Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
D. Vijayalakshmi And Another vs Dist. Collector, Krishna And Others on 24 March, 1999
Equivalent citations: 1999(3)ALD29, 1999(2)ALT764, 1999 A I H C 2554, (1999) 3 ICC 11, (1999) 1 LACC 510, (1999) 3 ANDHLD 29, (1999) 2 ANDH LT 764
JUDGMENT
1. These three writ petitions are disposed of by a common judgment as the issues involved are more or less common to all the writ petitions.
2. WP No. 17068 of 1997 was filed by four petitioners who are owners of Ac.5.10 cents in NTS No. 1 of Block No.9 of Machavaram village, Vijayawada Urban Mandal, Krishna District. Originally the writ petition was filed claiming compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the LA Act') on the basis of the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the LA Act on 13-1-1997 on the ground that the earlier notifications have lapsed, Later on the petitioners have filed an Amendment Petition in WP MP No.23246 of 1998 seeking an amendment of the prayer which was allowed on 10-7-1998. By the virtue of this Amendment Petition, the petitioners are seeking a Writ of mandamus declaring the notifications dated 5-11-1979 and 25-1-1990 issued by the 2nd respondent under Section 4(1) of the LA Act as illegal, arbitrary and unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 300A of the Constitution of India and to direct the respondents to initiate proceedings under Section 11 of the LA Act and to pass award and pay compensation amount to the petitioners as per Section 4(1) Notification.
3. The brief facts in this writ petition are as follows :
4. The petitioners lands were acquired for construction of quarters for employees of South Central Railway and advance possession was taken on 17-12-1979. Although Notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act was issued and declaration made under Section 6 of the LA Act notifying an extent of Ac.22.19 cents including the petitioners lands to an extent of Ac.5.10 cents, and notification was published on 31-3-1980, no further steps were taken by the respondents for payment of compensation. However, in respect of Ac.3.72 cents in NTS No.28 of Machavaram village covered by the same notification an Award No. 12/84 dated 13-8-1984 was passed.
5. Later on after the amendment to the LA Act No.68 of 1984, the Divisional Superintendent, South Central Railway, Vijayawada, vide letter dated 8-9-1987 sent fresh proposals to the 2nd respondent to initiate fresh proceedings under the LA Act for acquisition of petitioners lands and other lands in total Ac.16.98 cents.
Therefore, notification under Section 4(1) was again issued on 25-1-1990 and published on 22-2-1990. But no steps were taken for passing of the award and for, payment of compensation. However, in respect of some land covered by this notification an award No.3/92 dated 18-4-1992 was passed. Again the notification dated 25-1-1990 was cancelled and another notification dated 13-1-1997 in respect of petitioners lands was published. However, no steps are taken for determining the compensation and passing of the award. Hence this writ petition seeking the relief as mentioned in the above paragraph.
6. The relief sought for in WP No.20360 of 1996 is to declare that by operation of Section 11-A of the LA Act, the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed and consequently to direct the 2nd respondent to pass an award by reviving the land acquisition proceedings by issuing fresh notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in respect of NTS Nos.2, 20, 23 and 27 of Machavaram village, Vijayawada Urban of an extent of 2.28 cents belonging to the petitioners and to fix the market value existing as on the date of the fresh notification with all the benefits accrued tinder the LA Act.
7. The brief facts of this writ petition are that the petitioners are the owners of Ac.2.28 cents which form part of Ac.22.19 cents in NTS Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28 and 29 of Machavaram village, Vijayawada Urban. Respondents 3 and 4 had taken possession of petitioners' lands on 14-3-1980 in NTS Nos.2, 20, 23 and 27 of an extent of 79 1/2 cents, 68 cents, 61 cents and 19 cents respectively. The statements of the petitioners were obtained by the 3rd respondent to the effect that the possession delivered on 14-3-1980 has nothing to do with the regular acquisition of the land by initiating the proceedings under the LA Act and without prejudice to their claims to compensation. In other words possession was taken dehorse the Land Acquisition Act.
