Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mohammed Aijaz vs Principal Secretary State Of M.P. And 5 ... on 21 January, 2016
Author: P.K. Jaiswal
Bench: P.K. Jaiswal
1
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH : BENCH AT INDORE
(D. B.: Mr. P.K. Jaiswal & Mr. J.K. Jain, JJ.)
W.A. No.9/2013 & Other connected matters
Omprakash Jaiswal
V/s
State of M.P . & Ors.
*****
W.A. No.120/2013 & other connected matters
State of M.P. & Ors.
V/s
Omprakash Jaiswal
*****
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Shri A.K. Sethi, learned Senior Advocate with Shri Rahul A.
Sethi, Shri K.L. Hardia, Shri Vivek Dalal, Shri Vishal Baheti and
Shri Abhyankar, Advocates for the appellants.
Shri Sunil Jain, learned Additional Advocate General with
Shri Yogesh Mittal, learned Govt. Advocate for the
respondents/State.
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ORDER
(Passed on 15th day of February, 2016) Per P.K. Jaiswal, J.
This order shall govern the disposal of W.A. Nos. 4/13, 5/13, 6/13, 7/13, 9/13, 12/13, 14/13, 16/13, 17/13, 18/13, 19/13, 20/13, 25/13, 26/13, 27/13, 28/13, 29/13, 30/13, 31/13, 32/13, 33/13, 34/13, 35/13, 36/13, 37/13, 38/13, 39/13, 40/13, 41/13, 42/13, 43/13, 44/13, 45/13, 46/13, 47/13, 48/13, 49/13, 50/13, 2 51/13, 52/13, 53/13, 55/13, 56/13, 57/13, 61/13, 62/13, 63/13, 64/13, 65/13, 66/13, 67/13, 68/13, 69/13, 70/13, 71/13, 72/13, 73/13, 74/13, 75/13, 76/13, 77/13, 78/13, 79/13, 80/13, 81/13, 82/13, 83/13, 84/13, 85/13, 86/13, 87/13, 88/13, 89/13, 90/13, 91/13, 92/13, 93/13, 94/13, 95/13, 96/13, 97/13, 98/13, 99/13, 100/13, 101/13, 102/13, 103/13, 104/13, 105/13, 106/13, 107/13, 108/13, 109/13, 110/13, 111/13, 112/13, 113/13, 114/13, 115/13, 116/13, 117/13, 118/13, 120/13, 122/13, 123/13, 124/13, 125/13, 127/13, 128/13, 131/13, 132/13, 133/13, 135/13, 137/13, 138/13, 139/13, 140/13, 141/13, 142/13, 143/13, 144/13, 145/13, 146/13, 147/13, 148/13, 149/13, 150/13, 151/13, 152/13, 153/13, 156/13, 157/13, 158/13, 159/13, 160/13, 161/13, 162/13, 163/13, 164/13, 165/13, 166/13, 167/13, 168/13, 169/13, 170/13, 171/13, 172/13, 173/13, 174/13, 175/13, 176/13, 177/13, 178/13, 179/13, 180/13, 181/13, 182/13, 183/13, 184/13, 185/13, 186/13, 187/13, 188/13, 190/13, 191/13, 192/13, 193/13, 194/13, 195/13, 196/13, 197/13, 198/13, 199/13, 200/13, 201/13, 202/13, 203/13, 204/13, 205/13, 206/13, 207/13, 208/13, 209/13, 210/13, 211/13, 212/13, 213/13, 214/13, 215/13, 216/13, 217/13, 218/13, 219/13, 220/13, 221/13, 222/13, 223/13, 224/13, 225/13, 226/13, 227/13, 228/13, 229/13, 230/13, 231/13, 232/13, 233/13, 234/13, 235/13, 236/13, 237/13, 238/13, 239/13, 240/13, 241/13, 242/13, 245/13, 246/13, 247/13, 248/13, 249/13, 250/13, 257/13, 258/13, 259/13, 260/13, 261/13, 264/13, 265/13, 266/13, 267/13, 268/13, 269/13, 270/13, 271/13, 272/13, 273/13, 274/13, 275/13, 276/13, 277/13, 278/13, 279/13, 280/13, 281/2013, 284/13, 285/13, 286/13, 287/13, 288/13, 289/13, 290/13, 291/13, 292/13, 293/13, 294/13, 295/13, 296/13, 297/13, 298/13, 299/13, 300/13, 301/13, 302/13, 303/13, 304/13, 305/13, 306/13, 307/13, 308/13, 309/13, 310/13, 311/13, 312/13, 313/13, 314/13, 315/13, 316/13, 317/13, 318/13, 319/13, 320/13, 3 321/13, 322/13, 323/13, 324/13, 325/13, 326/13, 327/13, 328/13, 329/13, 330/13, 331/13, 332/13, 333/13, 334/13, 335/13, 336/13, 337/13, 338/13, 339/13, 340/13, 341/13, 342/13, 343/13, 345/13, 346/13, 347/13, 348/13, 349/13, 350/13, 351/13, 352/13, 353/13, 354/13, 355/13, 356/13, 357/13, 358/13, 359/13, 360/13, 361/13, 362/13, 363/13, 364/13, 365/13, 366/13, 368/13, 369/13, 370/13, 371/13, 372/13, 373/13, 374/13, 375/13, 376/13, 377/13, 378/13, 379/13, 380/13, 381/13, 382/13, 383/13, 385/13, 386/13, 387/13, 388/13, 389/13, 390/13, 391/13, 392/13, 393/13, 394/13, 492/13, 494/13 and W.A. No.832/13 as in all these writ appeals identical question is involved.
2. These appeals have arisen from the impugned judgment and order dated W.P. No.9601/2011, passed by the writ court on 6/11/2012 (Omprakash Jaiswal v/s. State of P.P. & Ors.), by which and whereunder, the writ court partly allowed the writ petition by holding that notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, is a valid notification, but quashed the order dated 14.3.11 issued by Collector, Indore under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act (for short "the Act"), order dated 27/09/2011, passed by the SDO, Depalpur whereby case was recommended to Collector, Indore, Order dated 28/09/2011 passed by Collector, Indore whereby case was recommended to Commissioner, Indore Division, Indore and order dated 1/10/2011 passed by Commissioner, Indore whereby the recommendations of SDO and Collector were approved and, thus, the subsequent proceeding stand vitiated i.e. notification dated 4/11/2011 under Section 6 of the Act.
