Delhi High Court
Anil Mahajan vs Commissioner Of Customs & Anr. on 4 February, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000IIIAD(DELHI)369, 2000CRILJ2094, 84(2000)DLT854, 2000(53)DRJ501, 2000(69)ECC758, 2000ECR36(DELHI)
Author: Cyriac Joseph
Bench: Cyriac Joseph
ORDER Cyriac Joseph, J.
1. This is a petition filed under Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code for grant of bail to the petitioner who is alleged to have committed offences punishable under Sections 132 and 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The offence under Section 132 of the Act is bailable and the offence under Section 135(1)(b) of the Act is non-bailable. The petitioner was arrested on 4.8.1999 and he has been in judicial custody since 5.8.1999. After completion of investigation a complaint has been filed in the Court against the petitioner. Even though the petitioner filed an application for bail in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge it was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on 30.9.1999 observing that the petitioner is involved in a serious economic offence which has been committed with a cool calculated mind with deliberate designs and with an eye on personal profits regardless of the consequences to the community and nation at large.
2. According to the respondents, on 30.7.1999 smuggled synthetic fabrics of foreign origin and assorted colour bearing foreign markings and measuring 128745.80 meters and valued at Rs. 1,28,74,580/- were recovered and seized from the business premises and godowns of M/s. New India Agencies which is a proprietary concern of the accused Shri Anil Mahajan. At the time of raid by the officers of the Customs department the co-accused Shri Naresh Mittal was present. Shri Naresh Mittal was the Executive/Authorized Signatory of M/s. New India Agencies and was in charge of its day to day affairs. The petitioner Shri Anil Mahajan and the co-accused Shri Naresh Mittal could not produce any document in support of the legal import of the above mentioned seized goods. The seized goods are notified goods and are covered under Section 123 of the Act. As per a notification issued by the Central Government under Section 123 of the Act, "fabrics made wholly or mainly of synthetic yarns" are covered under Section 123 of the Act and hence the burden of proving that the seized goods are not smuggled goods is on the accused. However the accused completely failed to produce any evidence to prove that the seized goods were legally imported. After the arrest of the petitioner and the co-accused shri Naresh Mittal an application was moved on their behalf on 6.8.1999 stating that the seized goods had been legally imported against the Bills of Entry produced along with the said application. The learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate directed the respondents to verify the said Bills of Entry. Accordingly the said Bills of Entry were verified but none of the Bills of Entry could be co-related with the seized goods. The petitioner had tendered a voluntary statement under Section 108 of the Act stating that Bills of Entry were not available at the time of the raid, that the import documents did not contain details of any individual roll of fabric, that he was not aware of the stock position at his branch office at Delhi, that it was not possible to co-relate the seized goods with the import documents and that he was not even aware of the address of the transport companies which transported the goods from Mumbai to Goa - Delhi. The co-accused Shri Naresh Mittal also gave a statement under Section 108 of the Act stating that he was not having any document to support the possession of the imported goods seized from his godowns, that there was no stock register relating to the smuggled fabrics and that no document was available at the time of search by the Customs officers. The respondents have alleged that the petitioner Shri Anil Mahajan and the co-accused Shri Naresh Mittal were carrying on their activities in a shady and hush-hush manner. According to the respondents the seized smuggled goods are liable to be confiscated under Section 111 of the Act. It is also stated that the offences committed by the petitioner are very grave and that, if found guilty, the petitioner is liable to be punished with imprisonment up to a period of seven years and fine. It is further stated that, in the absence of any special reasons, the punishment under Section 135(1)(b) of the Act shall not be less than three years. This application for bail is opposed also on the ground that along with the official witnesses there are independent witnesses and there is every possibility of the accused person tampering with evidence and fleeing from justice if he is released on bail.
