Delhi High Court
Usha Sales Ltd. And Ors. vs Aruna Gupta And Anr. on 19 May, 1987
Equivalent citations: ILR1988DELHI103
JUDGMENT Jagdish Chandra, J.
(1) In this suit the plaintiffs seek the following reliefs against the defendants in respect of the itemises in dispute comprising the first floor premises of* the house known as 99-Anand Lok, New Delhi and the second floor in the annexe premises and the car parking space on the ground floor, therein :-
(a) restraining defendants from obstructing the plaintiffs their employees representatives, and/or causing obstruction in any manner whatsoever, from going to and using the 1st floor premises and the Car Park space at ground floor, of the house known as 99, Anand Lok, New Delhi.
(B)restraining the defendants from disturbing the possession of the plaintiffs, in respect of the premises, given to plaintiff No. 1 on rent, in house No. 99, Anand Lok, New Delhi.
(C)to pass a decree in the sum) of Rs. 1,04,000 as compensation for damages caused to the plaintiff.
(D)a decree for further damages at the rate of Rs. 3100 per month and Rs. 500 per day from 5-5-1982 till the date the plaintiffs are allowed to use peacefully these premises.
(2) Plaintiff No. 1 M/ s. Usha Sales Ltd., New Delhi (hereinafter to be referred to as the Company) is a limited company duly registered under the Indian Companies Act, and plaintiffs 2 and 3 are respectively its marketing manager and a senior officer. The premises in question were taken on lease by the Company from the defendants at a monthly rental of Rs. 3100 out of which the rental of Rs. 2100 was towards the first floor of the main premises and the remaining Rs. 1100 towards the second floor of the annexe premises and the car parking space on the ground floor. The premises m question were allotted by the Company to its previous General Manager L. L. Jain for his residence who subsequently tendered his resignation from the service of the company on 6-2-1982 and whose resignation was accepted and who was ultimately relieved by the Company from its service on 5-5-1982, and who also handed over the possession of the said premises along with furniture etc. to the company on that very day. The dispute between the parties arose in respect of these premises when plaintiff no. 2 S. N. Sarma, the marketing manager of the Company who was transferred from Hyderabad to Delhi, was sought to be put into possession of the premises in question and who had brought with him a truck load of .his luggage to these premises and when his entry in these premises was sought to be resisted by the land-lady Ms. Aruna Gupta and her husband Bharat Kumar Gupta defendant No. 2 on the ground that the leasedeed in respect of the tenancy premises was only for the residence of the Company's previous General Manager L. L. Jain and for no other officer of the Company and that the lease had come to an end after L. L. Jain had left the services of the Company and handed over the possession of the premises in question The allegations of the plaintiffs are that when S. N. Sarma. Saniay Wndhawan co-plaintiff Ms. S. N. Sarma and Company's Chowkidar named Pancham went up and got into the first floor of House No. 99, Anand Lok, New Delhi, the defendants, all of a sudden, locked the door of the staircase on the ground floor which is the only access to the premises in question en the first floor and a further intention of causing further harassment to them, cut-off the electricity, telephone and water connections of the first floor premises as a result of which the above-mentioned four persons were illegally and forcibly detained and confined to the first floor of the premise against their wishes by the defendants for about four hours and they were thus deprived of the aforesaid facilities of electricity, water and telephone as also the meals during the aforesaid period of their wrongful confinement and they were also unable to communicate with any person outside the said premises, not even the office of the company. It is further alleged that these persons also suffered from agony-mental as well as physical-accompanied by a severe shock to their nervous system. Sanjay Wadhawan plaintiff No. 2 was able to inform the management of the Company about the aforesaid wrongful detentions, through a slip written by him and thrown out of the first floor premises to a peon of the Company who was standing outside near the truck carrying the luggage of S. N. Sarma. When the other officers of the Company rushed to the premises in question they demanded and persuaded the landlady defendant no. I to open the door to the staircase whereupon plaintiffs S. N. Sarma and Sanjay Wadhawan together with Mrs. Sarma and Chowkidar Panjan were in a position to come down. Both the parties then complained to the police and on whose intervention the luggage of S. N. Sarma was kept in the tenanted annexe on the second floor of the premises.
(3) It is also asserted that the defendants are not allowing the plaintiffs and the Company's officers I representatives to so to the first floor premises in the main building and to use the same for the residence of its officer S. N. Sarma plaintiff No. 2, and have threatened to cause obstruction in future, in case any attempt was made by the plaintiff to go to the first floor or park the car on the ground floor of the tenants premises and use the same for the residence of its any other officers including plaintiff no. 2 S. N. Sarma and further that even the essentail. facilities like water, electricity and telephone connections which had been illegally cut-off by the defendants, have lot been restored uptil now as a result of which the Company is unable to use the first floor premises and the parking space on the ground floor any more and enjoy the aforesaid essential amenities since 5-5-1982. The aforesaid telephone connection belongs to the Company.
(4) It is also asserted that plaintiff No. 2 S. N. Sarma who had come from Hyderabad on transfer bag and baggage had been allotted by the Company the premises in dispute turn his residence but on account of the aforesaid obstructionist attitude and activity of the defendants S. N. Sarma has been compelled to stay in Lodi Hotel with his family, against his will as a result of which the Company is suffering unnecessary loss. The covenant in the lease-deed to the effect that the prermises in question shall not be used for the residence of any other officer of the Company except L. L. Jain, unless otherwise agreed to by the landlady, has been challenged by the plaintiffs as unenforceable in law and the landlady can evict the Company which is now the statutory tenant, only under the provision of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 but is not entitled to obstruct the Company in the fashion resorted to by her. The aforesaid co nant in the lease-deed is also assailed by the plaintiffs as a result of the coercion asserting that the Company was badly in need of a residential premises for the residence of its officers as getting a suitable accommodation in Delhi and particularly in South Delhi, was a difficut task, and the rents going up high every day, the general tendency of the landlords was to get the maximum rents of their property with an expectation of increase thereof every six months and thin putting the tenants to accept their terms and the defendants being no exception, the Company was, thus, coerced to accept this term in the lease deed. It is further asserted that the Company would not .agree to the demand of the landlady for the enchancement of the isntal from Rs. 3.100 to Rs. 4,000 per month for the induction of another officer of the Company.
(5) For the above-mentioned conduct on the part of the defendants the aforesaid reliefs have been claimed in this suit.