3. Both the parties i.e. landowners and State are partly aggrieved by the order of Writ Court and praying for allowing these appeals.
44. For the sake of convenience, the facts are taken from W.A. Nos.9/2013(Omprakash V/s State of M.P. & Ors.) and W.A. No.120/2013(State of M.P. & Ors. V/s Omprakash).
5. Certain extent of land in four villages namely Kali Billod, Ranmal Billod, Selampur and Ambapur, Tehsil - Depalpur, District-Indore was sought to be acquired in pursuant to the Notification No.9/Bhu-Arjan/Depalpur/2011, Indore dated 14.03.2011 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. The said Notification reads thus:-
dk;kZy; dysDVj] bUnkSj] e0iz0 ,oa insu mi lfpo e/;izns'k 'kklu] jktLo foHkkx Øekad 9@Hkw&vtZu@nsikyiqj@ 2011 bankSj] fnukad 14-03-2011 vf/klwpuk pwafd jkT; 'kklu dks ;g izrhr gksrk gS fd blds layXu vuqlwph ds [kkus (1) esa ls (4) esa of.kZr Hkwfe ds vuqlwph ds [kkus (6) esa mlds lkeus fn;s x;s lkoZtfud iz;ksx ds fy;s vko';drk gSA vFkok vko';drk iM+us dh laHkkouk gSA vr% Hkw&vtZu vf/kfu;e 1894 (Øekad 1 lu~ 1994) dh mi/kkjk (1) ds mica/kksa ds vuqlkj mlds }kjk lHkh lacaf/kr O;fDr;ksa dks bl vk'k; dh lwpuk nh tkrh gS fd jkT; 'kklu blds }kjk vuqlwph ds [kkus (5) esa mYysf[kr vf/kdkjh dks mDr Hkwfe ds laca/k esa mDr /kkjk dh mi/kkjk (2) }kjk nh xbZ 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djus ds fy;s izkf/kd`r djrk gSA vuqlwph Hkwfe dk o.kZu
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------....... .
ftyk rglhy uxj@xzke yxHkx /kkjk 4 (2) LkoZtfud
{ks=Qy ds varxZr iz;kstu dk
gSDVs;j esa izkf/kd`r vf/kdkjh oZ.ku
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 2 3 4 5 6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bankSj nsikyiqj dkyhfcYykSn Area 434-259 egkizca/kd ftyk uohu csVek&ihFkeiqj
O;kikj ,oa m?kksx baMfLVª;y DyLVj gsrq
dsUnz bUnkSj
bankSj nsikyiqj j.key fcYykSn Area 223-448 egkizca/kd ftyk uohu csVek&ihFkeiqj
O;kikj ,oa m?kksx baMfLVª;y DyLVj gsrq
dsUnz bUnkSj uohu
bankSj nsikyiqj lyheiqj Area 82-776 egkizca/kd ftyk uohu csVek&ihFkeiqj
O;kikj ,oa m?kksx baMfLVª;y DyLVj gsrq
dsUnz bUnkSj uohu
bankSj nsikyiqj vEckiqj Area 64-147 egkizca/kd ftyk uohu csVek&ihFkeiqj
O;kikj ,oa m?kksx baMfLVª;y DyLVj gsrq
dsUnz bUnkSj uohu
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5
Hkwfe dk uD'kk (Iyku) dk fujh{k.k vf/kdkjh ,oa Hkw&vtZu vf/kdkjh rglhy nsikyiqj ftyk bankSj ds dk;kZy; esa fd;k tk ldrk gSA e/;izns'k ds jkT;iky ds uke rFkk vkns'kkuqlkj jk?kosUnzflag dysDVj ftyk bUnkSj ,oa insu milfpo e0iz0 'kklu] jktLo foHkkx]
6. The landowners/Bhumiswami's filed writ petitions questioning the validity of this notification alleging that it suffered from a number of infirmities, principal infirmity being that the said notification was totally vague in respect of the lands sought to be acquired. In that, neither the description of the lands i.e. Survey numbers or khasra numbers were given nor the names of the landowners, whose lands were sought to be acquired in four villages, were given. The landowners also challenged the order dated 27/09/2011, passed by the SDO, Depalpur whereby the case was recommended to Collector, Indore whereby the case was recommended to the Commissioner Indore Division, Indore. In turn, vide order dated 01/10/2011 Commissioner Indore passed the order whereby recommendations made by Collector and SDO were and on 4/11/2011 notification was issued under Section 6 of the Act.
7. As per impugned order, total 157 writ petitions were filed by Shri Vivek Dalal, Advocate whereas objections were filed in 95 cases only. In 62 cases, no objections were filed as the petitioners of 6 petitions were unaware about the inclusion of their land. Similarly, 26 writ petitions were filed by Shri K.L. Hardia, Advocate on behalf of 76 writ petitioners, but only one writ petitioner filed his objection under Section 5-A of the Act and no objections were filed by 75 writ petitioners. After issuance of Notification under Section 4 of the Act, an objection under 6 Section 5-A of the Act was filed on the ground that the Notification dated 14/03/2011 wherein arguments were heard by the SDO Mr. Jitendra Singh on 24/05/2011 and the case was reserved for recommendations and recommendations were made on 27/09/2011 by Mr. Gautam Singh, SDO, Depalpur, who has not heard the objections. Apart from this, neither Mr. Jitendra Singh who heard the objections on 24/05/2011 nor Mr. Gautam Singh, who has recommended on 27/09/2011 were specifically appointed by appropriate Government to hear the objections and recommend the case. They also pointed out the work distribution memo issued by Collector dated 14/12/2010 wherein work which was allotted to Mr. Jitendra Singh the then Dy. Collector, SDO, has been mentioned, in which he was not authorised to hear and decide the objections relating to Section 5-A of the Act. Mr. Jitendra Singh was posted as SDO, Depalpur upto 24/08/2011.
The work was allotted by Collector, Indore relating to land acquisition cases on 15/09/2011. If the SDO, Depalpur was acting as Collector for the purpose of disposal of objections filed by the landowners, then recommendations were directly required to be sent to the Commissioner, Indore, who was appropriate Government and there was no necessity of recommendations which were made by Collector, Indore, who has not heard the objections. This indicates that the recommendations were not made by SDO in the capacity of Collector.
