopted this statement in order to come a conclusion that there has been abnormal increase in prices of the market values of land. Except this statement there was no material on record to justify this conclusion that there has been rising trend in the market values of land at Tirumla. No evidence was led by the claimants that any sale transactions had taken place in between. The LAO in Award No.45/90-91 had made a reference to various sale transactions of the year 1984 reflecting sale consideration ranging between Rs. 9.48 to Rs. 10.25 per sq. ft.
35. Sri N. Basavaiah, Principal Senior Civil Judge, who passed the order in O.P.No.93 of 1991, which has given raise to AS.120 of 2001, also fixed the market value at Rs. 90/- per sq. ft for land which was acquired through notification dated 25.5.1987. It was brought to our notice on behalf of TTD that the claimants in this case had purchased the acquired property in 1968 for a consideration of Rs. 2,500/-, as can be seen from the statement of RW1 Sri K. Ashwani Kumar recorded in O.P.No.93 of 1991. He appeared on behalf of the claimant (his mother) since she was bedridden. He stated that in 1968 his mother purchased an extent of 1170 sq. ft. land for Rs. 2,500/- and the same was acquired for TTD. Similarly, Sri S. Ramanujulu who appeared on behalf of the claimant as RW.2 in O.P.No.93/91 stated that he had purchased the said site acquired for a consideration of Rs. 2,500/- in 1970. R.W.1 Sri P. Vasudeva Reddy who appeared as R.W.1 in O.P.No.92 of 1991 admitted that in 1967 the acquired site measured 1434 sq. ft. with building standing thereon. It was purchased for a consideration of Rs. 3,500/-. All the sale transactions as are referred to in the statements of Sri K. Ashwani Kumar, S. Ramnujulu and Sri P. Vasudeva Reddy are registered sale transactions, which would show that hardly there has been any increase in the market values of the land. Under another registered sale deed dated 12.4.1969 marked as Ex.B.2 in O.P.No.107 of 1990, one Smt. Rangamma had purchased an extent of 1365 sq. ft. of site for a consideration of Rs. 11,000/-, which reflects the price of Rs. 8.50 per sq. ft. There is dispute as regards the actual area acquired. The actual area as got measured by the LAO was found on spot to be 1259 sq. ft. As such, claimant's plea was negatived and area noticed by LAO was confirmed by the Reference Court.
36. In the light of the above evidence, the legal position will have to be examined. The mandate of law is that a person, who is deprived compulsorily of his land for public purpose by the State, under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, must be, paid compensation in accordance with law i.e. the true market value. This Constitutional mandate of paying the true market value of land was highlighted by the Supreme Court in its decision in BHAG SINGH AND OTHERS V. UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH, saying: -
"Where land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it would not be fair and just to deprive the holder of his land without payment of the true market value when the law in so many terms, declares that he shall be paid such market value."
37. In determining the amount of compensation, factors enumerated in Section 23 of the Act are to be taken into consideration and the factors enumerated in Section 24 of the Act are to be excluded. It need hardly be said that the land is not to be valued merely by reference to the use to which it was being put at the time at which its value has to be determined, but only by reference to the uses, which it was reasonably capable of being put in future. This potential use to which the land was reasonably capable of being put in future in the hands of the owner has to be taken into consideration and the owner is entitled to have the price assessed with reference to the advantages which will give the land the greatest value. Assessing the amount of pecuniary benefits obtained by past user in disregard of the possible benefits in future does not properly compensate the value of an owner's interest. The possibility of a mere profitable use is one such advantage, which may be taken into consideration, which is known as the potential value.
38. In SRI RANI M.VIJAYALAKSHMAMMA RAO BAHADUR, RANEE OF VUYYUR v. THE COLLECTOR OF MADRAS, (1969) 1 M.L.J (SC) 45 the Supreme Court held that when the land is being compulsorily taken away from a person, he is entitled to the highest value, which similar land in the locality is shown to have fetched.
39. As the claimants have been deprived of their land by legal process there is no manner of doubt that the claimants in the cases before us have a legal and legitimate right to a fair and reasonable amount of compensation for the land. It was urged on behalf of some of the claimants that as the claimants had been deprived of their land by virtue of notification, issued almost 20 years ago in the year 1981, and the compensation was being assessed in the appeals in 2001, the claimants will have to be recompensated for rehabilitation so as to enable them to purchase similar lands elsewhere. Rupee value had declined considerably during the last twenty yeaRs. Therefore, it will be the reinstatement value, which should be the guiding factor in determining the amount of compensation. We have duly considered this submission but find no force therein.
40. The doctrine of reinstatement value cannot be applied in determining the market value under Section 23(1) of the Act. The reason is obvious as reiterated by the Supreme Court in K. POSAYYA AND OTHERS v. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR, that there will always be a gap between the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act and the date of payment. To recompensate the loss, payment of interest under Section 28 of the Act, solatium under sub-section (2) of Section 23 and in appropriate cases, after the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 came into force, additional amount of 12% per annum under Section 23(1A) is provided. Therefore, it will be illegal and unrealistic to apply the doctrine of reinstatement of value in determining the compensation of value under Section 23(1) of the Act.
41. In determining the market value, the Court has to eschew arbitrary fixation keeping in view the settled principles of law in evaluating market value in compulsory acquisition on the hypothesis of a willing vendor and a willing vendee. Therefore, it will be necessary for us to consider the principles on which compensation may be assessed in these appeals.
42. In NARAYAN GAJAPATI RAJU V. REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER, AIR 1939 PC 98 the judicial committee of the Privy Council held that compensation for compulsory acquisition governed by Section 23(l) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is the market value of the land at the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act "what a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from willing purchaser". The function of the Court in awarding compensation under the Act is to ascertain the market value of the land at the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act
43. In SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, BANGALORE v. T. ADINARAYANA SETTY, the Supreme Court reiterated the traditional methods of evaluating the land OF having resort to (1) Opinion of experts; (2) The price paid within a reasonable time in bona fide transactions of purchase of the land acquired or the land adjacent to the acquired land and possessing similar advantages; (3) A number of years of purchase of the actual or immediately prospective profits of the land acquired.
44. One of the modes to assess fair amount of compensation being what a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from willing purchaser for the acquired land as on the relevant date i.e. the date of publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. The best evidence of the value of property are the sale transaction in respect of the acquired land to which the claimant himself is a party; the time at which the property comes to be sold; the purpose for which it is sold; nature of the consideration; and the manner in which the transaction came to be brought out. In the absence of such a sale deed relating to the acquired land, the sale transactions relating to the neighbouring lands in the vicinity of the acquired land can be taken note of. In that case, the features required to be present are; it must be within a reasonable time of the date of the notification; it must be a bona fide transaction; it should be a sale of land similar to the land acquired or land adjacent to the land acquired; and it should possess similar advantageous features. These are relevant features to be taken into consideration to prove the market value of the acquired land as on the date of the notification published under Section 4(1) of the Act. However, market value cannot be fixed with mathematical precision but must be based upon sound discretion exercised by the reference court in arriving at a just and reasonable price. It should not be based on feats of imagination or flight of fancy. Determination of compensation for compulsory acquisition involves consideration of the price, which a hypothetical willing purchaser can be expected to pay for the lands in the existing use as well as relatable potentialities. The acid test is the armchair of the willing vendor would offer and a prudent willing buyer accept taking all relevant prevailing conditions of the normal market, potentialities and likely use to which the land is capable of being put in the same condition, as on the date of the notification. Reference Court is expected to be circumspect, pragmatic and careful in analysing the evidence and arriving at just and fair market value of the lands under acquisition, which could be fetched on the date of the notification. When decisive evidence of the market value of the very land compulsorily acquired is unavailable, reference court should seek light from comparable sales in the neighbourhood.
45. In THE DOLLAR COMPANY, MADRAS v. COLLECTOR OF MADRAS, it was held that the best evidence of the value of property is the sale of the very property to which the claimant is a party. If the sale is of recent date, then all that need normally be proved is that the sale was between a willing purchaser and a willing seller, that there has not been any appreciable rise or fall since and nothing has been done on the land during the short interval to raise its value. If the sale was long ago, may be the Court in that case would examine more recent sales of comparable lands in order to arrive at the current value of the land as on the date of notification under section 4 of the Act. Apex Court held that instead of wandering around neighbouring lands or guessing as to what might have been the price of the disputed land, when evidence of the actual purchase of the land is available, that should express the market value itself. In LAND ACQUISTIION OFFICER v B. VIJENDER REDDY AND OTHERS, the Apex Court has reiterated same view.