8. The 2nd respondent on 31 -3-1980 issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act in respect of Ac.22.19 cents. Pursuant to the said notification an award was passed on 31-8-1984 in Award No. 12/ 84 for an extent of Ac.3.72 cents covered by NTS. No.28. In 1984 there was an amendment to the LA Act by Act No.68 of 1984. In view of the said amendment the land acquisition proceedings initiated earlier lapsed. Therefore, the 3rd respondent submitted revised plans pursuant to which Notification under Section 4(1) was issued on 22-2-1990. The said notification covers the petitioners' lands in an extent of Ac.2.28 cents. The 2nd respondent initiated award proceedings in Award No.3/92 and determined the compensation at Rs.200 per sq. yard for the lands covered by NTS No.2 (part), 17, 24 and 28/1B of an extent of Ac.3.88 cents. After deducting 1/3rd value for developmental charges, the compensation was fixed at Rs.110/- per sq. yard. However, no award was passed in respect of the petitioners' lands. On 12-4-1994 the Government gave clearance for completion of the land acquisition proceedings by passing the award in respect of all the lands covered under the above said NTS Nos. as some of the owners of the lands whose lands were acquired were already paid compensation. However, the petitioners were not paid any compensation and no award was made. Therefore, the petitioners filed WP No.28236 of 1995 which was disposed of on 13-1-1996 directing the 2nd respondent to pass an award within one month and the respondents 3 and 4 were directed to deposit 80% of the compensation. Against the said judgment, an appeal was filed which was disposed of with a direction to the respondents to pass the award within 3 months. The respondents while passing the award relied on the notification dated 31-3-1980 issued under Section 4(1) of the LA Act and accordingly determined the market value at the rate of Rs. 14.50," Aggrieved by the determination of compensation taking the Section 4(1) Notification dated 31-3-1980 as the basis, the present writ petition is filed.
9. Writ Petition No.32745 of 1997 is filed by the General Manager, South Central Railway, Secunderabad. The prayer sought for in this writ petition is to issue a writ of mandamus declaring G.O. Ms. No.967 dated 15-10-1996 as illegal and unconstitutional and inoperative in law and consequently to direct the 2nd respondent not to make the award pursuant to the said Government Memo dated 15-10-1996.
10. The facts in this writ petition are same as those mentioned in WP Nos. 17068 of 1997 and 20360 of 1996. The only relevant factor to be mentioned in this writ petition is that after the issuance of the Section 4(1) notification dated 31-3-1.980, the 2nd respondent requested the petitioner to send fresh proposal to enable him to initiate land acquisition proceedings in respect of Ac.5.10 cents in NTS 1 of Machavaram village. Accordingly the petitioner sent the proposal and a notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act was issued on 15-10-1996 by the impugned G.O. Ms. No.967 which was published on 5-12-1996. The said notification is contrary to law. Since the notification under Section 4(1) was published on 5-11-1979 the award is to be passed on the basis of Section 4(1) notification dated 31-3-1980 and not on the basis of notification dated 13-1-1997. Hence the prayer for a direction to the official respondents to determine the compensation relying on the notification dated 31-3-1980 and not the notification dated 13-1-1997 and to declare the notification dated 13-1-1997 as illegal.
11. The respondents filed their respective counter affidavits. According to the counter affidavits though the original notification under Section 4(1) of LA Act was published on 31-3-1980, on account of the pendency of the proceedings under the Urbian Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short 'the ULC Act') award could not be passed as it could not be decided whether the lands of the petitioners would be surplus under the ULC Act or not. If, in the event of determining that the lands belonging to the petitioners would be surplus lands, it is not necessary to finalise the acquisition proceedings under (he LA Act as the surplus lands of the petitioners vest in the Government on payment of compensation under the ULC Act and at any rate under Section 23 of the LA Act, the relevant date for the purpose of determining the compensation is the date on which the notification under Section 4(1) was published. That being the legal position, the petitioners are entitled for compensation on the basis of notification dated 31-3-1980 and the subsequent notifications issued from time to time cannot be taken into account.
