Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn. vs Labour Court And Ors. on 10 March, 1993
Equivalent citations: (1994)ILLJ542RAJ, 1993WLN(UC)129
JUDGMENT B.R. Arora, J.
1. These nine petitions involve a common question of law hence they are, therefore, being disposed of by this common judgment. To resolve the controversy, the facts of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4856 of 1992 R.S.R. T.C. v. Judge, Labour Court and Ors., are taken into consideration.
2. Non-petitioner No. 2 was in the employment of the petitioner. Disciplinary proceedings against the respondent No. 2 were initiated as per the Standing Orders. After holding proper enquiry, the disciplinary authority found the respondent No. 2 guilty and imposed the punishment of stoppage of ten annual grade increments. An industrial dispute was raised by the Union and the State Government referred the following dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal- cum-Labour Court, Udaipur:
D;k laHkkx izcU/kd] jktLFkku jkT; iFk ifjokgu fuxe] mn;iqj }kjk Jfed dh eatwj vfne ifjpkyd ¼mn;iqj vkxjk½ dk ftldk izfrfuf/kRo ftl rjg jksMost ,eIykbt izcU/kd ¼x`g½ }kjk fd;k x;k gS½ nl okf"kZd osru izfN;ka dk tkus dk n.M mfprZ ;k cSBk gS \ ;fn ugh rks Jfed fdl xgu dks ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS \ Both the parties were given adequate opportunities by the Tribunal to adduce evidence. The respondent No. 2 did not contest the legality and validity of the disciplinary enquiry but challenged the order only on the ground that the imposition of the penalty of stoppage of ten annual grade increments was harsh and highly excessive and is disproportionate to the mistake committed by him. The learned Judge of the Tribunal, by his Award dated January 22, 1992, held that the stoppage of ten annual grade increments was excessive and exhorbitant and he, therefore, reduced the penalty imposed by the petitioner to that of stoppage of three annual grade increments so that the workman may have an opportunity to improve himself. It is against this order that the petitioners have preferred these writ petitions.
3. It is contended by the leaned counsel for the petitioners that the provisions of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, "the Act") can be pressed in service by the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court where the industrial dispute referred to the Tribunal is only related to the discharge, dismissal or termination of a workman and not in regard to any other dispute which does not relate to the discharge, dismissal or termination of the employee. His further submission is that in the present case, the legality and validity of the enquiry was not challenged by the respondent No. 2 before the Tribunal and the learned Judge of the Tribunal has not specifically held that the penalty imposed by the the disciplinary authority was excessive and disproportionate but still he reduced the penalty for giving an opportunity to the respondent No. 2 to improve himself which he was not competent to do so. Lastly it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it is not a case of victimization of the respondent No. 2 and, therefore, the penalty imposed by the petitioner could not have been reduced. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, on the other hand, has supported the award passed by the learned Judge of the Tribunal and submitted that the Tribunal had ample powers to adjudicate upon the matter in controversy and to decide the adequacy of the punishment/penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority under Sections 7 and 10 read with Schedule II of the Act, 1947.
4. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties.
5. Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, clothes the Labour Court, Tribunal and the National Tribunal with the powers to give an appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of a workman if the dispute is referred for adjudication to the Tribunal and the Tribunal is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified. Section 11A of the Act, 1947, reads as under:
" 11-A. Powers of the Labour Court, Tribunal and National Tribunal to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen:
Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and in the course of adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set-aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment, in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require:
Provided that in any proceeding under this Section, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter".
Section 11A of the Act, 1947, gives powers to the concerned Tribunal or the Labour Court to re-appreciate the evidence and to come to its own conclusion about the guilt or otherwise and hold that the misconduct itself is not proved or that the misconduct proved does not warrant the punishment and alter the same in cases where the order passed in the domestic enquiry relates to the dismissal or discharge of the workman. The provisions of Section 11A of the Act have no relevance so far as the other punishments imposed in a domestic enquiry. Those cases are covered by Sections 7 and 10 read with Schedule II of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 7 of the Act deals with the establishment and the constitution of the Labour Court for adjudication of the industrial dispute relating to any matter specified in Schedule II and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under the Act. Section 10 of the Act provides that where the appropriate Government is of the opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may, at any stage, by order in writing, refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with it or relevant to the dispute if it relates to any matter specified in Schedule II to a Labour Court for adjudication. Schedule II deals with the matters within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. Clause (i) of Schedule II provides that the Labour Court can go into the propriety or legality of the order passed by the employer under the Standing Orders. A close reading of Sections 7 and 10 alongwith Schedule II of the Act makes it very clear that under Section 10 of the Act, the court has been given power to go into the question of propriety and legality of the order passed by an employer under the Standing Orders. Standing Orders are statutory terms of the conditions of service and if an employer does not conform to the provisions of the Standing Orders, he commits an illegality and the order passed, which is illegal, has to be straightway set aside by the Tribunal. At the time of considering the legality and validity of the order, the adequacy of penalty can, also, be gone into by the Tribunal and if it is found that the punishment imposed is disproportionate and unnecessarily harsh, then the same can be reduced. The propriety or reasonableness of the punishment imposed by the employer under the Standing Orders can be gone into. The provisions of Section 11A of the Act provides good guidelines with respect to the powers conferred upon the Tribunal to go into the question of adequacy of the punishment. The Act is a welfare legislation and while interpreting the provisions, the Court has to adopt a beneficial rule of construction and a construction which furthers the policy and object of the Act and is more beneficial to the employee, has to be preferred. The Labour Court, under the Act, has been constituted and created to discharge its functions for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Of course, the management of the employer has power to maintain its internal management and discipline but the powers are not unlimited and when an industrial dispute is raised, the Tribunal has been given power to adjudicate upon the legality and propriety of the order passed by the employer under the Standing Orders.
6. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute referred by the State Government for adjudication to the Labour Tribunal and the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction, is devoid of any force in view of the provisions of Sections 7 and 10 read with Schedule II of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
7. Now so far as the merit of the case is concerened, the learned Judge of the Tribunal has considered the facts and circumstances of the case in the right perspective and the order passed by the learned Judge of the Tribunal does not require any interference.
8. In the result, I do not find any merit in these writ petitions and the same are hereby dismissed.