Allahabad High Court
Raj Kumar And Others vs Deputy Director Of Consolidation, ... on 9 January, 1995
Equivalent citations: AIR1995ALL380, AIR 1995 ALLAHABAD 380, 1995 ALL. L. J. 1941
ORDER
1. The petitioners pray to quash different orders passed by the Consolidation authorities.
The Facts :--
2. The relevant facts for the purpose of disposal of this writ petition are in narrow compass :-- There appears to be a dispute between the petitioners and Respondents 4 and 5 concerning right, title, interest and possession over plot Nos. 1281/1 and 1287/2 of village Dhadha Chanwar in the District of Azamgarh (which both sides state that now it is part of the District Mau). The petitioners filed a suit for ejectment of Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 from the lands in question which was decreed by the trial Court, but the decree for ejectment could not be executed by the petitioners because "of an order of stay passed under Order 41, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Appellate Court. The Revi-sional Authority rejected the claim of the petitioners on the grounds, inter alia that since the petitioners could not execute the decree their claim is not tenable.
The Submissions :--
3. Mr. Mishra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, contended as follows :-- (i) Since furthr proceedings in the execution case filed for effecting delivery of possession pursuant to the decree of eviction was stayed on appeal preferred by Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 the Revisional authority was not justified in law in drawing an inference against the petitioner on that ground, (ii) The authorities have also failed to appreciate that after passing of the order of abatement of the suit, the finding either recorded in favour of the petitioners or in favour of the Respondents in the appeals arising therefrom (the suit at one stage has reached up to the Board of Revenue in 2nd Appeal and was remitted- back to the 1st Appellate Court for fresh disposal) became non est and the consolidation authorities have erred in recording their findings against the petitioners on the basis of the observation/ findings recorded in the appeals, (iii) The claim of the other side in regard to the land in question was founded on the basis of long possession which in law does not constitute adverse possession. Their claim has been erroneously upheld holding that they have acquired title by adverse possession despite the fact that there was no pleading set forth by Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 regarding acquisition of title adverse possession, nor had they adduced evidence to support adverse possession.
4. Mr. Rai, the learned counsel appearing for the contesting Respondents, on the other hand, prayed to dismiss this writ application submitting as follows :--(i) This writ application has been filed belately and accordingly it should be dismissed on account of limitation. (ii) No error of law, and or fact was committed by the Consolidation authorities in recording their findings against the petitioners (iii) The Petitioners have not appended copy of the objection preferred by Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 nor had they appended the deposition of their witnesses.
My findings :
5. I take first the objection No. 1 taken by Mr. Rai. This writ appliction was filed on 29-7-1976 whereas the Revisional Order was passed on 20-1-1976. However, it appears that the following endorsements have been made on the certified copy of the impugned Revisional Order : (i) Date of application : 8-3-1976 (ii) Date of notice : 3-6-1976; and (iii) Date of issue: 7-7-1976. It appears that the Petitioner had filed a review application which was dismissed by order dated 5-7-1976.
6. Mr. Rai, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting Respondents, however, could not show me any provision of the Constitution of India or the Rules of this Court or the Limitation Act, 1963 that a writ petition has to be dismissed on the ground of limitation, if not filed within 90 days of the impugned order. He could not cite any"decision that a writ petition admitted for hearing has to be dismissed on the ground of limitation. On the contrary the law which I know that there is no period of limitation of 90 days for filing a writ petition. In P.S. Sadasiva-swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 2271 (1974 Lab IC 143) it was held by the Supreme Court that "it is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Art. 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who, stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. In Chandra Bhushan v. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, Uttar Pradesh (Regional) Lucknow, AIR 1967 SC 1272 : (1967 All LJ 264) a Five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court, when a writ petition was summarily rejected by this Court observing that the period of limitation expired on 7th November 1961 and no explanation has been furnished why the writ petition could not be filed on November 7, 1961 which was filed on November 13, 1961, the said order was set aside holding as follows :-
"(2) The High Court of Allahabad has not framed any rule prescribing a period of limitation for filing petition for writs of Certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Ordinarily in the absence or a specific statutory rule, the High Court may be justified in rejecting a petition for a writ of certiorari against the judgment of a subordinate Court or tribunal, if on a consideration of all the circumstances, it appears that there is undue delay. But the aggrieved party should have a reasonable time within which to move the High Court for certiorari. Sometimes it has been suggested that the remedy be certiorari is in the nature of that afforded by writ of error, it will not be issued or if issued will be quashed or superseded, where, in the absence of special facts or circumstances excusing the delay, the application is not made until after the time within which a writ of error must be prosecuted has elapsed; see Ferris and Perries - "Extraordinary Legal Remedies" p. 202. The Allahabad High Court in Mongey v. Board of Revenue, U. P. Allahabad, AIR 1957 All 47 : (1956 All LJ 334) has consistently with that view laid down the practice that "writ petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution should be filed as quickly, after the delivery of judgment of the infereiorr tribunal, as possible. A period of 90 days, which is the period fixed for appeals to the High Court from the judgments of Courts below, should be taken as the period for application for the issue of a writ of certiorari, and that time can be extended only when circumstances of a special nature, which are sufficient in the opinion of the Court, are shown to exist." But in the absence of a statutory rule the period prescribed for preferring an appeal to the High Court is a rough measure; in each case the primary question is whether the applicant has been guilty of laches or undue delay. A rule of practice cannot prescribed a binding rule of limitation; it may only indicate how discretion will be exercised by the Court in determining whether having regard to the circumstances of the case, the applicant has been guilty of laches or undue delay."