12. From the facts narrated above, it is clear that in WP No. 17068 of 1997 the possession of the petitioners' lands were taken under Section 17(4) of the LA Act pursuant to a notification issued on 5-11-1979. On 31-3-1980, notification under Section 4(1) was published in the Gazette. Since no award was passed within two years from the date of publication of the notification, a fresh draft notification was issued on 25-1-1990 and pursuant to the said draft notification Section 4(1) notification was published on 22-2-1990 and a notice under Section 9 of the LA Act was issued to the petitioners. However, no award was passed. Again another notification dated 5-12-1996 was issued as the notification dated 22-2-1990 was lapsed. It was published on 13-1-1997 in Andhra Jyoti news paper. However no steps are laken to conduct award enquiry till today.
13. In WP No.20360 of 1996, Section 4(1) notification was published on 30-3-1980 and possession of the petitioners' lands was taken on 14-3-1980. Since no award was passed, the petitioners approached this Court by way of WP No.28236 of 1995 which was disposed of with a direction to the respondents to pass award. Accordingly an award was passed determining the compensation at Rs.14.50 per sq. yard basing on the notification dated 30-3-1980.
14. In WP No.32745 of 1997, the Railways are challenging the fresh notification dated 5-12-1996 published under Section 4(1) on the ground that it is illegal.
15. The main arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioners in WP No. 17068 of 1997 is that though possession was taken as long back as on 17-12-1979, till today no award is passed. The Government issued successive notifications under Section 4(1) on 31-3-1980, 22-2-1990, 5-12-1996, but no compensation is paid till day. The ground on which no award was passed determining the compensation is pendency of the proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act (for short 'the ULC Act'). Pendency of the proceedings under the ULC Act is not a bar for determining the compensation payable under the LA Act when once the power under the said Act has been exercised. Unreasonable delay in making the award after issuance of notification under Section 4(1) resulted in arbitrary exercise of power. Therefore, the notifications dated 31-3-1980, 22-3-1990 and 5-12-1996 should be declared as void and a fresh notification should be issued, (refer : P. Appalamurthy v. State of A.P., ; Singarem Colleries Co. Lid v. V.S. Murthy, 1983 (2) APLJ 405; Special Deputy Collector v. M.J. Swamy, . Since the notifications issued under Section 4(1) dated 31-3-1980, 22-2-1990 and 5-12-1996 are void and nonexistent, the respondents should issue a fresli notification as it is within the competence of the respondents to issue successive notifications. (Refer : State of M.P. v. Vishmi'Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 1594; Lt. Governor, H.P. v. Avinash Sharma, ; Raghunath v. State of Maharashtra, ; A.V. Papayya Sastry v. State of A.P., )
16. While the learned Counsel for the respondents contended that when possession was taken under Section 17(4) of the LA Act, the proceedings under Section 4(1) do not lapse. (Refer : Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., ; Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, ; Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman, ; H.M. Kelogirao v. Govt. of A.P., . When once the proceedings do not lapse, under Section If A of the LA Act, the question of issuance of a fresh notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act does not arise. The notification dated 31-3-1980 still subsists and, therefore, the relevant date for the purpose of payment of compensation is 31-3-1980 and subsequent notifications issued on 22-2-1990 and 5-12-1996 are illegal as the Government has no power to issue successive notifications while the original notification subsists. Further, in view of the pendency of the proceedings under the ULC Act, the Government need not proceed with the proceedings under the LA Act as acquiring the land under the LA Act is illegal when they are available under the ULC Act. (Refer : Dattatraya v. State of Maharashtra, ).
17. The following questions, therefore, arise for consideration on the facts and circumstances of the cases :
(1) Whether the petitioners can seek declaration that the notifications dated 31-3-1980, 22-2-1990 and 5-12-1996 arc void on account of unreasonable delay in determining and awarding the compensation to the petitioners ?
(2) Whether it is open to the Government to issue successive notifications ?