8. Since the objection was that the concerned SDO is having no jurisdiction to entertain the objections inspite of Notifications dated 24/12/83 and 15/02/99 of the State Government as it does not empower the SDO to hear the objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act, therefore, SDO was duty bound to hear and decide the said objections first as it goes to the root of the case.
7Apart from this, even if it is assumed that SDO, Depalpur was empowered to hear the objections, then too, Mr. Gautam Singh, SDO who was authorised by the Collector vide distribution memo dated 15/09/11 was required to re-hear the objection before making recommendations and was having no authority to recommend the case on 27/09/11 on the basis of hearing on objections, which were heard by his predecessor on 24/05/11. With the aforesaid, they prayed for issuance of writ of certiorari for quashment of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act and recommendations made by the SDO, Depalpur dated 27/09/2011, recommendations made by the Collector, Indore on 28/09/2011 and order dated 1/10/2011, passed by the Commissioner Indore Division, Indore.
9. The petitioners challenged the validity of notification issued under Section 4 of the Act on the ground that the notification was totally vague in respect of the lands sought to be acquired. In that, neither the description of the lands i.e. Survey numbers or khasra numbers were given nor the names of the landowners, whose lands were sought to be acquired in four villages, were given.
10. As per notification under Section 4 of the Act, the land was proposed to be acquired for the Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor(DMIC) project which is India's most ambitious infrastructure project. Site was conceived as a symbol of Indo- Japan strategic Partnership during the Hon'ble Prime Minister of India's visit to Tokyo in December, 2006. A MOU was signed between Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Government of India (MOCI) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Government of Japan (METI) on this occasion to promote Japanese investments in India and explore opportunities for 8 mutual co-operation as part of Special Economic Partnership Initiatives(SEPI) under the 'Common Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)' to be reached between India and Japan. The DMIC is essentially aimed at the development of 24 futuristic, new, industrial cities in India which can compete with the best manufacturing and investment destinations in the world. For DMIC, the land is sought to be acquired by M.P. Audyogik Kendra Vikas Nigam(for short "MPAKVN"), which is a company fully owned and controlled by Government of Madhya Pradesh.
11. The learned Writ Court after appreciating the decision laid down by the Apex Court and M.P. High Court in the case of M.P Housing Board Vs. Mohd. Shafi 1992(2) SCC 168, Narendrajeet Singh Vs. State of U.P. 1970(1) SCC 125, Omprakash Sharma vs. M.P. Audyogik Kendra Vikas Nigam (2005) 10 SCC 306, Executive Engineer M.P. Housing Board vs. Shrikant Mishra, 2008(4) MPLJ 384, Sooraram Pratap Reddy vs. District Collector, Ranga Reddy District reported in (2008) 9 SCC 552, Nand Kishore Gupta vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2010) 10 SCC 282 and Pratibha Nema vs. State of M.P., (2003) 10 SCC 626, has held that at the stage of Section 4 of the Act, Government may not in fact possessing all the necessary details which are dependent upon the survey on which it can decide which land in the locality would be suitable for the public purpose. Investigation into necessary data provided under Section 4(2) empowered the entry to carry out various operations mentioned therein on any land in such locality. Only after such survey is made, Government can decide, which particular land in the locality is adapted or suitable for public purpose and, thus, it is clear that at the stage of notification under Section 4 only locality is required to be mentioned not the survey numbers or 9 the names of the owners of the land, as it is not possible to meet these particulars without entering into the exercise contemplated in sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act.
12. On the strength of the above proposition, the learned writ court has held that the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act dated 14.03.2011 is valid notification. But in respect of objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act, the learned writ court held that the decision making process of respondents was not fair and allowed the writ petitions by quashing the recommendations dated 27/09/2011, 28/09/2011 and the order dated 01/10/11, passed by Commissioner, Indore Division Indore with a direction to re-decide the objections after giving an opportunity of being heard by the land owners and permitted all the landowners (including those who have not filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act) to file the objections/additional objections within a period of eight weeks from the date of the order in terms of order passed by the Apex Court in the matter of J & K Housing Board Vs. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul, (2011) 10 SCC 714 and directed the Collector, Indore to deal with the objections raised effectively as it is not empty formality, but forms basis on which State takes final decision on objections of land owners and also quashed all consequential actions.
13. The respondent/State also partly aggrieved by the impugned order whereby the learned writ court quashed the recommendations and directed all the landowners to file their objections under Section 5-A of the Act and quashment of all consequential actions, they challenged the order by filing separate writ appeals vide W.A. Nos.14/13, 64/13, 67/13, 68/13, 69/13, 115/13, 116/13, 117/13, 118/13, 120/13, 122/13, 123/13, 156/13, 185/13, 186/13, 187/13, 188/13, 190/13, 191/13, 192/13, 10 193/13, 194/13, 195/13, 196/13, 197/13, 198/13, 209/13, 210/13, 211/13, 212/13, 213/13, 214/13, 215/13, 216/13, 217/13, 218/13, 219/13, 220/13, 221/13, 222/13, 223/13, 224/13, 225/13, 226/13, 227/13, 228/13, 229/13, 230/13, 231/13, 232/13, 233/13, 234/13, 235/13, 236/13, 237/13, 238/13, 239/13, 240/13, 241/13, 242/13, 245/13, 246/13, 247/13, 248/13, 249/13, 250/13, 257/13, 258/13, 264/13, 265/13, 266/13, 267/13, 268/13, 269/13, 270/13, 271/13, 272/13, 273/13, 274/13, 275/13, 276/13, 277/13, 278/13, 279/13, 280/13, 281/13, 284/13, 285/13, 286/13, 287/13, 288/13, 289/13, 290/13, 291/13, 292/13, 293/13, 294/13, 295/13, 296/13, 297/13, 298/13, 299/13, 300/13, 301/13, 302/13, 303/13, 304/13, 305/13, 306/13, 312/13, 313/13, 314/13, 315/13, 316/13, 317/13, 318/13, 319/13, 320/13, 321/13, 322/13, 323/13, 324/13, 325/13, 326/13, 327/13, 328/13, 329/13, 330/13, 331/13, 332/13, 333/13, 334/13, 335/13, 336/13, 337/13, 338/13, 339/13, 340/13, 345/13, 346/13, 347/13, 348/13, 349/13, 350/13, 351/13, 352/13, 353/13, 354/13, 355/13, 356/13, 357/13, 358/13, 359/13, 360/13, 361/13, 362/13, 363/13, 364/13, 365/13, 366/13, 368/13, 369/13, 370/13, 371/13, 372/13, 373/13, 374/13, 375/13, 376/13, 377/13, 378/13, 379/13, 380/13, 381/13, 382/13, 383/13, 385/13, 386/13, 387/13, 388/13, 389/13, 390/13, 391/13, 392/13, 393/13 and 394/13 on the ground that those who have not filed objections under Section 5- A, could not be allowed to contend that Section 5-A enquiry was bad and that consequently, Section 6 declaration must be struck down and that then the Section 4 notification would lapse. Further, quashing the orders passed by the appropriate authority is bad in law.
14. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submits that on their reading of Section 4 of the Act as interpreted in various judgments of the Apex Court and High Court, it is crystal clear 11 that the purpose and intention to issue notification is to make a person aware that the Government intend to acquire their land. Accordingly, it is minimum and inevitable to show description of the land with precision and accuracy in notification under Section 4 of the Act, so as to enable the effected persons to submit their objections with regard to such acquisition. They submitted that the notification does not contain any such list, and, therefore, the description of the land sought to be acquired is totally absent. Only the name of the village mentioned where land is proposed to be acquired and it is mentioned that the plan of the land is available in the office of Land Acquisition Officer, Indore where it can be seen. They submitted that it does not fulfill the statutory and mandatory requirement of the Act.
15. Per Contra, Shri Sunil Jain, learned Additional Advocate General supported the reasoning recorded by the learned writ court in respect of validity of notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act and submitted that once the name of the village is mentioned in the notification itself, it was open for the land owners to pursue the map and submit their objections. He supported the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act and submits that is it in consonance with the requirement of Section 4 of the Act and omission to give particulars of land where the locality was specified did not render the notification invalid under Section 4 (1) of the Act and names of the villages in view of the smallness of those areas as a locality is sufficient compliance of Section 4(1) of the Act.
16. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record of the writ court.
17. Before proceedings with the arguments, it is apt to quote Section 4 (1) and 5-A of the Act which reads as under:-
124. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon: (1) Whenever it appears to the [appropriate Government] that land in any locality [is needed or] is likely to be needed for any public purpose [or for a company] a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette [and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language], and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality [(the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of publication of the notification)].
5-A Hearing of objections.
1) Any person interested in any land which has been notified under section 4, sub-section (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a company may, [within thirty days from the date of the publication of the notification], object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be.
Every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing and the Collector shall give the object or an opportunity of being heard either in person or by any person authorized by him in this behalf or by counsel and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, either make a report in respect of the land, which has been notified under sub-section (1) of section 4 or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land,to the appropriate Government, containing his recommendations on the objections, together with the record of the proceedings held by him, for the decision of the Government or the Board of Revenue, as the case may be. The decision of the Government or the Board of Revenue, as the case may be shall be final .
For the purpose of this section, a person shall be deemed to be interested in land who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation if the land were acquired under the Act.
18. The plain construction of this provision does not require particulars of the land to be given in the notification under Section 4(1) and it only requires that the locality in which the land is needed should be specified. On a comparison with the words 13 used in Section 6 of the Act, there can be no doubt that the particulars of the land needed are required to be specified only in the declaration made under Section 6 of the Act. If the requirement of a valid notification under Section 4(1) was the same as of that under Section 6, then there was no reason to use different words in these two provisions. This variance in the words used must, ordinarily, be taken as indicating different requirements under these two provisions. The same conclusion is also reached when the object of a notification under Section 4(1) is taken into account. It is settled, that at the stage of Section 4(1) there is only a proposal for acquisition which at the stage of Section 6 becomes the decision of the appropriate Government. One object of the notification under Section 4(1) is to notify the inhabitants of the locality that land from that locality is to be acquired for the specified public purpose and their interests are likely to be affected. Such notice is to enable all persons having any interest in the lands within the locality to object to the proposed acquisition under Section 5A and this right of objection is available under Sub-section (1) of Section 5A of the Act even in respect of 'any land' in the locality. Thus, the right of objection is not confined only to the particular land in which the objector has an interest but extends also to 'any land' in the locality. The reason is obvious. It is open to the inhabitants of the specified locality to show that lands in that locality or any particular land therein should be excluded from the acquisition proceedings and that the purpose can be fully achieved even by acquiring some other land. This result would be possible only if at that stage the location alone of the specified public purpose is decided and not its exact situation within the locality specified. The locality alone being notified, opinion of suitability can be formed in respect of 14 any land within that locality taking into account the views of the inhabitants therein. This can be done only if a firm decision with respect to particular survey numbers has to be taken after the notification under Section 4(1). Another object of this notification is to permit the officers of the Government under Sub-section (2) of Section 4 to enter upon and survey any land in the locality and to do the other acts necessary. This survey is obviously to collect relevant data in order to decide which particular land in the locality is more suited for the purpose of acquisition. The Collector has then to submit his report as required by Section 5A, taking into consideration all this material and it is then that the appropriate Government takes the final decision which results in the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. It is only at the stage of this final decision of the Government that the land is, therefore, required to be particularised. Viewed from this angle as well, the object of Section 4(1) requires only the locality to be specified in the notification thereunder and it does not require the particulars of land within it to be specified. Thus, the plain construction of the langauge in subsection (1) of Section 4, the setting in which the provision occurs, the subject-matter of the statute and the object of the provision all lead only to this conclusion.
19. We shall now first consider the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants that Section 4(1) of the Act requires not only the locality where the land is situated, but also the details of the land, survey number, khasra number, residential area have to be specified in the notification.
