Punjab-Haryana High Court
M/S Ambika International vs Union Of India And Another on 17 June, 2016
CWP No. 12615 of 2016, CWP No. 12616 of 2016, CWP No. 12617 of
2016 and CWP No. 12618 of 2016.
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP No. 12615 of 2016
DATE OF DECISION :- June 17, 2016
M/s Ambika International ...Appellant
Versus
Union of India and another ...Respondents
CWP No. 12616 of 2016
M/s Fine Aromatics ...Appellant
Versus
Union of India and another ...Respondents
CWP No. 12617 of 2016
M/s Jay Ambey Aromatics ...Appellant
Versus
Union of India and another ...Respondents
CWP No. 12618 of 2016
M/s Shiva Mint Industries ...Appellant
Versus
Union of India and another ...Respondents
1 of 16
::: Downloaded on - 21-06-2016 00:02:22 :::
CWP No. 12615 of 2016, CWP No. 12616 of 2016, CWP No. 12617 of
2016 and CWP No. 12618 of 2016.
2
CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE M.JEYAPAUL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT RAWAL
Present:- Mr. C. Harishankar, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. Man Mohan, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. V.K. Kaushal, Advocate for Union of India.
***
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the
judgment? Yes/No
2. To be referred to the Reporters or not? Yes/No
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the digest? Yes
M.JEYAPAUL, J.
1. The petitioners, in these 4 writ petitions, claim to be manufacturers of menthol, dementholised oil, deterpenated fractionated menthol oil, and other similar products, for which they are registered with the Central Excise authorities. The premises, in which the petitioners claim to manufacture the said products, are proximately located, in the Bari Brahamana locality in Jammu. The products stated to be manufactured by the petitioners are used as raw material in the manufacture of further products, by downstream manufacturers, to whom the petitioners claim to be clearing and selling their products. Cenvat Credit, under the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, is availed, by such downstream manufacturers-chiefly M/s Sharp Menthol India Ltd (SMIL) under Rule 12 of the said Rules. As the availment of the said Cenvat Credit is not subject matter of dispute in the present case, no further reference is required to be made thereto.
2. By virtue of the geographical location, i.e. in notified areas in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the petitioners claim the benefit of area- based exemption from payment of duty, under the Central Excise Act, 1944 2 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 21-06-2016 00:02:23 ::: CWP No. 12615 of 2016, CWP No. 12616 of 2016, CWP No. 12617 of 2016 and CWP No. 12618 of 2016.
3(hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), in terms of Notification 56/2002-CE, dated 14.11.2002. Under the said Notification, manufacturers located in the areas notified in the said Notification, in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, are entitled to exemption, from duty, on the products manufactured by them, for which purpose they are, in the 1st instance, required to pay the duty, whereafter they are entitled to be refunded that amount of the said duty as has been paid otherwise than by way of utilisation of Cenvat Credit, i.e. through their Personal Ledger Account (PLA).
3. Concededly, all the 4 petitioners, claimed, and were granted, the benefit of Notification 56/2002-CE supra, on the clearances, effected by them, of the products stated to have been manufactured in their premises and cleared to SMIL and other downstream manufacturers.
4. Subsequently, Show Cause Notices were issued to all 4 petitioners, by the Commissioner of Central Excise, Jammu, alleging that the petitioners had wrongfully availed the benefit of exemption, under Notification 56/2002-CE supra, as investigations were stated to have revealed that they were not engaged in the manufacture of finished products at all. The said Show Cause Notices were by and large identical, relying on the same evidence, and covered the following periods :
i) Show Cause Notice, dated 29/10/2012, issued to M/s Ambika International (hereinafter referred to as "Ambika"), covered the period November 2007 to 2010.
ii) Show Cause Notice, dated 04.10.2012, issued to M/s Jay Ambey Aromatics (hereinafter referred to as "Jay Ambey"), covered the period October 2007 to 2010,
iii) Show Cause Notice, dated 29/10/2012, issued to M/s Fine Aromatics (hereinafter referred to as "Fine"), 3 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 21-06-2016 00:02:23 ::: CWP No. 12615 of 2016, CWP No. 12616 of 2016, CWP No. 12617 of 2016 and CWP No. 12618 of 2016.4
covered the period November 2007 to 2010, and
iv) Show Cause Notice, dated 04.10.2012, issued to M/s Shiva Mint Industries (hereinafter referred to as "Shiva"), covered the period October 2007 to 2010.
