Gujarat High Court
Rajeshbhai @ Raju Jivanbhai Solanki vs State Of on 22 August, 2013
Bench: Ks Jhaveri, K.J.Thaker
RAJESHBHAI @ RAJU JIVANBHAI SOLANKI....Appellant(s)V/SSTATE OF GUJARAT....Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) R/CR.A/1449/2007 JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1449 of 2007 With CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1452 of 2007 With CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1453 of 2007 FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE KS JHAVERI and HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.J.THAKER ================================================================ 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? 2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? 3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ? 4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ? 5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ? ================================================================ RAJESHBHAI @ RAJU JIVANBHAI SOLANKI....Appellant(s) Versus STATE OF GUJARAT....Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) ================================================================ Appearance: MR AMIT M NAIR, ADVOCATE for the Appellant(s) No. 1 MS CM SHAH, ADDL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1 ================================================================ CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE KS JHAVERI and HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.J.THAKER Date : 22/08/2013 ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE KS JHAVERI)
1. Criminal Appeal No. 1449 of 2007 has been preferred by original accused no. 4 Rajeshbhai @ Raju Jivanbhai Solanki, Criminal Appeal No. 1452 of 2007 has been preferred by original accused no. 2 Sureshbhai Jivanbhai Solanki whereas Criminal Appeal No. 1453 of 2007 has been preferred by original accused no. 1 Jivanbhai Hemabhai Solanki of Sessions Case No. 300 of 2006. Original accused no. 3 - Babubhai Mafabhai Parmar had preferred Criminal Appeal No. 1351 of 2007. However, as he expired during the pendency of appeal, the case against him stood abated and therefore Criminal Appeal No. 1351 of 2007 was abated qua original accused no. 3 vide order dated 30.07.2013 passed by this Court.
1.1 The accused nos. 1, 2 & 4 were inter alia sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and were ordered to pay fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default, simple imprisonment for one month for offence punishable under section 302, 114 of Indian Penal Code by impugned judgement and order dated 23.10.2007 in Sessions Case No. 300 of 2006 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 5, Ahmedabad. The accused were given benefit to set off under section 428.
2. As per the prosecution case, the original accused no. 3 had gone to the house of original accused no. 2 along with accused no. 4 to compromise with the deceased on 28.11.2005 at around 10.30 am where the deceased was present with his wife. It is the prosecution case that the deceased-original complainant did not agree to the proposal of the accused persons to give his daughter in marriage to the brother-in-law of the son of original accused no. 3. Therefore, during the settlement talks, original accused no. 1 poured petrol on the deceased whereas the accused nos. 2 and 4 caught hold of the deceased and accused no. 3 lighted matchstick and set the deceased on fire. The deceased while burning rushed outside the house. The neighbours tried to douse the fire by pouring water on him. He was taken to hospital for treatment where he succumbed to his injuries.
2.1 Thereafter, necessary panchnamas were drawn and post mortem was carried out. After completing the inquest panchnama, the offence was registered against the accused. After their arrest and necessary investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused. Ultimately, as the case was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, the same was committed to the Sessions Court.
2.2 The trial was initiated against the accused and during the course of trial the prosecution examined the following witnesses as oral evidences:
P.W. 1- Shivrambhai Chauhan Ex. 08 P.W. 2 Dahyabhai Jadav Ex. 10 P.W. 3 Pravinbhai Muliyana Ex. 13 P.W. 4 Dineshbhai Makwana Ex. 16 P.W. 5 Gulabji Rana Ex. 20 P.W. 6 Dr. Jayshreeben Patel Ex. 24 P.W. 7 Ravindrabhai Shrivastava Ex. 28 P.W. 8 Narendra Masalkar Ex. 30 P.W. 9 Rekhaben Solanki Ex. 34 P.W. 10 Kiritkumar Thakar Ex. 35 P.W. 11 Ambalal Bharwad Ex. 36 P.W. 12 Babiben Parmar Ex. 37 P.W. 13 Gauridutt Sharma Ex. 38 P.W. 14 Madhukarbhai Patil Ex. 42 P.W. 15 Mukeshkumar Chaudhary Ex. 46 P.W. 16 Rameshbhai Patel Ex. 49 2.3 The prosecution also exhibited the following documents as documentary evidences:
Complaint Ex. 47 Report under section 157 Ex. 48 Panchnama of scene of offence Ex. 9 Yadi for recording DD Letter to FSL Ex. 38 Report by FSL Ex. 40 Panchnama of clothes of deceased Ex. 21 Inquest panchnama Ex. 12 Treatment certificate Ex. 32 Vardhi Ex. 43 P.M. Note Ex. 26 Death certificate Ex. 27 Panchnama of body condition and clothes of accused Ex. 11 Panchnama of body condition and clothes of accused Ex. 29 Panchnama of body condition and clothes of accused Ex. 17 Dispatch note Ex. 51 Receipt by FSL Ex. 52 FSL Report Ex. 53 Biological analysis Ex. 54 Forwarding letter by FSL Ex. 55 Report for adding section 302 Ex. 50 2.4 The
defence also examined two witnesses in support of their case:
D.W. 1 Hiraben Waghela Ex. 59 D.W. 2 Rameshbhai @ Devjibhai Ex. 60 2.5 At the end of the trial and after recording the statement of the accused under section 313 of Cr.P.C., and hearing arguments on behalf of prosecution and the defence, the learned Sessions Judge convicted the appellants as mentioned aforesaid. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgement and order passed by the Sessions Court the appellants have preferred the present appeals.