20. Shri A.K. Sethi, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the Division Bench decision of the Apex Court in the case of Om Prakash Sharma (supra), the Apex Court relying on the 15 decision of Narendrajit Singh(supra) wherein it is stated that the defect of non-mention of the locality where the proposed land was situated in the notification, was a serious defect vitiating the notification, held that the defect in a notification under Section 4(1) cannot be cured by giving full particulars in the notification under Section 6(1) of the Act and allowed the appeal with a direction that the order does not prevent the respondents from initiating the acquisition proceedings afresh in regard to the very lands in question in accordance with law. Para 5 to 8 of the decision of Om Prakash Sharma(supra) are relevant which reads as under:-
5. A Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in the aforementioned judgment, referring to earlier judgments, have held that notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, if it suffers from vagueness in regard to public purpose, such a notification cannot be sustained. In this judgment, reference is made to the judgment in Narendrajit Singh v. State of U.P. Reported in 1970 1 SCC 125 wherein it is stated that the defect of non-mention of the locality where the proposed land was situated in the notification, was a serious defect vitiating the notification. The notification in that case also did not specify the survey number or Khasra number of the land. In other words, the notification in the present case is as vague, if not more as in that case. In the said judgment, it is observed thus: (SCC pp. 174-75, para 13) "13. In Narendrajit Singh v. State of U.P., while dealing with the requirements of a valid notification under Section 4 of the Act, this Court observed that the defect of non-mention of the locality where the proposed land was situate I the notification was a very serious defect vitiating the notification. In that case, the Schedule attached to the notification issued under Sections 4 (1) and 17(1) of the Act read as follows:16
SCHEDULE District Pargana Mauza Approxi- For what purpose Remarks mate area required
------------------------------------------------------------ Rampur Bilaspur Gokal 125 acres For the rehabli-
Nagri tation of East
Pakistan dis-
placed families,
under the Minis-
try of Rehabili-
tation, Govern-
merit of India.
________________________________________________________ This Court opined that though Section 4(1) does not require the identity of the land which may ultimately be acquired to be specified with too many details but it undoubtedly casts upon the Government a duty to 'specify the locality in which the land is needed'. In Narendrajit Singh case, this Court also repelled the argument identical to the one raised by Mr. Thakur that since detailed particulars of the land had been given in the notification issued under Section 6(1) of the Act, the absence of those particulars in Section 4(1) notification was of no consequence. The Court said : (SCC p. 129, para 10).
' In our view the defect in a notification under Section 4 (1) cannot be cured by giving full particulars in the notification under Section 6(1)."
6. No judgment was shown by the learned counsel for respondents either to distinguish or taking contrary view. The learned Single Judge has rightly held that the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act could not be sustained. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in upholding the notification by merely enhancing the compensation.
7. Under the circumstances, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgments are set aside so far they relate to the appellants.
8. We make it clear that this order of ours does not prevent the respondents from initiating the acquisition proceedings afresh in regard to the very lands in question in accordance with law. If the authorities decide to proceed with the acquisition proceedings afresh, they may commence the acquisition proceedings within a period of three months. We further direct that the parties shall maintain the status quo existing on the lands in question covered by these 17 appeals for a period of three months or till the date the acquisition proceedings commence, whichever is earlier.
21. Shri Vivek Dalal, learned counsel has drawn our attention to the decision of Executive Engineer, M.P. Housing Board vs. Shrikant Mishra(supra) and submitted that the Division Bench decision is based on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Babu Barkya vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 1203 and Narendrajit Singh v. Stae of U.P. (1970) 1 SCC 125 wherein it has been held that Section 4 (1) of the Act does not require the identity of the land which may ultimately be acquired to be specified with too many details but it undoubtedly casts upon the Government a duty to 'specify the locality in which the land is needed'. Locality does not mean that the particulars of land have to be mentioned whereas the judgment of Narendrajit Singh(supra) has been overruled as is evident from the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Narinderjit Singh/Ranjit Singh & Others vs. The State of U.P. & Others, AIR 1973 SC 552 and drawn our attention to the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court case and submitted that the ratio of Executive Engineer, M.P. Housing Board vs. Shrikant Mishra's case (supra) would not be applicable because subsequent judgment of Narendrajit Singh/Ranjit Singh & Ors. vs. The State of U.P. & Ors. AIR 1973 SC 552 has not been considered by the Division Bench. In Executive Engineer, M.P. Housing Board vs. Shrikant Mishra's case (supra) it has been held that in the notification under Section 4, it is apparent that name of the village "Padara", name of Tehsil- Huzur, name of District Rewa has also been mentioned. Not only that "mohalla" i.e. precise locality where the land is situated in village has also been mentioned as 18 "suarantola". Thus, the mention of Suarantola" in village is for precise locality. The Division bench also held that in the notification under Section 4, the particulars of the locality mentioned under Section 4(1) of the Act, has been mentioned with quite precision in the instant case. It was not possible to give any further details before survey undertaken and finally mind was made up by the State Government before making the survey under Section 4(2) of the Act. Thus, the notification issued under Section 4 in the instant case mentioning the name of the district, tehsil and village and particularly tola(mohalla) of the village cannot be said to be the vague notification and held that it was not necessary to give the survey numbers and the names of the owners in the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act.
22. In the case in hand, along with the village, no detailed particulars of the locality has been mentioned as is evident from the notification which has been reproduced here in the preceding paras and, therefore, the judgment of Executive Engineer M.P. Housing Board vs. Shrikant Mishra(supra) is distinguishable on facts.
23. If we go through the judgment in the case of Civil Appeals No.1192 and 1193 of 1967 filed by Narendrajit Singh & Ranjit Singh & Ors. vs. The State of U.P & Ors., AIR 1971 SC 306, the Division Bench of the Apex Court relied on certain observations in Babu Barkya vs. State of Bombay AIR 1960 SC 1203 and held that Section 4 (1) does not require that the identity of the lands which may ultimately be acquired should be specified, but it enjoins upon the Government the duty to specify the locality in which the land is needed. In the case of Babu Barkya vs. State of Bombay(supra), the notification merely 19 showed that lands mentioned in the scheduled were needed. The schedule in its turn though it contained the heading District, Pargana, Mausza and Approximate area, gave no particulars of the same and all that was mentioned by way of a note was that the plan of the land might be inspected in the office of the Collector of Rampur. As no details were given, the only indication about the locality of the lands was possibly the District of Rampur inasmuch as the plan of the land was to be found in the office of the Collector of the same district.