46. It has judicially been noticed that in fixation of rate of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, there is always some element of guesswork. But the guesswork also has to be based on some foundation. It must spring from the totality of evidence, the pattern of rate, the pattern of escalation i.e. escalation of price in the years preceding and succeeding Section 4 Notification, inferable from the evidence.
47. In V.G. KULARNI v. SPL LAND ACUQISITION OFFICER, it was held that the principle of taking judicial notice of escalation of market prices of land every year cannot be extended to every case. Each case has to be considered on its own facts. Claimants must establish by adducing cogent and relatable evidence that there was gradual rise in price due to development and constant demand for land in the neighbourhood. In the absence of such evidence, it will not be permissible for the Courts to grant any escalation.
48. A Division Bench of this Court in LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, BODHAN v. T. RAJA VITTAL, held that allowing escalation in price of land at 10% per year has been recognised by Courts as reasonable for determining the market value, but, such principle is not an absolute rule, particularly, where evidence on record shows that the land under acquisition had no potentiality and there was no scope for upward rise in the price of the land during the date of transaction of sale relied upon by the claimant and date of notification.
49. In K. POSAYYA AND OTHERS (supra) it was held that the onus is always on the claimant to adduce relevant evidence in proof of his claim for higher compensation than the one offered by the Land Acquisition Officer. It was held that though the market value cannot be fixed with mathematical precision, it must be based upon sound discretion exercised by reference Court. Reference Court should be circumspect, pragmatic and careful in analysing the evidence. Though claimant should not put to loss by under-valuation, but, at the same time, public exchequer should not be put to undue burden by excess valuation. It is the statutory duty of the Court to maintain the balance between diverse interests.
50. On behalf of TTD learned Senior Advocate urged that hardly any evidence was led by the claimants before the reference Court so as to enable the reference Court to enhance the amount of compensation from that, which was offered by the LAO in his awards. The claimants who had sought references were bound to lead relevant and cogent evidence, in the absence of which the references were liable to be rejected. In case the claimants were to place reliance on some sale transactions, as they have done in their respective cases, it was also necessary for the claimants to have led evidence about the genuineness and bonafide of the sale transactions, which they miserably failed to do so. As such, it was urged that the enhancement allowed by the reference Court is unjustified.
51. Let us examine the relevant provisions of law and the settled position in this regard. In EZRA V. SECRETARY OF STATE, ILR 30 Cal 36 the legal character of the award made by the Collector under S. 11 was examined. It was held that the meaning to be attached to the word "award" under S. 11 and its nature and effect must be arrived at not from the mere use of the same expression in both instances but from the examination of the provisions of the law relating to the Collector's proceedings culminating in the award. The Collector acts in the matter of the enquiry and the valuation of the land only as an agent of the Government and not as a Judicial Office; and consequently, although the Government is bound by his proceedings, the persons interested are not concluded by his finding regarding the value of the land or the compensation to be awarded. The High Court further added that such tender once made is binding on the Government and the Government cannot require that the value fixed by its own Officer acting on its behalf should be open to question at its own instance before the Civil Court. The said decision of the Calcutta High Court was taken before the Privy Council and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council expressly approved of the observations made by the High Court in its judgment reported as EZRA V. SECRETARY OF STATE, ILR Cal 605 (PC).
52. In RAJA HARISH CHANDRA RAJ SINGH V. DEPUTY LAND ACQUISITION Officer, the legal status of the award of the Collector as approved in Ezra's case supra by the Privy Council was reaffirmed saying that the collector's award in a sense is a decision of the Collector reached by him after holding an enquiry as prescribed by the Act. It is a decision, inter alia, in respect of the amount of compensation, which should be paid to the person interested in the property acquired; but, legally the award cannot be treated as a decision. It is in law an offer or tender of the compensation determined by the Collector to the owner of the property under acquisition. If the owner accepts the offer no further proceeding is required to be taken; the amount is paid and compensation proceedings are concluded. If, however, the owner does not accept the offer, S. 18 gives him the statutory right of having the question determined by Court, and it is the amount of compensation, which the Court may determine, that would bind both the owner and the Collector. In that case, it is on the amount thus determined judicially that the acquisition proceedings would be concluded. Because of this nature of the award of the Collector that the award is described as a tender or offer made by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property for his acceptance.
53. Again in DR. G. H. GRANT v. STATE OF BIHAR, it was held that an award by the Collector is strictly speaking an offer made to the person interested in the land notified for acquisition: the latter may accept the offer, but is not bound to accept it. He may ask for a reference to the Court for adjudication of his claim for adequate compensation. The person interested may even accept the compensation under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount and ask for a reference. It is also open to the Government, even after the award is made, but, before possession is taken, to withdraw from acquisition of any land in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. It is, therefore, not the award of the Collector, which is the source of the right to compensation; the award quantifies the offer of the appropriate Government, which is made because the Government has taken over, or intends to take the land of the owner under the authority conferred by the Land Acquisition Act.
54. When the person interested, who has not accepted the award and not received the amount of compensation offered or accepted the amount offered under protest, such a claimant would be in a position to ask for a reference as to the sufficiency of the amount and when the reference is made to the Court, the position of such a person before the reference Court is akin to that of a Plaintiff in a civil suit. A reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not an appeal against the award. The reference Court cannot take into account the material relied upon by the Land Acquisition Officer in his Award unless the same material is produced and proved before the Court. The Award of the Land Acquisition Officer being not a judgment of the trial Court open or exposed to challenge before the court hearing the Reference and is merely an offer made by the Land Acquisition Officer, the material utilised by him for making his valuation cannot be utilised by the Court unless produced and proved before it. It is not the function of the court to sit in appeal against the award, approve or disapprove its reasoning, or correct its error or affirm, modify or reverse the conclusion reached by the Land Acquisition Officer, as if it were an appellate Court. The Reference Court has to treat the reference as an original proceeding before it and determine the market value afresh on the basis of the material produced before it. The claimant being in the position of a plaintiff has to show that the price offered for his land in the award is inadequate on the basis of the materials produced in the Court. Of course the materials placed and proved by the other side can also be taken into account for this purpose.
55. The above principles have been more elaborately explained in CHIMANLAL HARGOVINDDAS V. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, POONA, . The Supreme Court also elaborated the course of action to be adopted by the reference Court in evaluating the acquired land and culled out with reference to number of earlier decisions the principles. In the said case, the Reference Court had virtually treated the award rendered by the Land Acquisition Officer as a judgment. While reiterating the legal status of the award and position of the claimant in a reference before the Supreme Court, as we explained above, the Apex Court laid down that the market value of land under acquisition has to be determined as on the crucial date of publication of the notification under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act as if the valuer is a hypothetical purchaser willing to purchase land from the open market and is prepared to pay a reasonable price as on that day. It has also to be assumed that the vendor is willing to sell the land at a reasonable price. In doing so by the instances method, the Court has to correlate the market value reflected in the most comparable instance, which provides the index of market value. Only genuine instances have to be taken into account. Sometimes instances are rigged up in anticipation of Acquisition of land. In some cases even post-notification instances can be taken into account (1) if they are very proximate, (2) genuine and (3) the acquisition itself has not motivated the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of the resultant improvement in development prospects. The Court further held that the most comparable instances out of the genuine instances have to be identified on the various considerations: viz. (i) proximity from time angle; (ii) proximity from situation angle. Having identified the instances which provide the index of market value the price reflected therein may be taken as the norm and the market value of the land under acquisition may be deduced by making suitable adjustments for the plus and minus factors vis-a-vis land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition. A balance sheet of plus and minus factors may be drawn for this purpose and the relevant factors may be evaluated in terms of price variation as a prudent purchaser would do. The market value of the land under acquisition has thereafter to be deduced by loading the price reflected in the instance taken as norm for plus factors and unloading it for minus factoRs. The Court thereafter elaborated and illustrated some of the plus and minus factoRs. Plus factors being: 1. Smallness of size. 2. Proximity to a road. 3. Frontage on a road. 4. Nearness to developed area. 5. Regular shape. 6. Level vis-a-vis land under acquisition. and 7. Special value for an owner of an adjoining property to whom it may have some very special advantage. The minus factors being: 1. Largeness of area; 2. Situation in the interior at a distance from the road; 3. Narrow strip of land with very small frontage compared to depth. 4. Lower level requiring the depressed portion to be filled up. 5. Remoteness from developed locality and 6. Some special disadvantageous factor, which would deter a purchaser. The court gave a word of caution that these are general guidelines to be applied with understanding informed with common sense and every case must be dealt with on its own fact pattern bearing in mind all these factors as a prudent purchaser of land in which position the Judge must place himself.