3. The petitioner does not deny the search/raid of the premises in question and the seizure of the goods. According to the petitioner the seized goods were imported from Singapore, Korea and Japan in container loads and were cleared at Mumbai, Goa and Delhi. They are stated to be non-standard and odd lengths of different varieties of fabrics in assorted colours and widths which are left out of regular length rolls. They are called 'stocklot' and is a cheep product bought in bulk. According to the petitioner the value of the goods has been highly exaggerated. It is stated that the goods are covered under Open General Licence Scheme and are neither prohibited nor restricted for the purpose of import. Any person can import any quantity on payment of customs duty. There is no restriction on the sale or purchase of the said fabrics. It is also stated that the seized goods are not goods notified under Section 11B of the Act and that there is no statutory requirement of record keeping in respect of purchase, sale, stocks etc. It is further stated that the goods attracted ad-valorum customs duty and the Bills of Entry provide all the relevant information. When the searches/raids started the petitioner was abroad. Learning about the searches/raids he returned to India and reported to the Customs House and produced all the import documents in respect of all imports made by him since the commencement of the business. He owned that all the seized goods had been imported by him and were covered by the import documents produced by him. The officers however refused to look into the documents and proceeded to place him under arrest on 4.8.1999 and produced him in the Court on 5.8.1999. The petitioner claims that 58 sets of import documents were produced in the Court of the A.C.M.M. on 6.8.1999. The learned A.C.M.M. handed them over to the prosecution to take note of them. Though the genuineness of the import documents was not challenged by the department, a verification report was filed on behalf of the department stating that the seized goods could not be co-related with the documents produced and that co-relation was not possible for the reasons mentioned in the report. The petitioner has denied that the seized goods are covered under Section 123 of the Customs Act. According to him there is nothing on record to show how the various varieties and blends seized by the respondents meet the description "fabric made wholly or mainly of synthetic yarns". The petitioner has also stated that the petitioner and the co-accused Shri Naresh Mittal had promptly retracted the statements given under Section 108 of the Act. It is contended that the petitioner did not make any confession or admission regarding commission of any offence punishable under Section 135(1)(b) of the Act. According to the petitioner, in view of Section 135(1)(b)(ii) of the Act the offence alleged to have been committed by him can attract only the punishment of imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years of fine or both. It is also contended that the petitioner fully cooperated with the investigation which has already been completed and that he is not required for any further investigation or enquiry. It is further contended that since the evidence in the case has already been documented and since the witnesses are official witnesses there is no basis for any apprehension that the petitioner will flee from justice or tamper with evidence if he is released on bail.
4. The seizure of the goods from the premises of the accused has been admitted by the petitioner. He has also admitted that the seized goods were imported by him. According to him they were imported under valid import documents. However according to the respondents the seized goods could not be co-related with the import documents produced by the petitioner. The question whether the seized goods are actually covered by the import documents produced by the petitioner cannot be decided in these proceedings. Similarly, the question whether the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner is punishable under Section 135(1)(b)(i) or under 135(1)(b)(ii) cannot be decided without recording evidence in the case and without deciding whether Section 123 of the Act applies to the seized goods and whether the market price of the said goods exceeds Rs. 1 lakh. In other words the contention of the petitioner regarding the maximum sentence that can be awarded to him in the event of his conviction is premature at this stage. Hence for considering this application for grant of bail, I shall presume that, as contended by the respondents, the offence, if proved, will attract the punishment under Section 135(1)(b)(i) of the Act i.e. imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and fine, provided that, in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be recorded in the judgment of the Court, such imprisonment shall not be for less than three years.