(6) The suit has been resisted by the. defendants who while conceding the tenancy in respect of the premises in question Have raised certain preliminary objections to the effect that the suit" not mantainable and is even otherwise barred by Ss. 14, 16. 38 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act. 1963 and does not disclosed any cause of action against them and also that the suit is not properly valued for .purposes of court fees and jurisdiction. It is asserted that in view of the clear term provided in the lease-deed that the premises in question were let out to the Company only for the residence of one specified and particular officer of the Company named L L. Jain and for the occupation of no other officer of the Company, and L. L. Jain having resigned from the Company, the Company is barred from using or allowing the use of the premises in question by its am other officer or employee. The defendants have also pleaded that in fact it was L. L. Jain who was the tenant of the defendants in the premises in question but as he was not to pay rent himself out of his own pocket but was to be paid by the Company, it was in those circumstances that in the lease-deed the Company was shown as a lessee, while in substance and reality the premises were let out only to L. L. Jain and the fact remained that for all intents and purposes L L, Jain was the tenant. It was further pleaded that even if assuming though not admitting that the Company was a tenant, the lease was meant only for the benefit of L. L. Jain and it was clearly understood that in case L. L. Jain ceased to be in the employment of the Company for any reason whatsoever, the contract of lease would stand discharged and would cease io be enforceable and the Company would no longer be the tenant in the premises in question and the possession thereof would be immediately handed over to the defendants and the Company being bound by the aforesaid expressed and implied terms of the contract of lease was bound by the same and cons quently the suit was wholly untenable, misconceived, mala fide and fraudulent. It is also asserted that L. L. Jain had already delivered possession of the premises in question to defendant No. 1 on 14-5-1982, either for himself and\or on behalf of the Company, denying the assertion of the Company that lie possession was delivered by L. T.. Jain to it, with the result that the suit for injunction was not maintainable.
(7) The defendants have also asserted that it was L, L. Jain who was quite well known to the defendants as he himself was a Chartered Accountant and defendant No. 2 was also a Chartered Accountant and had assured and represented to the defendants that he was to take the premises on lease but as the rent was to be paid by the Company the lease deed would be executed by the Company in favor of the land lady defendant No. I, that he would himself reside in the premises and that the lease would be only for his benefit and residence and for no other, officer or employee of t:ic Company and that in Case he was transferred out of Delhi or ceased to be in the employment of the Company the lease would stand discharged and would be unenforceable and that he would hand over the possession of the premises to them and the Company would then have no right, title or interest therein and that it was on those representation and assurance of L. L. Jain that the said premises were given on lease to him through the rent-notes were execoted and handed over in the name of the Company.
(8) The allegations of the plaintiffs regarding the illegal or wrongful confinement and detention of plaintiffs 2 and 3, Mrs. Sarma and Company's Chowkidar named Pancham are specifically denied by asserting to the contrary that the plaintiffs with a squad of 20 persons tried to forctly occupy the first floor pleases which was objected to and resisted by the defendants and other residents of the colony since their action was wholly wrongful, illegal, violent and criminal in nature and content whereupon the Flying Squad was summoned and it was on the intervention of and on the protection given by the police that the plaintiffs could not force entry into the first floor premises but to avoid the occurrence of voileance at the hands of the plaintiffs, and at the instance of the police the Company was permitted to keep the luggage of plaintiff No. 2 S. N. Sarma on the second floor of the annexe presses which they had brougt in a truck along with the squad more than 20 persons and then arrangement was permitted subject to the determination of the dispute between the parties "elating to the premises in cuestion and, thus, the assertions of the plaintiffs in regard the their actual physical possession of the first floor premises as also the annexe premises have been denied by the defendants as absolutely baseless and false.
(9) The allegation regarding the cutting of the amenities such as electricity, water and telephone connections of the first floor by the defendants on that date or any other date lias also been denied Thus, the claim for any compensation damages has also been controverter. It is also challenged that the defendants have no right to obstruct the unlawful act on the part of the plaintiffs to make an forcible entry into these premises or that the aforesaid covenant in the lease-deed that the premises in question were meant only for the residence of L. L. Jain and for none else, was not binding upon the plaintiffs. The assertion that the landlady wanted to increes,. the rent and had got inserted the aforesaid covenant in the lease-deed for that purpose, was also dented as wholly baseless. They have, thus, asserted their right to prevent any trespass on the part of the plaintiffs -and to resist any forcible entry in the premises in question as threatened and being threatened by them.
(10) The pleadings in the written statement were controverter by tile plaintiffs in their replication and from the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed:-
1.Has the suit been properly valued for the purposes of court-fees; and has the correct court-fee been paid thereon ?
2.Is the suit maintainable in the present form ?
3.Is the suit barred in view of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, especially Sections 14, 16, 38 and 41 ?
4.Is the tenant of the premises the plaintiff-company or Mr. L. L. Jain ?
5.What is the effect of the clauses in the lease, that the suit premises have been taken for the use and occupation of Mr. L. L. Jain only ?
6.Does the plaintiff No. 2 have any right to enter the premises in suit and use and occupy the same without the consent of defendant No. I?
7.Has the contract of leasc been frustrated in view of the resignation of Mr. L. L. Jain from the plaintiff-company ?
8.Has the suit premises been surrendered by Mr. L. L. Jain to defendant No. 1 ?
9.Is the agreement dated 27th January 1981 vitiated bycoercion, as alleged, or unjustified or illegal in any manner ?
10.Have plaintiffs 2 and 3 been illegally detained by the defendants and are they entitled to any compensation on this account ?
11.Are the plaintiffs entitled to the injunction as sought for and for the damages as demanded ? If so. what is the amount ?12.Relief. Issue No. 1
(11) The perusal of the plaint shows that the plaintiffs claimed further damages against the defendants at the rate of Rs. 3100 per month and Rs. 500 per day from 5-5-1982 till such date the plaintiffs 'are allowed to use peacefully tenanted premises in question. No court-fees was paid in respect of this relief of further damages nor the valuation thereof stated in the plaint nor purposes of court-fees. The suit was filed in Court on 13-5-1982 and obviously there was no justification for the plaintiffs in not paying the requisite court-fees and staling the valuation for purposes of court-fees in respect of these damages at least from the period from 5-5-19-82 till the filing of the suit, i.e. 13-5-1982 and to that extent the objection of the defendants under this issue is correct.
(12) Regarding the payment of court-fees and the statement of valuation for purposes of court -fees in the plaint, in respect of the aforesaid further dam-ages from the date of the filing of the suit till such date the plaintiffs are allowed to use peacefully the tenanted premises, the objection raised by the defendants is not tenable. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended, and in my opinion correctly, that the valuation of the suit is to be seen only as on the date of the institution of the suit and not what it shall be on some unknown subsequent date. In this case it was not known to the plaintiffs at the time when they filed this suit as to when they would be allowed to use peacefully the demised premises and that was the matter which rested with the decision of the approbate issue in the suit which decision would normally be given at the time of the final disposal of the entire suit. With that ignorance the plaintiffs could not possibly state the valuation for purposes of court-fees in the plaint in respect of the future damages from the date of the institution of the suit till the date they are allowed to use peacefully the premises in question. Girja Kuer v. Shiva Prasad Singh and others Air 1935 Patna 160 (1) is the authority cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs in support of this proposition and it was held therein as under :- "The value of the suit is its value at the date of the institution of the suit and not what will become its value on some subsequent date. Future mesne profits being uncertain cannot be taken into account for the purpose of payment of court-fee and for the purpose of determining the value of a suit. Applying the analogy of future mesne profits to future damages it is clear that no court-fee is payable in respect of the damages pendente lite. It follows therefore that it cannot be taken into account for determining the value of the suit."
No authority to the contrary on this point was cited by the learned counsel for the defendants.