56. These are well-settled principles reiterated from time to time by the Apex Court in somewhat similar or different words in subsequent decisions also which we need not multiply. It has been reiterated that in determining the market value, the Court has to eschew arbitrary fixation keeping in view the settled principles of law in evaluating market value in compulsory acquisition on the hypothesis of a willing vendor and a willing vendee.
57. In MEHTA RAVINDRARAI AJITRAI v. STATE OF GUJARAT, Supreme Court reiterated the ratio in West Bengal Administrator General's case that the persons to prove the fair transaction are either the vendor and the vendee or the person conversant with the sale and they are to be examined. The original sale deed or the certified copy of the sale deed is to be produced. The same is the view expressed in COLLECTOR, RAJGARH v. HARI SINGH THAKUR, . This Court also followed the same view in TAHSILDAR, LAND ACQUISITION, VISAKHAPATNAM v. P. NARASINGH RAO, (1985) 1 APLJ 99.
58. The Supreme Court in BALDEV SINGH V. STATE OF PUNJAB, laid emphasis that only genuine instances have to be taken into account since sometimes instances are rigged up in anticipation of Acquisition of land. It is common knowledge that it would take long time for publication of the notification under Section 4(1). In the meanwhile it would be known to the villagers that the land would be under acquisition. Therefore, it would be obvious that documents are brought into existence to inflate the market value. The Supreme Court thus held that the person conversant with the sale must be examined. The original sale deed or the certified copy of the sale deed may be produced but when none of the persons connected with the documents are examined there is no proof of passing of the consideration thereunder or the circumstances under which the documents came to be executed. Under these circumstances, the Court held that all the documents would be inadmissible in evidence and cannot be looked into.
59. In KUMARI VEERAIAH V. STATE OF A.P., the Supreme Court again reiterated that in the absence of adducing any evidence through the vendor or the vendee, the document per se cannot be relied upon. This principle was reaffirmed in STATE OF BIHAR v. MADHESHWAR PRASAD, . In A.P. STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, HYDERABAD V. P. VENKAIAH, Exs. A-2, A-9 and A-11 were relied on to enhance the compensation. Admittedly, none of the persons connected with the documents, namely, the vendee and the vendor were examined. It was then observed by the Apex Court that acceptance of certified copy of the sale deed as envisaged under Section 51-A relates only to the production of the original sale deeds but it does not dispense with proof of the contents of the documents, relative features vis-a-vis the land under acquisition. The same are needed to be proved by examining the persons connected with the transaction. Following the ratio in KUMARI VEERAIAH and MADHESHWAR PRASAD'S cases (supra), the Supreme Court discarded the documents relied upon by the claimants and thus reversed the view taken by the High Court and that of the reference Court, who had relied upon such documents.
60. SPECIAL DEPUTY COLLECTOR v. KURRA SAMBASIVA RAO, is a case arising from a judgment of this Court. K. RAMASWAMY and S. SAGHIR AHMAD and G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ relying upon the ratio of an earlier decision in PERIYAR AND PAREEKANNI RUBBERS LTD. v. STATE OF KERALA, said that the Supreme Court had in that case considered the entire case law as on that date, on the principle of determination of market value and the relevant tests to be applied. It was held that the burden of proof that the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer is not adequate is always on the claimant. The burden is to adduce relevant and material evidence to establish that the acquired lands are capable of fetching higher market value than the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer or that the Land Acquisition Officer proceeded on a wrong premise or applied a wrong principle of law. It was held that the paramount duty of the courts on facts to subject the evidence to very close scrutiny, objectively assess the evidence tendered by the parties on proper consideration thereof in correct perspective to arrive at adequate and reasonable market value. When sale transactions are relied upon, the same must be relevant and genuine and must be proved like any other evidence by examining either the vendor or the vendee. If it is proved that they are not available, the scribe of the document may also be examined in that behalf. The Bench thereafter examined the scope of Section 51-A of the Act saying that it only dispenses with the production of the original sale deed and directs to receive certified copy for the reason that parties to the sale transaction would be reluctant to part with the original sale deed since acquisition proceedings would take long time before award of the compensation attains finality and in the meanwhile the owner of the sale deed is precluded from using the same for other purposes vis-a-vis this land. The marking of the certified copy per se is not admissible in evidence unless it is duly proved and the witnesses, viz., the vendor or the vendee, are examined. The above principles have been reiterated in a catena of subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court.
61. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND MANDAL REVENUE OFFICER V. V. NARASAIAH, is another case arising from a Judgment of this Court. K. T. THOMAS, R. P. SETHI and B. N. AGRAWAL, JJ noticed that Division Bench of this Court had enhanced land value to rupees seventy five thousand and odd per acre over and above the market value fixed by the reference Court. For making the aforesaid enhancement the Division Bench took into consideration two sale-deeds the copy of which were marked without examining anybody connected with the transaction recorded in the instruments. State of Andhra Pradesh was the Appellant though in the cause title it was shown as the Land Acquisition Officer concerned of the State. On behalf of the Appellant it was contended before the Supreme Court that the High Court should not have taken into account the sale price shown in the two sale deeds as the claimant did not examine the vendee or the vendor or anybody else connected with the sale. The Supreme Court then noticed that there were two decisions of the Court which propounded a legal position consistent with the above stand of the appellant State ie. INDER SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA, and P. RAM REDDY v. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, HYDERABAD, . Learned counsel arguing for the respondent submitted that S. 51-A has been incorporated in the Land Acquisition Act 1894 specifically for obviating the insistence for examination of anyone connected with the transactions mentioned in such sale-deeds if the Court has to consider such transactions as evidence in the case. Learned counsel arguing for the respondent thus submitted that the aforesaid legal position may be reconsidered. The learned judges then noticed that in P. Ram Reddy's case a Bench of two Judges (K. Ramaswamy and N. Venkatachala, JJ.) had considered the position under Section 51-A of the L.A. Act and speaking for the Bench Venkatachala J. had stated that the mere fact that a certified copy of the document is accepted as evidence of the transaction recorded in such documents does not dispense with the need for a party relying upon the certified copies of such documents produced in Court in examining witnesses connected with documents to establish their genuineness and the truth of their contents. Therefore, the certified copies of the registered documents, though accepted as evidence of transactions recorded in such documents, the Court is not bound to act upon the contents of those documents unless persons connected with such documents give evidence in Court as regards them and such evidence is accepted by the Court as true. The Judges then observed that in Dr. Hari Singh Thakur's case ( (16) supra) the position has been approved as legally correct that before the introduction of S. 51-A in the Act, the Courts, invariably have, taken the view that unless at least one person, having direct knowledge about the transaction mentioned in the sale deed, is examined the mere marking of the copy of the document was insufficient for the Court to consider the details mentioned in the document as evidence. In this background the Bench held: -
"If the only purpose served by S. 51A is to enable the Court to admit the copy of the document in evidence there was no need for a legislative exercise because even otherwise the certified copy of the document could have been admitted in evidence. Section 64 of the Evidence Act says that "documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases hereinafter mentioned." Section 65 mentions the cases in which secondary evidence can be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document. One of the cases included in the list is detailed in clause (f) of the Section, which reads thus:
"When the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in India, to be given in evidence."
Section 57 of the Registration Act 1908 enables any one to apply for copy of the entries in Book No. 1 (the said Book is meant for keeping the register of the document as well as non testamentary documents relating to immovable property). When any person applies for a copy of it the same shall be given to him. Sub-section (5) of S. 57 of that Act says that "all copies given under this Section shall be signed and sealed by the registering officer and shall be admissible for the purpose of proving the contents of the original document."
62. If the position regarding admissibility of the contents of a document which is a certified copy falling within the purview of S. 57 (5) of the Registration Act was as adumbrated above, even before the introduction of S. 51A in the L.A. Act, could there be any legislative object in incorporating the said new provision through Act 68 of 1984 ? It must be remembered that the State has the burden to prove the market value of the lands acquired by it for which the State may have to depend upon the prices of lands similarly situated which were transacted or sold in the recent past, particularly those lands situated in the neighbouring areas. The practice had shown that for the State officials it was a burden to trace out the persons connected with such transaction mentioned in the sale deeds and then to examine them in Court for he purpose of proving such transactions. It was in the wake of the aforesaid practical difficulties that the new S. 51A was introduced in the L.A. Act. When the Section says that certified copy of a registered document "may be accepted as evidence of the transaction recorded in such document" it enables the Court to treat what is recorded in the document, in respect of the transactions referred to therein, as evidence.