(3) Whether vesting of lands under Section 17(4) of the LA Act in the Government is a bar for seeking a declaration that the notifications issued under Section 4(1) of the Act is void on account of unreasonable delay in determining and awarding the compensation ?
18. To consider the first question, it is necessary to refer to the observations made by Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy (as he then was) in Appalamurthy's case (supra). I refer to the facts of this case in brief as the main thrust of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is the said judgment Appalamurthy's case (supra).
19. Notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act was issued invoking the provisions under Section 17(4) of the Act dispensing with (he inquiry under Section 5A and declaration under Section 6 was made on 1-7-1974. No award was passed until the filing of the writ petitions. Other facts are not required to be referred as this fact itself is relevant. The contention that was raised was that keeping acquisition proceedings pending for such a long time without passing the award and without paying the compensation to the owners is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power. It was also contended that the price payable is the market rate prevailing on the date of the notification under Section 4(1) and, therefore, the delay of about 8 to 10 years is unreasonable and oppressive as the owners are deprived of the fair equivalent. It was also argued that over the last 8 to 10 years the prices have increased several-folds, and paying today the compensation at the rate prevailing about 8 to 10 years earlier is an abuse of power, and the provisions of the Act. The contention on behalf of the Government was that on account of the pendency of the proceedings under the ULC Act, the land acquisition proceedings could not be finalised. The Court held that "the statutory power conferred upon the State by this Act, viz., the power of eminent domain, should be exercised reasonably and fairly, which necessarily means that the award must be passed with reasonable expedition". It was further that "if the Government wanted to wait for the result of the proceedings under the ceiling laws, it was welcome to do so, provided it withdrew the notification issued under the Land Acquisition Ac!. But, it cannot have both ways. It cannot say that it will keep the notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act alive, and, at the same time, wait for the result of the proceedings under the ceiling laws, so as to ultimately opt for the more advantageous alternative. This would be an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power. A notification cannot be issued for the purpose of pegging down the price, or for freezing the price, as the case may be, and then wait for a convenient and opportune time to pass an award. Such a line of thinking and the course of conduct is alien to the scheme and intendment of the Land Acquisition Act." It was also held that "In the absence of any valid explanation for this delay, and also in the absence of any statutory prohibition or restraint against the passing of award, it must be held that this delay in passing the award makes the very exercise of power viz., the power to acquire the lands in accordance with the provisions of the Act, unreasonable, oppressive and unfair. Every public authority is bound to act reasonably and fairly in exercise of its power. An arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power cannot be countenanced by Courts; more so, when it causes prejudice and loss to the citizens."
20. The judgment of the learned single Judge in Appalamurthy's case (supra) was challenged it Writ Appeal No.368/81 and batch. The said Writ Appeals wef'e dismissed confirming the view of the learned single Judge. The judgment of the learned single Judge was also confirmed by a bench in Singarcni Colleries case (supra).
21. The full Bench of this Court in Special Deputy Collector v. M.J. Swamy (supra) observed that a notification under Section 4(1) in violation of mandatory requirement of local publication is a void notification and when once it is a vojd notification, it gets nullified and denuded of legal effect and becomes a dead tetter. Therefore, if the Collector proceeds to restart the process of acquisition, he would not be committing any illegality and there is no legal bar to do so.
22. What emerges from the above decisions is that as long as there is no prohibition prohibiting the authorities from proceeding with the proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, the authorities are bound to proceed with the land acquisition proceedings and pass an award in exercise of the powers conferred under the Act. The unreasonable delay in not passing the award under the LA Act makes the exercise of power unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive and unfair arid the Courts should not countenance the same, especially in cases where it causes prejudice and loss to the citizens. From the facts narrated above, though the notifications were issued in 1980 and possession was taken in 1980 itself, till today in one case and till the filing of the WP No.28236/95 in the High Court in other case and the High Court directing the respondents to pass the award, neither an award was passed nor the compensation was determined and paid. There is an unreasonable delay of about 19 years in one case ant! 16 years in the other cases. The delay resulted not only loss to the petitioners, but caused prejudice to them in view of the increase in land value especially in urban areas and if the petitioners are paid compensation on the basis of Section 4(1) notification dated 31-3-1980, it would deprive them of a valuable right to the property. The Government had taken possession of the property in 1980 and enjoying while depriving the petitioners not only the right to enjoy the property but also the amount to which they are entitled by way of compensation under the Act. The exercise of power in this case is unreasonable, oppressive and unfair and, therefore, the notifications dated 31-3-1980, 22-2-1990 and 5-12-1996 are declared as void and unreasonable.