3. Mr. Amit Nair, learned advocate appearing for the accused has submitted that the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the oral evidence was not in consonance with the medical evidence. He has drawn the attention of this Court to the evidence of the doctor who performed post mortem and submitted that the doctor herself has opined that looking to the injuries sustained by the victim, the possibility of suicide cannot be ruled out. He submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the death of deceased was homicidal. He submitted that going by the facts and circumstances of the case, it is evident that the death was more of suicidal in nature or could be perceived as accidental death. In this context he has relied upon Chapter 11 of The Essentials Of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology, more particularly the discussion on Suicide and Homicide.
3.1 Mr. Nair submitted that there are variations in the dying declarations given by the deceased in the form of history before the doctor, the complaint and the Executive Magistrate. He submitted that in the complaint the victim stated that he was at accused no. 1 s house when the alleged incident happened. In the version before the magistrate, he has stated that the accused did not mention the alleged role of original accused nos. 2 & 4. In the history before the doctor, the deceased has stated that he was at his own house when the accused persons came there and accused nos. 2, 3 & 4 caught hold of him and accused no. 4 set him on fire. He submitted that the dying declarations could not have been relied upon by the trial court in view of various infirmities in the dying declarations and therefore could not have been made the basis of conviction.
3.2 Mr. Nair further submitted that the prosecution failed to examine relevant and important witnesses who were actually the eye witnesses in the present case. He submitted that in fact the panch witnesses have turned hostile. He submitted that the defence on the contrary examined two witnesses who were the eye witnesses and they have not supported the case of the prosecution.
3.3 Mr. Nair also submitted that the genesis of the motive or intention is not well founded since the accused no. 1 being a teacher was at his school at Pinthroda village, Kheda whereas the accused nos. 2 & 4 were at work to polish diamonds and the same is also proved from the evidence of D.W. 1 & 2. He submitted that the accused persons have been falsely roped in the present case.
3.4 In support of his submissions, Mr. Nair has relied upon the following decisions:
Surinder Kumar Vs. State of Haryana reported in 2012(1) GLH 658;
Shaileshkumar Chandrakant Bhatt vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2009(1) GLH 131;
Sharad Birdichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 1984(0) GLHEL-SC 26145;
Minaben Merabhai vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2002 (2) GLR 1662;
Gopal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2009 (2) GLH 489;
Vishal Rajendra Trivedi vs. State of Gujarat reported in 1995 (2) GLH 1094;
4. Ms. Chetna M. Shah, learned APP has strongly supported the impugned judgement and order and submitted that the prosecution has proved its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. She submitted that the contention that the patient was not conscious while recording of dying declaration cannot be accepted inasmuch as the dying declaration started at 1225 hours and ended at 1255 hours after being certified by the doctor that the patient is conscious and fit to record his statement. The thumb impression of the deceased has been appended on the declaration and the same is also signed by the Executive Magistrate and he has certified that the deceased was conscious while giving his dying declaration.
4.1 Ms. Shah submitted that the prosecution has proved the case against the present appellants beyond doubt inasmuch as the victim has suffered serious burn injuries to the extent of around 80% and the dying declaration, complaint and the history before the doctor are sufficient proof to convict the appellants. She submitted that the prosecution witnesses have clearly established the presence of the appellants at the scene of offence by way of prosecution witnesses as well as defence witnesses.
