Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Medisetti Appala Raju vs State Of Andhra Pradesh on 17 February, 2026
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APHC010081372026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3521]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
TUESDAY,THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF FEBRUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 1244/2026
Between:
1. MEDISETTI APPALA RAJU,, S/O. RAMULU, AGED ABOUT 63
YEARS, OCC BUSINESS, R/O.16-16/4, VSK HOMES,
MANGAPURAM STREET, PRAHLADAPURAM COLONY,
GOPALAPATNAM, VISAKHAPATNAM.
2. MEDISETTY ANANTHA LAKSHMI,, W/O. APPALA RAJU, AGED
ABOUT 52 YEARS, OCC HOSUEWIFE, R/O.16-16/4, VSK HOMES,
MANGAPURAM STREET, PRAHLADAPURAM COLONY,
GOPALAPATNAM, VISAKHAPATNAM.
3. KSR SATYA PAVAN KUMAR,, S/O.APPA RAO, AGED ABOUT 38
YEARS, OCC BUSINESS, R/O.6-386/1, VUDA APARTMENT,
VEPAGUNTA, PENDURTHI, VISAKHAPATNAM.
4. SMT.MEDISETTY HARIKA ALIAS BINDU,, D/O.APPALA RAJU, AGED
ABOUT 35 YEARS, R/O.16-16/4, VSK HOMES, MANGAPURAM
STREET, PRAHLADAPURAM COLONY, GOPALAPATNAM,
VISAKHAPATNAM.
5. KUNDRAPU APPALA RAJU,, S/O.LATE RAMULU, AGED ABOUT 43
YEARS, OCC BUSINESS, R/O.8-272/3/3, VUDA COLONY,
GOPALAPATNAM, VISAKHAPATNAM.
6. SMT.KUNDRAPU SUJATHA,, W/O. APPALA RAJU, AGED ABOUT 42
YEARS, R/O.8-272/3/3, VUDA COLONY, GOPALAPATNAM,
VISAKHAPATNAM.
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED(S)
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AND
1. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP.BY ITS PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT, HYDERABAD. THROUGH THE
STATION HOUSE OFFICER, IV TOWN P.S., VISAKHAPATNAM.
2. KUTCHARLAPATI VENKATA SURYANARAYANA RAJU,
S/O.CHANDRA RAJU, AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS, OCC BUSINESS,
R/O.50-121-54/1 /A, BALAYYA SASTRY LAYOUT,
SEETHAMMADHARA, VISAKHAPATNAM.
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S):
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused(S):
1. KONA N.D.V.RAMANA RAO
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S):
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
The Court made the following:
ORDER:
The Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity 'the Cr.P.C.,')/Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity 'the BNSS') seeking to quash the proceedings against the Petitioners/Accused No.1, 2, 4 and 7 in FIR No.17 of 2020 on the file of the IV Town Police Station, Visakhapatnam Commissionerate registered for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 316(2) and 318(4) read with 61(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity 'the BNS').
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. Perused the record.
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3. As per the MOU, some of the petitioners allegedly failed to achieve the targets fixed by respondent No.2. The FIR has been registered for the alleged offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating. However, both offences do not ordinarily go together.
4. In Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd v. State of Uttar Pradesh1 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating cannot coexist simultaneously.
5. Further in N. Raghavender v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that prosecution had failed to prove charges under Section 409, 420, and 477A of 'the I.P.C.,' and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of 'the Act.,' on the ground that no financial loss was caused to the bank, or to any customer; no conspiracy was established; the bank official committed gross misconduct by misusing his position, by acting himself in dereliction of his duties, but there was no criminal misconduct fall under the ambit of Section 409, 420 and 477A of 'the I.P.C'.
6. Furthermore, K. Bharathi Devi v. State of Telangana3 wherein at para No.34 it is held as under:
"34...It has been held that there are certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavor having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or a family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, the High Court would be justified in quashing the criminal proceedings, even if the offences have not been made compoundable."1
Crl.A.No.3114 of 2024 dated 23.08.2025 2 Crl.A.No.5 of 2010 dated 13.12.2021 3 (2024) 10 SCC 384 4
7. Section 406 of 'the I.P.C.,' deals with criminal breach of trust, which presupposes lawful entrustment of property followed by dishonest misappropriation or conversion. In contrast, Section 420 of 'the I.P.C.,' addresses cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, which requires deception at the inception of the transaction. Thus, while Section 406 of 'the I.P.C.,' arises from a breach of an existing fiduciary relationship, Section 420 of 'the I.P.C.,' is predicated upon fraudulent inducement at the very outset. The two offences, therefore, operate in distinct spheres.