5. The above-mentioned demands, in the Show Cause Notices referred to herein above, were all raised under Section 11A of the Act, which entitles the "proper officer", empowered for the said purpose under the Act, to issue Show Cause Notice for recovery of any duty which has, inter alia, been erroneously refunded to an assessee. The gravamen of the charge levelled by the Revenue, in each and all of the above-mentioned 4 Show Cause Notices, was identical, i.e. that, as the assessee concerned had been found, on investigation, not to have manufactured during the concerned periods, the products, on the clearances where of, it had availed the benefit of Notification 56/2002-CE supra, the refund, of the duty paid by the assessee through its PLA, was liable to be recovered by the Revenue, under Section 11A of the Act. It is not necessary to embark, in detail, on the specifies of the allegations contained in the said Show Cause Notices; suffice it to state that all the said Show Cause Notices relied on the same evidence, which was, primarily, in the form of statements, recorded under Section 14 of the Act, from the following persons, during the course of investigation :
a) Shri D.K. Jain, authorised signatory of M/s Bareilly Agro Products.
b) Shri Pooran Lal, Pradhan of village Gopalpur.
c) Smt. Kamla Devi, Pradhan of village Jatoya Jafarpur,
d) Shri Mulayam Singh, Pradhan of village Naugawa,
e) the executive officer of the Nagar Panchayat, Kemri, and 4 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 21-06-2016 00:02:23 ::: CWP No. 12615 of 2016, CWP No. 12616 of 2016, CWP No. 12617 of 2016 and CWP No. 12618 of 2016.5
f) Shri S.S. Sambyal, General Manager of the petitioner.
6. Additionally, the Show Cause Notices relied upon letters, dated 20/09/2011, by the Additional Commissioner of Central Excise, Merrut-II, and letter, 01.04.2011, of the Assistant Commissioner (Preventive), Central Excise Commissioner, Lucknow.
7. For the sake of completion of the record, it may be mentioned here, that, in addition to the above, Show Cause Notice, dated 07/12/2011, alleging undervaluation, in respect of the clearances effected by it during the period December 2006 to February 2010, was also issued, to Ambika, by the Directorate General of Central Excise Intelligence.
8. Replies, to the above-mentioned Show Cause Notices, were filed by all the 4 petitioners.
9. The above-mentioned Show Cause Notices were initially answerable to the Commissioner of Central Excise, Jammu. However, subsequently, Corrigenda were issued, in each case, making the Commissioner of Central, Chandigarh-II (i.e. Respondent No. 2 herein) the adjudicating authority in each case.
10. In exercise of the power conferred on him by the said Corrigenda, Respondent No. 2 has, by Orders-in-Original dated 19/05/2016 and 01/06/2016, adjudicated the Show Cause Notices issued to Ambika and Jay Ambey. The said Orders-in-Original confirm, against Ambika and Jay Ambey, the entire duty demand proposed in the Show Cause Notices issued to them, with interest, and also imposed equivalent amounts as penalties on the said assessees.
11. These Orders-in-Original, dated 19/05/2016 in the case of 5 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 21-06-2016 00:02:23 ::: CWP No. 12615 of 2016, CWP No. 12616 of 2016, CWP No. 12617 of 2016 and CWP No. 12618 of 2016.
6Ambika and 01/06/2016 in the case of Jay Ambey, form subject matter of challenge in CWP 12615 of 2016 and CWP 12617 of 2016 which pray for issuance of writs of certiorari, quashing and setting aside the said Orders- in-Original.