4.2 Ms. Shah submitted that a cumulative minute reading of the complaint and dying declaration will enumerate that the deceased was being pressurized to give his daughter in marriage to a relative of accused no. 3 which the deceased did not want to. She submitted that the motive and intention of the accused in the present offence is also proved beyond reasonable doubt.
4.3 Ms. Shah submitted that the dying declaration and complaint given by the victim is self explanatory in nature. She submitted that the declarations were voluntary and made by free will of the deceased. She has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Shudhakar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2012) 7 SCC 569 and submitted that a person on death bed will normally speak the truth and only the truth. She has also relied upon another decision of Apex Court in the case of Krishan vs. State of Haryana reported in (2013) 3 SCC 280.
5. At the outset, it may be mentioned that, that death of deceased Rameshbhai Parmar was caused due to burn injuries is not in dispute. The memorandum of the postmortem examination (Exhibit
28) shows that Dilsukhba had sustained about 80% burn injuries. The cause of death, as opined by Dr. J.K.Patel, the Medical Officer who conducted the postmortem examination, is shock due to extensive whole body burns. Thus, that Rameshbhai died an unnatural death due to burn injuries is undisputed.
6. P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 are the panch witnesses who have turned hostile. P.W.3 Pravinbhai Muliyana, Ex. 13, is the Executive Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration at around 1225 hours after receiving yadi from Amraiwadi police station at 1210 hours on 28.11.2005. He started recording the dying declaration after ascertaining the medical condition and fitness of the victim. He has stated that the victim was fit enough to give his statement and he recorded the same after asking basic questions. He has admitted that the signatures of the doctor who certified the fitness of the patient was not taken on the dying declaration but the same was appended on the yadi. He has stated that the patient was fit and conscious during the course of recording of dying declaration.
6.1 In the dying declaration at Ex. 15, the deceased had stated that original accused nos. 1 to 4 were present at the scene of offence. He has narrated in detail that the accused nos. 1 & 2 as well as wife of accused no. 2 had wrongly roped the deceased in a case of kidnapping and rape of wife of accused no. 2 and were harassing him. He has stated that the accused persons were pressurizing the deceased to give his daughter in marriage to a relative of original accused no. 3 which was not agreeable to the deceased. The deceased has stated that on the date of incident, as the deceased denied marrying his daughter to the relative of accused no. 3, original accused no. 1 poured petrol on the deceased and tried to lit match stick but it was put off by the deceased. Thereafter, original accused no. 3 lit another match stick and set the deceased ablaze. The deceased shouted for help and the neighbours came and tried to extinguish the fire. The deceased in his dying declaration has mentioned that the appellants are the perpetrators of the offence in question.
6.2 The incident occurred at around 10.00 to 10.30 am on 28.11.2005. The history was given before P.W. 10 Kiritkumar Thakar who was the Head Constable of Amraiwadi on patrolling duty. Thereafter, the second history was given to the Medical Officer, Dr. Narendra Masalkar who was on duty at L.G. Medical Hospital at around 11.40 am on 28.11.2005. Thereafter, third dying declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate at 12.25 am and finally fourth dying declaration in the form of FIR to the I.O was recorded on the same day.
7. Let us go through the evidences of these witnesses in detail. P.W. 10- Kiritkumar Thakar has deposed vide Ex. 35 that on 28.11.2005 at around 10.00 am while he was on patrolling duty he received a message that a man had sustained burn injuries near Rauf Ni Chali and therefore they reached the scene of offence. He has deposed that the deceased had told him that the accused nos. 2 & 4 had caught hold of him and the accused no. 3 had set him ablaze. He has stated in his cross examination that the deceased was conscious when he was speaking to him.
7.1 P.W. 8 - Dr. Narendra Masalkar is the medical officer who was on duty at L.G. Hospital when the victim was brought. This witness has deposed that accused nos. 1, 2 & 3 had caught hold of him and accused no. 1 had poured petrol on him and set him ablaze. He has deposed that the neighbours had extinguished the fire by pouring water on him. He has deposed that the patient was conscious when brought to hospital and that he had sustained around 80% injuries on the entire body.