(13) Consequently, it is held that the suit has not been properly valued for purposes of court-fee in so far as it omits to put the valuation in respect of the claim for damages at the rate of Rs. 3100 per month and Rs. 500 per day for the period from 5-5-1982 till 13-5-1982 the date of the institution of the suit, and further that court-fees has not been paid by the plaint's for the claimed damages on those rates for the said period. But retarding the rest of the. claim for future damages from that date of the institution of the Suit till the date the plaintiffs are allowed to use peacefully the tenanted premises, the objection of the defendants is not tenable and any such valuation could not be included in the "valuation for purposes of court-fees nor were the plaintiffs required to pay any court fees in respect of the same and, thus to that extent the plaint is held to be properly valued for purposes of court-fees and further that correct court-fees has been paid thereon. This issue i" decided accordingly partly in favor of the plaintiffs and partly against them to the extent indicated above. Is gave NOS. 2 & 3 (14) The suit is for the grant of permanent injunction as also for the recovery of damages. The injunction sought is that the defendants should not obstruct the plaintiffs/their employees representatives, and/or causing obstruction in any manner whatsoever, from going to and using the first floor premises and the car park space 'at ground floor of the house known as 99, Anand Lok, New Delhi and further should not disturb the possession of the plaintiffs in respect thereof. According to the learned counsel for the defendants the contract of lease stood frustrated as L. L. Jain had left the premises of the company and was no longer in possession of the demised premises and under the lease-deed the premises in question had been taken on lease only for the residence of L. L. Jain, an officer of the Company and the Company was debarred under the lease from using the demissed premises for any other purpose or for the residence of its any other officer, and, thus, there was left no right with the' Company to enforce against the defendants. This contention " lands repelled for the reason that even though with the exit of L L. Jam the contractual tenancy came to an end, the Company became statutory tenant in respect of the demised premises and there is no gain-saying the fact that statutory tenant is entitled to remain in possession of the tenanted premises until evicted under the relevant provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (in short the Act). The suit is based not on the contract of lease but has been brought for protecting the Company's statutory estate in the demised premises by protecting against trespass and interference by the defendants. These plea's find mention in sub-paras (v) to (viii) of Para 16 of the plaint. For retaming the n foresaid statutory protection the Company has a right of injunction 'and can also claim damages if such a right has been sought to be disturbed or interfered with by the defendants.
(15) The Supreme Court has in Biswabani Pvt. Ltd. v. Santosh Kumar Dutta and others held that a statutory tenant can always file a suit to ask for an injunction restraining the landlord from interfering with his possession or user of the premises. In that case the Supreme Court while setting aside the judgment of the High Court and while holding that the tenant company was a statutory tenant observed that the statutory tenant would enjoy the protection of the statute and the status of irremovability unless he was evicted from the premises under the enabling provisions of the statute and that such lenant could enforce such right through an injunction. When the statutory tenant asks for an injunction restraining the landlord from interfering with his possession of the demised premiss, then he is asserting a property right. Such injunction is permissible under Section 38(3) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which reads as under :- "Perpetual injunction when granted (1)..............,.............. (2) ............................. (3) When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff's right to, or enjoyment of, property the court may grant a perfetual injunction in the following cases, namely- (a) where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff; (b) where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damages caused, or likely to be caused, by the invasion; (e) where the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief ; (d) where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings."
The right of the statutory tenant flows not fro a contract but from a statute. The question is not whether an injunction can be granted to specifically perform a term of a contractor not and the provisions of Sections 14, 16 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act have therefore no relevance or application. The statutory tenant enforces his right under the statute and not under the contract. Ss. 14 and 16 of the Specific Relief Aet, 1963 pertain to the specific enforceability of a contract and not a statutory right. S. 41(e) on which reliance has been placed by the defendants also talks of a contract. There is no bar with regard to the enforcement of such right to property and, particularly, such right flowing from a statute. It is for this reason that in (supra) the Supreme Court granted such injunction to a statutory tenant with the following observations:- In such circumstances the appellant as tenant would be entitled to protect its possession unless evicted in due course of law and in order to protect its possession it can legitimately sue, .there being no bar in law, for a declaration of its status as tenant and for an injunction either prohibitory or mandatory, -as the case maybe........".
So, these Issues are decided in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
(16) Issue NO. 4 The most important piece of evidence which clinches this issue is Ext.DWI{X-4 which is the certified copy of the plaint of Suit No. 542 of 1982 filed by the land-lady /defendant No. 1 Smt. Aruna Gupta against the Company defendant No. 1 and L.L. Jain as defendant No. 2 in the court of Shri Sat Pal, Sub Judge, Delhi. This plaint is dated 6-5-1982 and it contains clear and unequivocal admissions on the part of the land-lady regarding the Company M/s. Usha Sales Limited being the tenant of the property in question under that plaintiffs and it would be advisable to setout the relevant positions from this plaint and the same are reproduced below :-- "1.That the plaintiff is the owner landlord of property No. 99, Anami Lok, New Delhi since the time it was purchased /built. 2. That with effect from 1-1-1981, the plaintiff let out two portions of the said property to the defendant No.1 for use as residence for the defendant No. 2 who is a senior Employee of the defendant No. 1. 3. That the terms and conditions relating to the tenancy of the defendant No. 2 were reduced into writing by the defendant No. I vide its communication No. HD/ADG/H.2 dated 27-1-1981, according to which the tenanted premises No. 2(a) cannot be used for any purpose other than the residence of the defendant No. 2. 5. ..........keeping with the terms and conditions of the 'tenancy the tenanted premises cannot be used for any purpose other than the residence of the defendant No. 2. 7. That the threatened action of the defendants is an explicit breach of the obligations existing in favor of the plaintiff by virtue of writing dated 27th January, 1981 addressed to the plaintiff by the defendant No. I in which the terms and conditions relating to the tenancy in respect of the tenanted premises in question are embodied and the defendant are bound by the same.
(17) So, from the plain reading of the aforesaid paras in the plaint of the suit filed by the land-lady against M/s. Usha Sales Limited and Shri L. L. Jain, there is left no manner of doubt that the Company and not L. L. Jain was the tenant of the property in question. One more very significant, fact which emerges from this plaint is that the landlady unmbiguously relies upon the writing dated 27-1-1981 evidencing the lease in question and addressed by the Company to the land-lady and further relying fully on the terms and conditions mentioned therein relating to the tenancy in respect of the tenanted premises in question and which according to her bound the Company as well as L. L. Jain. It would also be noted that this plaint is dated 6-5-1982 only a week prior to the filing of the present suit on 13-5-1982 wherein , plaint is dated 12-5-1982. In the face of the aforesaid decisive and clinching evidence in favor of the Company, no amount of any other evidence would be sufficient to rebut the same. The lease deed relied upon by the land-lady herself in the above mentioned plaint Ext. DW1/X-4 filed in the suit in the court of Shri Sat Pal Sub Judge was executed by the Company in favor of the land-lady and not by L. L. Jain.