24. The Apex Court in that context has held that the defect in a notification under Section 4 (a) cannot be cured by giving full particulars in the notification under Section 6(1). This judgment of Narendrajit & Ranjt Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. [AIR 1971 SC 306 has been set aside on review by the Apex Court and by order dated 24/10/1972 the Civil Appeals were allowed, but on different grounds and, therefore, the appellants/landowners will not get any help from the aforesaid subsequent judgment. In the case of M.P Housing Board Vs. Mohd. Shafi 1992(2) SCC 168, the Apex Court has held that the notification under Section 4 is required to give with sufficient clarity not only the "public purpose" for which the acquisition proceedings are being commenced but also the "locality" where the land is situated with as full a description as possible of the land proposed to be acquired to enable the "interested" persons to know as to which land is being acquired and for what purpose and to take further steps under the Act by filing objections etc., since it is open to such persons to canvass the non-suitability of the land for the alleged "public purpose" also. If notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act is defective and does not comply with the requirements of the Act, it not only vitiates the 20 notification, but also renders all subsequent proceedings connected with the acquisition, bad.
25. In the case of M.P Housing Board Vs. Mohd. Shafi 1992(2) SCC 168, in three judges Bench decision of the Supreme Court, the only description about the particulars of 2.298 Hectares of land proposed to be acquired is that the same is situated in District-Mandsaur, Tehsil- Mandsaur and village - Mandsaur is for residential purpose. The "public purpose" for which the land is required has been stated to be "for housing scheme of housing board."
26. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Hajari Vs. the State of M.P. , AIR 1976 MP 76 considering the word ".land" in any locality is a reasonably small one, like that of a village, the naming of such village as a 'locality' is a sufficient compliance of Section 4(1) . Para 6, 12 and 14 of the aforesaid Full Bench decision are relevant which reads as under:-
6. We shall now consider the main question requiring our decision. The argument of Shri Samvatsar, learned counsel for the petitioner is that Section 4(1) of the Act requires not only the locality where the land is situate but also the land with reference to the Khasra numbers to be specified in the notification. He relies on the decision of the Division Bench in Deva v. State of M. P. (Misc. Peta.
No. 63 of 1974 (Indore), D/- 29-9-1975), which undoubtedly supports his contention. On the other hand, another Division Bench in Christian Fellowship (Hospital), Raj-nandgaon v. State of M. P (1973 MPLJ
18), while dealing with this question held as follows :--
"..... The view taken in Iftikhar Ahmed's case (AIR 1961 Madh Pra 140) in so far as it lays down that in omission to give particulars of land in a notification under Section 4(1) renders the notifica tion invalid and, therefore, vitiates the entire land acquisition proceedings, can no longer be accepted as laying down good law." (Para 3) "If the locality is a reasonably small one, like that of a village, the naming of such village as a 'locality' is a sufficient compliance of Section 4(1). But this does not necessarily imply that the naming of a city like Bhopal, 21 would amount to a specification of a locality within the mean ing of the section. It all, therefore, de pends on the nature of the locality where the land is situate in each particular case.
The answer to the first question, there fore, must be that village is a 'locality' within the meaning of Section 4(1) of the Act, having regard to the smalness of the area involved. The naming of a village as a locality in a notification issued under that section, therefore, does not render it invalid in any manner." (Para 8) The above quoted passages from the decision in Christian Fellowship (Hospital), Rajnandgaon v. State of M. P. (supra) occur in the opinion of A. P, Sen, J., who was the third Judge to whom the case was referred on a difference between Naik J. and Shiv Dayal J. (as he then was) who constituted that Division Bench. The opinion of A. P. Sen J. therefore, constitutes the decision of that Division Bench. In this case it was clearly held that omission to give particulars of the land, where locality was specified did not render the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act invalid and naming of the village, in view of the smallness of its area, as a locality is a sufficient compliance of Section 4(1). There is thus a direct conflict on this point between these two Division Bench decisions. It is a matter of regret that the earlier Division Bench decision, which was reported in 1973 MPLJ 18 as also in 1973 Jab LJ 163 was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench deciding Deva's case (supra) much later on 29-9-1975. What is more, the learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the State in Deva's case (supra) conceded this point in the petitioner's favour. It is obviously for this reason that the later Division Bench deciding Deva's case (supra) missed the earlier reported decision of another Division Bench and was misled into taking a contrary view on the same point without even referring to the earlier Division Bench decision. We shall now consider the question on its merits.
12. This takes us now to the meaning of the word 'locality' occurring in Section 4(1). In Christian Fellowship (Hospital), Rajnandgaon v. State of M. P. (1973 MPLJ 18) the conclusion reached on this point is quoted in para 6 above. In substance the conclusion is, that a village is a locality having regard to its smallness. This conclusion was reached after referring to the meaning of the word 'locality' given in the ordinary and legal dictionaries. The several meanings as well as the setting in which. the word 'locality' occurs indicate that this is substantially the correct meaning. 'Locality' is a place with an area 22 which is reasonably small and compact so that it has come to exist and the treated as one unit, a reference to which sufficiently identifies the area and the persons therein. Orddnarily, the unit has acquired a name by which it is referred and understood.
14. The result is that ordinarily naming the village would amount to specifying the locality unless it is shown in a particular case that the village specified is much too large to be treated as a locality, there being smaller units within that village and having a name, which can be more appropriately called a locality. This would, therefore, be a question of fact in each case and where a village is sepcified in the notification under Section 4(1), it would be presumed to be valid unless the person challenging its validity shows that in fact the village named does not amount to specifying the locality on the facts and in the circumstances of that case. We are, therefore, in agreement with the conclu-sion reached on this point by A. P. Sen J. in Christian Fellowship (Hospital), Rajnandgaon v. State of M. P. (1973 MPLJ 18). We would, however, add thereto what has been said herein by us. We find that substantially the same view has also been taken in Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi v. Durga Shankar (AIR 1975 All 99) (DB).