12. The said petitioners, i.e. Ambika and Jay Ambey, contend, in the writ petitions filed by them, that Respondent No. 2 has committed a fatal error in adjudicating the Show Cause Notices issued to them, by relying on the statements, recorded from the persons already named in para- 5 supra, under Section 14 of the Act, without 1st admitting the said statements in evidence in accordance with the procedure prescribed, in this regard, by Section 9D of the Act. Per corollary, it is submitted that, had Respondent No.2 admitted the said statements in evidence, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Section 9D of the Act, the petitioners would have been in a position to exercise their option to test the said evidence by cross-examining the authors of the said statements. Owing to the flawed procedure that Respondent No. 2 has chosen to follow, by relying on statements recorded under Section 14 of the Act without admitting them in evidence, it is the said petitioners' submission that they have been deprived of the opportunity to test the said evidence by cross- examining the makers of the said statements. This, it is submitted by them, has vitiated the Orders-in-Original dated 19/05/2016 and 01/06/2016 supra, passed by Respondent No. 2, in their entirety.
13. While candidly acknowledging the fact that the Orders-in- Original, dated 19/05/2016 and 01/06/2016, passed by Respondent No. 2, are appealable, under Section 35B of the act, to the Customs, Excise and 6 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 21-06-2016 00:02:23 ::: CWP No. 12615 of 2016, CWP No. 12616 of 2016, CWP No. 12617 of 2016 and CWP No. 12618 of 2016.
7Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal"), the petitioners, i.e. Ambika and Jay Ambey seek to justify invocation of the writ jurisdiction of this Court essentially on the ground that any appeal, to the Tribunal would, by virtue of the amended provisions of Section 35F of the act, had to be accompanied by pre-deposit of 7 ½% of the duty demand confirmed against them by the Orders-in-Original passed by Respondent No. 2, which, they contend, would, in view of the fact that the said Orders- in-Original had been passed in flagrant violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 9D of the Act, be entirely unjustified. In this regard, they also draw attention to the fact that the Allahabad High Court, while upholding the vires of Section 35F of the Act, to the extent the said provision requires mandatory pre-deposit of 7 ½% of the duty demand confirmed against an assessee to appeal thereagainst to the Tribunal, in its judgment in Ganesh Yadav vs. U.O.I., 2015 (320) ELT 711 (All), was cautious enough to keep open the avenue of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in appropriate cases. Ambika and Jay Ambey seeks to contend that the present case is one such case, in which they ought to be permitted to move this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, instead of relegating them to the remedy of appeal available under Section 35B of the Act and the burden of mandatory pre-deposit which would inevitably follow an which, as they point out, is prohibitive.
14. In view of the fact that the case of the petitioners is essentially premised on Section 9D of The Central Excise Act, 1944, it would be appropriate to reproduce the said provision, in extenso, thus :
7 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 21-06-2016 00:02:23 ::: CWP No. 12615 of 2016, CWP No. 12616 of 2016, CWP No. 12617 of 2016 and CWP No. 12618 of 2016.8
"9D. Relevancy of statements under certain circumstances.-
(1) A statement made and signed by a person before any Central Excise Officer of a gazetted rank during the course of any inquiry or proceeding under this Act shall be relevant, for the purpose of proving, in any prosecution for an offence under this Act, the truth of the facts which it contains,-
(a) when the person who made the statement is dead or cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or whose presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, the Court considers unreasonable; or
(b) when the person who made the statement is examined as a witness in the case before the Court and the Court is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the statement should be admitted in evidence in the interests of justice. (2) The provision of sub-section (1) shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to any proceeding under this Act, other than a proceeding before a Court, as they apply in relation to a proceeding before a Court."
15. A plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 9D of the Act makes it clear that clauses (a) and (b) of the said sub-section set out the circumstances in which a statement, made and signed by a person before the Central Excise Officer of a gazetted rank, during the course of inquiry or proceeding under the Act, shall be relevant,for the purpose of proving the truth of the facts contained therein.
16. Section 9D of the Act came in from detailed consideration and examination, by the Delhi High Court, in J.K. Cigarettes Ltd. vs. CCE, 8 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 21-06-2016 00:02:23 ::: CWP No. 12615 of 2016, CWP No. 12616 of 2016, CWP No. 12617 of 2016 and CWP No. 12618 of 2016.
92009 (242) ELT 189 (Del). Para 12 of the said decision clearly holds that by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 9D, the provisions of sub-section (1) thereof would extend to adjudication proceedings as well.
