Madras High Court
The Regional Transport Authority, ... vs State Transport Appellate Tribunal, ... on 22 April, 1994
Equivalent citations: AIR1995MAD226, AIR 1995 MADRAS 226, (1994) 1 MAD LW 509 (1994) WRITLR 316, (1994) WRITLR 316
Author: A.R. Lakshmanan
Bench: A.R. Lakshmanan
ORDER
1. The Regional Transport Authority, Namakkal Region (Collector of Salem) has filed all the three writ petitions. Originally, the petitioner filed three Civil Revision Petitions in CR.P.S.R.Nos. 19698, 19695 and 19701 of 1994 under Art. 227 of the Constitution challenging the order of the Stale Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) dated 25-1-1994 in Appeal No. 340 of 1993, order dated 31-l-1994 in Appeal No. 17 of 1991 and order dated 29-12-1993 in Appeal No. 341 of 1993 respectively. In all these cases, the applications of the respective 2nd respondent herein for grant of stage carriage permit were rejected by the petitioner herein. The respective 2nd respondent filed appeals before the Tribunal to set aside the orders of the petitioner. The Tribunal, on a consideration of the entire materials on record, allowed the appeals, set aside the orders of the petitioner and granted the reliefs to the respective 2nd respondent.
2. Aggrieved against the orders of the Tribunal, the petitioner originally filed three civil revision petitions under Art. 227 of the Constitution. The office returned the papers raising the question of maintainability. At the request of the petitioner, the matter was posted before my learned brother D. Raju, J. The learned Judge after hearing the learned Advocate General on 23-3-1994, directed the office to number the revisions and post for admission. Thereafter, the revisions-were numbered as C.R.P. Nos. 1070 to 1972(1072) of 1994 and posted for admission before D. Raju, J. On 25-3-1994, on the representation of Mr. R. Swaminathan, learned Addl. Govt. Pleader (Civil Suits), the learned Judge permitted the petitioner to take steps for converting the civil revision petitions filed under Art. 227 of the Constitution as writ petitions as prayed for by the petitioner. Though it is specifically directed by the learned Judge that the petitioner is permitted to take steps for converting the revisions under Art. 227 of the Constitution as writ petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution, no such step was taken by the petitioner to convert the civil revision petitions as writ petitions. However, the office has converted the revisions as writ petitions, numbered the same and posted them before me for admission on 7-4-1994.
3. On behalf of the petitioner, Mr. M. Vellaisami, learned Addl. Govt. Pleader appeared, and on behalf of the contesting 2nd respondent, Mr. V. A. Sadagopan and Mr. R. S. Ramanujam took notice and also argued the matter on 8-4-1994 not only onthe question of maintainability but also on the merits of the case.
4. A brief history of the three writ petitions is as follows :-- The contesting 2nd respondent in W. P. No. 6414 of 1994 (K. Chitra) filed an application before the petitioner for grant of a new stage carriage permit to ply on the route Sendamangalam to Arapalleswarar Koil (via) Kalappanalchen-patty, Neducombal, Karavalli, Solakkadu and Smedu for a period of five years from the date of issue. Representations were heard from 21 persons including the 2nd respondent. The counsel for Anna Transport Corporation objected to the grant of permit. Counsel for the representators in Serial Nos. 2 to 6 have welcomed the proposal stating that the additional transport facilities as applied for by the 2nd respondent herein will be beneficial to the public. The representators in Serial Nos. 7 to 15 have also welcomed the proposal since only two buses are plying on the above route. The representators in Serial Nos. 16 to 20 have objected to the grant of permit stating that adequate transport facilities are available now with an unhealthy competition on the sectors. The Regional Transport Authority, Namakkal Region/ Collector of Salem (Mr. P. A. Ramaiah, I.A.S.) by order dated 23-3-1993 in R. No. 104373/A2/92 rejected the application of the 2nd respondent herein for grant of permit by holding that the transport facilities now available is enough to the travelling public and that the grant of new permit will create unhealthy competition among the operators. Against the said order, the 2nd respondent K. Chitra filed AppealNo. 341 of 1993 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by its order dated 29-12-1993 allowed the appeal for grant of a new permit to ply a stage carriage bus on the route Sendamangalam to Arapalleswarar Koil, as prayed for, for a period of five years from the date of issue of permit. The 2nd respondent was directed by the Tribunal to produce the vehicle with valid records before the petitioner herein within six months from the date of receipt of the order and the petitioner was directed to grant permit to the 2nd respondent K. Chitra within a month of production of the vehicle with valid records. The petitioner has filed W. P. No. 6414 of 1994 against the order of the Tribunal.
