Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ramanuj Tiwari vs M.P. State Co-Operative Tribunal And ... on 14 January, 2008
Equivalent citations: 2008(2)MPHT31
Author: Chief Justice
Bench: Chief Justice
ORDER A.K. Patnaik, C.J.
1. This is an appeal against the order dated 17-9-2007 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 12054/07 (S) under Section 2 (1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005.
2. The facts briefly are that the appellant was working as Deputy Manager with respondent No. 4-Co-operative Society and was posted as District Marketing Officer in the year 1983 in District Raigarh. On 14-6-1985, he was suspended and charge-sheeted and a departmental enquiry was conducted against him and thereafter he was served with an order of termination on 4-1-1994. Aggrieved by the order of termination, the appellant filed an appeal before the Board of Directors of the respondent No. 4-Co-operative Society and the Board of Directors quashed the order of termination and instead imposed a penalty of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect, but the Managing Director of the Co-operative Society did not allow the appellant to join his duties. Aggrieved, the appellant filed a dispute under Section 55 (2) of the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (for short 'the Act') before the Registrar, Co-operative Societies and the Registrar exercising his power under Section 55 (2) of the Act appointed Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies as his nominee to decide the dispute. The Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies by order dated 8-7-2005 directed the respondent No. 4-Co-operative Society to comply with the direction of Board of Directors of the Co-operative Society. Since the Deputy Registrar did not give direction regarding back wages, the appellant filed an appeal before the Registrar, Co-operative Societies under Section 78 (1) of the Act claiming back wages. The appeal was transferred to the Additional Registrar, who, by order dated 27-1-2006 affirmed the order of Deputy Registrar. The appellant then filed second appeal before the M.P. State Co-operative Tribunal (for short 'the Tribunal') which was registered as S.A. No. 74/2006. An objection was raised by the respondent No. 4 before the Tribunal that the Deputy Registrar had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute under Section 55 (2) of the Act and the Tribunal held that the Deputy Registrar did not have jurisdiction under Section 55 (2) of the Act and quashed the order passed by the Deputy Registrar. Aggrieved, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 12054/2007 (S) in this Court and by the impugned order dated 17-9-2007 the learned Single Judge upheld the view taken by the Tribunal that under Section 55 (2) of the Act the Deputy Registrar had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute.
3. Mr. Ankit Saxena, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the language of Section 55 (2) of the Act is clear that a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by a society can be decided by the Registrar or "any officer appointed by him not below the rank of Assistant Registrar" and therefore the Tribunal has come to an erroneous conclusion that the Registrar could not appoint a Deputy Registrar to decide the dispute. He submitted that the Tribunal appears to have taken a view that it is only the Registrar or the Joint Registrar who can decide the dispute under Section 55 (2) of the Act because of the notification No. F-5-1-1999-XV-1-A, dated 26th July, 1999 issued under Section 3 (2) of the Act by the State Government directing that all powers conferred with the Registrar under the Act and the rules made under the Act shall be exercised by the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies. He submitted that by a notification issued under Section 3 (2) of the Act, the State Government cannot restrict the power of the Registrar expressly and specifically conferred by Section 55 (2) of the Act to appoint "any officer not below the rank of Assistant Registrar" to decide a dispute regarding terms of employment, working conditions and disciplinary action taken by a society.
4. Mr. Piyush Dharmadhikari, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 4, on the other hand, submitted that Sections 3 (2) and 55 (2) have to be harmoniously construed and if these two provisions harmoniously construed then the Registrar can only appoint a Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies in terms of the notification dated 26th July, 1999 issued by the State Government under Section 3 (2) of the Act to exercise its power under Section 55 (2) of the Act. He further submitted that by another notification No. F-5-1-1999-XV-l-C, dated 26th July, 1999 issued under Section 3 (2) of the Act, the State Government has directed that powers conferred on Co-operative Societies by the Sections of the Act specified in column (2) of First Schedule to the notification shall be exercised by the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies in the State to the extent as specified in column (3) and within the area as specified in column (4) of the said Schedule. He submitted that it is thus clear that only Assistant Registrar of the particular area as mentioned in the Schedule to the notification can exercise the power under Section 55 (2) of the Act. He submitted that Schedule to the said notification shows that powers of the Registrar under the Act can be exercised by the Assistant Registrar in respect of all Co-operative Societies except financial banks and societies whose area of operation extend beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. He further submitted that the area of the operation of the respondent No. 4 extends beyond the limits of jurisdiction of the Deputy Registrar who decided the dispute.
5. There can be no dispute over the proposition that provisions of an Act have to be read harmoniously. As Venkatarama Aiyar, J., puts it in Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore - "The rule of construction is well settled that when there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is what is known as a rule of harmonious construction".
6. But harmonious construction does not mean that one of the provisions of an Act will be reduced to a "dead letter" because to harmonise is not to destroy. There may be, for example, some general provisions and specific provisions in an Act and general provisions cannot be interpreted in such a manner so as to override the specific provision altogether. As explained in 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation' by Justice G.P. Singh as under:
A familiar approach in all such cases is to find out which of the two apparently conflicting provisions is more general and which is more specific and to construe the more general one as to exclude the more specific. The question as to the relative nature of the provisions general or special has to be determined with reference to the area and extent of their application either generally or specially in particular situations. The principle is expressed in the maxims Generalia specialibus non derogant and Generalibus specialia derogant. If a special provision is made on a certain matter, that matter is excluded from the general provision.
