Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Uma Aggarwal vs Employees State Insurance Corporation ... on 11 January, 2024
1
Item No.40
O.A. No.378/2022
With
O.A. No.2296/2022
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench, New Delhi
O.A. No.378 /2022
With
O.A. No.2296/2022
This the 11th day of January, 2024
Hon'ble Mr. R N Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Sanjeeva Kumar, Member (A)
O.A. No.378/2022
Smt. Uma Aggarwal
Aged 63 years
W/o Sh. Satish Aggarwal
Retired Social Security Officer from
ESIC (Group 'C')
R/o SF-II, Vardaan Apartment,
Module-13-14
Abhay Khand-III, Indira Puram
Ghaziabad-201010. ... Applicant
(By Advocate : Mr. Yogesh Sharma)
VERSUS
1. Employees State Insurance Corporation
Through the Director General
Panchdeep Bhawan, CIG Marg,
New Delhi - 110 002.
2. The Secretary/Chairman
Standing Committee, ESI Corporation
Ministry of Labour and Employment
Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi Marg
New Delhi - 110 001.
3. The Addl. Commissioner & Regional Director
Employees State Insurance Corporation
Ashram Road,
Ahmedabad - 380 014. ...Respondents
2
Item No.40
O.A. No.378/2022
With
O.A. No.2296/2022
(By Advocate : Brig. Dinkar Adeeb)
O.A. No.2296/2022
Shyam Lal, Aged 64 years
S/o Sh. Ram Singh
Retired Social Security Officer
From ESIC
R/o H. No.3121/A, Sector 3
H.B. Colony
Ballabhgarh,
Faridabad (Har)-121 004. ... Applicant
(By Advocate : Mr. Yogesh Sharma)
VERSUS
1. Employees State Insurance Corporation
Through the Director General
Panchdeep Bhawan, New Delhi-2.
2. The Director General
Employees State Insurance Corporation
Panchdeep Bhawan,
New Delhi -2. ...Respondents
(By Advocate :Mr. V.K. Singh)
O R D E R (ORAL)
Hon'ble Mr. R N Singh, Member (J):
Learned counsels for the parties in the captioned OAs have been heard on various dates and today they have concluded their arguments.
2. Learned counsels for the parties have submitted that the issue involved in both the cases are 3 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 identical, the grounds urged in support and against are also common and, therefore, with the consent of the learned counsels for the parties, the matters have been heard together and are being disposed of by the present common order.
3. For benefit of writing this common order, facts are being taken from OA No.378/2022 titled Smt. Uma Aggarwal Vs. ESIC and others. It is the case of the applicant that while working as Social Security Officer, disciplinary proceeding was initiated against her under Regulation 14 & Para 3 of Third Schedule of the ESIC (Staff and Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1959 (as amended) vide charge memo dated 29.03.2011 for the allegations, as contained under three Articles of Charges as available in order dated 16.09.2021 (Annexure A/1). In the present OA, the applicant has prayed for the following relief(s) :-
"(i) That the Hon'ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to pass an order of quashing penalty order dated 16.9.2021 (Annex.A/1), impugned charge sheet dt.29.3.2011, IO report and entire disciplinary proceedings declaring to the effect that the same are illegal, arbitrary, against the rules and against the principle of natural justices and consequently, the applicant is entitled for consequential benefits including 4 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 restoration of full pension and full retirement gratuity with arrears and interest.
(ii) That the Hon'ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to pass an order of quashing the impugned amendment in Regulation 8(I) of ESIC (Staff & Conditions of Service) Regulation, 1959 dt. 28.12.2019 circulated vide circular dt.7.1.2020, in which it has been stated that there is no need to take UPSC advice before imposing penalty to retire employees of ESIC, declaring to the effect that the same is illegal, arbitrary and against the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.
(iii) Any other relief which the Hon'ble Tribunal deem fit and proper may also be granted to the applicants along with the costs of litigation."