63. The words "may be accepted as evidence" in the section indicate that there is no compulsion on the Court to accept such transaction as evidence, but it is open to the Court to treat them as evidence. Merely accepting them as evidence does not mean that the Court is bound to treat them as reliable evidence. What is sought to be achieved is that the transactions recorded in the documents may be treated as evidence, just like any other evidence, and it is for the Court to weigh all the pros and cons to decide whether such transaction can be relied on for understanding the real price of the land concerned.
64. There are similar enabling provisions in other statutes by which the Courts are allowed to treat the facts stated in certain documents as evidence. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, S.293 is incorporated to enable the Court to use the report of a Government Scientific Expert as evidence in any inquiry, trial or proceeding under the said Code, even without examining any person as a witness in Court for that purpose. Similarly, S. 13 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (pertaining to the Report of a Public Analyst) contains sub-sec. (5) which says that any document purporting to be a Report signed by a Public Analyst "may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein in any proceeding under this Act." Dealing with the scope of that provision a Constitution Bench of this Court has held in Mangaldas v. State of Maharashtra, that the sub-sec. clearly makes the contents of the Report of Public Analyst admissible in evidence and the prosecution cannot fail solely on the ground that the Public Analyst had not been examined in the case, but what value is to be attached to such report must necessarily be for the Court to consider and decide.
65. In the case of S. 51A of the LA Act also the position cannot be different, as it is open to the Court to act on the documents regarding the transaction recorded in such documents. However, this will not prevent any party who supports or opposes the said document or the transaction recorded therein to adduce other evidence to substantiate their stand regarding such transactions. But it is not possible to hold that even after the introduction of S. 51A the position would remain the same as before."
66. Ultimately, the Supreme Court, in the light of the above discussion, held that they were unable to concur with the observations made by the two Judge Bench in Inder Singh v. UOI and P. Ram Reddy v. Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad (supra) that even in spite of S.51A of the Act certified copies of the sale-deed could not be considered without examining persons connected with the transactions mentioned therein
67. In STATE OF HARYANA V. RAM SINGH, it was pointed out before the Supreme Court that the learned single Judge of the High Court had relying upon the decision of this Court in Baldev Singh's case (supra) had excluded Exhibits R/2 and R/3 produced by the State from consideration on the ground that neither the vendor nor the purchaser had been examined. It is pointed out that Baldev Singh's case was no longer good law in view of the subsequent decision of this Court in Narasaiah's case. The Supreme Court agreed with the submission that the Counsel for the State was right when he submitted that the High Court erred in rejecting Exhibits R/2 and R/3 as inadmissible only on the ground that the parties to the documents had not been examined by the State. The Bench held that it is not the law that a certified copy of a registered sale deed is inadmissible in evidence unless the parties to the document are examined to prove it. That would be contrary to what Section 77 read with Sections 74(2) and 76 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and more specifically Section 51A of the Land Acquisition Act provide. As far as the provisions of the Evidence Act are concerned, referring to RAMAPPA V. BOJAPPA, it was observed that a certified copy of the registered sale deed is admissible in evidence and does not need to be proved by calling a witness and Section 51A of the Act is to the same effect. V. Narasaiah's case (supra) was referred to observing that by virtue of Section 51-A of the Act, a certified copy of a document registered under the Registration Act, 1908 including a copy under Section 57 of the Act may be accepted as evidence of the transaction recorded in such documents. It is open to the Court to accept the certified copy as reliable evidence and without examining parties to the documents. The Bench further observed that this does not preclude the Court from rejecting the transaction itself as being mala fide or sham provided such a challenge is laid before the Court. The Bench then said that in Baldev Singh's case the sale deeds produced by the claimants were challenged as collusive and it was alleged that the sale transactions had been entered into only for the purpose of inflating the market value in anticipation of acquisition proceedings. It was in this context that the Court held: "There is no proof of passing of the consideration thereunder or the circumstances in which the documents came to be executed. Under these circumstances, all the documents are inadmissible in evidence and cannot be looked into." The Bench thus observed that the decision in Baldev Singh's case is not an authority for the proposition that the certified copy of a registered sale deed is inadmissible in evidence without proof of the execution of the documents by the vendor/purchaser or any other witness.
68. The position, which thus emerges on an analysis of various decisions of the Supreme Court, is that Section 51-A of the Act now permits the Courts to accept as evidence certified copy of a document duly registered under Registration Act, as reliable evidence, without examining the parties to the document and without insisting upon production of the original document. But, mere acceptance of such certified copy as evidence does not preclude the Court from examining the evidentiary value of the transaction reflected therein. It is open to the Court to treat such certified copies as evidence, but, mere accepting such certified copies as evidence does not mean that Court is bound to treat them as reliable evidence reflecting the market value. What is sought to be achieved by Section 51-A of the Act is that the transactions reflected in the documents may be treated as evidence just like any other evidence and it is always open for the Court to weigh all the pros and cons to decide whether such transaction can be relied on in determining the real price of the land concerned. Circumstances on record may be such by which Court may form its opinion that such sale transactions were entered into only for the purpose of inflating the market value, in anticipation of acquisition proceedings. Therefore, when circumstances on record are such, the burden will lie upon the claimants to prove the genuineness of the transaction by examining the vendor and vendee that market value reflected in the document was fixed bona fide and was not an inflated market value projected in anticipation of acquisition proceedings. In nutshell, the Court has always to weigh all the pros and cons including circumstances available on record and then proceed to determine the market value on admissible material.
69. In the instant cases, as noticed, none of the sale transactions relied on by the claimants can be said to be bona fide transactions worth acceptance in order to arrive at the correct market value. Circumstances on record are such that it would impel us to conclude that all transactions relied upon by the claimants were brought about and entered into by the parties only for the purpose of inflating the market value in anticipation of acquisition proceedings.
70. When we look at the evidence adduced in these cases, as also the awards of the reference Courts as are challenged before us, already referred to above, the entire basis for fixing the market value or the very foundation for fixing of the market value is the Judgment rendered in O.P.Nos.23 of 1969 and batch dated 17.8.1970, which in turn is based upon the earlier decision in O.P.No.34 of 1964. As noticed earlier, in O.P.No.34 of 1964, it was the post notification sale, which was made the basis for determining the market value and pre-notification sale, was discarded. In O.P.No.23 of 1969 and batch appreciation was allowed at Rs. 3/- per sq. ft. by erroneously taking date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act to be 1965 whereas the notification was published on 27.6.1957. May be that the decisions rendered in O.P.No.23 of 1969 and batch or O.P.No.34 of 1964 have become final, but, that cannot be held to be binding on the claimants and the State herein or any authority particularly TTD. May be that TTD accepted the decision in those cases but that fact also would not be a guiding factor for the Courts for determining the market value of the land acquired subsequently. It is the statutory duty of the Courts to determine the market value of the land as on the date of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act, taking into consideration the factors as are enumerated under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act. In case market value of the same land is not available, reference court is entitled to look into the market value of the land of the adjoining lands provided it is proved on record that the same are comparable sales with reference to nature of land, its location, potentialities etc. For allowing escalation also there must be some evidence adduced by the claimants.