5. Learned counsel for the respondents strongly opposed the grant of bail to the petitioner mainly on two grounds : (i) that the petitioner is accused of a grave economic offence and (ii) that the petitioner may flee from justice and tamper with evidence if he is released on bail. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that bail should not be refused on the ground that the offence is an economic offence. According to the learned counsel, either the description of the offence as an economic offence or the maximum sentence that can be awarded cannot be a ground for refusing bail to the petitioner since the investigation has already been completed, the goods have been seized, the records have been taken into custody, the evidence has been documented and the complaint has been filed in the Court. It is submitted that the petitioner is no more required for any further investigation or enquiry and that there is no likelihood of the petitioner fleeing from justice or tampering with evidence. It is further submitted that the petitioner is an established businessman with roots in the society and that there is no basis for a reasonable apprehension that the petitioner will flee from justice if he is released on bail. It is contended that since the evidence in the case has been documented and since the main witnesses are official witnesses there is no possibility of the petitioner tampering with evidence if he is released on bail.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh and Others Vs. State (Delhi Administration) reported in AIR 1978 SC 179, Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc. Vs. The State of Punjab and the order of this Court in Ranu Ghosh Vs. State (CBI) reported in 1996 JCC 710. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat Vs. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal and Another ; Balkrishna Chhaganlal Soni Vs. State of West Bengal and the orders of this Court in Sanjay Verma Vs. State reported in 1991 JCC 273 and Rajinder Singh Vs. Union of India reported in 1992 JCC 455.
7. While explaining the power of the Court to grant bail under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898, the Supreme Court in The State Vs. Captain Jagjit Singh held that whenever an application for bail is made to a Court, the first question that it has to decide is whether the offence for which the accused is being prosecuted is bailable or otherwise. If the offence is bailable, bail will be granted without more ado. But if the offence is not bailable, further considerations will arise and the Court will have to decide the question of grant of bail in the light of those further considerations such as nature and seriousness of the offence, the character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial, a reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with, the larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations which arise. The Supreme Court also held that even though the powers of the High Court in the matter of granting bail were very wide, various considerations such as those indicated above had to be taken into account before bail was granted in a non-bailable offence.
8. In Gurcharan Singh & Others Vs. State reported in AIR 1978 Supreme Court 179, the Supreme Court considered the power of the Court under Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1974 to grant bail in cases involving non-bailable offences and held that in all non-bailable cases except cases relating to offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life, judicial discretion would always be exercised by the Court in favour of granting bail subject to sub-section (3) of Section 437 with regard to imposition of conditions, if necessary. The Supreme Court also held that unless exceptional circumstances were brought to the notice of the Court which might defeat proper investigation and a fair trial, the Court would not decline to grant bail to a person who was not accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court pointed out that Section 439(1) conferred special powers on the High Court or the Court of Session in respect of bail and that unlike under Section 437(1) there was no ban imposed under Section 439(1) against granting of bail by the High Court or the Court of Session to persons accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. However, it was clarified that the High Court or the Court of Session would have to exercise its judicial discretion in considering the question of granting bail under Section 439. It was also held that the overriding considerations in granting bail were the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence was committed; the position and the status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice; the likelihood of repeating the offence; the likelihood of jeopardising his own life being faced with a grim prospect of possible conviction in the case; the likelihood of tampering with witnesses; the history of the case as well as of its investigation and other relevant grounds which, in view of so many variable factors, cannot be exhaustively set out. In paragraph 29 of the Judgment in the above case, the Supreme Court pointed out that the two paramount considerations were the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and his tampering with prosecution evidence and that they related to ensuring a fair trial of the case in a court of justice. According to the Supreme Court, it is essential that due and proper weight should be bestowed on these two factors apart from others. However, the Supreme Court also said that there could not be an inexorable formula in the matter of granting bail and that the facts and circumstances of each case would govern the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or cancelling bail. The Supreme Court also opined that the general observations contained in the judgment in The State Vs. Captain Jagjit Singh (supra) with regard to the principles that should govern the grant of bail in the case of a non-bailable offence under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898 equally applied to the grant of bail under Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1974 and that the legal position was not different under the new Code.
9. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu and Others Vs. Public Prosecutor, , V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., observed that "Bail or Jail?" - at the pre-trial or post-conviction stage - largely hinged on judicial discretion. The learned Judge held that personal liberty was too precious a value of our constitutional system recognised under Article 21 that the crucial power to negate it was a great trust exerciable not casually but judicially, with lively concern for the cost to the individual and the community. It was further held that deprivation of personal freedom must be founded on the most serious considerations relevant to the welfare objectives of society specified in the Constitution. The learned Judge quoted Lord Russel who had said that bail was not to be withheld as a punishment and that the requirements as to bail were merely to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial. According to V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant to take judgment and serve sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. After holding that it makes sense to assume that a man on bail has a better chance to prepare and present his case than one remanded in custody the learned Judge observed that if public justice is to be promoted mechanical detention should be demoted.
10. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh and Others Vs. State (supra) were followed by the Supreme Court in Miss Harsh Sawhney Vs. Union Territory, and in Mohan Singh Vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh . In Mohan Singh Vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh, even though the counsel for the State argued that the corruption of which the accused was prima facie guilty was substantial, the Supreme Court held that it was not sufficient reason to refuse bail. In paragraph 2 of the said judgment the Supreme Court held thus :-
"Counsel for the State pressed before us that the corruption of which the appellant was guilty prima facie according to the results of the investigation) was substantial. Let us assume so. Even then refusal of bail is not an indirect process of punishing an accused person before he is convicted. This is a confusion regarding the rationale of bail. This Court has explained the real basis of bail law in Gurcharan Singh Vs. State (Delhi Administration) AIR 1978 SC 179; (1978 Crl. L.J. 129).
11. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc. Vs. The State of Punjab, the Supreme Court has observed that Judges have to decide cases as they come before them, mindful of the need to keep passions and prejudices out of their decisions. The Court has also observed that in which case bail should be granted and in which case it should be refused is a matter of discretion. The court found it interesting to note that as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in Nagendra Vs. King Emperor , that the object of bail was to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused was whether it was probable that the party would appear to take his trial and that it was indisputable that bail was not to be withheld as a punishment. The Supreme Court also referred to the observation of the Allahabad High Court in K.N. Joglekar Vs. Emperor , that Section 498 of the Old Code which corresponds to Section 439 of the New Code, conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which corresponds to the present Section 437. The Allahabad High Court had also observed that there was no hard and fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 498 and that the only principle which was established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously. The Supreme Court referred also the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor Vs. H.L. Hutchinson , wherein it was held that the principle to be deduced from the various sections in the Cr.P.C. was that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception, that as a presumably innocent person, the accused person is entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case and to establish his innocence and that an accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody. The High Court had also held that it would be very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any particular rules which would bind the High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the Court unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes bail may be granted but not in other classes. The Supreme Court apparently approved the above views and observations and held (vide paragraph 30) as follows :
"It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a variety of ircumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of bail."
12. In State Vs. Jaspal Singh Gill the Su-
preme Court expressed the view that the Court before granting bail in cases involving non-bailable offences particularly where the trial has not yet commenced should take into consideration various matters such as the nature and seriousness of the offence, the character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being required at the trial, reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with, the larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations.
13. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that in cases involving economic offences the Court should take a strict view in the matter of granting bail to the accused and that bail should not be granted in the interest of the nation and the society. In support of this contention learned counsel relied on the judgments in Balakrishna Chhaganlal Soni Vs. State of West Bengal, and State of Gujarat Vs. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal, . In Balakrishna Chhaganlal Soni Vs. State of West Bengal the Supreme Court observed that social and economic offences stood on a graver footing in respect of punishment and that if judicial institutions were not to be cynically viewed by the community, the Courts must help the process of conviction. In State of Gujarat Vs. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal the Supreme Court observed that a murder may be committed in the heat of moment upon passions being aroused but an economicoffence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the community. The Court also observed that ends of justice are not satisfied only when the accused in a criminal case is acquitted and that the community acting through the State and the Public Prosecutor is also entitled to justice. It was further observed that the entire community is aggrieved if the economic offenders are not brought to book. The observations made by the Supreme Court in the above mentioned two cases were with regard to conviction and sentence and not with regard to grant of bail. In my view those observations may be relevant for assessing the gravity of the offence which is only one of the several aspects to be considered for granting or refusing bail. Those observations do not classify economic offences as a special category for the purpose of grant or refusal of bail. Bail cannot be refused merely because the offence involved is an economic offence. A similar view was taken by another learned Judge of this Court (S.K. Mahajan, J.) in Ranu Ghosh Vs. State reported in 1996 JCC 710. However, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in Sanjay Verma Vs. State, reported in 1991 JCC 273 another learned Judge of this Court (R.L. Gupta, J.) relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat Vs. Mohanlal Jitamalji (supra) to refuse bail to the accused in the said case. A perusal of the order in Sanjay Verma Vs. State shows that the learned Judge relied on the observations of the Supreme Court to take the view that economic offences are placed even at a higher pedestal than murder. Bail was refused by the learned Judge mainly on the ground that the petitioner therein was alleged to have stated that earlier also he used to help his father in the latter's smuggling activities and was involved in the seizure of 120 foreign marked gold biscuits and, therefore, he was likely to indulge in offences of a similar nature if released on bail. In this context it should be mentioned that if the Legislature wanted the Courts to treat economic offences differently from other offences in the matter of granting bail, they could have made special provisions specifying additional limitations on granting of bail as in the case of offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. In the absence of such special provisions the general principles governing the grant of bail under Sections 437 and Section 439 of Criminal Procedure Code will apply even in a case involving an economic offence. It is significant that even though additional limitations on grant of bail have not been specified in legislations like the Customs Act and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, considering the nature of the offences and in the interest of society and the State, in addition to the provisions for sentence and penalty, provisions have been made under Section 111 of the Customs Act and Section 63 of FERA for confiscation of the goods/currency/security/money/property in respect of which the offence was committed.
14. The legal position emerging from the above discussion can be summarised as follows :
(a) Personal liberty is too precious a value of our Constitutional System recognised under Article 21 that the crucial power to negate it is a great trust exercisable not casually but judicially, with lively concern for the cost to the individual and the community. Deprivation of personal freedom must be founded on the most serious considerations relevant to the welfare objectives of society specified in the Constitution.
(b) As a presumably innocent person the accused person is entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case and to establish his innocence. A man on bail has a better chance to prepare and present his case than one remanded in custody. An accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his case and properly defend himself than if he were in custody. Hence grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception.
(c) The object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial. The principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant to take judgment and serve sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment.
(d) Bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. Even assuming that the accused is prima facie guilty of a grave offence, bail cannot be refused in an indirect process of punishing the accused person before he is convicted.
(e) Judges have to consider applications for bail keeping passions and prejudices out of their decisions.
(f) In which case bail should be granted and in which case it should be refused is a matter of discretion subject only to the restrictions contained in Section 437(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. But the said discretion should be exercised judiciously.
(g) The powers of the Court of Session or the High Court to grant bail under Section 439(1) of Criminal Procedure Code are very wide and unrestricted. The restrictions mentioned in Section 437(1) do not apply to the special powers of the High Court or the Court of Session to grant bail under Section 439(1). Unlike under Section 437(1), there is no ban imposed under Section 439(1) against granting of bail by the High Court or the Court of Session to persons accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. However while considering an application for ail under Section 439(1), the High Court or the Court of Sessions will have to exercise its judicial discretion also bearing in maind, among other things, the rationale behind the ban imposed under Section 437(1) against granting bail to persons accused of offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life.
(h) There is no hard and fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise of such discretion by the Courts. There cannot be an inexorable formula in the matter of granting bail. The facts and circumstances of each case will govern the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or refusing bail. The answer to the question whether to grant bail or not depends upon a variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of bail.