27. This question has also been considered by the Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. vs. Vishnu Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 1593. From the notification, it is clear that chunk of the four villages namely Kali Billod, Ranmal Billod, Selampur and Ambapur, Tehsil - Depalpur, District-Indore has to be acquired in pursuant to the . Notification under Section 4 (1) and, therefore, law laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that at the stage of Section 4, the Government may not in fact possess all the necessary details upon which it can be decided which of the land in the locality is suitable for public purpose and at the stage of notification under Section 4 only locality is required to be mentioned nor the survey numbers or the names of owners of the land, as it is not possible to mention the same without entering into the exercise contemplated in sub-section 2 of 23 Section 4 of the Act. Thus, we are of the view that the learned writ court rightly upheld the notification issued under Section 4 by holding that the same is valid and it cannot be said to be vague.
28. In respect of second question that every person likely to be adversely affected by a decision must be granted a meaningful opportunity of being heard. Section 5-A of the Act also mandates that the person who heard and considered the objections can alone decide them; and not even his successor is competent to do so even on the basis of materials collected by his predecessor.
29. Shri Sunil Jain, Learned AAG for the State has submitted that only very few landowners have filed their objections before the office of the Collector and after granting sufficient opportunity, the orders were passed. There is no violation of Section 5-A of the Act and learned writ court has committed an error in setting aside the recommendations of SDO, Collector and order passed by the Commissioner, Indore Division, Indore and also erred in quashing all the actions of the respondents.
30. Section 5-A of the Act mandates that objections must be filed within 30 days of the issuance of the notification. Section 5- A further obligates the Collector to submit a report to the Government in respect of the objections preferred by persons interested in the land, as well as pertaining to any aspect of the nature of the land proposed to be acquired.
31. In Nandeshwar Prasad v. U.P. Government, AIR 1964 SC 1217, the Apex Court dealt with the nature of objections under Section 5-A of the Act 1894 observing as under: "13. The right to file objections under Section 5-A is a substantial right when a person's property is being threatened with acquisition and we 24 cannot accept that that right can be taken away as if by a side wind..."
32. The rules of natural justice have been ingrained in the scheme of Section 5-A of the Act 1894 with a view to ensure that before any person is deprived of his land by way of compulsory acquisition, he must get an opportunity to oppose the decision of the State Government and/or its agencies/instrumentalities to acquire the particular parcel of land.
33. Section 5-A(2) of the Act, which represents statutory embodiment of the rule of audi alteram partem, gives an opportunity to the objector to make an endeavour to convince the Collector that his land is not required for the public purpose specified in the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act or that there are other valid reasons for not acquiring the same. Thus, section 5-A of the Act embodies a very just and wholesome principle that a person whose property is being or is intended to be acquired should have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made.
34. On the consideration of the said objection, the Collector is required to make a report. The State Government is then required to apply mind to the report of the Collector and take final decision on the objections filed by the landowners and other interested persons. Then and then only, a declaration can be made under Section 6(1) of the Act 1894.
35. Therefore, Section 5-A of the Act 1894 confers a valuable right in favour of a person whose lands are sought to be acquired. It is trite that hearing given to a person must be an effective one and not a mere formality. Formation of opinion as 25 regard the public purpose as also suitability thereof must be preceded by application of mind having due regard to the relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. The State in its decision making process must not commit any misdirection in law. It is also not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act, 1894 confers a valuable important right and having regard to the provisions, contained in Article 300A of the Constitution of India has been held to be akin to a fundamental right. Thus, the limited right given to an owner/person interested under Section 5-A of the Act, 1894 to object to the acquisition proceedings is not an empty formality and is a substantive right, which can be taken away only for good and valid reason and within the limitations prescribed under Section 17(4) of the Act, 1894.
36. The Land Acquisition Collector is duty-bound to objectively consider the arguments advanced by the objector and make recommendations, duly supported by brief reasons, as to why the particular piece of land should or should not be acquired and whether the plea put forward by the objector merits acceptance. In other words, the recommendations made by the Land Acquisition Collector should reflect objective application of mind to the entire record including the objections filed by the interested persons.
37. The Apex Court in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao Vs. APSRTC, AIR 1959 SC 308, held: "Personal hearing enables the authority concerned to watch the demeanour of the witnesses and clear up his doubts during the course of the arguments, and the party appearing to persuade the authority by reasoned argument to accept his point of view. If one person hears and another decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty 26 formality. We therefore hold that the said procedure followed in this case also offends another basic principle of judicial procedure." (Emphasis added)
38. The Apex Court in Rasid Javed & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr., AIR 2010 SC 2275 following the judgment in Gullapalli (supra), supra held that a person who hears must decide and that divided responsibility is destructive of the concept of hearing is too fundamental a proposition to be doubted.
39. A similar view has been re-iterated by the Apex Court in Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association v. Designated Authority & Ors., (2011) 2 SCC 258, wherein the Apex Court dealt with a case wherein the Designated Authority (DA) under the relevant Statute passed the final order on the material collected by his predecessor in office who had also accorded the hearing to the parties concerned. The Apex court held that the order stood vitiated as it offended the basic principles of natural justice.
40. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the very person/officer, who accords the hearing to the objector must also submit the report/ take decision on the objection and in case his successor decides the case without giving a fresh hearing, the order would stand vitiated having been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice.
41. Relying on a Full Bench decision of this Court in the matter of Hajari vs. The State of M.P.(supra) and law laid by the Apex Court, we are of the view that specifying locality is the only requirement of valid notification and omission to give particulars of land with reference to Khasra numbers in a notification under 27 Section 4(1) does not render the notification invalid.
42. The arguments that the objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act were heard by the then SDO Mr. Jitendra Singh on 24/05/2011 and case was reserved for recommendation and recommendations were made on 27/09/2011 by Mr. Gautam Singh, SDO Depalpur, who has not heard the objections. Thus, the very persons / officers who were hearing to the objections has not submitted the report nor has taken any decision on the objections and his successor decides the objections / recommends the case without giving a fresh hearing, the order would stand vitiated having been passed in violation to the principle of natural justice.
43. The learned writ court rightly quashed the recommendations made by SDO, Depalpur on 27/09/2011, the recommendations made by Collector, Indore on 28/09/2011 and the order dated 1/10/2011 passed by the Commissioner, Indore Division.
44. In the light of law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Laxmi Devi vs. State of Bihar & Ors., (2015) 10 SCC 241, we are of the view that the landowners who are likely to be adversely affected by the decision must be granted a meaningful opportunity of being heard. This right cannot be taken away by a side - wind, as so powerfully and pellucidly stated in Nandeshwar Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 1217 and decision on the objections should be available in a self- contained, speaking and reasoned order, reasons cannot be added to it later as that would be akin to putting old wine in new bottles.