5. W. P. No. 6415 of 1994 is directed against the order of the Tribunal allowing the appeal filed by the 2nd respondent herein viz., R. Pari. The 2nd respondent has purchased the vehicle TMK 5510 from one M. Muru-gesan, the previous owner. The said M. Murugesan applied for variation of permit conditions in respect of his stage carriage TMK 5510 plying on the route Namakkal to Jedarpalayam (via) Velu-goundanpatti, Serukkalai, Kodur, Erum-balam, Kunnamalam, Pamagoundampala-yam, Sithampoondi and Zarain Elarapillai with independent single trip between Musiri and Tiruchengode, involving extension of sector between Tiruchengode and Erode and for certain other reliefs. The Regional Transport Authority, Namakkal Region/Collector of Salem (Mr. K. Surjit Chouthri, I.A.S.) rejected the application of the said M. Murugesan on the ground that the existing route overlaps the approved scheme route Namakkal to Vaiyalapadi and the extension sector also overlaps the approved scheme route. He has also rejected on the ground that State Transport Undertakings are ready to operate any number of vehicles if need be. The said M. Murugesan filed Appeal No. 17 of 1991 before the Tribunal to set aside the order of the petitioner. The Tribunal, by its order dated 31-1-1994, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the petitioner dated 21-5-1990 in R. No. A2/5678/90. The 2nd respondent R. Pari, who impleaded himself as appellant in the place of his predecessor-in-title M. Murugesan, was granted extension of sector from Tiruchengode to Erode and also other reliefs. The Secretary to the Regional Transport Authority, Namakkal Region, was directed to fix suitable timings but without disturbing the trip departing from Jedarpalayam at 10-05 p.m. towards Namakkal. Aggrieved against the said order, the petitioner has filed W. P. No. 6415 of 1994.
6. W. P. No. 6416 of 1994 has been filed against the order of the Tribunal in Appeal No. 340 of 1993 allowing the appeal filed by the 2nd respondent P. Kasthuri and thereby granting a new stage carriage permit to ply on the route Sendamangalam to Vasalurpatti for a period of five years from the date of issue. The Regional Transport Authority (Mr. P. A. Ramaiah, I.A.S.) heard twenty persons including the 2nd respondent P. Kasthuri. The Anna Transport Corporation objected to the grant of permit in favour of the 2nd respondent. Some of the representators welcomed the proposal and some others objected. The Regional Transport Authority (Mr. P. A. Ramaiah, I.A.S.) rejected the application of the 2nd respondent by holding that the transport facility now available is enough to the travelling public and the grant of new permit will create unhealthy competition among the operators. The 2nd respondent filed Appeal No. 340 of 1993 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by order dated 25-1-1994 allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the petitioner and granted a new permit to the 2nd respondent P. Kasthuri to ply on the route Sendamangalam to Vasalurpatti for a period of five years from the date of issue of permit. The petitioner was directed to grant a new permit within one month from the date of production of the vehicle with valid records. Aggrieved against this order of the Tribunal, the petitioner has filed W. P. No. 6416 of 1994.
7. When the matters were listed before me on 7-4-1994, the learned counsel for the contesting 2nd respondent in all the writ petitions raised a preliminary issue on the question of maintainability of the writ petitions. Arguments were heard from both sides on the question of maintainability and also on merits.
8. This Court was requested by the petitioner to treat the memo of grounds of revision filed in the respective civil revision petitions as part and parcel of the affidavits filed in support of the writ petitions for better appreciation of the question involved in the writ petitions. In the writ affidavits it is only stated that the Tribunal has allowed the appeals filed by the respective 2nd respondent herein on erroneous views of the facts and law and that the order of the Tribunal is contrary to law and liable to be set aside.
9. Since this Court was requested to treat the memorandum of grounds of revision, as part and parcel of the writ affidavits, the grounds raised in the civil revision petitions were also perused and arguments heard. It is only stated in the grounds of revision that adequate transport facilities are available on the routes in question and that the Tribunal has failed to consider the objections made by the representators, that adequate transport facilities are available. No other legal ground has been raised in the grounds of revision.
