Punjab-Haryana High Court
Ram Singh Sharma vs Smt. Parmod Kumari And Anr. on 6 March, 1992
Equivalent citations: (1992)102PLR396
JUDGMENT A.P. Chowdhri, J.
1. This revision is directed against order dated August 22, 1991, by which the Senior Subordinate Judge, Rohtak, dismissed the petitioner's application under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure for being impleaded as a co-defendant in the suit.
2. Smt. Parmod Kumari instituted a suit for declaration that she was owner in possession of plot No. 2 measuring 412 square yards in D. L. F. Colony, Rohtak, in which she had constructed a boundary wall, and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant Municipal Committee from demolishing the boundary wall abutting on the municipal street. The case is being contested by the Municipal Committee. It was pleaded by the Committee that the plot in question abuts on a 50 feet wide street of the Municipal Committee and the plaintiff had encroached upon an area 18 feet wide from out of the said Public street The case of the plaintiff is that the street in front of her plot is only 30 feet wide and not 50 feet wide. The parties had almost concluded their evidence when the petitioner made an application under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure for being impleaded as a co-defendant with the Municipal Committee. The application was resisted by the plaintiff and it was dismissed by the trial Court mainly on two grounds, namely, (1) that the applicant was not a necessary party, and (2) that no relief was sought by the plaintiff against him. Aggrieved by the order, the applicant has preferred this revision.
3. The contention of Mr. C. B. Kaushik, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the petitioner's house also abuts on the same street and he is thus vitally interested in the outcome of the suit. He further submits that the petitioner apprehends that the Committee may collude with the plaintiff and thereby prejudice the right of the petitioner, whose house also abuts on the same street across the road, almost in front of the plot of the plaintiff. He placed reliance on Rakhaldas Mukherjj v. Kalipada Bhattacharji, A. I. R. 1936 Cal. 534.
4. The contention of learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff on the one hand and the Municipal Committee on the other hand is that the petitioner is not a necessary or even a proper party. The- plaintiff being dominus litus is entitled to decide against whom he seeks relief and that no relief having been sought against the petitioner, he could not be impleaded as a co-defendant and the order in question called for no interference.
5. I have carefully considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for both the parties. The authority relied on by Mr. Kaushik relates to a declaration in respect of easement of pathway. It was in this context held that every owner of servient tenement denying the plaintiff's right and every person obstructing the use of the right were necessary parties. The analogy of easement cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. The petitioner is neither a necessary nor a proper party to the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff has sought no relief against the petitioner. The impleading of the petitioner has been stoutly opposed by the plaintiff who is dominus litus and unless it can be held that the applicant is a necessary party, he cannot be impleaded as a defendant against the wishes of the plaintiff. Moreover, the evidence in the suit has nearly been completed and joining of the applicant at this stage will reopen the whole case. For these reasons, I find no merit in the revision petition, which is accordingly dismissed. Parties through their counsel are directed to appear in the trial Court for further proceedings on March 12, 1992.