Chattisgarh High Court
Krishna Kumar Yadav vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 16 January, 2025
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2024:CGHC:33481
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
CRA No. 1036 of 2021
Krishna Kumar Yadav S/o Laxman Yadav, Aged About 37 Years
R/o Village Jaroundha, P.S. Takhatpur, District Bilaspur
Chhattisgarh.
... Appellant
versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through The PS- Takhatpur, District
Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
---- Respondent
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For Appellant : Mr. Mirza Hafiz Baig, Advocate For Respondent-State : Mr. Pranjal Shukla, PL.
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Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge Judgment on Board 16.01.2025.
1. This criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the judgment dated 13.08.2021, passed in Special Session Trial No.26/2018 by learned Addl. Session Judge/First FTSC (POCSO), Bilaspur, (CG), whereby appellant has been convicted as under :-
Conviction Sentence
U/s 454 of the Rigorous imprisonment
Indian Penal Code for 03 years & fine of
(IPC) amount Rs.250/-, in
default of payment of fine
06 months additional RI.
2
U/s 376 (2) of IPC RI for 10 years & fine of
amount Rs.500/-, in
default of payment of fine
three months additional
RI.
Both sentence run concurrently
2. The prosecution case, in brief, is this that on 28.08.2017, present appellant forcefully entered into the house of victim/prosecutrix and thereafter committed forceful sexual intercourse with her and also threatened her not to disclose the incident to anyone. Based upon report, FIR was registered against the appellant for offence under Sections 450, 376 of IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act.
3. On completion of investigation, challan/charge sheet was filed against the appellant for offence under Sections 450, 376 of IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act.
4. The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 14 witnesses, whereas the appellant-accused in support of his defence not examined any witness. Statement of appellant (accused) was recorded under Section 313 of CrPC in which he denied all incriminating evidence appearing against him, pleaded innocence and false implication.
5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence/material available on record, the trial Court vide impugned judgment convicted and sentenced the accused/appellants in the manner as described in Para-1 of this 3 judgment. Hence this appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment is per se illegal and contrary to the evidence available on record as the prosecutrix (PW-3) in her cross-examination stated that she had lodged the false FIR due to fear and pressure. There was love affair between the appellant and prosecutrix. As per case of prosecution, prosecutrix was minor at the time of alleged incident, but no authentic documentary proof was filed in order to show that the prosecutrix was a minor girl on the alleged date. Further, no ossification test of the prosecutrix has been conducted to ascertain her age. Learned counsel further submits that there are many contradictions and omissions in the statement of the prosecutrix, which was not considered properly by learned trial court. As such, the impugned judgment of conviction recorded and sentence awarded deserves to be set-aside.
Alternatively, it is argued that if the Court finds that alleged offence/crime has been committed by the appellant, then considering the fact that appellant is in jail since 15.07.2021 and thereby already served more than three years of jail sentence, he is not having any previous criminal incident, the sentence awarded to the appellant be reduced to the period already undergone by them.
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7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State supporting the impugned judgment and submits that the prosecutrix was a minor girl on the date of incident and this fact has been duly proved by the prosecution by adducing oral and documentary evidence. Prosecutrix was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse by appellant. Being so, the impugned judgment is strictly in accordance with law and the present appeal is liable to be dismissed.
8. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the recorded placed on record.
9. Now this Court has to see whether the prosecution has been able to prove that on the date of incident prosecutrix was minor. Though PW-3/prosecutrix and her mother & father (PW-1 & PW-
4) in their deposition have stated that on the date of alleged incident, prosecutrix was minor aged about 15 years, but did not produce the birth certificate or any other relevant document regarding DOB of prosecutrix. The prosecution has heavily relied upon the entry made in Dakhil-Kharij register of Government Primary School, Jaraunda, Block Takhatpur, regarding date of birth of prosecutrix. Though in the said register, her date of birth is recorded as 16.10.2001, but PW-5/Headmaster of said school has admitted in his cross-examination that he is not aware that on what basis said entry was made in Dakhil Kharij Register as he was not the author who made the said entry. Prosecution has also failed to explain that on what basis said entry was made in 5 Dakhil Kharij Panji. Further, no ossification test of the prosecutrix has been conducted to ascertain her age.
10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Alamelu and another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, (2011) 2 SCC 385 observed in paras 40 & 48 of its judgment as under:
"40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster.
Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded.
48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:-
"The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a 6 guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted."
11. In the case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & others, (2022) 8 SCC 602, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in para 33 as under:
"33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:
33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be.