10. However, to a question put by the Court in regard to the maintainability of the writ petitions, Mr. M. Vellaisami, learned Addl. Govt. Pleader, after reiterating the contentions raised in the affidavits and the grounds of revisions, has further urged as follows : He invited my attention to S. 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which provides that any person aggrieved by various kinds of orders passed by the Regional Transport Authority may appeal to the Tribunal constituted under S. 89(2) of the Act and the Tribunal after giving such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard, give a decision thereon which shall be final. It is thus contended by the learned Addl. Govt. Pleader that under the scheme of the Act, the original authority is also given an opportunity to put forward his case before the Tribunal and it is, therefore, deemed to be a respondent in the appeal. My attention was also drawn to the first Proviso to Rule 158 of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (Form of Appeal and Revision). According to the learned Addl. Govt. Pleader, the said rule also provides that no appeal shall be deemed to have been made properly unless the respondents concerned are cited and unless a copy of the appeal is furnished simultaneously to the respondents so cited. In other words, according to the learned Addl. Govt. Pleader, for all practical purposes, the Regional Transport Authority is treated as respondent in the appeal, which is evident from the mandatory requirement under S. 89(1) of the Act viz., that the original authority should be given an opportunity of being heard before giving a decision.
11. The learned Addl. Govt. Pleader also drew my attention to S. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and submitted that under this section, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorised to hear the appeal from the decisions of such Court. But, unlike S. 89(1) of the Act, there is no provision in Sec. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure or any other section in the Code of Civil Procedure, that the appellate Court should give an opportunity to the original Court, and in the absence of such a provision in the Code of Civil Procedure, if the original Court is not made a party to the proceeding before the appellate Court and the judgment of the original Court, even if set aside, there is no scope for a further appeal or revision at the instance of the original Court.
12. Mr. M. Vellaisami, learned Addl. Govt. Pleader, then contends that in the decision reported in Bar Council of Maha-rashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar, AIR 1975 SC 2092 : (1976) 1 SCR 306, the Bar Council has been considered to be a person aggrieved under more or less identical circumstances and, therefore, the petitioner herein can maintain the writ petitions. He further contended that if the variation is not in public interest, which is one of the criteria prescribed under S. 47, it will be in order to espouse the public interest by way of a revision or a writ petition.
The above is the gist of the submissions made by the learned Addl. Govt. Pleader.
13. The learned counsel appearing for the respective 2nd respondent invited my attention to S. 68 of the Act which deals with the transport authorities and argued that the Regional Transport Authority viz., the Collector, is a persona designata constituted under S. 68 of the Act to exercise the powers conferred under the Act. Once the power has been exercised by the Collector as Regional Transport Authority, he has become functus officio. In my opinion, the argument of the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent merit acceptance and based on sound reasoning.
14. Section 68 of the Act provides that the State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute for the State a State Transport Authority to exercise and discharge the powers and functions specified in sub-sec. (3), and shall in like manner, constitute Regional Transport Authorities to exercise and discharge throughout such areas as may be specified in the notification, in respect of each Regional Transport Authority; the powers and functions conferred by or under this Chapter on such authorities. Section 68(3) of the Act provides that the State Transport Authority and every Regional Transport Authority shall give effect to any directions issued under S. 67 of the Act and the State Transport Authority shall, subject to such directions and save as otherwise provided by or under the Act, exercise and discharge throughout the State the powers and functions mentioned in clause (3) viz., to co-ordinate and regulate the activities and policies of the Regional Transport Authorities, if any, of the State; to perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority where there is no such authority, and if it thinks fit or if so required by a Regional Transport Authority, to perform those duties in respect of any route common to two or more regions; to settle all disputes and decide all matters on which differences of opinion arise between Regional Transport Authorities; and to discharge such other functions as may be prescribed.
15. Section 68 of the Act, as stated above, deals with the transport authorities. Subsection (I) provides the constitution for the State a State Transport Authority by notification in the Official Gazette to exercise and discharge the powers and functions provided in sub-sec. (3) of S. 68 of the Act. Exercising this power, the State Transport Authority has constituted the Collector as a Regional Transport Authority for a region. In other words, the Collector is a persona designate constituted under S. 68 of the Act to exercise the power conferred upon him under the Act. Once the powers have been exercised by the Collector as Regional Transport Authority, he, in my view, has become functus officio. Therefore, after exercising the powers under S. 80 of the Act, either by refusing or granting permit to an applicant, the function of the Regional Transport Authority has become complete and he has no power to deal with the matter thereafter.