8. As seen from the record, the alleged offences levelled against the Petitioners/Accused Nos.1, 2, 4 and 7 are punishable with imprisonment for less than seven (07) years.
9. However, a perusal of the FIR and the material placed on record, there exists a prima facie case to consider the request of the Petitioner under Section 528 of 'the BNSS'. Nonetheless, the circumstances of the case necessitate a thorough and comprehensive investigation. The voice of the de-facto complainant cannot be stifled at the threshold.
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Practical Solutions Inc. v. State of Telangana, Criminal Appeal No.353 of 2026 (arising out of SLP (Criminal) Diary No.953 of 2026), on dated 19.01.2026 has held as follows:
"We also take notice of the fact that the petition before the High Court was to quash the FIR. In a petition where quashing of the FIR is prayed for, the High Court should not have passed an order directing the Investigating Officer to comply with Section 41-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, because it indirectly amounts to granting a relief which the High Court could have considered only if a prima facie case for quashing of the FIR is made out."5
11. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation4, wherein at paragraph No.33, it is held as under:
33. On the basis of the interpretation given by us, we conclude as follows:
a. An arrest by a police officer is a mere statutory discretion which facilitates him to conduct proper investigation, in the form of collection of evidence and, therefore, shall not be termed as mandatory.
b. Consequently, the police officer shall ask himself the question as to whether an arrest is a necessity or not, before undertaking the said exercise.
c. For effecting an arrest, qua an offence punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years, the mandate of Section 35(1)(b)(i) of the BNSS, 2023 along with any one of the conditions mentioned in Section 35(1)(b)(ii) of the BNSS, 2023 must be in existence.
d. A notice under Section 35(3) of the BNSS, 2023 to an accused or any individual concerned, qua offences punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years, is the rule. e. Even if the circumstances warranting an arrest of a person are available in terms of the conditions mentioned under Section 35(1)(b) of the BNSS, 2023, the arrest shall not be undertaken, unless it absolutely warranted. f. Power of arrest under Section 35(6) read with Section 35(1)(b) of the BNSS, 2023, pursuant to a notice issued under Section 35(3) of the BNSS, 2023 is not a matter of routine, but an exception, and the police officer is expected to be circumspect and slow in exercising the said power.
12. Furthermore, in this regard, it is apposite to mention the Hon'ble Apex Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar 5, wherein a detailed guidelines were issued at Para Nos.11 and 12, for arresting a person, which are being reproduced herein below:-
11. Our endeavor in this judgment is to ensure that police officers do not arrest accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorize detention casually and mechanically. In order to 4 Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.5191 of 2021, dated 15.01.2026 5 (2014) 8 SCC 273 6 ensure what we have observed above, we give the following direction:
a).All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A of the IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity „the Cr.P.C.‟);
b) All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub- clauses under Section 41(1)(b)(ii);
c) The police officer shall forward the check list duly filed and furnish the reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further detention;
d) The Magistrate while authorizing detention of the accused shall peruse the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorize detention;
e) The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent of police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
f) Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A of Cr.P.C be served on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the District for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
g) Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action, he shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before High Court having territorial jurisdiction.
h) Authorizing detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court.
12. We hasten to add that the directions aforesaid shall not only apply to the cases under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the case in hand, but also such cases where offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years; whether with or without fine.
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13. The similar view is also reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Md.Asfak Alam v. the State of Jharkhand 6 , which also reiterated the guidelines laid down in the case of Arnesh Kumar.
14. In the light of the law laid down in the case of Satender Kumar Antil, Arnesh Kumar and Md. Asfak Alam, the investigating officer is under legal obligation to proceed in accordance with law, but he shall follow the procedure prescribed under Sections 41 and 41(A) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' (now Sections 35 and 35(3) of 'the B.N.S.S.,' 2023). The petitioners are obliged to render their fullest cooperation in the ongoing investigation.
15. In the result, the Criminal Petition is disposed of directing the Investigating Officer to comply with Section 35(3) of 'the BNSS'/41-A of 'the Cr.P.C.,' and to strictly follow the directions issued in the cases of Satender Kumar Antil, Arnesh Kumar and MD. Asfak Alam. If it is noticed in the course of investigation that the petitioners have committed any offence which is punishable with imprisonment beyond seven years, the investigating officer is at liberty to proceed in accordance with law.
As a sequel, Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed.
_________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date: 17.02.2026 KMS 6 (2023) 8 SCC 632 8 80 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION No.1244 of 2026 Date: 17.02.2026 KMS