45. In connection with the landowners, or persons interested, who have not filed objections, under Section 5-A, in principle, it 28 must be accepted that they had no objection to Section 4 notification operating in respect of their property.
46. On the other hand, in respect of those who filed objections they may have locus standi to contend that Section 5-A enquiry was not conducted properly, we therefore, not agree in principle with a view of judgment of three Benches in Abhey Ram (dead) by Lrs. and Ors. v/s Union of India & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2564 that those who have not filed objections under Section 5-A, could not be allowed to contend that Section - 5-A enquiry was bad and that consequently, Section 6 declaration must be struck down and that then the Section 4 notification would lapse. However, no objections were filed by the landowners, logically Section - 6 declaration must be deemed to be in force so far as they are concerned.
47. For these reasons, we are of the view that the learned writ court has erred in permitting all the landowners including those who have not filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act. Thus, we are of the view that in respect of those who did not object to Section 4(1) notification by filing objection under Section 5-A, the said notification must be treated as being in force. Those landowners cannot be permitted to contend. In some other cases, the notification was quashed and such quashing would also enure to their benefits. To that extent, we partly allow the appeal of the State bearing W.A. Nos.64/13, 67/13, 68/13, 69/13, 115/13, 116/13, 117/13, 118/13, 120/13, 122/13, 123/13, 156/13, 185/13, 186/13, 187/13, 188/13, 190/13, 191/13, 192/13, 193/13, 194/13, 195/13, 196/13, 197/13, 198/13, 209/13, 210/13, 211/13, 212/13, 213/13, 214/13, 215/13, 216/13, 217/13, 218/13, 219/13, 220/13, 221/13, 222/13, 223/13, 224/13, 225/13, 226/13, 227/13, 228/13, 229/13, 230/13, 231/13, 232/13, 233/13, 234/13, 29 235/13, 236/13, 237/13, 238/13, 239/13, 240/13, 241/13, 242/13, 245/13, 246/13, 247/13, 248/13, 249/13, 250/13, 257/13, 258/13, 259/13, 264/13, 265/13, 266/13, 267/13, 268/13, 269/13, 270/13, 271/13, 272/13, 273/13, 274/13, 275/13, 276/13, 277/13, 278/13, 279/13, 280/13, 281/13, 284/13, 285/13, 286/13, 287/13, 288/13, 289/13, 290/13, 291/13, 292/13, 293/13, 294/13, 295/13, 296/13, 297/13, 298/13, 299/13, 300/13, 301/13, 302/13, 303/13, 304/13, 305/13, 306/13, 312/13, 313/13, 314/13, 315/13, 316/13, 317/13, 318/13, 319/13, 320/13, 321/13, 322/13, 323/13, 324/13, 325/13, 326/13, 327/13, 328/13, 329/13, 330/13, 331/13, 332/13, 333/13, 334/13, 335/13, 336/13, 337/13, 338/13, 339/13, 340/13, 345/13, 346/13, 347/13, 348/13, 349/13, 350/13, 351/13, 352/13, 353/13, 354/13, 355/13, 356/13, 357/13, 358/13, 359/13, 360/13, 361/13, 362/13, 363/13, 364/13, 365/13, 366/13, 368/13, 369/13, 370/13, 371/13, 372/13, 373/13, 374/13, 375/13, 376/13, 377/13, 378/13, 379/13, 380/13, 381/13, 382/13, 383/13, 385/13, 386/13, 387/13, 388/13, 389/13, 390/13, 391/13, 392/13, 393/13 and 394/13 and partly set aside the order passed by the learned writ court to the extent as indicated herein-before and dismiss the writ appeals of landowners bearing W.A. Nos. 4/13, 5/13, 6/13, 7/13, 9/13, 12/13, 16/13, 17/13, 18/13, 19/13, 20/13, 25/13, 26/13, 27/13, 28/13, 29/13, 30/13, 31/13, 32/13, 33/13, 34/13, 35/13, 36/13, 37/13, 38/13, 39/13, 40/13, 41/13, 42/13, 43/13, 44/13, 45/13, 46/13, 47/13, 48/13, 49/13, 50/13, 51/13, 52/13, 53/13, 55/13, 56/13, 57/13, 61/13, 62/13, 63/13, 65/13, 66/13, 70/13, 71/13, 72/13, 73/13, 74/13, 75/13, 76/13, 77/13, 78/13, 79/13, 80/13, 81/13, 82/13, 83/13, 84/13, 85/13, 86/13, 87/13, 88/13, 89/13, 90/13, 91/13, 92/13, 93/13, 94/13, 95/13, 96/13, 97/13, 98/13, 99/13, 100/13, 101/13, 102/13, 103/13, 104/13, 105/13, 106/13, 107/13, 108/13, 109/13, 110/13, 111/13, 112/13, 113/13, 114/13, 30 124/13, 125/13, 127/13, 128/13, 131/13, 132/13, 133/13, 135/13, 137/13, 138/13, 139/13, 140/13, 141/13, 142/13, 143/13, 144/13, 145/13, 146/13, 147/13, 148/13, 149/13, 150/13, 151/13, 152/13, 153/13, 157/13, 158/13, 159/13, 160/13, 161/13, 162/13, 163/13, 164/13, 165/13, 166/13, 167/13, 168/13, 169/13, 170/13, 171/13, 172/13, 173/13, 174/13, 175/13, 176/13, 177/13, 178/13, 179/13, 180/13, 181/13, 182/13, 183/13, 184/13, 199/13, 200/13, 201/13, 202/13, 203/13, 204/13, 205/13, 206/13, 207/13, 208/13, 259/13, 260/13, 261/13, 307/13, 308/13, 309/13, 310/13, 311/13, 341/13, 342/13, 343/13, 492/13, 494/13 and W.A. No.832/13, by holding that it was not necessary to give the survey numbers and the names of the owners in the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act.
48. In the result, the writ appeals stands disposed of, but without any order as to cost. A copy of this order be retained in other connected writ appeals.
(P.K. Jaiswal) (J.K. Jain)
Judge Judge
pn/