71. Reference Courts in all cases proceeded to assume that since market value had already been fixed at Rs. 40/- in O.P.No.23 of 1969 and batch, therefore, it must be presumed that this was the market value as in the year 1965. In some cases, the Reference Courts took the market value of Rs. 40/- as in the year 1962 assuming that the Land Acquisition Officer passed award on 29.11.1965 and notification under section 4(1) of the Act was issued in the year 1962, therefore, Rs. 40/- should be taken as the market value as in the year 1962 and not in the year 1965. We have already noticed that notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published on 27.6.1957. How far the said award could have been made the basis by the reference Courts in arriving at the market value of the land is a question, which was urged before us. In this connection, we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, CITY IMPROVEMENT TRUST BOARD v. NARAYANAIAH, . There is no question of principle of res judicata applicable with regard to the judgments though the LAO is a party. Judgment is not inter se parties. Claimants being different, therefore, judgment and decree will not be binding on LAO or TTD or claimants in the present cases. The judgments relied upon by the reference courts being not inter se parties and are not relatable to the lands in question are judgments in personam. Section 43 of the Evidence Act lays down general provision governing admissibility of all judgments whether they are judgments in rem or judgments in personam and says that the judgments other than those falling under sections 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant, unless they fall under the other provisions of Evidence Act. All that is relevant under section 43 of the Evidence Act is the existence of such judgment, or order or decree. Therefore, what has to be taken as a fact proved in all cases before us is that for a plot of land acquired through notification published on 22.3.1957 the market value was determined at Rs. 30/- per sq. ft.(O.P.No.34 of 1964) and for the land acquired through another notification published on 27.6.1957 the market value was determined at Rs. 40/- per sq. ft (O.P.No.23 of 1969) and nothing beyond that. It was held in Narayanaiah's case (supra) that such judgments are relevant if they relate to similarly situated properties and contain determination of value on dates fairly proximate to the relevant date. In case either of the parties is in a position to show that the said judgment does not reflect the market value there is no reason why reliance can be placed upon the said decision in order to arrive at the market value of the land acquired subsequently. More so when it has successfully been demonstrated before us that in O.P.No.23 of 1969 notification under section 4(1) was actually published on 27.6.1957 but the Court had wrongly assumed it to have been published either in 1962 or 1965. Had correct date of publication been taken as 27.6.1957, there was no scope of market value going beyond Rs. 30/- per sq. ft.
72. Supreme Court in Posaiah's case (supra) proceeded to examine the market value of the land determined in earlier awards and discarded those on the ground that the same would not be relevant and binding since correct principles were not applied in arriving at the market value of the land in earlier decisions. Reference in this connection may be made to paras 4 and 5 of the said decision from which it appears that Judgments - Ex.A.1, Ex.A.3, Ex.A.3, Ex.A.4, Ex.A.5 and A.6 were discarded since they were found to be based upon the Judgment Ex.A.2 wherein the very basis for determining the market value was found to be erroneous. In the instant case, post notification sale dated 29.6.1957 was made as the basis in determining the market value of the land covered by the judgment rendered in O.P.No.34 of 1964. The said sale deed was alleged to be amongst the relations and this was much after the requisition was made by TTD to Government on 22.8.1955 to acquire the land. Section 4(1) notification was issued on 22.3.1957. In O.P.No.23 of 1969 and batch this judgment was made the basis to arrive at the market value of the land acquired by allowing annual appreciation at Rs. 3/- per sq. ft. For allowing this appreciation, there is no basis. Even otherwise also, appreciation could not have been allowed since in O.P.No.23 of 1969 land was acquired through notification-dated 27.6.1957. In case, these piece of evidence are taken out, the only evidence available on record reflects that the market value in the vicinity was Rs. 11/- per sq. ft. We have noticed that the very land, which was acquired in three cases, was purchased by the claimants couple of years prior to acquisition. In one case, an extent of 1170 sq.ft. of land was purchased in the year 1970 for Rs. 2,500/-; in the other case claimant purchased in 1968 land measuring 1170 sq. ft. again for Rs. 2,500/-. In another case, a site to the extent of 1434 sq. ft. was purchased for Rs. 3,500/-. No other sale transaction representing the market value either Rs. 30/- or Rs. 40/- per sq. ft was produced or proved on record. What is proved on record are the sale deeds reflecting market value of the land in and around the vicinity between Rs. 10/- per sq. ft or Rs. 11/- per sq. ft and not more than that. There is also no evidence adduced that there has been any rise in prices of the lands. May be as noticed above, the area has become an important Holy Place and a big centre of pilgrimage. But, there were no land transactions in the area. Some restriction on the sale of lands in the area came subsequently when Section 123 was inserted in A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, which provide that any person intending to sell his land situated in Tirumala Hills area shall first give notice to the Executive Officer of his intention to sell such land, requiring the Executive Officer to exercise his option to purchase the land and any sale of land by person in contravention of the section is voidable at the option of the Executive Officer. Option has to be exercised by the Executive Officer to purchase the land. In case an agreement is arrived at between the person intending to sell and the Executive Officer, the person is bound to sell the land to TTD in accordance with the said agreement and in case agreement cannot be arrived at, the persons concerned has to be paid a reasonable price to be determined by the Revenue Divisional Officer. This provision came into force with effect from 28.5.1987. It was urged on behalf of TTD that it was a clog attached to the land and therefore definitely affect the market value of the land. On behalf of the claimants it was urged that it was not a clog, but only a right of offer of a thing to be sold and this being a very weak right could be legitimately defeated. Further, the clog being in favour of TTD and not in favour of the Government, it need not affect the market prices of the land. There was no ban operating prior to 1987. People were free to sell and were obliged to offer it to TTD.
73. May be that there was no ban or restriction prior to 1987. But, what was required for the claimants to prove in the instant cases was that prior to issuance of 4(1) notifications, the acquired lands reflected higher market value than the one offered by the LAO or to prove bona fide sale transactions of comparable lands in and around the vicinity reflecting higher market value. There is absolutely no evidence adduced by the claimants establishing that the lands acquired would have fetched higher value than the one offered by the LAO. On the other hand, TTD did produce evidence as reflected in Proceedings dated 10.8.1982. From a perusal of the said proceedings, it is clear that TTD proposed to acquire land for laying of road from North Theerthakatta Street to North Mada Street, connecting to Sri Varahaswamy Vari Temple, Tirumala and also to construct a big open shed to facilitate the pilgrims performing marriages etc. By agreement, compensation was agreed to be paid to the enjoyers of the land at Rs. 30/- per sq. ft. subject to their production of title deeds and other documents. The TTD Board sanctioned the scheme for payment of compensation at Rs. 30/- per sq. ft. Again by proceedings dated 1.6.1989 with respect to acquisition of properties in Ward No.3, Block K, on the north of Anjaneya Swamy Temple, Sannidhi Street, Tirumala, by private negotiations compensation for the land was agreed to be paid at the rate of Rs. 40/- per sq. ft. subject to the condition that the concerned persons withdraw the suits and writ petitions pending in various courts. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for TTD, therefore, submitted that since the claimants in the present cases would be entitled to 30% compulsory acquisition charges besides other statutory benefits including interest etc. TTD is prepared to pay the market value at Rs. 23/- per sq. ft irrespective of the fact that claimants did not adduce any acceptable evidence to prove that market value of the land acquired would fetch more than what was offered by the LAO. It was contended that in case Rs. 23/- is assessed as the market value, adding thereto the compulsory acquisition charges (solatium) interest etc. the claimants would get similar amount as was the rate TTD offered and paid to others, whose properties were also acquired and thus there will be no discrimination.
74. Learned counsel for the claimants urged that in A.S. No. 2031 of 2001 affidavit was filed by the respondents stating that TTD has no objection for the appeal being allowed. Learned counsel further stated that in A.S. No. 2421 of 2001 arising out award in O.P.No.92 of 1991, A.S. No. 1778 of 2001 arising out of award in O.P.No.96 of 1991 and A.S. No. 1927 arising out of award in O.P.No.94 of 1991, Reference Court relied upon the concession made by the counsel appearing on behalf of the beneficiary-TTD that it had no objection for fixation of market value at the rate of Rs. 90/- per sq. ft and in view of this concession, it was not permissible for TTD to maintain these appeals. He made reference to para 8 of the Judgment in O.P.No.96 of 1991, para 6 in O.P.No.92 of 1991 and para 8 in O.P.No.94 of 1991 saying that the Court recorded the statement of the learned counsel appearing for TTD-beneficiary that "The advocate for Respondent No2/beneficiary argued that in similar cases this Court fixed the market value of the site at Rs. 90/- per sq. ft and he has no objection to fix the same market value for the site acquired in this case".
75. Learned Senior Advocate for TTD submitted that no such concession was made before the Reference Court. Judgment in O.P.No.93 of 1991 was delivered on 25.11.2000. Arguments in O.P.No.94 of 1991 were heard on 19.3.2001 and it was decided on 24.3.2001. Arguments in O.P.Nos.92 and 96 of 1991 were heard on 14.3.2001 in which judgment was delivered on 23.8.2001. In these cases arguments were heard by Sri Basavaiah, learned Senior Civil Jude. Concession in fact was made in O.P.No.93 of 1991 against which appeal A.S. No. 120 of 2001 has been filed.