x x x "(4) There are certain special circumstances which would have normally justified the Court in not insisting upon strict com-pliance even with its own rule of practice. Originally November 7, 1961 was declared a working day by the High Court, but by notice issued by the Court on November, 7, 1961, the High Court and its offices were, without previous intimation, closed some time about mid-day for the Diwali holidays, and the Court and its offices re-opened on November 13, 1961. The petition which was intended to be filed in that High Court was sworn on October 12, 1961, and an Advocate had, it appears, been engaged by the appellants to lodge the petition, and notice as required by the rules of the High Court was served upon the Standing Counsel. There is not reason to think that the appellants whould not have presented the petition on Nobember 7, 1961 if the offices of the High Court were not closed at 1.00 P.M. x x x x x x x x "(5) .....It may be mentioned that apart from the ground that the petition was not presented within ninety days, there is nothing which indicates that the appellants were guilty of laches or undue delay, nor are there grounds which justified the High Court in holding that it would be unjust to permit a departure from the practice of the court."
I further find that when this Court again dismissed a writ petition by its order dated 1-2-1982 observing that "writ petition was beyond time by 136 days. Neither the explanation of 136 days nor the explanation for filing it today, was given", the Supreme Court in Smt. Sudama Devi v. The Commissioner. AIR 1983 SC 653 : (1983 All LJ 731 (1)) set aside the aforesaid order of this Court and remanded the writ petition 10 the High Court for Us disposal on merits in accordance with law by observing as follows (at page 653: of AIR) :--
"This view does not appear to be correct because the High Court has proceeded on the assumption that there is a period of limitation of 90 days and unless sufficient casuse is shown..... as contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, a writ petition filed after the expiration of 90 days is liable to be rejected. This assumption is wholly unjustified. There is no period of limitation prescribed by any law for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is in fact doubtful whether any such period of limitation can be prescribed by law. In any event, one thing is clear and beyond doubt, that no such period of limitation can be laid down either under rules made by the High Court or by practice. In every case it would have to be decided on the facts and circumstances, whether the petitioner is guilty of laches and that would have to be done without taking into account any specific period as a period of limitation. There may be cases where even short delay may be fatal while there may be cases where even a long delay may not be evidence of laches on the part of the Petitioner...."
Thus, I over rule the first objection raised by Mr. Rai.
7. I find merit in the 2nd submission of Mr. Mishra. The Petitioners could not be blamed for non effecting of the delivery of possession of the land in question. They did execute their decree for eviction but Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 got further proceedings in the execution case stayed. The consolidation authorities also could not place reliance on different orders passed by the authorities in the suit and the appeal arising there from inasmuch as after passing of the order of abatement the judgments in the suit and or the appeal became nought which is cler from the following observations made by the Supreme Court in Mst. Bibi Rahmani Khatoan v. Harkoo Gope, AIR 1981 SC 1450 (at page 1452; of AIR) :--"
"8. The grievance of Shri Singh is that the High Court while make an order declaring that the second appeal has abared, was in error in setting aside the judgments and decrees of the trial Court as well as of the first appellate court which were in favour of the present appellants on the ground that those proceedings have aiso abated. 'At first blush this argument is very attractive but if accepted it has potentiality of doing irreparable harm.