(18) The contention raised on behalf of the defendants that the premises let out were meant only for the residence of L.L. Jam, an officer of the Company and for the residence of no other officer of the Company except with the consent of the land-lady and, thus, the tenancy had -been created only for the beneficial interest of L. L. Jain and of no other, and further that the rent of the premises was also to come from L. L. Jam and not from the Company and, thus, the tenancy in favor of the Company was only a benami and that the real tenant was L. L. Jain, cannot be accepted. The defendants placed reliance upon a preforma Ext. (Public Witness 1/6 which is a proforma of the letter of allotment which the Company is having for the purpose of the same being filled up by its officers for the purpose of allotment of residential premises to them. Shri Kameshwar Swarup (FW1) in his cross-examination Conconceded as correct that the Company had a proforma of the letter of allotment and Ext. PW1/6 was that proforma. This proforma reads as to flows :- "You shall arrange to pay the rent directly to the Accounts Department. In case your entitlement of house rent subsidy is less than the rental of the above premises, the short fall in the rent amount shall have to be made good by your. You shall also be responsible for payment of clectricity/water charges or any other dues as per applicable rules in this regard."
Even if such a proforma was filled up by L. L. Jain in favor of the Company, and he was also liable for the payment of the entire rental of the tenanted premises, the same does not and cannot make him the tenant in respect thereof under the land-lady and it is the Company which was really intended to be the tenant. The rent was not to be paid direct by L. L. Jam to the land-lady but the same was to be paid first by the officer concerned in the accounts department of the Company and it was then that the Company was pay the rent to the land-lady. Such an arrangement with circumlocution is not for nothing and it is a matter of common knowledge that such arrangements are frequently made with the land-lords by the various comnanies though the premies are taken by the companies for the residence of their officers, Such arrangement involves the direct responsibility of the Company for the payment of rent to the land-lady who appears to have more faith in an organisation for the regular payment of rent without default than in an individual tenant who is more prone -to making defaults or is being irregular , the payment of rent. -This is very important and Significant .aspect of the matter in the creation of tenancy.
(19) The learned counsel for the plaintiffs placed reliance on two letters Ext. P2 dated 30-4-1982 and dated 8-5-1982 (Annexure I to the replication). The letter Ext. P2 was addressed by the land-lady to the Executive Director of the Company whereas the letter dated 8-5-1982 is from Bharat Kumar Gupta defendant No. 2, husband of the land-lady Shri Charat Ram. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that since both the letters were addressed to the Company the lease must be held in favor of the Company itself, as it was the Company which was requested in these letters to see that the vacant possession of the tenanted premises was handed over by it/L. L. Jain when he vacated the premises in question on 5-5-1982 as he had resigned from the Company. The learned counsel for the defendants submitted that the reliance of the plaintiffs on these two letters for the aforesaid result was misconceived and unwarranted Inasmuch as both these letters made the matter clear in favor of the defendants. The letter Ext. P2 dated 30-4-1982 states as under:- Kindly refer to the lease agreement entered by me with you in respect of the above premises let out to your L. L. Jain..........". In the second letter dated 8-5-1982 it is stated as follows :- As I wanted to have some company in house of my taste I agreed to let out its 1st floor to your Mr. L. L. Jain on 27th January, 1981. Mr. L, L Jain informed me that the rent shall be paid by Messrs Usha Sales Limited, a Company of which he was then an employee...........". The aforesaid assertions appearing in these two letters are without any basis and are, in fact, admissions of the defendants in their own favor and are almost meaningless view of the unmistakable admission of the land-lady in the plaint of the suit filed by her in the court of Shri Sat Pal, Sub Judge, Delhi. The reliance on these two letters by the plaintiffs appears to be only in a limited sense as to why these letters were written by the defendants to the Company when L. L. Jain was the tenant and not the Company and that the necessity of writing these letters appeared to the defendant for the reason that the Company was the tenant. The aforesaid assertions in these two letters by the defendants that the premises had been let out to L. L. Jain appear to have been made by the defendants for their own benefit as they apprehended that the Company, after resignation of L. L. Jain from the company, would put in possession of the tenanted premises some other officer of its own. So, these assertions having been made in imminent anticipation of the aforesaid probable trouble emanating from the Company, can be given no importance in favor of the defendants. Under these circumstances, it is held that it is the plaintiff-company and not its officer L. L Jain who was the tenant of the premises in question and this issue is found accordingly in favor of the plaintiffs. Issue Nos. 5 & 6 (20) The contention of the learned counsel for the defendants is that as provided in the contract of lease the suit premises could be used only for the residence of L. L. Jain an employee of the Company and for no other purpose. The learned counsel also made it clear during the course of arguments that the defendants were not in any manner seeking the eviction of the Company from the said premises but the Company would be bound, under the lease agreement, to use the premises only for that particular purpose, i.e., for the residence of L. L. Jain and for no other purpose. It is the admitted case of both the parties that the tenanted premises in question have been used by L. L. Jain for his residence and further that L. L. Jain has ceased to be in the employment of the Company and is not in occupation of the demised premises. On the other hand, the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs is that in the face of the aforesaid clause in the lease-deed, the suit premises were used only by L. Jain and by none-else and after the exit of L. L. Jain from the services of the Company and from the premises in question, the contractual lease came to an end and even by the letter Ext. P2 dated 30-4-1982 the land lady had called upon the Company to hand over actual physical possession of the premises to her as on account of the resignation of G. L. L. Jain from the Company and his leaving the premises the Compony was under an obligation to vacate the same. and thereby the land lady had terminated the contractual tenancy. The learned counsel has further urged that on the equting of the contractual tenancy the statutory tenancy in favor of the Company would come into operation and the right of the statutory tenant to remain in the premise cannot be interfered with except -through the order of eviction by the Rent Controller under any one of the grounds of eviction set out in 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. 1958 and that no such order of eviction has been passed against the Company nor has the landlady instituted any eviction proceedings to obtain such an eviction order. The opening word of S. 14 of the Act is non-obstante provision according to which notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favor of the landlord against a tenant, except B that on an application made by the landlord, in the prescribed manner, the Controller may pass an order for the recovery possession of the promises on one or more of the grounds enumerated there under. So, in view of this mandatory provision of law the insertion of the aforesiaid clause of the premises in question to be used only by L. L. Jain, in the contract of lease, can be of no avail to landlady for dispossessing the Company/tenant from the said premises unless and until the landlady can bring her case on any of grounds of eviction set out in S. 15 of the Act. Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Is haram alias Brijram and others was dialing with the case under Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947) (at 475) observed as follows:--- Construing the provisions of Ss. 12, 13 and 28 of the Bombay Rent Act in the light of the public policy which permeates the entire scheme and structure of the Act, there is no escape from the conclusion that the Rent Court under this Act is not competent to pass a decree for possession either in invitum or with the consent of the parties on a ground which is de hors the Act or ultra vires the Act. The existence of one of the statutory grounds mentioned in Ss. 12, and is a sine qua non to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Court under those provisions. Even parties cannot by their consent confer such jurisdiction on the Rent Court to do something which according to the legislative mandate, it could not do". In Smt. Hai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan and others it was held as follows :-- It is well-settled that where the Rent Control and Restrictions Acts are in operation, a landlord cannot obtain 'eviction of the tenant unless he can satisfy the requirements of the provisions in those Acts. The general law of landlord and tenant to that extent will give way to the Special Act in that behalf. It is also well-settled that if the court does not find the permissible grounds for eviction disclosed in the pleadings and other materials on record, no consent or compromise will give jurisdiction to the court to pass a valid decree of eviction". Then again in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal 7-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in a unanimous decision made the following observations :- "It will bear repetition to say that under the Transfer of Property Act in order to entitle the landlord to recover possession determination of the lease is necessary as during its continuance he could not recover possession, while under the State Rent Act the landlord becomes entitled to recover possession only on the fulfillment of the rigour of law provided therein. Otherwise not. He cannot recover possession merely by determination of tenancy".