Thus, if a special provision has been made in certain matter, that matter be excluded from general provision otherwise the general provision may have the effect of destroying special provision altogether.
7. Applying this principle of statutory interpretation to the interpretation of the Act in the present case, Section 3 (2) of the Act is a general provision and reads as follows:
3. Registrar and other officers.- (2) The officers appointed to assist the Registrar shall, within such areas as the State Government may specify, exercise such powers and perform such duties conferred and imposed on the Registrar by or under this Act as the State Government may, by special or general order, direct:
Provided that no officer other than the Additional Registrar or the Joint Registrar shall be directed to exercise the powers to hear appeals under Section 78.
Hence Section 3 (2) of the Act empowers the State Government to issue a special or general order directing that the powers of the Registrar can be exercised and duties of the Registrar can be performed by officers appointed to assist the Registrar within such areas which State Government may specify. It is in exercise of such powers under Section 3 (2) of the Act that the notification No. F. 5-1/99-XV-I-A, dated 26th July, 1999 has been issued by the State Government directing that all the powers conferred on the Registrar under the Act and the rules made thereunder shall be exercised by Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies within the State of Madhya Pradesh. Again it is in exercise of such powers under Section 3 (2) of the Act that the State Government has also issued notification No. F. 5-1-99-XV-I- D, dated 26th July, 1999 directing that the powers conferred on the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Madhya Pradesh, shall be exercisable by the Assistant Registrar of the Co-operative Society in the State to the extent to be specified in column (3) of the Schedule to the notification and within the area as specified in column (4) of the Schedule.
8. But there is yet another specific provision in Section 55 (2), which reads thus:
55. (2) Where a dispute, including a dispute regarding terms of employment, working conditions and disciplinary action taken by a society, arises between a society and its employees, the Registrar or any officer appointed by him not below the rank of Assistant Registrar shall decide the dispute and his decision shall be binding on the society and its employees:
Provided that the Registrar or the officer referred to above shall not entertain the dispute unless presented to him within thirty days from the date of order sought to be impugned:
Provided further that in computing the period of limitation under the foregoing proviso, the time requisite for obtaining copy of the order shall be excluded.
If we were to hold that by virtue of the notifications issued under Section 3 (2) of the Act, it is only the Joint Registrar who could exercise the powers of the Registrar under Section 55 (2) of the Act in the entire State of Madhya Pradesh or it is the Assistant Registrar of the area concerned who is to exercise the powers under Section 55 (2) of the Act, then the express special provision in Section 55 (2) of the Act to the effect that "any officer appointed by the Registrar not below the rank of Assistant Registrar" could hear the dispute of the nature described therein would be rendered nugatory. In other words, the interpretation suggested by Mr. Dharmadhikari would give full effect to Section 3 (2) of the Act but would destroy the express specific provisions in Section 55 (2) of the Act empowering the Registrar to appoint an officer not below the rank of Assistant Registrar to decide the dispute relating to terms of employment, working conditions and disciplinary action taken by the Co-operative Societies.
9. In our considered opinion, therefore, Section 55 (2) of the Act is specific provision made by the legislature authorizing the Registrar to appoint any officer not below the rank of Assistant Registrar to decide the dispute of the nature mentioned under Section 55 of the Act and this specific express provision made by the legislature has to be read independently of Section 3 (2) of the Act and in any case the State Government by a special or general order cannot override such express specific provision made by the State Legislature in Section 55 (2) of the Act.
10. Mr. Dharmadhikari next submitted that under the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, an appeal against an order passed by the learned Single Judge under Article 227 of the Constitution is expressly barred and that under Sub-section (1) of Section 2 an appeal is only available against an order passed by the learned Single Judge under Article 226 of the Constitution only. He submitted that a reading of the impugned order would show that the learned Single Judge has passed the order under Article 227 of the Constitution and therefore no appeal as such to a Division Bench is available under Section 2 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005.
11. As we have noted above, the challenge before the learned Single Judge by the appellant was to the view taken by the Tribunal that under Section 55 (2) of the Act the Registrar could not authorize the Deputy Registrar to decide a dispute relating to disciplinary action taken by the Co-operative Society against the appellant and the ground taken by the appellant in the writ petition before learned Single Judge is that the said view is an error in law. An error of law made by a Tribunal can be corrected by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and we find on a reading of the writ petition that it was filed not only under Article 227 but also under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our view therefore the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is the order under Article 226 of the Constitution and an appeal against the impugned order was available to the Division Bench under the Adhiniyam of 2005. We are supported by the judgment delivered by Special Bench of this Court in Manoj Kumar v. Board of Revenue and Ors. .
13. The appeal is allowed and the impugned order of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the matter be remanded to the Tribunal for decision on merits.
14. The Tribunal will decide the case expeditiously, preferably within six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.