16. Further, the Regional Transport Authority is exercising the power as a quasi-judicial authority. In other words, he is an authority under the Act to decide whether an applicant is eligible to get permit. If there are more number of applicants for permit, he has to decide which of the applicant is more suitable for grant of permit. In doing so, he is deciding the lis between the rival contenders as an authority under the Act, If his order is modified or set aside by the appellate auth-ority on an appeal filed by the affected party, the appellate order can be agitated further by only a person whose interest and rights have been affected by the orders of the appellate authority but not by the original authority.
17. This apart, to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the person invoking (Regional Transport Authority in this case) such jurisdiction should show to the Court that his personal right has been infringed or affected. In the present case, it would not be said that the personal right of the petitioner/Regional Transport Authority has been infringed by the order of the appellate authority and, therefore, a writ petition can be maintained at his instance. In view of the above legal position, I am of the view, that the arguments of the learned Addl. Govt. Pleader cannot at all be accepted. Under any stretch of imagination the original authority cannot be deemed to be a respondent in the appeal under the scheme of the Act.
18. Certain authorities cited by the learned counsel for the contesting 2nd respondent can also be usefully referred to in this context. They are reported in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, AIR 1976 SC 578 : (1976) 3 SCR 58; Director of Enforcement v. Rama Arangannal, (1981) 1 Mad LJ 64 : (AIR 1981 Madras 80); The Regional Transport Authority, Coimbatore v. The Shanthi Transports (C.R.P. No. 1753 of 1980 dated 17-12-1991 of S. Mohan, J., as he then was); Regional Transport Authority, Erode v. Chitra Devi (C.R.P.No. 1779 of 1981 dated 26-11-1981 of S. Mohan, J., as he then was) and Palani Andavar & Co. v. The State Transport Authority, Madras-5 (W.P. No. 6358 of 1982 dated 1-9-1982 of S. Padmanabhan, J.).
19. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai's case AIR 1976 SC 578, the principal question that fell for determination in the appeal before the Supreme Court was, whether the proprietor of a cinema theatre holding a licence for exhibiting cinematograph films, is entitled to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction ex debito justitiae to get a no objection certificate granted under Rule 6 of the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954, by the District Magistrate in favour of a rival in the trade, brought up and quashed on the ground that it suffers from a defect of jurisdiction. Respondents 1 and 2 before the Supreme Court are the owners of a site. They made an application under Rule 3 of the Rules to the District Magistrate, Kaira, for the grant of a certificate that there was no objection to the location of a cinema theatre at this site. The District Magistrate invited the opinions of the Chairman of Nagar Pan-chayat, Executive Engineer Roads and Buildings and the District Supdt. of Police. These authorities opined that they had no objection for the grant of certificate applied for. The District Magistrate, after visiting the site, submitted a report to the State Government that the proposed site was not fit for the location of a cinema house. He recommended that the no objection certificate should be refused. The State Government did not agree with the recommendation of the District Magistrate and directed the latter to grant the certificate. Accordingly, the District Magistrate granted the no objection certificate to respondents 1 and 2.
20. The appellants before the Supreme filed a writ petition in the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constiiution praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari, mandamus, directing the respondents to treat the no objection certificate granted to respondents 1 and 2 as illegal, void and ineffectual. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that no authority vested in the appellant had been infringed or prejudiced or adversely affected as a direct consequence of the order impugned. Before the Supreme Court, the learned counsel for the appellant assailed the finding of the High Court in regard to the locus standi of the appellant to maintain the writ petition. The question as to who is an aggrieved person and what are the qualifications requisite for such a status has also been considered by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court having seen that the appellant has no standing to complain of injury, actual or potential, to any statutory right or interest, pass on to consider whether any of his rights or interests, recognised by the general law, has been infringed as a result of the grant of no objection certificate to the respondents. Here again, the Supreme Court answered the said question in the negative. The Supreme Court held that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right; he has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest and, therefore, he is not a person aggrieved and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the no objection certificate to the respondents.
21. In the decision reported in Director of Enforcement v, Rama Arangannal, (1981) 1 Mad LJ 64 : (AIR 1981 Mad 80) the Director of Enforcement filed the appeal claiming himself to be aggrieved against the order of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board dated 13-12-1974, which allowed the appeal filed by the respondents (Rama Arangannal and others) and set aside the order of adjudication of the Deputy Director of Enforcement dated 28-8-1972 holding the respondents guilty of contravention of the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and imposing a personal penalty of Rs. 5,000/- on each of the respondents.