76. As regards the concession alleged to have been made by the counsel appearing for TTD, suffice it to say that the alleged concession is neither accepted by TTD nor there was any authority to do so. There is no such concession on record that the market value of the land was Rs. 90/- per sq. ft as on the date of publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. Statement in fact appears to have been made by learned counsel for TTD before the Reference Court that since in a similar case market value has already been fixed by the Court at Rs. 90/- per sq. ft, there is no need to record finding again and again in later cases. As such, learned counsel appearing for TTD appears to have made a request to the Reference Court that the said case may also be decided similarly. One fact, however, cannot be lost sight of that the fixation of rate at Rs. 90/- per sq. ft in other cases is on an erroneous assumption as regards the market value fixed in O.P.No.23 of 1969 and batch for which already we have mentioned that such fixation of market value could not have been relied upon as in O.P.No.23 of 1969 and batch cases wrong date of publication under section 4(1) was taken into consideration while arriving at the market value of the land. Therefore, for the said reason also such concession even if made by the learned counsel for TTD, the same has no meaning or value. Any concession made in ignorance of the factual position is not binding on the Courts. Courts are statutorily enjoined to fix market value on the basis of material on record and not on the basis of such erroneous statements made by the counsel.
77. Learned counsel appearing for the claimants further submitted that fixation of market value is not made merely on the basis of the award made in O.P.No.23 of 1969 and batch but also placing reliance on Award No.2 of 1952 dated 9.4.1952 and also taking note of sale transaction dated 29.6.1957 by which a site of 84 sq. ft was sold for Rs. 2,500/- at the rate of Rs. 30/- per sq. ft and for that reason market value was fixed at Rs. 40/- per sq. ft for the land acquired in the year 1962 as reflected in O.P.No.23 of 1969. We have already observed above as regards O.P.No.23 of 1969 and batch that wrong date of publication of notification under Section 4(1) led to allowing appreciation in the market value. Notification was published on 27.6.1957. Sale deed dated 29.6.1957 referred to was executed by Smt. Navneethamma is a post notification sale. Reference Court wrongly took the date of acquisition as in the year 1962. As such this submission has to be discarded.
78. As we have already noticed that numerous sale deeds produced and relied upon in this case, executed from time to time, reflected almost constant market rates in regard to sites at Tirumla. Ex.B.2 produced in O.P.No.107 of 1990 is a copy of registered sale deed dated 12.4.1969 executed by Smt. Hamsavenamma in favour of Rangamma by which an extent of 1365 sq. ft was sold for Rs. 11,000/-. The market value thus reflected is Rs. 8/- per sq. ft. Ex.P.5 in the same O.P. is a copy for registered sale deed dated 21.11.1984 executed by Subbalaxamma in favour of M. Reddeppa under which an extent of 390 sq. ft of site was sold for Rs. 4,000/- reflecting market value at Rs. 10.25 ps. Per sq. ft. Beneficiary Smt. Subbalakshmamma and father of Reddappa were examined as R.W.6 and R.W.5 respectively on behalf of the TTD to prove the document. In addition, in A.S. No. 1892 of 2002 Ex.B.8 registered sale deed dated 21.11.1984 was produced by which an extent of 360 sq. ft was sold for Rs. 3,500/- reflecting market value at Rs. 9.72 per sq. ft. In the awards, the LAO referred to number of sale deeds. Under registered sale deeds dated 25.4.1984 and 11.9.1984 an extent of 1125 sq. ft under each document was sold for Rs. 11,000/- at the rate of Rs. 9.76 per sq. ft. By registered sale deed dated 21.7.1984 an extent of 1687 sq. ft of site was sold for Rs. 16,000/- reflecting the market at Rs. 9.48 per sq. ft. By registered sale deed dated 27.3.1984 an extent of 208 sq. ft of site was sold for Rs. 2,000/- at the rate of Rs. 9.61 per sq. ft. Similarly, under registered sale deed dated 29.8.1984 an extent of 2739 sq. ft of site was sold for Rs. 26,000/- reflecting market value of the land at Rs. 9.49 per sq. ft. Under registered sale deed dated 5.5.1986 an extent of 3715 sq. ft of site was sold for Rs. 37,000/- reflecting market value of the land at Rs. 9.86 per sq. ft. These sale transactions clearly show that constant market value prevailed in Tirumala without any appreciation even after lapse of considerable period.
79. As observed above, the very basis in determining the market value of the land by the reference courts is erroneous in law and is contrary to the settled principles. Reference Courts have proceeded in the matter assuming abnormal rise in prices and erroneously placed reliance upon the judgments in O.P.No.34 of 1964 or O.P.No.23 of 1969 and batch. Reliance was placed erroneously on the alleged statement of LAO made in O.P.No.30 of 1982. There was no evidence adduced by the claimants evidencing any escalation in price from 1957 till respective dates of acquisition. Evidence on record as discussed above suggest that prices have remained static at Tirumala irrespective of the place gaining considerable importance or the place being visited by innumerable pilgrims. Pilgrims visit the Holy Place only for the purpose to have darshan of the deity and not with a view to settle there. No evidence is let in to show that there was heavy demand for land in the area. Therefore, there was no justification on the part of the Reference Courts in fixing the market value on the basis of the market value fixed in the earlier judgments. May be that in one case i.e. in O.P.No.23 of 1969 and batch appeals were filed and there was no interference by this Court in the assessment of the market value, but, that alone could not have been made the basis for arriving at the market value in these cases. There was absolutely no evidence to have proceeded to fix the market value more than what was offered by the LAO. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the offer of TTD, we are of the view that instead of accepting the offer and fixing the market value at Rs. 23/- per sq. ft, we are inclined to take in all cases the market value of the land at Rs. 30/- per sq. ft., which would be just, fair and equitable and to that extent the respective awards of the reference courts deserve to be modified.
80. As regards enhancement made by the Reference Court in various awards in favour of the claimants towards value of the structures, though in the appeals filed by TTD there is challenge to the awards on that aspect, but appeals to that extent were not pressed before us.
81. Now we will deal with the Appeals/Cross Objections filed by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation for acquired land and structures. In some of the appeals, there is also a dispute as regards the exact extent of land acquired by LAO.
A.S. No.1145 of 2003:
This appeal is connected to A.S. No. 2031 of 2001 arising out of the order in O.P.No.59 of 2001 by the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati. While A.S. No. 2031 is preferred by LAO challenging the award of the Reference Court in fixing the market value at Rs. 88/- per sq ft AS. No. 1145 of 2003 is preferred by claimant No.3 seeking compensation for land at Rs. 300/- per sq. ft and for structures at Rs. 1,50,000/-.
82. Property acquired was TS.No.24, Ward No.3, Block-K.Tirumala owned by three claimants. Only Claimant No.3 (A. Krishnaiah) has preferred this appeal for further enhancement.
83. Reference Court held that except the oral evidence of RW1 (A. Krishnaiah) no other evidence was let in to establish that the claimant is entitled to higher compensation for the structures than what was awarded by LAO and accordingly confirmed the compensation awarded for structures.
84. The claimant appearing as RW1 in his statement except stating that the value of the building as fixed by R & B Engineer is inadequate and he is entitled for higher compensation has not produced any documentary evidence in support of his claim for higher compensation. RW2 Asst. Executive Officer, Panchayat, TTD, Tirumala deposed about the valuation report given by Executive Engineer, R & B marked as Ex.B.7 wherein value of the structures of the claimants was estimated and the share of the appellant-claimant was fixed at Rs. 12,505/-. The other two claimants who have not filed any appeal were awarded compensation for structures at Rs. 59,658/- and Rs. 17,602. The appellant-claimant did not produce any other evidence to show that the valuation arrived at by the Executive Engineer in his report Ex.B.7 is not correct or is contrary to Standard Specification Rates or any other guidelines prescribed therefor. In the absence of the same, the Reference Court was justified in placing reliance on Ex.B.7 valuation report and negating claim for further enhancement.
85. As regards higher compensation for land, we have already dealt with the said aspect in detail and for the said reasons; the claimant is not entitled for higher compensation for land or for structures.
86. Cross objections in AS.1279 of 1999: Claimant filed Cross Objections seeking higher compensation for land.
87. Before the Reference Court, the claimant also disputed about the actual extent of land acquired. While according to LAO, it is 1259 sq. ft, according to the claimant, it is 1365 sq. ft. Reference Court held that the site acquired is 1259 sq. ft. In the Cross Objections, the claimant has not challenged the said finding. The claimant has sought further enhancement in the market value of land from Rs. 100-00 per sq. ft to Rs. 150/- per sq. ft. We have already fixed the market value payable for the site and for that reason the Cross-Objections are liable to be dismissed.