Then the same authority at page 1753 (para 16) made the following observations :- "Evem if the lease is determined by a forfeiture under the Transfer of Property Act the tenant continues to be a tenant, that is to say, there is no forfeiture in the eye of law. The tenant becomes liable to be evicted and forfeiture comes into play only if he has incurred the liability to be evicted under the State Rent Act, uoi otherwise".
(21) In the case reported in Biswabani Pvt. Ltd. v. Santosh Kumar Dutta and others there was a clause that after 5 years the tenant shall deliver possession and that after the said period he would be treated as a trespasser. The tenant did not deliver possession and the High Court passed an eviction decree saying that it would lead to evil consequences, if a party who solemnly agreed to deliver possession was allowed to resile from his promise. But the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment saying that any 'agreement contrary to the provisions of the Rent Act is invalid and that if the landlord could enforce such as agreement then it would make a mockery of the provisions of the said Act. 122 (22) The Calcutta High Court relying on the agreement between the parties to deliver possession had observed thus :- "Here is a party who has solemnly entered into an agree- ment, has enjoyed the benefit of it, has committed, a flagrant breach of it and now wishes the law to come to his aid and protect him from evil consequences of the appellant succeeds it would be no unhappy state of affairs.
(23) But the Supreme Court while commenting on this observation of the High Court and while setting aside, the High Court Judgment observed thus :- "And this feeling of righteous indignation completely ignores the overriding provisions of the relevant Rent Restriction Act which came to the aid of every tenant in its area of operation on the determination of contractual tenancy. At its commencement every lease would have its origin in a bilateral contract which except for lease for indefinite period of permanent lease would be for some specified duration. On the expiry of the period the solemn implied promise or assurance is to return possession. If such a promise is to be enforced overlooking or ignoring Rent Restriction Act it would make a mockery of protection extended by Rent Restriction Act."
(24) Dialing with a case under Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 the Supreme Court in Smt.Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and others observed as follows :- "Keeping in view the main object of Rent Control Legislation, the position of a tenant whose contractual tenancy has been determined has to be under- stood in the light of the provisions of the Rent Acts. Though provisions of all the Rent Control Acts are not uniform, the common feature of all the Rent Control Legislation is that a contractual tenant on the termination of the contractual tenancy is by virtue of the provisions of the Rent Acts not liable to be evicted as a matter of course under the ordinary law of the land and he is entitled to remain in possession even after determination of the contractual tenancy and order or decree for eviction will be passed against a tenant unless any ground which entities the landlord to get an order or decree for possession specified in the Act is established. In other swords, the common feature of every Rent (Control Act is that it affords protection to every tenant 'against eviction despite termination of tenancy except on grounds recognised by the Act and no order or .decree for eviction shall be passed against the tenant unless any such ground is established to the satisfaction of the Court."
So, in view of these authorities of the Supreme Court the clause in question in the lease-deed that the suit premises have been taken for the residence of L.L. Jain only, has no adverse effect against the plaintiff Company which has become a statutory tenant under the landlady defendant ; No.1 after the resignation of L.L. Jain from the Company, and further that after the exit of L. L. Jain, the Company has a right to use the premises in question for the residence of any other Officer of its own including plaintiff No. 2 S. N. Sarma without obtaining the consent of the landlady/deft. No. 1 until the Company is evicted under S. 14 of the Act. So, both these issues are decided in favor of the plaintiffs. Issue NO. 7 (25) It has already been discussed and held under some earlier issues that the contract of lease has been frustrated in view of the resignation of L.L. Jain from the Company but this does not affect adversely the right of the Company to retain possession of the premises in question as a statutory tenant and not to be dispossessed except by order of eviction passed under S. 14 of the Act.
(26) In view of the finding under issue no. 4 that the tenant in the premises..in question is the Company and not L.L. Jain this issue loses relevance because L.L. Jain not being a tenant had no right to surrender possession of the premises in question to the landlady and the possession could be surrendered only by the 'tenant-Company.
(27) Kameshwar Swarup (Public Witness 1), Secretary and Manager (Legal) of the Company as also plaintiff No. 2 S. N. Sarma (PW2) and plaintiff No. 3 Sanjay Wadhawan (Public Witness 3) have deposed that the keys of the first floor of House No. 99" Anand Lok, New Delhi had been delivered by L.L. Jain to the Company on the morning of 4-5-1982 and the same were given by the Company to S.N. Sarma (Public Witness 2) on the evening of 4-5-1982 and that on his application Ext. PWI/5 for allotment of the premises in question, the letter of allotment Ext. PWI{6 was issued by the Company in his favor on that very day, i.e. 4-5-1982 and that it was on the next day on 5-5-1982 at about 8.00 A.M., Mr. Sarma along with his wife, Sanjay Wadhawan and one Chowkidar named Pancham entered the first floor of the said house despite resistence by the landlady who locked them in the premises in question by locking the door at the ground floor from where the stairs led to the first floor. On the other hand, the position taken up by the defendants as also in the testimony of the landlady Smt. Aruna Gupta defendant No. 1 as DW1 is that it was on 14-5-1982 that L.L. Jain had delivered vacant possession of premises in question to her vide possession receipt Ext. DW/1 which was proved by S.N. Gupta (DW2) who is one of the attesting witnesses of the same by stating that it had been signed by L.L. Jain in his presence and that it was attested by him as also by one Mr. Chhabra in the presence of L. L. Jain. He further stated that L.L. Jain vacated the said premises on that very day, i.e. 14-5-1982.
(28) In para 5 of the plaint the plaintiffs asserted that L.L. Jain had vacated the premises and handed over the possession of the same to the Company on 5-5-1982 and on the same day itself S. N. Sarma had moved into the said premises with his personal belongings. In Para 5 of the plaint is reproduced below :- "c Shri L.L. Jain vacated the aforesaid premises and handed over the possession of the premises under tenancy and other items like furniture. Cooler, and Air-Conditioner etc. to the plaintiff-company on 5th May, 1982. The plaintiff's another Officer Shri S. N. Sarma (Plaintiff No. 2) Marketing Manager who had been transferred from Hyderabad to New Delhi, moved into the aforesaid premises with his personal belongings on 5th May, 1982, itself."
It was also stated in para 4 of the plaint that Mr. L. L. Jam was relieved from the service of the Company on 5th May 1982.
(29) In para 7 of the preliminary objections of the written statement the defendants averred as under :- "THATShri L. L. Jain has already delivered possession of the premises in question namely the first floor of house No. 99, Anand Lok, New Delhi to defendant " No. 1 either for himself and/or on behalf of the plaintiff company to the defendant No. 1 on 14-5-1982......"