22. In that case, a preliminary objection had been taken by the respondents as to the maintainability of the appeal by the Director of Enforcement stating that under the Foeign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, it is only the Central Government which can be taken to be aggrieved against the decision of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board under Section 54 of the said Act, allowing the appeal filed by the respondents and the Director of Enforcement, who passed the initial order of adjudication cannot file the appeal treating himself as an aggrieved person. The respondents then contended that the Director of Enforcement being himself a quasi judicial Tribunal passing an order of adjudication cannot be, in any event, taken to be aggrieved against the decision of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board reversing his decision and, therefore, the appeal filed by the Director of Enforcement cannot in any event, be maintained. G. Rajanujam, J., observed as follows (AIR 1981 Mad 80 at pp.81 and 82) :--
"On the question as to the maintainability, of the appeal, it is seen that the Explanation to Section 54 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, treats only the Central Gov-ernment is an aggrieved party for the purpose of filing an appeal to the High Court in respect of orders passed by the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board under that section. Therefore, only the Central Government can file and prosecute an appeal the order of the Appellate Board, and not any other authority. In this case, the appeal has been filed by the Director of Enforcement, who is the initial authority who passed the adjudication order against the respondents and whose order has been set aside by the Appellate Board on an appeal filed by them. Therefore, the Director of Enforcement cannot be said to be aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Board merely because its order of adjudication has been set aside by the Appellate Board. If that were to be possible every subordinate Tribunal can file an appeal against the order of the Appellate Tribunal reversing its decision, to a further appellate forum. The Director of Enforcement cannot be treated as an aggrieved party, for while passing the order of adjudication he has acted only as a quasi-judicial Tribunal, and such a quasi-judicial Tribunal cannot have a grievance when its order is set aside by a higher appellate forum. If he entertains a grievance when the appellate forum sets aside its order, then he should be taken to have had a bias in the dispute which has been adjudicated by him. Therefore, it will be against the principles of natural justice if we assume that the Director of Enforcement who is a quasi judicial Tribunal adjudicating a matter between the Government and the person sought to be proceeded against for violation of the provisions of the Act, had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the matter which was the subject-matter of the dispute which he adjudicated. It would have been a different matter if the statute authorised the Director of Enforcement to file an appeal. But admittedly in this case, the Director oft En-
forcement has not been statutorily authorised, to file an appeal against the order of the Appellate Board at the instance of the Gov-ernment of India otherwise. If the quasi judicial Tribunal is expected to question the orders of the appellate bodies, a specific power has to be given to the initial Tribunal under the relevant statute. Under Sections 253 and 256 of the Income-tax Act the Income-tax Officer who passes the original order of assessment in his capacity as quasi judicial Tribunal, is enabled to file an appeal against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner setting aside his orders, on the directions or at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax. Under Section 57 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, power is given to the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to file a revision to the High Court against the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. We can cite many such instances where the statute specifically enables the initial quasi-judicial authority to file an appeal against the reversal of its judgment by the appellate authority to a further appellate or revisional forum. Such a statutory provision is necessary for the reasons afore-stated, as otherwise, it will lead to the inevitable conclusion that the initial authority had an interest in the dispute before it, and, therefore, it considers itself aggrieved when its judgment was reversed by an appellate forum. In this view of the matter, the Director of Enforcement, who is the appellant in this case, cannot be said to be an aggrieved person."
23. C.R.P. No. 1779 of 1981 (Regional Transport Authority, Erode v. Chitra Devi) arose out of a variation granted by the Tribunal. The question before S. Mohan, J., as he then was, was whether it will be open to the original authority viz., the Regional Transport Authority, to maintain the revision. The learned Judge while rejecting the contention of the Government, observed as follows :--
"Public interest is, no doubt, a relevant criterion under Section 47(1) of the Act. Certainly on that score, a transport authority cannot say that merely because an order of variation has come to be passed by the Tribunal, it is an aggrieved person, and I do not sec how the transport authority can claim itself to be a conscience keeper of the public or representing the consciousness of the general public. Section 64(i) reads as follows :--
64(1) Any person --
(i) aggrieved by any other order which may be prescribed, may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal constituted under sub-section (2), who shall, after giving such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard, give a decision thereon which shall be final'.
I do not find any scope whatever for the argument of the Government Pleader that because the parties are heard, the Regional Transport Authority can be considered to be an aggrieved person. I see no relevancy in this argument.