AS. No. 155 of 2003: This appeal is connected to A.S. No. 2304 of 2002 arising out of award in O.P.No.95 of 1991 of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati. While A.S. No. 2304 of 2002 is preferred by LAO challenging the award of the Reference Court in fixing the market value at Rs. 86/- per sq. ft, AS. No. 155 of 2003 is preferred by claimant No.3 seeking further compensation for the structures to the extent of Rs. 8,94,036-00 and for the site at Rs. 250/- per sq. ft.
88. Before the Reference Court the claimant disputed about the actual extent of land acquired. While TTD claims that it had acquired 4176 sq. ft., claimant says that an extent of 5220 sq. ft. of land was acquired. Therefore, in this appeal he claimed compensation for difference of 1044 sq. ft.
89. The Reference Court held that there was no evidence to show that LAO acquired an extent of 5220 sq. ft. The claimant Sreenivasulu Naidu was examined as RW1. He has not stated anything about the measurements of the land acquired except stating that the site acquired was 5220 sq. ft and not 4176 sq. ft. R.W.3 TAP Narayana, AEO, deposed that TTD acquired only 4176 sq. ft. of land. In the absence of any evidence produced by the claimant that the LAO acquired more area than notified or that the acquired extent was 5220 sq. ft land, it is not possible to brush aside the evidence of RW3 that only an extent of 4176 sq. ft of land was acquired. Section 4(1) notification was issued after taking measurements of the land to be acquired. Therefore, the claimant's grievance for compensation for the difference in area of 1044 sq. ft cannot be accepted.
90. The Reference Court awarded compensation of Rs. 2,12,965/- for the building and Rs. 1,32,489-00 for fixtures and furniture, totaling to Rs. 3,45,454/- placing reliance on Ex.B.14 building estimation prepared by the Superintending Engineer, R & B, Cuddapah. The claimant claimed for the building an amount of Rs. 11,07,000/- based on estimate Ex.B.12 prepared by a private engineer who was examined as R.W.3. Reference Court held that there is no reason to deviate from the estimates prepared by the Superintending Engineer and accordingly rejected the claim of the claimant.
91. Mr. P. Bapanaiah, a diploma holder in L.C.E who appeared as witness (R.W.3) in his statement stated that he inspected the acquired property and got prepared an estimate in respect of the building which had first and second floors, it consisted of twenty five rooms with attached toilets. Apart from three family portions, there were eight shop rooms in the ground floor. The acquired building was adjacent to the main temple to its north and he stated that as per his estimation, the structural value of the building was Rs. 11,07,000/-. In his cross-examination he stated that R & B Engineer had valued the building with fixtures at Rs. 3,45,454/-. He also stated that he valued the building in the year 1991.
92. We have already discussed as regards the relevant date of fixing the market value of land. Notification under section 4(1) in this case was published on 15.1.1987. As such, in case claimant wanted further enhancement than what was offered by the Collector, it was necessary for the claimant to have adduced cogent and acceptable evidence as regards the market value of the structures as on 15.1.1987. Valuing the building four years later in point of time after notification under Section 4(1) was issued, is of no consequence. Burden to prove the value claimed lay upon the claimant who failed to discharge the same. There is no evidence led by the claimant as regards the age of the building, expected life of the building. More over, what was expected of the claimant was to prove the depreciated value of the building as on the date of the notification under section 4(1). Having failed to adduce evidence to prove the same, the estimates prepared by R.W.3 cannot be accepted nor the claim of the appellant for further enhancement of compensation for the building can be allowed and to that extent the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
93. As regards higher compensation for land, we have already dealt with the said aspect in detail and for the said reasons; the claimant is not entitled for higher compensation for land.
A.S. No. 1701 of 2001: This appeal is connected to A.S. No. 1983 of 2001 arising out of the award in O.P.No.34 of 1991 of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati. While A.S. No. 1983 of 2001 is preferred by LAO challenging the award of the Reference Court in fixing the market value at Rs. 90/- per sq. ft, AS. No. 1701 of 2001 is preferred by the claimant seeking higher compensation for structures at Rs. 4,17,000/- and for land at Rs. 300/- per sq. ft.
94. Reference Court held that the claimant failed to establish that he is entitled to higher compensation for the building than what was fixed by the LAO.
95. We have gone through the material on record including the oral and documentary evidence. RW1 is the claimant. He stated that according to him, the valuation of the superstructures is Rs. 4,17,000/- and he purchased the building in the year 1984. No witness was examined nor any documentary evidence adduced in support of the said claim. RW2, AEO in his statement deposed that the valuation of the superstructures was done by the Superintending Engineer, R & B, Cuddapah and proved Ex.B.8 the valuation report dated 30.7.1990 wherein the valuation of the super structures was estimated at Rs. 1,77,913/- The valuation was accepted by the LAO. The claimant has not adduced any other evidence to rebut the said valuation of the Superintending Engineer. The burden to prove that claimant was entitled to higher amount of compensation was on him. Having failed to adduce any evidence, the claim was rightly rejected by the Reference Court.
96. As regards higher compensation for land at Rs. 300/- per sq. ft. we have already dealt with the said aspect in the main judgment and for the said reasons; the claimant is not entitled for higher compensation for land also.
A.S. No. 1728 of 2001: This appeal is connected to A.S. No. 1984 of 2001 arising out of the award in O.P.No.37 of 1991 of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati. While A.S. No. 1984 of 2001 is preferred by LAO challenging the award of the Reference Court in fixing the market value at Rs. 90/- per sq. ft, A.S. No. 1728 of 2001 is preferred by claimant seeking higher compensation for structures at Rs. 1,80,000/- and @ Rs. 300/- per sq. ft for the land.
97. The Reference Court held that the claimant has failed to establish that he is entitled to higher compensation for the structures.
98. R.W.1 is the claimant. He deposed that he is entitled to compensation of Rs. 1,80,000/- towards the structures. Except his statement, he failed to adduce either oral or documentary evidence in support of his claim for superstructures. RW2 TAP Narayana, AEO, TTD deposed that the structures were valued by Superintending Engineer, R & B, Cuddapah at Rs. 14,620-99 and proved valuation report Ex.B.8 dated 30.7.1990 which was accepted by the LAO. The claimant having failed to adduce any evidence to establish how the valuation report Ex.B.8 is not correct or cannot be acted upon, the award of the Reference Court cannot be found fault with.
99. As regards higher compensation for land at Rs. 300/- per sq. ft. we have already dealt with the said aspect in detail and for the said reasons; the claimant is not entitled for higher compensation for land.
100. Cross objections in AS.2421 of 2001: Cross Objectors 1 and 2 have filed separate Cross Objections claiming further enhancement of compensation for the land at Rs. 150/- per sq. ft in place of Rs. 90/- per sq. ft. We have already held that fair market value to which claimants are entitled to is Rs. 30/- per sq. ft as on the date of the relevant date of notification and for that reason Cross-Objections are liable to be dismissed. Though the claimants had before the Reference Court claimed compensation over an extent of 1551 sq. ft and not over 1434 sq. ft, but, in Cross-Objections, there is no challenge to the finding of the Reference Court that claimants are entitled to compensation only for 1434 sq. ft.
A.S. No. 1778 of 2001 and Cross objections in AS. No. 1778 of 2001: TTD in this appeal has questioned the findings of the Reference Court as regards the exact area acquired. As per TTD, the land acquired is 2131 whereas the claimant's case was that site acquired is 2405 sq. ft. The Reference Court relied upon the sale deed Ex.B.1 and held that area acquired is 2405 sq. ft and not 2131 sq. ft as claimed by TTD. When appeal was taken up by us, in view of recital in Ex.B.1 sale deed dated 16.12.1961, which is the title deed in favour of the claimant reflecting therein that an extent of 2405 sq. ft having been sold, learned counsel appearing for TTD frankly did not press for the appeal as regards the exact area acquired.
101. Cross-Objections are filed by claimants seeking further enhancement of market value at Rs. 150/- per sq. ft as against the market value of Rs. 90/- per sq. ft awarded by the Reference Court. We have already held that the market value of the land as on the date of notification to be at Rs. 30/- per sq. fit and for that reason, the Cross-Objections are liable to be dismissed.