In the corresponding para 7 of the replication the plaintiffs stated as follows :- "IT is denied for want of knowledge that Mr. L. L. Jain has already delivered possession of the premises in question namely the first floor of house No. 99 Anand Lok, New Delhi to the Defendant No. 1, either for himself and/or on behalf of Plaintiff company to the Defendant No. 1 on 14-5-1982. As far as the Plaintiff No. 1 knows that Mr. L.L. Jain has not given the possession of the premises to the Defendant No. I on 14-5-1982. On 5-5-1982, as already stated in the plaint, the keys of the premises and the furniture and/or other goods which were given to Mr. L. L. Jain by the company were handed over to the official of the Plaintiff company on the morning of 5-5-1982 by Mr. L. L. Jain himself in the premises itself and on that very date the plaintiff No. 2 went inside the premises for keeping his luggage."
So, the date 5-5-1982 is reiterated in the replication by the plaintiffs as the one on the morning of which the keys of the premises and the furniture etc. given by the Company to L. L. Jain, were handed over to the official of the plaintiff-company by L.L. Jain himself in the premises itself and it was on that very date that S. N. Sarma went inside the premises for keeping his luggage.
(30) It was contended that the denial of the plaintiffs for want of knowledge regarding surrendering of possession of L. L. Jain to the landlady on 14-5-1982, is no denial in the eye of law and the averment on that point in para 7 of the preliminary objections of the written statement would be deemed to have been admitted by the plaintiff in view of the provision of law contained in Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and further that the aforesaid pleadings in the plaint as also" in the replication would' belie the story now put forth in the testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses that L. L, Jain had surrendered the 'possession of the premises in question along with keys on the morning 6f 4-5-1982. This contention of the learned counsel' for the defendants has much force.
(31) Kameshwar Swarup (Public Witness 1) Secretary and Manager (Legal) of the Company admitted in his cross-examination :-
"The plaintiff company lost possession of the first floor 14th, 1982 because the defendants produced in court a certificate of possession issued by Mr. L. L. Jain." It is also an admitted case of the plaintiffs that they again got the possession of the premises in question from the defendants on the morning of 28-5-82 vide possession receipt Ext. D3 of the even date issued by the Company. The statement of Kameshwar Swarup (Public Witness I) recorded earlier on this point is instructive :-
"ON14-5-1982 "we lost possession of the tenanted premises as the defendants removed Company's belongings by breaking open the locks and stored the same in the garage on the ground floor as well as on the car parking space. Thereafter by the order of 'this Court dated 27-5-1982 w.e (the plaintiff company) were declared as tenants of these premises and the plaintiffs obtained possession back of the tenanted premises on 28-5-1982 and we gave a possession receipt to the defendants. Ext. D3 is that possession receipt."
(32) No effort was made by the plaintiffs to amend the plaint and the replication regarding the date 5-5-1982 on the morning of which L. L. Jain is alleged to have delivered possession of the premises in question along with the Company's furniture therein and the keys to the Company It was, however, in his cross-examination that Sanjay Wadhawan (Public Witness 3) who is also plaintiff No. 3 in this case, stated that - "Shri L. L. Jain handed over possession of the premises in question to the company on the morning of 4th May, 1982 and there is only a typing mistake in the plaint wherein the date is mentioned as 5th May, 1982 (latter portion volunteered). I am not aware if there is a similar mistake even in the replication. I signed the plaint as well as the replication." He further stated as under :-
"L.L.Jain handed over to him the keys of the premises on 4th May, 1982 in the office. No receipt w So, from his aforesaid statement occurring in his crossexamination it would appear that he verified the Company's furniture in the premises in question in the absence of L.L. Jain after he had left. If his statement that there was only a typing mistake in the plaint wherein the date is mentioned as 5th May, 1982, it would mean that thereby hs meant that the date mentioned therein ought to have been 4th May, 1982 and not 5th May, 1982. But it would be seen that in para 5 of the plaint and para 7 of the replication in reply to the preliminary objection no. 7 of the written statement the date 5th May, 1982 has been asserted as the date both for handing over the possession of the premises and other items like furniture etc. to the Company as also to the moving of plaintiff No. 2 S. N. Sarma into the said premises with his personal belongings and the use of the word 'itself in para 5 of the plaint and the use of the words 'on that very date' in para 7 of the replication pertaining to that date are meaningful in that context and the aforesaid para 7 of the replication further makes it clear that the key? of the premises and furniture etc. were handed over by L.L. Jain to the official of the Company on the morning of 5th May, 1982 by L. L. Jain himself in the premises itself thereby belying the aforesaid explanation given by Sanjay Wadhavan (Public Witness 3) that he verified the furniture etc. in the premises in question on the morning of 5th May, 1982 in the absence of L.L. Jain when he along With S.N. Sarma and others were locked inside the premises in question by the landlady.
(33) So, from the above discussion it stands proved that the suit premises were surrendered on 14-5-82 by L. L. Jain to the landlady defendant No. I, but as it is the Company which has been found to be the tenant of these premises, the surrendering of possession by L.L. Jain to the land lady was on behalf of the Company only and this issue is decided accordingly partly in favor of the plaintiffs and partly in favor of the defendants. Issue No. 9 (34) The case of the plaintiffs in respect of this issue is that the Company was coerced into executing the lease agreement in question inserting the impugned clause of the user of these premises only for the residence of L.L. Jain and for no other officer of the Company, for the reason that the Company had up high every day, the general tendency of the landlords was "dictating, as the Company was badly in need of residential premises for the residence of its officers, and to get a suitable accommodation in the Union Territory of Delhi and particulrly in South Delhi, was a difficult task and as the rents were going up high every day, the general tendancy of the landlords was to get maximum rent of the property in Delhi and they expect increase of rent every six months from their tenants and they were always in search of some trick for getting the tenant evicted from the premises and the landlady deft. no. I was no exception to that tendency. This contention cannot be accepted as constituting coercion on the part of defendant no. 1. No writing by way of protest was sent by the Company to the landlady alleging the insertion of this clause as having been the result of any coercion on her part. This issue is decided against the plaintiffs. Issue No. 10 (35) Under issue no. 8 it has been seen that the version given by plaintiffs 2 and 3 S. N. Sarma and Sanjay Wadhayan and the witness Kameshwar Swarup (Public Witness 1) about the handing over of the keys of the premises in question by L.L. Jain to the Company on the morning of 4th May, 1982 and the handing over of the same in the evening of that very day by the Company to S. N. Sarma, has not been accepted as correct, and in the resultant the going up to the first floor of S. N. Sarma, his wife, plaintiff no. 3 Sanjay Wadhawan and Chowkidar Pancham by opening the locks of the house in question and their being locked therein by the landlady, also fall " through.