The decision reported in S. Sinha v. S. Lal & Co., AIR 1973 SC 2720 clearly says that ultimately in matters of the present kind, the Court has the discretion to grant the relief. No question of discretion arises in this case. Because, one authority viz., the petitioner, has thought it fit to reject the request of the respondent, who is the grantee by the Tribunal, on the ground of public interest. Therefore, this case has no relevance."
24. S. Mohan, J., as he then was, again reiterated the view which he has taken in C.R.P. No. 1779 of 1981 in C.R.P. No. 1753 of 1981 (The Regional Transport Authority, Coimbatore v. The Shanthi Transport, Coimbatore) dated 17-12-1991. The learned Judge has made the following order:
"I have held in C.R.P. Nos. 1779 of 1981 and 1228 of 1977, that it will not be open to a Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Appellate Tribunal who are vested with a quasi-judicial powers of grant of permit, to file a revision. On this view, the revisions were held to be not maintainable. Applying the said ruling, the Civil Revision stands dismissed."
25. S. Padmanabhan, J., in W.P. No. 6358 of 1982 (Palani Andavar & Co., Namakkal v. State Transport Authority, Madras-5) dated 1-9-1982, while following the decision of S. Mohan, J., as he then was, in C.R.P. No. 1779 of 1981, dated 26-11-1981, has respectfully agreed with the ratio laid down by S. Mohan, J., as he then was, and held that the State Transport Authority cannot maintain a revision against the order of the Tribunal.
26. In the said case before S. Padmanabhan, J., Palani Andavar and Company/ Petitioner and another filed an application before the respondent for the transfer of the composite permit in respect of the goods vehicle MED 4489 from the name of Veera-swami to the name of the petitioner/Palani Andavar and Company. The respondent/ State Transport Authority rejected the application. Against the order of rejection, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Tribunal, which allowed the appeal. The Tribunal also found that no premium or any other consideration had or had been intended to pass between the petitioner and the said Veeraswami for the transfer of the permit in question. The Tribunal, therefore, allowed the appeal and directed the transfer of the permit as prayed for by the petitioner. The petitioner, pursuant to the order of the Tribunal, filed the necessary documents before the respondent/State Transport Authority and since the respondent did not implement the order of the Tribunal, the petitioner filed the writ petition to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondent to implement the order of the Tribunal passed in Appeal No. 907 of 1981 dated 6-5-1982. An argument was advanced on behalf of the Government that the State Transport Authority proposed to file a revision against the order of the Tribunal. The learned Judge (S. Padmanabhan, J.) while observing that he would have been inclined to grant the adjournment sought for by the learned Addl. Govt. Pleader had it not been for the fact that the adjournment asked for is to enable the State Transport Authority to file a revision petition against the order of the Tribunal. As observed earlier, the learned Judge, agreeing with the ratio laid down by S. Mohan, J., as he then was, allowed the writ petition and directed the respondent to implement the order of the Tribunal.
27. The learned Addl. Govt. Pleader by relying on the decision reported in Bar Council of Maharashtrav. M. V. Dabholkar, (1976) 1 SCR 306 : (AIR 1975 SC 2092) contended that the writ petition filed by the petitioner/Regional Transport Authority is maintainable. In that case, a Bench of seven learned Judges of the Supreme Court considered the question whether the Bar Council of a State was a 'person aggrieved' to maintain an appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961. Answering the question in the affirmative, the Supreme Court, speaking through Ray, C.J., indicated how the expression 'person aggrieved' is to be interpreted in the context of a statute, thus (at p. 2098 of AIR) :
"The meaning of the words 'a person aggrieved' may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one 'a person aggrieved'. Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words 'a person aggrieved' is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of a private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality. The role of the Bar Council under the Advocates Act is comparable to the role of a guardian in professional ethics. The words 'person aggrieved' in Sections 37 and 38 of the Act are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession or denial of legal rights or burdens or financial interests."
In the above case, the Supreme Court held that the Bar Council, was considered to be an aggrieved person having regard to the functions it exercises and the duties imposed upon it under the Act. But, in my view, certainly, that cannot be a case here.
28. It is, thus, demonstrably clear from the authorities cited above, that the petitioner herein has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, muchless does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. As observed by the Supreme Court, he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that he is not a person aggrieved and has no locus standi to challenge the order of the Tribunal granting the reliefs to the respective 2nd respondent.