7.2 In the complaint given on 28.11.2005, the deceased has stated that he had gone to the house of accused no. 1 for compromise of the case filed against him by the accused persons and to mediate talks about giving his daughter in marriage to the son of accused no. 3 s sister. He has mentioned that on the date of incident, at around 09.00 am original accused no. 3 had come to house of accused no. 1 where accused no. 1 s two sons were already present and accused no. 3 told the deceased that if he doesnt agree to marrying his daughter to the son of sister of accused no. 3, the case pending in the Court of Sessions against him shall not be compromised and that he shall see to it that accused no. 2 divorces his wife. The deceased did not agree to this proposition and therefore getting angry the accused nos. 2 & 4 caught hold of him and accused no. 3 poured petrol on him and accused no. 1 lit the match stick and tried to put him on fire. The deceased has mentioned that he had put off the match stick, nevertheless the original accused no. 3 again lit the match stick and set him ablaze.
8. Considering the four dying declarations, we notice that all the four dying declarations state that the deceased was set on fire by the accused persons. The medical evidence supports the case of the prosecution. We have perused the medical papers as per which the deceased was given treatment and thereupon also the history of burns due to pouring of petrol by the accused persons is mentioned. The doctor who treated the deceased has supported the prosecution case as also the Executive Magistrate, P.W. 3 who had come to record the dying declaration of the deceased pursuant to the yadi received by him. The yadi sent to the Executive Magistrate also mentions that the deceased had sustained burns due to pouring of petrol by the accused persons.
8.1 Therefore, the possibility of suicide as contended by learned advocate for the appellants is required to be ruled out. This is clearly a case of homicidal death. Going by the dying declarations it can be prima facie inferred that the death of the victim was homicidal and thereby point a finger at the accused.
9. We are aware of the settled position of law that the courts have to be on guard to see that the dying declaration is not the result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination and that due care and caution must be exercised in considering weight to be given to the dying declaration. Moreover, a dying declaration should satisfy all the necessary tests and one such important test is that if there are more than one dying declarations they should be consistent particularly in material particulars. If there is doubt about the correctness of a dying declaration, courts should look for some corroborative evidence before convicting an accused on the basis of it.
It is, therefore, very important to consider other documentary as well as ocular evidences which may support either set of dying declaration.
10. It is pertinent to note that the wife of the deceased who happens to be the sister of original accused no. 1 is examined by the prosecution as P.W. 12. She has supported the case of the prosecution and from her testimony also it is clear that the accused persons were present at the scene of offence. She has stated that during the talks for compromise, she was asked by the deceased to go to the house of one Harjibhai Tulsibhai to get a bag and she readily went. She has stated that while she was returning she saw her husband in burning condition and she became unconscious. After she regained consciousness, she went to the hospital where she was informed by her husband-deceased that he was caught held by original accused no. 2 & 4 and accused no. 3 poured petrol whereas accused no. 1 set him ablaze.
11. On the other hand, the defence has examined two witnesses. D.W. 1- Hiraben Vaghela has deposed vide Ex. 59 that she has seen the alleged incident. She has deposed that she had seen the deceased taking out a plastic pouch containing some liquid and pouring it over-head. He then lit a matchstick and set himself ablaze. She has stated that she and another neighbour tried to extinguish the fire to which the deceased resisted and said that he wanted to die. She has deposed that the deceased also told her that he shall die but shall also involve the appellants in the incident. She has stated that accused no. 1, 2 & 4 were not present at the scene of offence.
11.1 D.W. 2 Rameshbhai @ Devjibhai Sandharva is the defence witness who has been examined at Ex. 60. He has deposed that the deceased took out a plastic pouch containing some liquid and poured it over-head. He then lit a matchstick and set himself ablaze. He has stated that the neighbours tried to extinguish the fire by pouring water on him. This witness has stated that the accused no. 4 was not present at his house.
12. Ex.
9 is the panchnama of scene of offence. It is borne out from the panchnama that two burnt match sticks were found from the scene of offence.
13. As far as the veracity of the dying declaration before the Executive Magistrate is concerned, it is required to be noted that the Executive Magistrate in his deposition has clearly mentioned that the deceased was conscious while recording the declaration and the endorsement of the doctor regarding the fitness of the patient was also taken. He stated that the deceased answered his questions and also appended his right thumb impression after the procedure was over at around 12.55 am.
14. In the case of Gopal (supra), the Apex Court in para 13 has observed as under:
13.