4. At the outset, Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the applicants, under instructions, does not press the relief sought by para 8(ii) in OA No.378/2022 with liberty to the applicant to agitate the same, if so required in future. Accordingly, the relief sought vide para 8(ii) of the OA No.378/2022 stand dismissed as not pressed with liberty in accordance with law.
5. Similarly, in the captioned OA No.2296/2022, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the applicant, who retired from services of the respondents on attaining the age of superannuation w.e.f. 31.07.2018 vide impugned Charge Memo dated 4.12.2022, stated to have been 5 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 communicated to him vide letter dated 11.01.2021 on 20.01.2021 under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of CCS (Pension) Rules 1972. In this OA, the applicant has prayed for the following relief(s) :-
"(i) That the Hon'ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to pass an order of quashing the impugned the charge sheet dt.4.12.2020 (Communicated vide letter dated 11.01.2021 on 20.1.2021) under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, after retirement of the applicant and the order dated 19.7.2022 (Annex.A/2) and entire disciplinary proceedings declaring to the effect that the same are illegal, arbitrary, against the rules and against the principle of natural justices.
(ii) Any other relief which the Hon'ble Tribunal deem fit and proper may also be granted to the applicants along with the costs of litigation."
6. In response to notices therein in the OAs, the respondents have filed counter reply. They have opposed the claim of the applicants and have prayed for dismissal of the OAs. The applicants have filed rejoinders and have reiterated their claim on the grounds raised in support thereof.
7. Learned counsel for the applicants in support of the claims of the applicants has argued that the charge memos, impugned in the respective OAs have not been issued by the competent authority. He submits that in the case of Smt. Uma Aggarwal 6 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 (supra), admittedly the competent authority is the Insurance Commissioner to impose major penalty. However, the disciplinary proceeding has admittedly been initiated and the penalty has been imposed by the Regional Director. He further submits that the said Regional Director, who is not the competent disciplinary authority has considered the written statement of defence and has appointed the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer and, therefore, the impugned order qua appointment of IO & PO is also vitiated and is non est in the eyes of law.
8. Learned counsel for the applicant has further argued that in the case of Uma Aggarwal (supra), the applicant has preferred representation seeking change of IO. However, during pendency of such representation, the IO has proceeded against her ex parte in place of staying the proceeding and awaiting for the decision of the competent authority and subsequently the said incompetent authority i.e. Regional Director has rejected the said representation of the applicant and forwarded a 7 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 copy of the I.O.'s Report. He submits that in this background, the report furnished by the IO is vitiated. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the applicants has placed reliance upon the OM dated 09.11.1972 of the Department of Personnel and Training. He further adds that the impugned order of penalty has been issued by the incompetent authority inasmuch as after retirement, the competent authority is the Standing Committee of the respondents whereas the order of impugned penalty has been issued by Chairman of the said Standing Committee. He adds that the matter has never been considered by the said Standing Committee and it was only considered by the Chairman and the order has also been passed by the Chairman. In support of his arguments, he has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of All India Institute of Medical Sciences Vs. S.P. Vashisht, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3168.
9. Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the applicants argues that in the case of Shyam Lal (supra), 8 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 admittedly the impugned charge memo was issued by the Director General of the respondents. He submits that in the case of retired personnel of the respondents, for initiation of disciplinary proceedings, only the Standing Committee is the competent authority and when the proceeding has been initiated by the Director General of the respondents, it is non est in the eyes of law. In support of this arguments, the learned counsel for the applicants refers to the provision of Regulations 8(6), 24 & 24 (A) of the Employees State Insurance (Staff and Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1959. Mr. Sharma, learned counsel further submits that the allegations against the applicant in the case of Shyam Lal (supra) relates to the period w.e.f. 30.12.2016 to 16.01.2017 i.e. four years prior to issuance of the charge memo and, therefore, the Impugned proceeding is not permissible in view of the provisions of Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the CCS (Pension Rules) 1972 as amended from time to time, the learned counsel argues.
9Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022
10. Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the applicants has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs. B.V. Gopinath that once the proceedings have not been initiated by the competent authority the same is vitiated and is non est in the eyes of law.
11. On the other hand, Brig. Dinkar Adeeb, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in OA No.378/2022, by referring to the pleadings filed on behalf of the respondents, has vehemently opposed the claim of the applicant.
12. Learned counsel has submitted that in view of the provisions of 5th Schedule of Regulation 12 of the ESIC (Staff and Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1959, the Regional Director is competent authority to impose minor penalty and any authority, who is competent to impose any of the penalties, as prescribed under the said Regulation can initiate the disciplinary proceedings in view of the provisions of Regulation 13 of the aforesaid Regulation and, therefore, there is no illegality or infirmity in issuance of the impugned 10 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 charge memo. He further submits that the representation of the applicant preferred to IO was duly processed and the same was considered by the competent authority and the competent authority has not acceded to the request of the applicant and the applicant was informed accordingly. However, learned counsel appearing for the respondents does not dispute that the decision of the competent authority has never been served upon the applicant before issuance of the communication dated 02.05.2019 (Annexure R/6) vide which the impugned IO's report has been supplied to the applicant seeking his defence in response thereto. It is also not in dispute that the communication dated 29.03.2019 (Annexure R/5), stated to be decision of the competent authority on applicant's representation for change of IO has not even been endorsed to the applicant and it is only communication of a decision to said Regional Director and on the basis of such decision, with respect to the IO report, it was communicated to the applicant vide communication dated 29.03.2019. 11 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 Learned counsel, by referring to the additional affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, has stated that though the Standing Committee is competent authority for imposing penalty upon the retired employees of the respondents, however, the said power has been delegated to the Chairman of the said Standing Committee and inasmuch as modalities were framed for dealing with the cases of the retired employees of the respondents' Corporation and the same was placed before the Standing Committee in its Meeting dated 04.10.2019 wherein it was proposed that the Chairman, Standing Committee shall issue the order of penalty and the same shall be subsequently reported to the Standing Committee in its ensuing meeting. The Standing Committee approved the said modalities and on the basis approval of the Standing Committee, the respondents were dealing with the cases of retired ESIC employees and orders were being passed by the Chairman of the Standing Committee. He further submits that since only such modalities and 12 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 orders passed by the Chairman were to be placed before the Standing Committee in the subsequent meeting, no notification in this regard has been issued so far.
13. Mr. V.K. Singh, learned counsel for the respondents in OA No.2296/2022, by referring to the pleadings filed on behalf of the respondents, has vehemently opposed the claim of the applicant. He has argued that though the Director General, who has issued the impugned charge memo is not the competent authority in terms of the relevant rules and regulations, however, the power has been delegated to him by the competent authority and, therefore, in view of delegation of power to him he has become the competent authority and thus there is no illegality in the impugned charge memo. He further submits that the allegations against the applicant relate to the period well within four years prior of issuance of the impugned charge memo, therefore, the reliance made by the learned counsel for the applicant on provisions 9(2)(b)(i) of CCS 13 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 (Pension Rules) 1972 will not be of any help in the case in hand.
14. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties and with their assistance, have also perused the provisions of the aforesaid Regulations and Rules and have also gone through the judgments referred and relied upon by them.
15. It is not in dispute that in the case of Smt. Uma Aggarwal (supra), the impugned disciplinary proceeding has been initiated by the Regional Director. The representation of the applicant for change of IO has been considered and rejected by the said Regional Director and during pendency of such representation of the applicant, the IO has proceeded ahead and the decision of the competent authority was supplied to the applicant along with IO's report for submission of his defence in response to the report furnished to the applicant. Similarly, it is not in dispute that the impugned charge memo in the case of Shyam Lal (supra) has been issued by the Director General, ESIC. The 14 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 provision of Regulation 13 of the Regulation ibid reads as under :-
"13. Authority to Institute Proceedings ...(2) A disciplinary authority competent under these regulations to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of regulation 11 may institute disciplinary proceedings against any employee for the imposition of any of the penalties specified in clauses
(v) to (ix) of regulation 11 notwithstanding that such disciplinary authority is not competent under these regulations to impose any of latter penalties."