23. The argument of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Daitatraya's case (supra) wherein it was observed that "when the lands in question or bulk of them are likely to be acquired under the ceiling law by paying compensation as provided therein, it would not be proper to compel the Government to acquire them under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. As already stated that Act has the overriding effect on all other laws."
24. The action of the respondents in not determining and awarding the compensation can neither be declared as unreasonable or oppressive as when once the ULC Act was brought into force, they can await the proceedings under the said Act even though they have initiated the proceedings under the LA Act. It is difficult to countenance the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondents. The observations made in Dattalraya's case (supra) are not relevant to the facts of the present case as in that case the land belonging to the petitioners was reserved under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act for a public purpose. Meanwhile the ULC Act was brought into force on 28-2-1976 and proceedings for acquisition of vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit placed under the Act were initialed against the petitioners. The petitioners challenged the proceedings under the ULC Act and sought for a declaration that the said ULC Act has no application to the lands reserved for a public purpose under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act and also sought a writ of mandamus for restraining the State Government or its agents from acquiring the land or taking possession of the land under the ULC Act. While refusing to issue a writ of mandamus declaring the action of the respondents frojp taking excess land under the ULC Act as legal, the above observations were made. The Court was not considering the case of a notification having been issued under the LA Act and not payment of compensation even after a lapse of 20 years after taking possession of the land. Therefore, the said judgment has no application to the facts of the present case.
25. The next question that arise.5 for consideration is whether it is open to the Government to issue successive notifications. The argument of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that it is not open to the Government to issue successive notifications especially in a case where the lands vested in the Government under Section 17(4) of the LA Act and possession was taken. I will deal with the issue as to the affect of vesting of land under Section 17(4) of the Act later. As regards the power of the Government to issue successive notifications a reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State ofM.P. v. Vishnu Prasad's case (supra) wherein it was observed that "the Government's power to acquire land in a particular locality is not exhausted by issuing one notification under Section 4(1) followed by a notification under Section 6. It can proceed to do so by a fresh notification under Section 4(1) and a fresh declaration under Section 6. Such a procedure would be fair to all concerned; it will be fair to Government where the prices have fallen and it will be fair to those whose land is being acquired where the prices have risen.
26. In Raghunath v. Stale of Maharashtra, (supra), it was observed that:
"..... Learned Counsel for the petitioner points out that, at least in respect of such of the lands comprised in the Section 4 notification dated 22-6-1982 as arc also covered by the subsequent notification under Section 4, it is legitimate to infer that the State Government has superseded the earlier notification by the latter one. This contention is clearly well founded. We would, therefore, like to make it clear that in respect of the lands covered by the first notification under Section 4 which are also covered by or comprised in, the second notification under Section 4, further proceedings regarding acquisition should be taken, in accordance with law, only in pursuance of the latter notification and the proceedings initiated in respect of such lands by the first notification dated 22-8-1982 should be deemed to have been superseded."
27. In Special Deputy Collector v. M.J. Swamy, (supra), a full bench of this Court has expressed their view that when once the notification is void, the Collector can restart the process of acquisition afresh and the action of the Collector in such circumstances cannot be said to be illegal.
28. What follows from the above, in my view, is that when once on account of unreasonable delay in determining and awarding the compensation the notifications under Section 4(1) dated 31-3-1980, 22-2-1990 and 5-12-1996 are declared as void, the Land Acquisition Officer is competent to restart the process afresh.
Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents is rejected.