(36) The plaintiffs' witnesses admitted that a person standing in the balcony of the first floor could talk to the person standing on the road. Thus, it would look improbable that none of the persons allegedly detained in the first floor told their peon Laxmi standing on the road, or the truck driver or any other person from the crowd, to inform the Company or the police, although they remained allegedly confined therein for more than 5 hours. The presence of peon Laxmi on the road all through has been admitted in his cross-examination by S. N. Sarma (Public Witness 2) and it would have been reasonable on his part and on the part of his companions alleged to have been detained on the first floor to have asked him to inform the Company or the police. The driver of the truck as also a number of persons were also in the same position. On this point the statement of S. N. Sarma (Public Witness 2) in his cross-examination is reproduced below :- "We could not think of any after about 9 A.M. how to contact the office of the plaintiff company and how to come out and this we could not think out uptil about 12.00 noon. Mr. Lakshmi peon remained on the road all throughout outside the main gate of the house and we could not see him from the balcony. But in that period we did not ask him to inform the plaintiff company about our detention. The truck with the luggags was parked on the road outside the main gate of the house and was not allowed to enter the compound and that truck could be seen by us from the balcony of the first floor and there was commotion outside. The driver of the truck was in fact asking me as to what he should do. There must be about 15120 persons in the commotion at that time. It did not strike me or my companions to ask the truck driver, Lakshmi peon or anybody in the commotion to inform the plaintiff company about our detention............. ............I approved the idea of Mr. Wadhawan to put the slip in the shoe of the Chowkidar for onward transmission to the office of the plaintiff company. That chit was thrown in the shoe at about 12.15 P.M. I cannot give any reason why I did not ask any person including the truck driver, peon Lakshmi or anybody from the commotion to communicate our detention in this house to the plaintiff company or to the police."
(37) In this back drop the version of the witnesses of the plaintiffs regarding a chit having been placed in the shoe and the same having been thrown from the balcony of the first floor to the peon Lakshmi standing on the road at about 12.30 P.M. after about 41 hours of their alleged detention, suffers a great set-back. According to the witnesses of the plaintiffs the landlady opened the lock of the door of the ground floor only after Kameshwar Swarup (Public Witness 1) arrived at the premises in question at 2.00 P.M. (38) The truck carrying the baggage of S. N. Sarma had admittedly arrived at the main gate of the house in question at 12.00 noon as stated by the witnesses of the plaintiffs. According to the version of' the defendants that truck was not allowed to enter inside the premises, and it remained outside the main gate of this house, and that S. N. Sarma and Sanjay Wardhavan etc. had not come to the premises in question in the morning as alleged and stated by them. The version of the landlady appearing in her statement as DW1 is reproduced below :- "It was in the middle of April 1982 that L.L. Jain told me that he had resigned from the plaintiff company and that he would hand over vacant possession of the premises in question to me on 5-5-1982. He also- told me that after 5-5-1982 he had to go to Bangkok. He also told me that it would be desirable that a letter be written by me to the plaintiff-company as well in this regard. I thereupon sent a registered letter to the plaintiff company on 30-4-1982. Ext. P2 is that letter. On 4-5-1982 L.L. Jain came to me and told me that he would not be able to give possession of the premises is question to me on 5-5-1982 as he was to go to Calcutta and that from Calcutta he would be returning on 13-5-1982 and would deliver the vacant possession of premises to me on the next 131 date, i.e., 14-5-1982. The same talk was repeated between us even on the morning of 5-5-1982 at about 8.30 or 9.00 A.M. when my husband defendant no. 2 was also present there at that time. L.L. Jain left at about 9.45 A.M. My husband also left for Income Tax Department at about 10.00 A.M. On that day i.e., 5-5-1982 I was a truck loaded with luggage at about 12.00 noon. I then came out to the main gate outside the drive way and found that besides luggage in the truck there were about 20 or 25 persons in the truck and the cars. I enquired from them whom they wanted to meet. Two or three persons out of them came forward and told me that they had come there to reside in the first floor. I told them that L.L. Jain Was still in occupation of the first floor in question and had not vacated the same but they told me that they had come from M/s. Usha Sales Ltd. and that they would reside in the first floor. Thereupon I told them that as per the agreement the premises in question had been let out only for the residence of L.L. Jain alone and therefore no other person could be put by the plaintiff in those premises. I got upset and frightened on their demond. I was- inside that gate and they were outside that gate. I then locked the gate from inside and came in and telephoned to my neighbours Mr. Balraj Chhabra and Mr. Inder Sanon and other acquaintances. Their ladies and servants then came and I told them that I was very pinch upset. There after I went in my car to the Income Tax Department to fetch my husband at about 12.30 or 12.45 P.M. I then came out of the main gate and locked it again from inside by putting my band inside and handed over the key to my neighbours who had arrived there and were inside the drive way. None of the persons who came with the truck or in cars entered inside the building. I returned along with husband from the Income Tax Office at about 1.20 or 1:25 P.M."
(39) The perusal of the letter Ext. P2 dated 30-4-1982 referred to above in the testimony of the landlady shows that L.L. Jain had informed her that he had resigned from the Company and was leaving for Bangkok and had stated that he would be vacating the house on 5th May, 1982. In this letter she requested the Company to see that the vacant possession was handed over to her by Company/L.L. Jain, when he vacated the premises on 5th May, 1982.
(40) There is no independent witness examined by either " side on these two contradictory versions of the parties but the letter Ext. P2 and the landlady's statement that L.L. Jain had told her that he would be vacating the house on 5th May, 1982, finds support from the plaint and replication of the plaintiff and that in turn supports the testimony of the landlady on the point that on the morning of 5th May, 1982 at about 8.30 or 9.00 A.M. L.L. Jain came to her when her husband defendant No. 2 was also present there and that L.L. Jain left at about 9.45 A.M. and her husband also left for Income Tax Department at about 10.00 A.M., which in turn would go to run down the version of S. N. Sarma and his companions coming to the premises in question in the morning of 5th May, 1982 and going up-stairs in the first floor and being locked in there by the landlady.
(41) According to all the plaintiffs' witnesses, the telephone of the premises was working at the time when they reached there. It was also working at the time when they were allegedly locked. According to Public Witness . 2, he reached the premises at 8.00 A.M. and soon thereafter the landlady locked the premises. Alter dicovering that he was locked in he rang up the Transport Company to enquire as to when the luggage would arrive and was told that the luggage would come to the said premises at about 10.00 A.M. It is submitted that it is highly improbable that when a person finds himself detained or locked, he would first ring up the Transport Company to find out the time of' the arrival of his luggage and would not ring up the Police or the Company or any where else to seek help for his release from the alleged detention. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid it is held that plaintiffs 2 and 3 were not illegally detained by the defendants. In view of this finding the question of awarding any compensation to the plaintiffs due to alleged detention does not arise. This issue is decided against the plaintiffs. Issue No. 11 (42) It has already been found under issues 2 and 3 that even after the lapse and termination of contractual tenancy the Company became the statutory tenant under the landlady I defendant no. 1 and was, thus, entitled to the statutory protection in respect of its status of irremovability in respect of the premises in question unless it was evicted there from under the enabling provisions of the statute, i.e., the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and that such a statutory tenant can enforce such right through an injunction. In this view of the matter the clause in the lease-deed that the premises in question would be used for the residence of L.L. Jain alone and for no other officer/employee of the Company, had no adverse effect on the aforesaid statutory right of the Company unless and until evicted under the statutory provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and that right of the Company, when sought to be interfered with by the landlady, can be protected by the grant of an injuction, Biswabani Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Santosh Kumar Dutta (supra) is an authority on this proposition of law.