(i) While exercising the discretion to grant or refuse bail the Court will have to take into account various considerations like the nature and seriousness of the offence; the circumstances in which the offence was committed; the character of the evidence; the circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; a reasonable apprehension of witnesses being influenced and evidence being tampered with; the larger interest of the public or the State; the position and status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witness; the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice; the likelihood of the accused repeating the offence; the history of the case as well as the stage of investigation etc. In view of so many variable factors the considerations which should weigh with the Court cannot be Exhaustively set out. However, the two paramount considerations are: (i) the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and (ii) the likelihood of the accused tampering with prosecution evidence. These two considerations in fact relate to ensuring a fair trial of the case in a Court of justice and hence it is essential that due and proper weight should be bestowed on these two factors.
(j) While exercising the power under Section 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code in cases involving non-bailable offences except cases relating to offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life, judicial discretion would always be exercised by the Court in favour of granting bail subject to sub-section 3 of Section 437 with regard to imposition of conditions, if necessary. Unless exceptional circumstances are brought to the notice of the Court which might defeat proper investigation and a fair trial, the Court will not decline to grant bail to a person who is not accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.
(k) If investigation has not been completed and if the release of the accused on bail is likely to hamper the investigation, bail can be refused in order to ensure a proper and fair investigation.
(l) If there are sufficient reasons to have a reasonable apprehension that the accused will flee from justice or will tamper with prosecution evidence he can be refused bail in order to ensure a fair trial of the case.
(m) The Court may refuse bail if there are sufficient reasons to apprehend that the accused will repeat a serious offence if he is released on bail.
(n) For the purpose of granting or refusing bail there is no classification of the offences except the ban under Section 437(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code against grant of bail in the case of offences punishable with death or life imprisonment. Hence there is no statutory support or justification for classifying offences into different categories such as economic offences and for refusing bail on the ground that the offence involved belongs to a particular category. When the Court has been granted discretion in the matter of granting bail and when there is no statute prescribing a special treatment in the case of a particular offence the Court cannot classify the cases and say that in particular classes bail may be granted but not in others. Not only in the case of economic offences but also in the case of other offences the Court will have to consider the larger interest of the public or the State. Hence only the considerations which should normally weigh with the Court in the case of other non-bailable offences should apply in the case of economic offences also. It cannot be said that bail should invariably be refused in cases involving serious economic offences.
(o) Law does not authorise or permit any discrimination between a foreign National and an Indian National in the matter of granting bail. What is permissible is that, considering the facts and circumstances of each case, the Court can impose different conditions which are necessary to ensure that the accused will be available for facing trial. It cannot be said that an accused will not be granted bail because he is a foreign national.
15. In the light of the principles stated above, I have considered the facts and circumstances of this case and I have come to the conclusion that the petitioner is entitled to bail. The petitioner is accused of offences under Sections 132 and 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962. On conviction, the maximum sentence that can be imposed on the petitioner is imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and fine. The petitioner was arrested on 4th August, 1999 and he has been in judicial custody since than. The investigation in the case has been completed and criminal complaint has been filed in the Court. The goods in respect of which the offence was committed had been seized by the respondents and hence no further recovery is to be effected. The main witnesses in the case are official witnesses and I do not find sufficient reasons to have a reasonable apprehension that the petitioner will tamper with prosecution evidence if he is released on bail. Nothing has been brought to my notice to have a reasonable apprehension that the petitioner will flee from justice if he is released on bail. From the materials placed on record, it is clear that the petitioner is an established businessman with roots in the society. I am not inclined to refuse bail to the petitioner on the ground that he is accused of a serious economic offence. Having regard to the entire facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find any justification for detaining the petitioner in prison any longer.
16. In the light of the discussion above and in view of the facts and circumstances of this case there will be a direction to release the petitioner on bail on his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court. However, the petitioner shall not leave the country without the prior permission of the trial court.
17. The petition stands disposed of.