XXXX XXXX XXX 7 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be In the case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & others, (2022) 8 SCC 602, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in para 33 as under:sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.
33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side.
33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance.
33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by In the case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & others, (2022) 8 SCC 602, the Hon'ble 8 Supreme Court observed in para 33 as under:the parties in each case.
33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile.
33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences.
33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents.
33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions.
33.11 Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015." 9
12. The Supreme Court in the matter of Manak Chand alias Mani vs. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC Online SC 1397 has reiterated the law laid down by it in the matter of Birad Mal Singhvi vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 (Supl.) SCC 604 and observed that the date of birth in the register of the school would not have any evidentiary value without the testimony of the person making the entry or the person who gave the date of birth. It was further reiterated that if the date of birth is disclosed by the parents, it would have some evidentiary value but in absence the same cannot be relied upon. For sake of brevity para No. 14 & 15 of the judgment are reproduced hereunder:-
"14 This Court in Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit (1988) Supp SCC 604 had observed that the date of birth in the register of a school would not have any evidentiary value without the testimony of the person making the entry or the person who gave the date of birth.
"14.... The date of birth mentioned in the scholar's register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. The entry contained in the admission form or in the scholar's register must be shown to be made on the basis of information given by the parents or a person having special knowledge about the date of birth of the person concerned. If the entry in the scholar's register regarding date of birth is made on the basis of information given by parents, the entry would have evidentiary value but if it is given by a stranger or by someone else who had no special means of 10 knowledge of the date of birth such an entry will have no evidentiary value."
15. In our opinion, the proof submitted by the prosecution with regard to the age of the prosecutrix in the form of the school register was not sufficient to arrive at a finding that the prosecutrix was less than sixteen years of age, especially when there were contradictory evidences before the Trial Court as to the age of the prosecutrix. It was neither safe nor fair to convict the accused, particularly when the age of the prosecutrix was such a crucial factor in the case."
13. In the case of P. Yuvaprakash versus State Rep. By Inspector of Police, AIR 2023 SC 3525, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in para 13 as under:
"13. It is evident from conjoint reading of the above provisions that wherever the dispute with respect to the age of a person arises in the context of her or him being a victim under the POCSO Act, the courts have to take recourse to the steps indicated in Section 94 of the JJ Act. The three documents in order of which the Juvenile Justice Act requires consideration is that the concerned court has to determine the age by considering the following documents:
(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available;
and in the absence thereof;
(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;
(iii) and only in the absence of
(i) and (ii) above, age shall be 11 determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board".
14. In light of aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the view that in the present case, there is no such clinching and legally admissible evidence brought on record by the prosecution to prove the fact that the prosecutrix was minor on the date of incident, yet the learned trial Court has recorded in the impugned judgment that she was minor. Hence, this Court set aside the finding so recorded by the learned trial Court and hold that the prosecution has not been able to prove successfully that on the date of incident she was minor.
15. Now coming to the point whether the appellant has been falsely implicated in this case for offence under 376(2) & 454 of IPC ? Prosecutrix in her Court statement has stated that on the date of alleged incident, she was alone in her house as her parents (mother and father) had gone to work. At that time, appellant/accused came to her house at about 10 am in the morning and committed forceful sexual intercourse with her and also threatened not to tell anyone about the incident or else he would kill her. Due to intercourse, she became pregnant. Version of the prosecutrix is supported by her mother and father (PW-1 & PW-4) in their deposition. Thus, learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the aforesaid offence. 12
16. As regards the quantum of sentence, considering that incident in question took place as back as in the year 2017 and now almost more than 07 years have passed. During these years, appellant must have suffered tremendous mental trauma and anguish of trial, he has already undergone more than 03 years of substantive sentence imposed by trial Court, he has no any previous criminal incident, he is aged about 37 years and having family behind him, this Court is of the opinion that sentence imposed by trial Court upon the appellant for offence under Section 376(2) of IPC (RI for 10 years) appears to be on higher side. So keeping in view all the circumstances, mentioned above, ends of justice will be served if the sentence imposed upon appellants is reduced from RI 10 years to RI 07 years.
17. In the result, appeal is allowed in part. The appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 4 of the POCSO Act. While maintaining the conviction of appellant under Sections 454 & 376(2) of the IPC, the sentence imposed upon him by trial Court is reduced from RI for 10 years to RI 07 years. However, sentence of fine imposed by the trial Court is hereby maintained.
18. The record of the trial Court along with copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action.
Sd/-
(Arvind Kumar Verma) JUDGE J/-