Madhya Pradesh High Court
K.C. Nema vs Secretary, School Education, ... on 10 July, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2001(4)MPHT173
Author: A.K. Mishra
Bench: A.K. Mishra
ORDER Bhawani Singh, C.J.
1. The petitioner retired from the post of Assistant District Inspector of Schools on reaching age of superannuation. He had applied for leave preparatory to retirement on 3-5-1967 followed by reminder dated 6-11-1967, but the same was not sanctioned, it appears for want of service book. Ultimately, he stood superannuated on 15-12-1967. His case was rejected by the respondents on 22-5-1972. Thereafter, the Joint Director, by letter dated 22-12-1997, informed the Commissioner as also the petitioner that payment of encashment of 120 days earned leave cannot be granted by Finance Department Memo dated 16-9-1980, therefore, the respondents rejected the claim of the petitioner.
2. The petitioner approached the State Administrative Tribunal by filing Original Application No. 2396/2000, which has been rejected by the Tribunal on 18-8-2000. Through this writ petition, the decision of the Tribunal has been challenged.
3. From perusal of the respective pleadings of the parties, it appears that there is no dispute about retirement of the petitioner as Assistant District Inspector of Schools on 15-12-1967. However, there is dispute as to the date when he had applied for leave preparatory to retirement. The petitioner contends that he had applied on 3-5-1967, but the respondents submits that it was done on 6-11-1967. Reference, in this connection is made to document (Annexure P-1) dated 31-5-1971, in which in para 3, there is reference to application moved by the petitioner dated 6-11-1967 under F.D. Memo No. 1195/4/R/1/2/1196- 4/R/1, dated 29-9-1967 and in para 6, it mentions about the application of the petitioner for grant of leave preparatory to retirement through application dated 3-5-1967.
4. Shri B. Da Silva, learned Deputy Advocate General, submits that the petitioner preferred application for leave preparatory to retirement on 6-11-1967, while Shri P.G. Kshatriya, learned counsel for the petitioner, states that the petitioner applied on 3-5-1967 and the application dated 6-11-1967 was by way of reminder.
5. Having recorded the respective submissions of the parties, the question for consideration is as to whether the case of the petitioner has been rightly rejected in term of the Government order (Annexure R-1), which confines the benefit of leave encashment to employees from 16-9-1980. It may be true that this order is prospective in operation and the case of the petitioner is not covered by this order, having retired from service on 15-12-1967. But considering the matter more exactly and correctly, it appears that the case of the petitioner is covered under F.R. 86 (a). It is clear from the record that the petitioner had applied for leave preparatory to retirement on 3-5-1967 and the contention that he did so on 6-11-1967, is liable to be rejected. Having done so, the respondents should have taken decision on this application within a reasonable time. His case would be considered on the ground that he had applied for leave preparatory to retirement on 3-5-1967. That being so, the petitioner would be entitled to consequential benefits on that basis.
6. Next, we examine the contention as to whether the case of the petitioner is barred by time, therefore, should not be entertained by this Court. On this question, the petitioner places reliance on the decision of the Apex Court reported in 1995 (5) S.L.R. 221 (M.R. Gupta Vs. Union of India and others). The result of the aforesaid discussion is that salary of the petitioner should be determined afresh, so shall be the pensionary benefits. The respondents having failed to do so correctly, continuing wrong has been committed to the petitioner giving him recurring cause of action, therefore, this case would not be barred by time. However, consequential amounts to be assessed, but the petitioner would not be entitled to interest on those amounts since it is hit by limitation and he should have approached the Court within time. The respondents are directed to implement this order within a period of four months.
7. The petition is allowed in terms aforesaid.
8. Writ Petition allowed.