16. The Schedule 5 of Regulation 12 of the Regulation ibid prescribes the disciplinary authority in respect of the Insurance Inspector/Manager Grade 2, Sr. Hindi Translator and the same reads as under :-
S. Description Appointing Disciplinary Extent of Appellate N of Authority Authority powers of Authority o. Officers/St (3) (4) Disciplinary (6) aff Authority (2) (5)
3. Insurance Insurance 1. Insurance To impose Director Inspector Commision Commissioner minor/majo General .Manager er i 2. Reguibak r penalty Grade Director/Adminis II/Senior trative Officer To impose Insurance Hindi II/Medical minor Commissio Translato Superintendent/ penalty ner r Director (Medical) Delhi and NOIDA.Director, sub-Regional Office Pune/Joint Regional Directors, Sub-
Regional Officers, Nagpur, Madurai and Coimbators.
15Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022
17. Provisions of Regulation 24 (A) of the Regulation ibid read as under :-
"24-A Competent Authority for Application of Central Government Rules For the purpose of application of Central Government rules to the employees of the Corporation under these regulations, the standing Committee shall be competent authority to exercise all the powers and functions which are vested in the President/Local Government/Ministries or Departments of the Government of India, under the various Central Government Rules."
18. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in S.P. Vashisht (supra) has ruled in para 23 as under :-
"23. We are of the considered view that if any authority other than the Disciplinary Authority competent to impose the penalty permissible under the Rules is permitted to draw the charge memo, the same would destroy the underlined protection guaranteed under Article 311(2) of the Constitution unless specifically permitted under the Rules framed in this regard. Further, in the light of the proposition of law settled in B.V. Gopinath (supra) as well as Sunny Abraham (supra), though under Rule 13(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, a Disciplinary Authority competent under the said Rules to impose the penalties specified in clauses (1) to (iv) of Rule 11 may 'institute' the disciplinary proceedings against the government servant for imposition of any of the penalties specified in clauses
(v) to (ix) of Rule 11, notwithstanding that such Disciplinary Authority is not competent under the CCS (CCA) Rules to impose any of the latter penalties but the same does not lighten the obligation to seek the approval of the 'Disciplinary Authority competent to impose the penalty under the Rules' for approval of charge memo. By virtue of Rule 13(2) of CCS (CCA) Rules, the Director, AIIMS being authorized to 'institute' the proceedings could have only 'drawn up' the distinct Articles of Charge which could be only finalized after approval by the Disciplinary Authority competent to impose the penalty i.e. President, AIIMS.
In the aforesaid context, it may also be appropriate to 16 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 refer to observations in para 51 & 52 of B.V. Gopinath (supra):-
"51. Ms Indira Jaising also submitted that the purpose behind Article 311, Rule 14 and also the Office Order of 2005 is to ensure that only an authority that is not subordinate to the appointing authority takes disciplinary action and that rules of natural justice are complied with. According to the learned Additional Solicitor General, the respondent is not claiming that the rules of natural Justice have been violated as the charge memo was not approved bythe disciplinary authority. Therefore, according to the Additional Solicitor General, CAT as well as the High Court erred in quashing the charge-sheet as no prejudice has been caused to the respondent.