Law relating to appreciation of evidence in the form of more than one dying declaration is well settled. Accordingly, it is not the plurality of the dying declarations but the reliability thereof that adds weight to the prosecution case. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration. The statement should be consistent throughout. If the deceased had several opportunities of making such dying declarations, that is to say, if there is more than one dying declaration they should be consistent. However, if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely, whether they are material or not. While scrutinising the contents of various dying declarations, in such a situation, the court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances.
14.1 In the case of Shaileshkumar Bhatt (Supra), this Court has held that when there is more than one dying declaration genuinely recorded, they must be tested on touchstone of consistency and probabilities and in the light of other evidence.
14.2 In the case of Surinder Kumar (supra), the Apex Court has held in para 17 as under:
Inasmuch as the acquittal by the trial Court and conviction by the High Court is solely based on the dying declaration, in view of our above discussion, there is no need to traverse the evidence and other factual details. In view of the infirmities pointed above, and contradictions as to the occurrence, failure on the part of the Executive Magistrate in obtaining certificate as to whether Kamlesh Rani had made a voluntary statement and not attested by any doctor and also his statement which is contradictory to that of the deceased Kamlesh Rani and of the fact that at the relevant time she was under
the influence of Fortwin and Pethidine injections and was not supposed to be having normal alertness, as rightly observed by the trial Court, we hold that the dying declaration Ex. PD does not inspire confidence in the mind of the Court. Inasmuch as the dying declaration is the only piece of evidence put forward against the accused in the light of our discussion and reasoning, the accused in the light of our discussion and reasoning, the accused Surinder Kumar is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
14.3 In the case of Minaben Merabhai (supra), this Court has observed that in case where there are two views possible, it would be hazardous and totally unsafe to convict the appellants relying on one set of circumstances and giving up the other. Similarly in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra), the Apex Court has observed that where two possibilities are available, the benefits which go to the accused will undoubtedly be entitled to the accused.
14.4 On the other hand, the Apex Court in the case of Kamalavva and another vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2009) 13 SCC 614 has held as under:
18. In the aforesaid decision this Court while referring to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Laxman case reiterated that there is no requirement of law that the dying declaration must necessarily contain a certification by the doctor that the patient was in a fit state of mind specially when the dying declaration was recorded by a Magistrate. It was also held in the said decision that it is the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to make statement gains the importance and reliance can be placed upon declaration even in the absence of the doctor's certificate provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful.
19. In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principles laid down by this Court, we will now examine the admissibility of the dying declaration in the case in hand.
20. PW-17 (Tahsildar) has stated that he was asked by the police to record the dying declaration of the deceased Shoba who was undergoing treatment in the hospital. He proceeded to the hospital and recorded the statement in the presence of Dr. M.S. Sangolli (PW-18) which was marked as Ext. P.17. The aforesaid statement was recorded in the form of questions and answers. From the nature of the answers the deceased has given, it cannot be said that she has not understood the questions and has not given proper answers. Therefore, it is not difficult to conclude that the mental capacity of the deceased was sound and she was capable of giving answers to the questions put forth by PW-17. The aforesaid dying declaration was recorded by PW- 17 in the presence of PW-18 who is a doctor attached to the same hospital. He has categorically stated in his evidence that the doctor had given the certificate to the effect that the injured was in a position to give the declaration. P.W. 18 also signed Ext. P. 17 (Dying Declaration). The thumb impression of the deceased Shoba was also taken on Ext. P.17. The doctor (PW-18) who was present at the time of recording the dying declaration has also attached a certificate to the effect that the said dying declaration was recorded in his presence.
21. In view of the aforesaid clear and unambiguous factual position we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was totally justified in relying upon the dying declaration recorded by the Taluka Executive Magistrate (PW-17) The technical objection raised by the counsel for the appellant regarding the unavailability of doctor's certification and endorsement as to mental fitness of the deceased, is liable to be rejected in as much as the same has been held by this Court in numerous decisions as a mere rule of prudence and not the ultimate test as to whether or not the said dying declaration was truthful or voluntary.
22. PW-17, who recorded the dying declaration had in his deposition categorically stated that the deceased while making the aforesaid statement was conscious and in a fit mental condition to make such a statement. PW- 17 being a Public Officer, we find no reason as to why he will implicate a person falsely. Accordingly, the aforesaid dying declaration could be relied upon as the same was truthfully recorded and the said statement gave a vivid account of the manner in which the incident had taken place. The same also corroborates in all respect with the statement given by the deceased to the police on 10.04.1995. The said statement was also recorded by the police officer of the rank of ASI and the deceased also put her LTI in it. In our considered opinion, the dying declaration is reliable and trustworthy and gives an accurate version of the manner in which the incident had taken place.