9. When a scheme of consolidation is undertaken, the Act provides for adjudication of various claims to land involved in consolidation by the authorities set up under the Act. In order to permit the authorities to pursue adjudication of rival claims to land unhampered by any proceedings in civil courts a wholesome provision was made that the pending proceedings involving claims tp land in the hierarchy of civil courls, may be in the trial court; appeal or revision, should abate. This provision was made with a view to ensuring unhampered adjudication of claims to land before the authorities under the Consolidation Act without being obstructed by proceedings in civil courts or without being hampered or impeded by decisions of the civil courts in the course of consolidation of hold-ings. In order to avoid conflict consequent upon rival jurisdictions the. legislature provided that the proceedings involving the claims to land put in consolidation should be exclusively examined by the authorities under the Consolidation Act and all rival jurisdiction would be closed. Simultaneously, it was necessary to deal with the pending proceedings and that is why the provision for abatement of such proceedings.
10. The concept of abatement is known to civil law. If a party to a proceeding eitber in the trial court or any appeal or revision dies and the right to sue survives or a claim has to be answered, the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased party would have to be substituted and failure to d so would result in abatement of proceedings. Now, if the party to a suit dies and the abatement takes place, the suit would abate. If a party to an appeal or revision dies and either the apepal or revision abates, it will have no impact on the judgment, decree or order against which the appeal of revision is preferred. In fact, such judgment, decree or order under appeal or revision would become final. Such is not the scheme of abatement as conceived by S. 4 of the Act. Here, if the abatement as is conceptually understood in the Code of Civil procedure is imported, it will do irreparable harm. To illustrate, if an appeal abates rendering either the trial court judgment or the judgment in first appeal final and binding, the consolidation authorities would also be bound by it and the party whose appeal or revision abated would lose its chance of persuading the appellate or revisional authority to accept its case which may result in interfering with or setting aside the judgment, order or decree in appeal. Such was not and could not be the intention of S. 4. This becomes manifestly clear from the proviso to clause (c) of S. 4 extracted hereinabove which shows that such abatement shall be without prejudice to the rights of the person affected to a pritate (sic) the rights or interest in dispute in the suit or proceeding before the appropriate consolidation authorities under and in accordance with the provisions of the Act. No one would, therefore, stand to suffer on account of the abatement because there is a special forum carved out for adjudication of the rights which were involved in proceedings which would abate as a consequence of the notification under S. 3. If the construction as canvassed for were to be adopted it would result in irreparable harm and would be counterproductive. The consolidation work would be wholly hampered and a party whose appeal is pending would lost the chance of convincing the appellate court which, if successful, would turn the tables against the other party in whose favour the judgment decree or order would become final on abatement of the appeal. Therefore, the legislature intended that not only the appeal or revision would abate but the judgment, order or decree against which the appeal is pending would also become non est as they would also abate and this would leave consolidation authority free to adjudicate the claims of title or other rights or interest in land involved in consolidation. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was right in not only holding that the second appeal pending before it abated but also the judgment and decree oi the trial court and first appellate court would stand abated along with those proceedings. We reach this conclusion on the language of Ss. 3 and 4 and the scheme of the act but the view which we are taking is also borne out by some decisions though in none of them this position was directly canvassed."
8. I am satisfied that it is a fit case where this Court should exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioners.
9. However in view of the findings recorded as above, I do not consider expedient to adjudicate the question of adverse possession and it will be upon for the Petitioners to raise this question before the Revisional Authority, which if raised, will be considered and adjudicated in accordance with law.
10. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned Revisional Order dated 20-1-1976 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh in Revision No. 254/438 as well as the order dated 5-7-1976 passed by him, as contained in Annexure-III, both are quashed and Revision No. 254/438 is remitted back to Respondent No. 1 for fresh dispodal in accordance with law.
11. In the peculiar facts and circumstances, 1 make no order as to cost.
12. Before I part, it is clarified that this judgment shall not be taken to mean that this Court has expressed itself in regard to the merit or otherwise of the claim of the parties and it will be for the Respondent No. 1 to adjudicate the dispute between the parties in accordance with law.
13. Let a writ of certiorari issued accordingly.
14. Order accordingly.