29. As held by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court and also of this Court, in which can aggrieved person has been held to be one who has a more particular or peculiar interest of his own beyond that of the general public in seeing that the law is properly administered. According to most of our decisions, in order to have a locus standi to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court, the petitioner should be 'an aggrieved person' and in a case of defect in jurisdiction, such a petitioner will be entitled to a writ of certiorari as a matter of course, but, if he does not fulfil that character, and is a 'stranger', the Court will, in its discretion, deny him this extraordinary remedy. I am, therefore, of the view, that the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground that no right vested in the petitioner has been infringed or prejudiced or adversely affected as a direct consequence of the order impugned by him and as such, he was not an 'aggrieved person' having a locus standi in the matter.
30. In the decision reported in Jasbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, AIR 1976 SC 578 : (1976) 3 SCR 58 referred to supra, it has been observed as follows (at p. 588 of AIR) :--
"It is true, that, in the ultimate analysis, the jurisdiction under Article 226 in general, and certiorari in particular, is discretionary. But in a country like India where writ petitions are instituted in the High Courts by the thousand, many of them frivolous, a strict ascertainment, at the outset, of the standing of the petitioner to invoke this extraordinary jurisdiction, must be insisted upon. The broad guidelines indicated by us, coupled with other well-established self-devised rules of practice, such as the availability of an alternative remedy, the conduct of the petitioner, etc., can go a long way to help the Courts in weeding out a large number of writ petitions at the initial stage with consequent saving of public time and money."
31. In the light of the above discussion, it is crystal clear that the petitioner has not been denied or deprived of any legal right. When he has not sustained any injury to any of his legally protected right, he cannot maintain the writ petition in this Court. Hence, I hold that the writ petitions are not maintainable at the instance of the petitioner.
32. Considering the case even on merits, I am of the view, that the Tribunal has carefully and deeply considered the rival submissions of both parties including the objections. The Tribunal, while granting the permit to the 2nd respondent and while reversing the order of the petitioner, has given cogent, convincing and sound reasoning. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the order of the Tribunal in Appeal No. 341 of 1993 (W.P. No. 6414 of 1994), paragraphs 6 to 9 in Appeal No. 17 of 1991 (W.P. No. 6415 of 1994) and paragraphs 6 to 8 in Appeal No. 340 of 1993 (W.P. No. 6416 of 1994) will bear ample testimony to the conclusion of the Tribunal. The Tribunal has considered even the minutes details such as occupancy ratio particulars, number of buses plying on the routes in question, distance from one place to the other, etc, etc. As a matter of fact, the Tribunal held that for the major portion of the routes, the number of buses available are far and a few and that the sectors in question are ill-served and that there is every justification and in fact, there is a crying need to provide more facilities as will be evident from the numerous representations sent by the public and associations requesting for such facilities. The Tribunal had categorically held that the grant will be in the interest of the public and hence the contesting 2nd respon-dents herein are entitled to the grant of permit and other reliefs asked for.
33. It has been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in the famous Mithilish Garg case (reported in AIR 1992 SC 443) that the present Act provides for liberal policy of grant and that it is necessary to have more operators in the field to provide ample choice to the public and that one is entitled to the grant of permit for the asking. In view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the question of need, as rightly pointed out by the Tribunal, is no longer the acid test. Further, there is enormous growth in population and increase in road traffics and the request of the contesting 2nd respondent has to be assessed in this context.
34. It is pertinent to notice at this stage the order of my learned brother J. Kanakaraj, J., in W.P. Nos. 3063 and 3064 of 1994 dated 25-2-1994. They were filed by one J. Vijaya-lakshmi, who is a stage carriage operator operating a stage carriage between Namakkal and Arapaleeswarar Koil. According to her, she is a sector operator covering the full sector and is aggrieved against the grant of permit in favour of one K. Chitra (2nd respondent in W.P. No. 6414 of 1994). She filed W.P. No. 3063 of 1994 to quash the order of the Tribunal in Appeal No. 341 of 1993 dated 29-12-1993, the subject-matter of W.P. No. 6414 of 1994. W.P. No. 3064 of 1994 is again filed by the said J. Vijayalakshmi to quash the order of the Tribunal in Appeal No. 340 of 1993 dated 25-1-1994 challenging the grant of relief in favour of P. Kasthuri (2nd respondent in W.P. No. 6416 of 1994). According to her, she is aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal granting the permit on the route Sendamangalam to Vasalurpatti to the said P. Kasthuri. J. Kanakaraj, J., while dismissing both the writ petitions on 25-2-1994, passed the following order :
"Both these writ petitions relate to the grant of a new permit to the respective 3rd respondent in each writ petition. The applications of the 3rd respondent were dismissed by the Regional Transport Authority in each case and it is only the Appellate Tribunal, which proceeded to grant the permit in favour of the 3rd respondent. A perusal of the order of the Tribunal shows that the Tribunal had taken note of the judgment of the Supreme Court that the application for the grant of a new permit is considerably liberalised under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In this case there is no dispute that there is any scheme over which the subject route over-lapses. The Tribunal has also stated that there are many villages, which are reached only by foot and which need public transport. The factual findings of the Tribunal do not warrant any interference by this Court. Consequently, both these writ petitions are dismissed."