102. Cross-Objections in A.S. No. 1963 of 2002: Dissatisfied with the market value of the land fixed by the Reference Court at Rs. 86/- per sq. ft respondent No.3 in the Cross-objections has restricted further enhancement of compensation at Rs. 200/- per sq. ft. No other claim is made in the Cross-Objections for enhancement of compensation for structures etc.
103. As regards higher compensation for land, we have already dealt with the said aspect and for the said reasons; the claimant is not entitled to any higher compensation for land.
104. Cross objections in A.S. No. 120 of 2001: Dissatisfied with the market value of the land fixed by the Reference Court at Rs. 90/- per sq. ft Respondent No.3 has in the Cross-Objections claimed enhancement of the compensation at Rs. 150/- per sq. ft. We have already dealt with the said aspect in detail and for the said reasons; the claimant is not entitled for higher compensation for land.
A.S. No. 1411 of 2003; This appeal is connected to A.S. No. 1975 of 2002 arising out of award in O.P.No.105 of 1999 of the III Additional District Judge, Tirupati. While A.S. No. 1975 of 2002 is preferred by TTD challenging the award of the Reference Court in fixing the market value at Rs. 40/- per sq. ft, AS. No. 1411 of 2003 is preferred by claimant seeking compensation for structures at Rs. 10,20,000/- and for land @ Rs. 190/- per sq. ft.
105. Before the Reference Court, the claimant had also disputed about the actual extent of land acquired. While the acquired land is 3680 sq. ft, according to claimant, it was 3780 sq. ft. Reference Court held that it is 3680 sq. ft. In the appeal, the claimant has not claimed compensation for 3780 sq.ft but has claimed enhancement only for 3680 sq. ft and simultaneously has challenged the finding of the Reference Court as regards the actual area. In the absence of any claim laid for compensation for 3780 sq. ft the Cross-Objection, to that extent is not maintainable.
106. As regards the market value of the structures standing on the acquired site, the claimants are seeking enhancement on the basis of the estimates prepared by Sri I.G.K. Reddy, R.W.4, a Chartered Engineer at Tirupati. He is running Maruthi Consultants and claims that the acquired building was inspected by him from 16.1.1994 to 18.1.1994. Building was having ground floor and first floor. There were two types of roofs in the ground floor, one is RCC and another Madras terraced roof. First floor was partly RCC roof and partly zinc sheeted roof. After inspection, he prepared estimation Ex.B.10 on the basis of the rates of Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams as prevalent in the month of June, 1994. He stated that every year TTD prepares SSR rates. In cross-examination, he stated that he had worked as Executive Engineer in Irrigation Department and retired in 1988 and according to him, in land acquisition matters, LAOs have to get the buildings valued and estimated through R & B authorities. He further stated that he had gone through the estimates prepared by the R & B Department. He was questioned about his estimates and he admitted that he had not shown depreciated value of the structures. He had also not shown in the report about the expected life of the building or even the age of the building. He had also not shown the depreciated value of the fittings. He did not state as to in what manner the estimates of R & B Department relied upon by the LAO in his award which formed the basis for awarding compensation to claimants were wrong. The claimant was expected to lead acceptable evidence in regard to valuation of building and structures and what would be the depreciated value of the building and structures as on the date of publication of notification under section 4(1) of the Act, which, in the instant case, was published on 18.5.1992. Estimates prepared with reference to any other date other than the date of notification published under section 4(1), will be of no help in the matter of fixation of market value of the property. The claimant was supposed to lead evidence about the exact age of the building as on the date of notification under Section 4(1) as also its expected life. It is only the depreciated value which would be the market value to which claimant would be entitled to. Having failed to lead any evidence on those aspects, there is hardly any ground to consider the submissions made on behalf of the claimants that they are entitled to compensation for structures at Rs. 10,20,000/-.
A.S. No. 1898 of 1991 and A.S. No. 2033 of 1991: In these appeals filed by TTD, the learned counsel appearing for TTD submitted that in view of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act 68 of 1984) the claimants ought not to have been allowed solatium at 30% and the Reference Court ought to have awarded solatium at 15%. We see no force in the submission.
107. The constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in UNION OF INDIA v. RAGHUBIR SINGH, did not agree with the view taken in BHAG SINGH v. UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH, and set at rest the controversy as regards payment of enhanced solatium as a result of the Amendment Act, 1984 saying that there can be no doubt that the benefit of the enhanced solatium is intended by S. 30(2) in respect of an award made by the Collector between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. Likewise the benefit of the enhanced solatium is extended by S.30 (2), to the case of an award made by the Court between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984, even though it is upon reference from an award made before 30 April, 1982. The Constitution Bench held:-
108. The question is: what is the meaning of the words "or to any order passed by the High -Court or Supreme Court on appeal against any such award?" Are they limited as contended by the appellants, to appeals against an award of the Collector or the Court made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September., 1984, or do they include also, as contended by the respondents, appeals disposed of between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 even though arising out of awards of the Collector or the Court made before30 April, 1982. We are of opinion that and the interpretation placed by the appellants should be preferred over that suggested by the respondents. Parliament has identified the appeal before the High Court and the appeal before the Supreme Court by describing it as an appeal against 'any such award'. The submission on behalf of the respondents is that the words 'any such award mean the award made by the Collector or Court, and carry no greater limiting sense; and that in this context, upon the language of S. 30(2), the order in appeal is an appellate order made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 - in which case the related award of the Collector or of the Court may have been made before 30 April, 1982. To our mind, the words 'any such award' cannot bear the broad meaning suggested by learned counsel for the respondents. No such words of description by way of identifying the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court were necessary. Plainly, having regard to the existing hierarchical structure of fora (forum?) contemplated in the parent Act these appellate orders could only be orders arising in appeal against the award of the Collector or of the Court. The words 'any such award are intended to have deeper significance, and in the context in which those words appear in S. 30(2) it is clear that they are intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or Court between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. In other words S.30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the benefits of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by the Court is made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 or to appeals against such awards decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the High Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before 24 September, 1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the award by the Collector or by the Court should have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. We find ourselves, in agreements with the conclusion reached by this Court in K. Kamalajammanniavaru (dead) by LRs. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (supra), and find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh (supra).
109. In K. KAMALAJAMMANNIAVARU v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, the following view was taken by the Supreme Court :-
The new S. 23(2), of course, necessarily applies to awards made by the Collector or Court after the commencement of the Act, that is, after September 9, 1984 which was the date on which the Act received the assent of the President. The Bill which ultimately became the Amendment Act was introduced into Parliament on April 30, 1982. Parliament obviously desired to give effect to the amended S. 23(2) from the date of introduction of the Bill. So the amended provision was expressly made applicable by S. 30(2) to awards made by the Collector or Court between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984 also. A natural corollary was that the new provision should apply to orders made by the High Court or by the Supreme Court in appeals against such awards, that is awards made between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. Parliament did not intend and could not have intended that whatever be the date of the award, however ancient it may be, solatium would stand enhanced to 'thirty per centum' if an appeal happened by chance or accident to be pending on April 30, 1982. Surely it was not the intention of Parliament to reward those who kept alive the litigation even after several yeaRs. If it was the intention of Parliament to make the amended S. 23(2) applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation wherever they be pending, the words "after the 30th day of April 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, 1982 in the House of the People) and before the commencement of this Act" in S. 30(2) would become meaningless. It is clear that Parliament wanted the amended S. 23(2) to have very limited retrospectivity. It made the provision applicable to awards made after April 30, 1982 and before September 24,1984 also and further to appeals to the High Court and the Supreme Court arising from such awards.
110. In these appeals, LAO passed award on 10.9.1981. Bill relating to Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 seeking to amend Section 23 and certain other provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was introduced in Parliament on 30.4.1982, which came into force on 24.9.1984. As on the date the Bill was introduced on the floor of the Parliament, reference was pending before the Reference Court and the same was decided in the year 1991. The award of the Reference Court thus is after 30.4.1982 and, in any case, after 24th September, 1994. Therefore, the submission of the learned Counsel that claimants are not entitled to solatium at the enhanced rate of 30% as per the Amendment Act, cannot be accepted.
111. Consequent to aforementioned discussion, appeals and Cross-objections filed by the claimants are dismissed. Appeals filed by TTD are partly allowed to the extent aforementioned. Awards of the Reference Courts stand modified as indicated above. It is made clear that in case claimants were not paid interest on solatuim, they will also be paid interest on solatium. Parties are left to bear their respective costs.