52. In our opinion, the submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General is not factually correct. The primary submission of the respondent was that the charge-sheet not having been issued by the disciplinary authority is without authority of law and, therefore, non est in the eye of the law. This plea of the respondent has been accepted by CAT as also by the High Court. The action has been taken against the respondent in Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules which enjoins the disciplinary authority to draw up or cause to be drawn up the substance of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charges. The term "cause to be drawn up"
does not mean that the definite and distinct articles of charges once drawn up do not have to be approved by the disciplinary authority. The term "cause to be drawn up" merely refers to a delegation by the disciplinary authority to a subordinate authority to perform the task of drawing up substance of proposed "definite and distinct articles of charge-sheet". These proposed articles of charge would only be finalised upon approval by the disciplinary authority. Undoubtedly, this Court in P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v. CAG [(1993) 1 SCC 419: 1993 SCC (L&S) 206 (1993) 23 ATC 645] has held that Article 311(1) does not say that even the departmental proceeding must be initiated only by the appointing authority. However, at the same time it is pointed out that: (SCC p. 422, para4) "4. However, it is open to the Union of India or a State Government to make any rule prescribing that even the proceeding against any delinquent officer shall be initiated by an officer not subordinate to the appointing authority." 17 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 It is further held that: (SCC p.422, para 4) "4.... Any such rule shall not be inconsistent with Article 311 of the Constitution because it will amount to providing an additional safeguard or protection to the holders of a civil post."
19. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sahni Silk Mills (P) Ltd. Vs. ESI Corpn., reported in 1994 SCC (5) 346, (supra), in paras 13 and 18 has ruled as:-
"13. It cannot be disputed that by the impugned resolution dated 28-2-1976 the Corporation not only delegated its power under Section 85-B(1) of the Act to the Director General, but also left it to the Director General to authorise any other officer to exercise the power under Section 85-B(1). From Section 94-A it does not appear that Parliament vested power in the Corporation to delegate its power on any officer or authority subordinate to. the Corporation, and also vested power in the Corporation to empower such officer or authority, to authorise any other officer to exercise the said power under Section 85-B(1). If Section 94-A had a provision enabling the Corporation, not only to delegate its power to any other officer or authority subordinate to the Corporation, but also to empower such officer or authority in its own turn to authorise any other officer to exercise that power, the resolution could have been sustained on the principle indicated in the cases Harishankar Bagla v. State of M. p.7 and Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board'. As such it has to be held that the part of the resolution dated 28-2-1976, which authorises the Director General to permit any other officer to exercise the power under Section 85-B(1) of the Act is ultra vires Section 94-A.
18. These appeals and special leave petitions have been filed on behalf of the Employees' State Insurance Corporation for setting aside the judgments of the different High Courts holding that in exercise of the power under Section 94-A of the Act, the Corporation could not have delegated its power under Section85- B(1) by the aforesaid resolution dated 28-2-1976 to 18 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 the Director General of the Corporation empowering him to authorise any other officer, to exercise the power under Section 85-B(1) of the Act."
20. Similarly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Varinder Mehta Vs. UOI and Ors.(supra) has ruled as under:-
"43. Accepting the submission of Ms. Indira Jaising would run counter to the well known maxim delegatus non protest delegare (or delegari). The principle is summed up in "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" De Smith, Woolf and Jowell (Fifth Edition) as follows:- "The rule against delegation A discretionary power must, in general, be exercised only by the authority to which it has been committed. It is a well- known principle of law that when a power has been confided to a person in circumstances indicating that trust is being placed in his individual judgment and discretion, he must exercise that power personally unless he has been expressly empowered to delegate it to another." The same principle has been described in "Administrative Law" H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth (Ninth Edition), Chapter 10, as follows:-
"Inalienable discretionary power An element which is essential to the lawful exercise of power is that it should be exercised by the authority upon whom it is conferred, and by no one else. The principle is strictly applied, even where it causes administrative inconvenience, except in cases where it may reasonably be inferred that the power was intended to be delegable. Normally the courts are rigorous in requiring the power to be exercised by the precise person or body stated in the statute, and in condemning as ultra vires action taken by agents, sub- committees or delegates, however expressly authorized by the authority endowed with the power."