(43) Admittedly, the landlady/defendant no.1 did not permit S.N. Sarma an officer of the Company and his trick load of luggage to enter the .building wherein the premises are situate at about 12.00 noon on 5-5-1982.. Moreover, the position taken up by the landlady throughout has been one of not allowing entry to any other officer of the Company except L. L. Jain, and that his tantamount, to interfering with the aforesaid statutory tenancy rights of the Company in the premises in question. Even the assertion of the landlady regarding her right in that regard as also her determination on that point is manifest from her written statement from which the relevant lines are reproduced below :- "........IT is absolutely false that the defendants are not entitled to obstruct the unlawful act on the part of the plaintiffs to make a forcible entry into the house............................. It may be, however, submitted that the defendants have a right to prevent any trespass on the part of the plaintiff and/or to resist the forcible entry which they threatened and/or threatening................. The defendants have every right and justification to enforce the terms of lease and to resist any unlawful act on the part of the plaintiff in allotting the premises in question to any other officer and or to use the same for his or their residence.........'*.
In her statement as D.W. 1 she stated as follows :- "........IT is correct that I was not prepared to allow anybody else except L.L. Jain to enter the premises in question............... I was not agreeable to allow any other employee of the plaintiff company to occupy the premises in question because the lease-deed was meant only for the residence of L.L. Jain and for nobody else.... . ". So, obviously in the face of this unmistakable position taken up by the defendants, the Company is entitled to the relief of injunction in exercise of its being the statutory tenant in the premises in question.
(44) The suit was filed by the plaintiffs on 13-5-1982. It has been found under issue no.8 that the suit premises were surrendered by L.L. Jain to the landlady/defendant no.1 on 14-5-1982 and that surrender by him was on behalf of the Company. Thus, the Company remained in possession of the premises in question uptil 14-5-1982 and, thus, there is no question of any damages to be allowed to the Company against the defendants for any period up to the filing of the .suit, i.e., 13-5-1982 and this is in respect of the damages claimed at the rate of Rs. 3,100 per month and Rs. 500 per day from 5-5-1892.
(45) Regarding the further damages at the rate of Rs. 3,100 per month and Rs. 500 per day from the date of the institution of the suit till the date of' the plaintiffs were allowed to use peacefully the tenanted premises the same cannot be decreed in this suit. The Court can grant the relief only as on the date of the suit and not on subsequent cause of action. The only exception to this Rule is recognised under Order 20 Rule 12. of the Code of Civil Procedure which talks of a suit for the recovery of possession of moveable property and for rents or mesne profit. Admittedly, the suit is neither for the recovery of rent nor for mesne profits. "Mesne Profit" is defined in S. 2(12) of the Code of Civil Procedure as follows - "MESNEProfits' of property means those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually receives or might with ordinary diligence have received there from, together with interest on such profits but shall not include profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession."
(46) Since this is an exception to the general rule, S. 11 of the Court Fees Act governs the payment of the court fees in such suits. There is no other provision either in the Code of Civil Procedure or in the Court Fees Act for decreeing any amounts or compensation paid or received during the pendency of the suit or for the payment of the court fees after passing of the decree.
(47) Even though it Was conceded by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that he was not claiming mesne profits in this suit, he, however, cited Girja Kuer v. Shiva Prasad Singh and others Air 1935 Patna 160. In the said case, the Court was only concerned with the valuation of the suit and held that:- "THEvalue of the suit is its value at the date of the institution of the suit and not what will become its value on some subsequent date. Future mesne profits being uncertain cannot be taken into account turn the purpose of' payment of court fee and for the purpose of determining the value of the suit. Applying the analogy of mesne profits to future damages. it is clear that no court fee .is payable in respect of damages pendente lite. It follows therefore that it cannot be taken into account for determining the value of the suit."
(48) The High Court of Ratna was only concerned with the valuation of the suit for the purpose of the jurisdiction. It observed at page 161 that :-- "THEvalue of a suit does not depend upon the competency of a Court to pass a decree for a particular claim. The claim' may be absolutely untenable and the plaintiff may not be entitled to it on the face of it, but nevertheless if the plaintiff claims it, he has to value it and that value will determine the forum for the institution of the suit. Secondly, I do not think the. question whether future damages can or cannot be decreed is free .from doubt. As the matter will have to be determined in the suit itself on the result of the main issue, I do not wish to express any opinion."
(49) There is, however a clear authority, reported as India Electric Works Ltd. vs. Mrs. B. S. Mantosh and others , in which a suit was filed being Suit No. 28 of 1948 for a decree for Rs. 13,164 as damages for wrongful use and occupation @ Rs. J 2 per diem. The plaintiffs also prayed for a decree at 'the same rate from the date of the suit to the date on which the Company would vacate the shed. The trial court decreed the suit and also the future damages. The High Court of Calcutta observed as follows :- "The rest of the decree in Suit No. 28 of 1948 was not according to law and cannot be maintained. The suit was a pure money suit and not a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property and mesne profits under Order 20, Rule 12 Civil Procedure Code . In such a suit, a preliminary decree may be passed for possession and for assessment, but in a pure suit for recovery of money, no decree can be passed for recovery of compensation after the date of the suit up to the date of the decree or after the date of the decree until recovery of possession. This part of the decree should, therefore, be set aside."
(50) Thus, further damages from the date of the suit onwards till the date the plaintiffs are allowed to use peacefully the tenanted premises cannot be decreed in this suit.
(51) So, while the plaintiffs are entitled to the injunction as sought for in respect of the premises in question, they are not entitled to damages claimed by them in para 'C' of the prayer clause at the rates Rs. 3,100 per month and Rs. 500 per day with effect from 5-5-1982 onwards till the date they are allowed to use peacefully the tenanted premises and this issue is decided accordingly partly in favor of the plaintiffs and partly against them to the extent indicated above. Issue NO. 12 (Relief) (52) In view of my findings under Issue No. I the plaintiffs shall pay court fees on the relief of damages claimed at the rates of Rs. 31,00 per month and Rs. 500 per day for the period from 5-5-1982 till 13-5-1982 within two weeks from today failing which the plaint in respect of that relief shall stand rejected.
(53) In view of my above findings the plaintiffs are granted' adecree of injunction as prayed for in para A (i) and (ii) of the prayer clause in the plaint, against the defendants; but their suit for damages in the sum of Rs. 1,04,000 on the ground of alleged detention is dismissed. The suit for further damages at the rates of Rs. 31,00 per month and Rs. 500 per day for the period from 5-5-1982 till the date of the suit, is dismissed when the requisite court fees for that relief is paid by the plaintiffs, while the plaint in respect of the further damages at the rates of Rs. 31,00 per month and Rs. 500 per day from the " date of the suit onwards till the date the plaintiffs are allowed to use peacefully the tenanted premises, is rejected. Under the circumstances, parties are left to bear their own costs.