The three Civil Revision Petitions (now converted into writ petitions) were filed on 7-3-1994, i.e., after the order of J. Kanakaraj, J., in W.P. Nos. 3063 and 3064 of 1994, dated 25-2-1994.
35. Before parting with this case, it is my duty to point out that a quasi-judicial authority like the petitioner, who is held to be a person not aggrieved, cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction challenging the order of the Tribunal. A statutory authority has to act with some sort of responsibility in filing the writ petitions challenging the order of the Tribunal. It cannot be gainsaid that the petitioner has no personal interest or a person aggrieved. It is the concern of the aggrieved persons to take steps challenging the order of the Tribunal. The petitioner cannot claim to be a mouth-piece of the public representing the consciousness of the general public. Being a public authority exercising statutory function, the petitioner is expected to act fairly with a sense of discretion. It passes my comprehension as to why the petitioner should assume the role of a person aggrieved and challenge the order of the Tribunal and thereby indulge in vexatious litigation and wasteful expenditure. In the instant case, the reason for filing the writ petitions is obvious.
36. Despite the catena of decisions of this Court taking a consistent view that the persons like the petitioner are not persons aggrieved and therefore, cannot challenge the order of the Tribunal, the present writ petitions have been filed which, in my opinion, are not only vexatious but also motivated. .,. Hence, I am of the view, that all the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. It is useful to refer in this context the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in State of Maha-rashtra v. Uttamrao Rayala Nikam, (1994) 2 SCC 116. In that case. Special Leave Petition was filed against the order of the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, which found that the respondent reached the efficiency bar. Earlier, he was compulsorily retired but by the order of the Court, he remained in service. Under the Rules made by the Government, the process should be made well in advance and record should be considered and a positive order should be made by the competent authority to pass an order stopping giving the increment due to the efficiency bar. On 14-9-1984, the Supervisory Officer passed an order stopping the efficiency bar by which time he had already passed three years which he would have been entitled to in the normal course. The Supreme Court while rejecting the appeal of the State of Maharashtra, has observed that the Tribunal has rightly pointed out that the stopping of crossing the efficiency bar is arbitrary, unjust and unfair. Yet, the State of Maharashtra has chosen to file the Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court. It is useful to extract the concluding remarks in the above case, which run thus:
"Therefore, the Tribunal has rightly pointed out that stopping of crossing the efficiency bar is arbitrary and we hold it unjust and unfair. Yet the petitioner has chosen with no responsibility in filing the SLP in this Court with no ghost of a chance of success. Therefore, the SLP was filed needlessly and irresponsibly. Accordingly, the SLP is dismissed with the exemplary cost of Rs. 5,000/-. This amount should be deducted from the personal pay of the officer/officers who has/have recommended to file this SLP. The Chief Secretary, Maharashtra Government is directed to deduct this amount from the personal pay of the officer/ officers concerned and send it to the account of the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee. The Registry is directed to communicate this order to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee which would correspond with the Chief Secretary for collection of the amount."
37. The observation made by the Supreme Court in the above cited case is equally applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. As pointed out by me in paragraphs supra, the present writ petitions have been filed by the petitioner by indulging in vexatious litigation and wasteful expenditure. The writ petitions were filed needlessly.
38. Even though it may be a case where exemplary costs can be awarded and recovered from the officers concerned from their personal pay as had been done by the Supreme Court in the case cited above, I refrain from doing so by taking a lenient view of the matter. This Court hopes that officers like the petitioner herein shall not institute such proceedings hereafter.
39. For the foregoing reasons, all the writ petitions are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
40. Writ petitions dismissed.