Delhi District Court
By This Order vs A Vismam on 5 March, 2014
-1-
IN THE COURT OF SHIRISH AGGARWAL, CIVIL JUDGE-1,
CENTRAL DISTRICT, DELHI
Suit No. 62/14
Rakesh Jain v. Brij Lal
ORDER
1. By this order, I shall decide the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure filed by the plaintiff. I shall thereafter proceed to examine whether the present suit can be disposed off on the basis of admissions made by the defendant.
2. The undisputed facts of the case are that Mr. Anil Kumar Jain is the owner of the property bearing shop nos.6A & 6B, Mall Raod, Khyber Pass, Delhi-110054 (hereinafter referred to as "the suit property"). The defendant was inducted as a tenant in this property. The monthly rate of rent was Rs.200/-.
3. The case of the plaintiff is that he had entered into an agreement with the defendant and the aforementioned owner of the suit property. As per the agreement, the plaintiff had paid Rs. 10,00,000/- to the defendant and the owner. It is averred that on making the payment, plaintiff became the tenant in the suit property at the monthly rate of rent of Rs.200/-. It is averred that on the basis of this agreement, the plaintiff obtained possession of the suit property and was paying rent to the owner. The plaintiff also claims Rakesh Jain v. Brij Lal Suit No.62/14 Page 1 of 8 -2- to be paying the electricity charges.
4. The plaintiff claims to have been running a shop from the suit property. It is stated in the plaint that the defendant has been creating hindrance and obstruction in the enjoyment of the plaintiff in the suit property. It is further stated that the defendant is trying to forcibly dispossess the plaintiff from the suit property.
5. By the present suit, the plaintiff has sought permanent injunction restraining the defendant from creating hindrance and obstruction in the peaceful use and enjoyment of the plaintiff in the suit property. He further seeks to restrain the defendant from taking possession of the suit property from the plaintiff, forcibly. By the application under Order 39 rules 1 and 2 of Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff has prayed for interim injunction restraining the defendant from creating hindrance and obstruction in the peaceful use and enjoyment of the plaintiff in the suit property, till the disposal of the suit. He further seeks to restrain the defendant from taking possession of the suit property from the plaintiff, forcibly, till the disposal of the suit.
6. Defendant has been examined. He has admitted that the plaintiff is a trespasser in the suit property, in which the defendant continues to be a tenant under Mr. Anil Kumar Jain. It is admitted that the defendant continues to pay rent to Mr. Anil Kumar Jain. It is further stated that no agreement as has been alleged by Rakesh Jain v. Brij Lal Suit No.62/14 Page 2 of 8 -3- the plaintiff had taken placed between the plaintiff on one hand and the owner of the suit property and the defendant, on the other hand. It is stated that the defendant has not received any payment from the plaintiff.
7. Arguments have been heard and the record is perused.
8. It is not in dispute that the defendant was a tenant under the owner of the suit property, Mr. Anil Kumar Jain at the monthly rate of rent of Rs.200/-. The plaintiff claims to have entered into an agreement with the defendant as the owner of the suit property, by which the plaintiff was substituted as a tenant in the suit property at the monthly rate of rent of Rs.200/-. The plaintiff claims to have to paid Rs.10,00,000/- to the defendant and to the owner of the suit property, as consideration. He further claims to be paying rent and electricity charges. The defendant has disputed these assertions made by the plaintiff and has stated that he continues to be a tenant.
9. Ld. counsel for the plaintiff has admitted that there was no written agreement that was entered into between the plaintiff on one hand and the owner of the suit property and the defendant, on the other hand. He has not filed any document to substantiate that this agreement had indeed taken place. He has further admitted that there is no documentary proof to substantiate that the payments of Rs.10,00,000/- and rent of Rs.200/- p.m. were made. The documents filed by the defendant at best show that the plaintiff has been in occupation of the suit property. The occupation of the Rakesh Jain v. Brij Lal Suit No.62/14 Page 3 of 8 -4- plaintiff has not even been disputed by the defendant. However, it has been stated by the defendant that the status of plaintiff in the suit property is that of a trespasser.
10. The plaintiff is claiming to have been substituted as a tenant in the suit property in place of the defendant. It is his case that the tenancy rights in the immovable property have been transferred to him. It is the admitted case of plaintiff that he is in occupation of the suit property for a term exceeding one year. This implies that the case of the plaintiff is that he has been inducted as a tenant for a term exceeding one year. Section 107 of Transfer of Property Act 1882 & Section 17 (1)(d),Registration Act, 1908 provide that lease of immovable property of such a period can be made only by a registered instrument. Admittedly, there is no registered or even written instrument in favour of the plaintiff by which he obtained lease of the suit property.
11. Moreover, the defendant has denied the plaintiff's title of tenancy. The issue of title cannot be deemed to be a simple one and the plea of the defendant cannot be easily brushed aside. The rival contentions of the parties relating to title need to be adjudicated. Keeping in view the existence of rival claims over ownership of the suit property, the plaintiff ought to have prayed for declaration of his title to the property instead of the present suit for injunction alone. Adjudication of title is not possible in the present proceedings since the present suit does not seek declaration of title and merely seeks injunction. Having refrained from seeking declaration of title, the present simplicitor suit for protection of possession is not Rakesh Jain v. Brij Lal Suit No.62/14 Page 4 of 8 -5- maintainable.