[Emphasis Supplied] 14.5 In the present case, when the Executive Magistrate recorded the dying declaration pursuant to the Vardhi received by him after taking opinion from the doctor, this Court finds no reason to disbelieve him more particularly when he has no axe to grind against the accused and being a public officer we find no reason as to why he will implicate a person falsely.
14.6 In the case of Shudhakar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2012) 7 SCC 569, the Apex Court has held that a dying declaration is the last statement made by a person at a stage when he is in serious apprehension of his death and expects no chances of his survival. At such time, it is expected that a person will speak the truth and only the truth and that normally in such situations, courts attach intrinsic value of truthfulness to such statement. It is also held that once such statement has been made voluntarily, it is reliable and is not an attempt by deceased to cover up truth or falsely implicate a person, then courts can safely rely on such dying declaration and it can form the basis of conviction, more so where version given by other prosecution evidence, there is no reason for courts to doubt truthfulness of such dying declaration.
14.7 In a recent decision of the Apex Court in the 10 case of Krishan vs. State of Haryana reported in (2013) 3 SCC 280, the Apex Court has held that it is not an absolute principle of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction of an accused. Where the dying declaration is true and correct, the attendant circumstances show it to be reliable and it has been recorded in accordance with law, the deceased made the dying declaration of her own accord and upon due certification by the doctor with regard to the state of mind and body, then it may not be necessary for the court to look for corroboration. In such cases, the dying declaration alone can form the basis for the conviction of the accused. But where the dying declaration itself is attended by suspicious circumstances, has not been recorded in accordance with law and settled procedures and practices, then, it may be necessary for the court to look for corroboration of the same.
15. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the prosecution has been able to prove the case against original accused no. 1- Jivanbhai Hemabhai Solanki beyond reasonable doubt. The role of original accused no. 1 & 3 have been described by the deceased in all the dying declarations. However, in the dying declaration recorded before the Executive Magistrate at Ex. 15, the deceased has not mentioned the role of the accused nos. 2 & 4. They have not sustained any burn injury during the act of holding the deceased when petrol was poured on him which generally is bound to happen under normal circumstances. We do not accept the case of the appellants that this is a case of suicide or that the original accused nos. 2 & 4 were not present at the scene of offence but the prosecution has failed to prove the role of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In view of the decisions cited hereinabove by learned advocate for the appellants and learned APP, we think it fit to grant benefit of doubt in favour of original accused nos. 2 &
4. The conviction of the original accused no. 1 is required to be confirmed. However, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Annapurna vs. State of U.P. reported in JT 2013 (9) SC 560, life imprisonment as awarded by the trial court would not be till last breath.
16. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No. 1453 of 2007 is dismissed qua appellant original accused no. 1- Jivanbhai Hemabhai Solanki. The order of conviction and sentence dated 23.10.2007 arising from Sessions Case No. 300 of 2006 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 5, Ahmedabad is confirmed qua original accused no. 1- Jivanbhai Hemabhai Solanki. However, life imprisonment as awarded by the trial court would not be till last breath and the case of the original accused no. 1 may be considered by the appropriate authority in accordance with law after 14 years of his serving sentence.
17. Criminal Appeals No. 1452 of 2007 and 1449 of 2007 are allowed qua original accused nos. 2 & 4 respectively. The order of conviction and sentence dated 23.10.2007 arising from Sessions Case No. 300 of 2006 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 5, Ahmedabad is quashed and set aside qua original accused nos. 2 & 4 being Sureshbhai Jivanbhai Solanki and Rajeshbhai @ Raju Jivanbhai Solanki. The appellants of Criminal Appeals No. 1452 of 2007 and 1449 of 2007 original accused nos. 2 & 4- Sureshbhai Jivanbhai Solanki and Rajeshbhai @ Raju Jivanbhai Solanki are granted benefit of doubt and are accordingly acquitted of the charges levelled against them under Sections 302 , 114 of Indian Penal Code.
18. Since the appellants of Criminal Appeals No. 1452 of 2007 and 1449 of 2007- original accused nos. 2 & 4 are on bail, their bail bond shall stand cancelled. R & P to be sent back to the trial court forthwith.
(K.S.JHAVERI, J.) (K.J.THAKER, J) divya Page 22 of 22