29. The next question to be considered is since the lands were acquired by invoking the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the LA Act, the lands stood vested in the Government and the notifications issued under Section 4(1) of the LA Act do not lapse and, therefore, whether it is open to this Court to declare the Notifications under Section 4(1) as void.
30. There cannot be any dispute that when Section 17(1) notification is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Section 11A can have no application to cases of acquisitions under Section 17 because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner. (Refer : Satendra Prasad Jain's case (supra); Allahabad Development Authority v, Nasiruzzaman (supra); H.M. Kelogirao 's case (supra); A. V. Papayya Sastry's case (supra);
31. The question is not whether the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act lapses and, therefore, the land vested in the Government gets divested, but the question is whether the notification under Section 4(1) is void on account of its offensive, unreasonable and unfair nature. There are two aspects of the issue. One is divesting of the land vested in the Government on account of lapse of the notification, and the other is what is the relevant date for determining the market value for the purpose of awarding the compensation. The two issues are different. By declaring the notification under Section 4(1) as void on account of unreasonable delay, the land vested in the Government do not get divested as the vesting is already complete. The declaration of the notification under Section 4(1) as void on account of unreasonable delay is only for the purpose of determining the market value. It has nothing to do with the vesting of the land in the Government and does not result in divesting of the land vested in the Government, though the vesting becomes without authority of law as the notification under Section 4(1) ceases to be in operation. However, since the authority is empowered to issue fresh notification, the Collector has to take fresh steps by issuing a notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act to regularise the vesting of the land in the Government.
32. The learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition relying upon Govt. of A.P. v. Mohd. Moinuddin Hussan, , contended that this Court has decided under exactly similar circumstances that the compensation payable is on the date on which the original notification was issued. It is true in Moinuddin's case (supra), the Court held that the relevant date for the purpose of determining compensation is the date on which the earlier notification was issued and not the subsequent notification. However, the said judgment is distinguishable on facts as the validity of notification issued under Section 4(1) of the LA Act as not challenged and the learned Judges themselves observed categorically stating that "we point out in these cases that notification was not challenged."
33. Sri Ramkrishna Rao contended that the petitioners cannot be permitted to challenge the notification at this distance of time namely after 16 years and therefore the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay. The arguments deserved to be considered only for rejection. It is pointed out that on 13-8-1984 Award No. 12/84 was passed in respect of Ac.3.12 cents and another Award No.3/92 was passed on 18-4-1992 in respect of some more land covered by the said notification and another notification under Section 4(1) was issued on 13-1-1997, but still no award was passed. The petitioners were hoping and expecting the authorities to pass an award and their legitimate expectations were belied as no award was passed either in 1989, 1992, or 1997. Even if they had approached the Court, the Court would have dismissed their writ petitions as premature on the ground that the petitioners apprehension that no award would be passed is baseless. Therefore, there is no substance in the arguments of the learned Counsel.
34. As regards the WP No.20360 of 1996 is concerned, it is true pursuant to the direction in the earlier writ petition the Award is passed determining the compensation at Rs. 14,50 per sq. yard. The determination of compensation at that rale is ridiculous and contrary to the awards passed in respect of a part of land. The Land Acquisition Officer himself awarded compensation in 1990 at the rate of Rs.l 10/- per sq. yard. Further, in view of declaration declaring the notifications under Section 4(1) of the Act dated 31-3-1980, 25-1-1990 and 13-1-1997 as void, the petitioners in this writ petition are entitled for compensation in accordance with Section 4(1) notification that is to be published pursuant to the judgment.
35. Therefore, what follows from the above is that on account of declaration that the notifications issued under Section 4(1) having been declared as unreasonable and void, the respondents have to take steps to issue fresh notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act 1, therefore, direct the respondents to take fresh steps to issue notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act within 3 months from today and thereafter pass the award within 3 months.
36. In view of the above, WP Nos. 17068 of 1997 and 20360 of 1998 are allowed and WP No.32745 of 1997 filed by the Railways is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee is Rs.1,000/- in each writ petition.