12. In this regard, reference may be made to the case of Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, AIR 2008 SC 2033, in which it has been laid down that when there is cloud over title, the person in possession must seek declaration of title and not mere injunction. It was observed thus:
"Where the plaintiff is in possession, but his title to the property is in dispute, or under a cloud, or where the defendant asserts title thereto and there is also a threat of dispossession from defendant, the plaintiff will have to sue for declaration of title and the consequential relief of injunction".
13. What is to be determined in the present case is whether the plaintiff had indeed entered into the agreement with the defendant and the owner of the suit property. No document has been furnished to prove the same. It has been admitted by the Ld. counsel for the plaintiff that there is no such document in existence. It is indubitable that a person making payment of Rs.10,00,000/- for the purpose of transaction of tenancy rights, that too, a tenancy which is protected by the stringent provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 would obtain receipts of payment. In the absence of receipts of payment of Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.200/- p.m., it is obvious that there was no such agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant and the owner of the suit property. Admittedly, the defendant was a tenant in the suit property. The plaintiff has failed to show his occupation to be legitimate.
Rakesh Jain v. Brij Lal Suit No.62/14 Page 5 of 8 -6-14. A person in occupation of a premises is not entitled to any injunction against a person who has legitimate right in the same. Grant of such injunction would amount to perpetuating his unlawful possession.
15. The plaintiff's occupation of the premises does not even amount to "possession" in the eyes of law so as to deserve protection. Therefore he is not entitled to the grant of injunction against dispossession. In this regard, reliance is placed on the decisions of Tamil Nadu Housing Board Vs. A Vismam, 1996(2) R.R.R. 353, D.T.T.D.C vs. D.R. Mehra & Sons, 62 (1996) DLT 234 (DB), Sant Lal Jain vs. Avtar Singh, A.I.R. 1985 SC 857, G.N. Mehra Vs. International Airports Authority of India (IAAI), 63 (1996) DLT 62, Thomas Cook Limited Vs. Hotel Imperial & Ors., 127 (2006) DLT 431 and Rame Gowda Vs. M. Varadappa Naidu, I (2004) SLT 675.
16. In my opinion, the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case in his favour. This indispensable requirement for grant of interim injunction remaining unfulfilled, I find no merit in the application of the plaintiff. The application is accordingly dismissed.
17. Having perused the record, it is pertinent to note that for the reasons stated above for dismissal of the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of Code of Civil Procedure, no purpose will be served by keeping the suit pending and putting it to trial.
18. The suit can be disposed off on the basis of admissions Rakesh Jain v. Brij Lal Suit No.62/14 Page 6 of 8 -7- at the present stage. In this context, I refer to Order 12 Rule 6, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which provides that "at any stage", the suit can be disposed off on the basis of admissions, "either on the application of any party or of its own motion". This proposition of law is clearly borne out from the following decisions:
Meera Gupta vs Dinesh Chand And Others 94 (2001) DLT 10:
"15. A bare reading of the said provision would show that the parties to suit are entitled to invoke the said provision and claim relief "at any stage of the proceedings". The expression used is un- ambiguous-"at any stage of the suit". In view of this clear provision, it would not be permissible to lay down a cut off point in the process of the proceedings in the suit to deny the invocation of the said provision.
xxx xxx xxx The wording of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code are couched in very wide language and the powers of the court are accordingly quite wide and not circumsubscribed by any stage in the suit."
Parivar Seva Sansthan vs Dr.(Mrs.) Veena Kalra & Ors. AIR 2000 Delhi 349:
"The use of the expression "any stage" in the said rule itself shows that the legislature's intent is to give it widest possible meaning."
20. Disposal of suit on the basis of admissions includes not only decreeing but also dismissal as has been laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Preet Inder Singh Vs. Gursharna Kaur & Anr. RFA No.747/2010. The following was held by the Hon'ble High Court in this case:
Rakesh Jain v. Brij Lal Suit No.62/14 Page 7 of 8 -8-"A decree is defined under Section 2(2) CPC to include a dismissal of the suit. Therefore, the defendant can also pray for dismissal of the suit under order 12 Rule 6 CPC on the basis of admitted facts which appear from pleadings or documents or otherwise in terms of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. The object of the legislature while enacting Order 12 Rule 6 CPC was to prevent unnecessary continuation of litigation, therefore, Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is very widely worded whereby the suit can be decreed/dismissed even by the Court on its own motion by referring to admissions made in pleadings or whether made orally or in writing."
21. Having noted the above manifest infirmities, I am unable to persuade myself to continue with the trail. That would be sheer wastage of precious judicial time and will put the parties to inconvenience and expense. Since the suit cannot be decreed, no useful purpose will be served by keeping it pending. Having held so, dismissing the suit at this stage is necessary for ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the court.
22. The suit is accordingly dismissed under Order 12 Rule 6 readwith Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. Matter is disposed off.
File be consigned to the record room.
(Announced in the open court [SHIRISH AGGARWAL]
today on 05.3.2014) CIVIL JUDGE-1
CENTRAL DISTRICT
DELHI
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