46. Ms. Indira Jaising also submitted that the purpose behind Article 311, Rule 14 and also the Office Order of 2005 is to ensure that only an authority that is not subordinate to the appointing authority takes disciplinary action and that rules of natural justice are complied with. According to the learned Addl. Solicitor 19 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 General, the respondent is not claiming that rules of natural justice have been violated as the charge memo was not approved by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, according to the Addl. Solicitor General, the CAT as well as the High Court erred in quashing the charge sheet as no prejudice has been caused to the respondent. In our opinion, the submission of the learned Addl. Solicitor General is not factually correct. The primary submission of the respondent was that the charge sheet not having been issued by the disciplinary authority is without authority of law and, therefore, non est in the eye of law. This plea of the respondent has been accepted by the CAT as also by the High Court. The action has been taken against the respondent in Rule 14(3) of the CCS(CCA) Rules which enjoins the disciplinary authority to draw up or cause to be drawn up the substance of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charges. The term "cause to be drawn up"
does not mean that the definite and distinct articles of charges once drawn up do not have to be approved by the disciplinary authority. The term "cause to be drawn up" merely refers to a delegation by the disciplinary authority to a subordinate authority to perform the task of drawing up substance of proposed "definite and distinct articles of charge sheet". These proposed articles of charge would only be finalized upon approval by the disciplinary authority. Undoubtedly, this Court in the case of P.V.Srinivasa Sastry & Ors. Vs. Comptroller and Auditor General & Ors.[19] has held that Article 311(1) does not say that even the departmental proceeding must be initiated only by the appointing authority. However, at the same time it is pointed out that "However, it is open to Union of India or a State Government to make any rule prescribing that even the proceeding against any delinquent officer shall be initiated by an officer not subordinate to the appointing authority." It is further held that "Any such rule shall not be inconsistent with Article 311 of the Constitution because it will amount to providing an additional safeguard or protection to the holders of a civil post."
21. On perusal of the provisions of the Regulations 1959, as quoted hereinabove, it is apparent that for imposition of major penalty in the case of Inspector/Manager, the competent authority is the 20 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 Commissioner. So far as the reliance made on provisions of Rule 13 of the aforesaid Regulations is concerned, it is apparent that the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has already considered the identical issue in the case of S.P. Vashisth (supra) as is apparent from para 23 of the said judgment and reproduced hereinabove.
22. Similarly, the provision of Regulation 24-A of the Regulation ibid categorically provides that all the powers and functions which are vested in the President i.e. local government, Ministries or Departments of Government of India under the various Central Governments Rules shall be exercised by the Standing Committee of the ESIC and in view of the proviso of Rule of Regulation 8(6), the Standing Committee, with the approval of the Central Government, can decide not to adopt any such modification or as the case may be beside to adopt them with various variations as the Standing Committee may deem fit. The said Pension Rules of the Central Government shall apply 21 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 either without or any modification or as the case may be with such variations as may be made.
23. It is an admitted case that for delegation of the powers through the DG, ESIC or the Chairman of the Standing Committee, the Standing Committee has never taken approval of the Central Government and, therefore, in view of the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, referred to hereinabove, the delegation being claimed in favour of the Director General, ESIC or the Chairman of the ESIC is no delegation in the eyes of law. Thus, in view of the aforesaid facts, Regulation, Law and discussion, we are of the opinion that the impugned orders deserve to be set aside.
24. Accordingly, the impugned penalty order dated 16.9.2021 (Annex.A/1) and impugned charge sheet dt.29.3.2011 in OA No.378/2022 and the impugned Charge sheet dt.4.12.2020 and order dated 19.7.2022 (Annex.A/2) in OA no.2296/2022 are accordingly set aside. The applicants shall be entitled for consequential benefits in accordance with law. However, the respondents shall be at 22 Item No.40 O.A. No.378/2022 With O.A. No.2296/2022 liberty to proceed, if they so decide, of course in accordance with relevant rules and law on the subject.
25. Both OAs are allowed in the aforesaid terms.
26. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
27. Registry is directed to place a copy of this order on the files of both the aforesaid OAs.
( Sanjeeva Kumar ) ( R.N. Singh )
Member (A) Member (J)
/uma/