There can, therefore, be no doubt about the legal position that the procedure prescribed in sub-section (1) of Section 9D is required to be scrupulously followed, as much in adjudication proceedings as in criminal proceedings relating to prosecution.
17. As already noticed herein above, sub-section (1) of Section 9D sets out the circumstances in which a statement, made and signed before a gazetted Central Excise Officer, shall be relevant for the purpose of proving the truth of the facts contained therein. If these circumstances are absent, the statement, which has been made during inquiry/investigation, before a gazetted Central Excise Officer, cannot be treated as relevant for the purpose of proving the facts contained therein. In other words, in the absence of the circumstances specified in Section 9D(1), the truth of the facts contained in any statement, recorded before a gazetted Central Excise Officer, has to be proved by evidence other than the statement itself. The evidentiary value of the statement, insofar as proving the truth of the contents thereof is concerned, is, therefore, completely lost, unless and until the case falls within the parameters of Section 9D(1).
18. The consequence would be that, in the absence of the circumstances specified in Section 9D(1), if the adjudicating authority relies on the statement, recorded during investigation in Central Excise, as evidence of the truth of the facts contained in the said statement, it has to be held that the adjudicating authority has relied on irrelevant material. Such 9 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 21-06-2016 00:02:23 ::: CWP No. 12615 of 2016, CWP No. 12616 of 2016, CWP No. 12617 of 2016 and CWP No. 12618 of 2016.
10reliance would, therefore, be vitiated in law and on facts.
19. Once the ambit of Section 9D (1) is thus recognized and understood, one has to turn to the circumstances referred to in the said sub- section, which are contained in clauses (a) and (b) thereof.
20. Clause (a) of Section 9D (1) refers to the following circumstances :
i) when the person who made the statement is dead,
ii) when the person who made the statement cannot be found,
iii) when the person who made the statement is incapable of giving evidence,
iv) when the person who made the statement is kept out of the way by the adverse party, and
v) when the presence of the person who made the statement cannot be obtained without unreasonable delay or expense.
21. Once discretion, to be judicially exercised is, thus conferred, by Section 9D, on the adjudicating authority, it is self-evident inference that the decision flowing from the exercise of such discretion, i.e. the order which would be passed, by the adjudicating authority under Section 9D, if he chooses to invoke clause (a) of sub-section (1) thereof, would be pregnable to challenge. While the judgment of the Delhi High Court in J&K Cigarettes Ltd. (supra) holds that the said challenge could be ventilated in appeal, the petitioners have also invited attention to an unreported short order of the Supreme Court in UOI and another vs. GTC India and others in SLP ( C) No. 2183/1994 dated 03/01/1995 wherein it was held that the order passed by the adjudicating authority under Section 9D of the 10 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 21-06-2016 00:02:23 ::: CWP No. 12615 of 2016, CWP No. 12616 of 2016, CWP No. 12617 of 2016 and CWP No. 12618 of 2016.
11Act could be challenged in writ proceedings as well. Therefore, it is clear that the adjudicating authority cannot invoke Section 9D(1)(a) of the Act without passing a reasoned and speaking order in that regard, which is amenable to challenge by the assessee, if aggrieved thereby.
22. If none of the circumstances contemplated by clause (a) of Section 9D (1) exists, clause (b) of Section 9D (1) comes into operation. The said clause prescribes a specific procedure to be followed before the statement can be admitted in evidence. Under this procedure, two steps are required to be followed by the adjudicating authority, under clause (b) of Section 9D (1), viz.
i) the person who made the statement has to first be examined as a witness in the case before the adjudicating authority, and
ii) the adjudicating authority has, thereafter, to form the opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the statement should be admitted in evidence in the interests of justice.
23. There is no justification for jettisoning this procedure, statutorily prescribed by plenary parliamentary legislation for admitting, into evidence, a statement recorded before the gazetted Central Excise officer, which does not suffer from the handicaps contemplated by clause
(a) of Section 9D(1) of the Act. The use of the word "shall" in Section 9D (1), makes it clear that, the provisions contemplated in the sub-Section are mandatory. Indeed, as they pertain to conferment of admissibility to oral evidence they would, even otherwise, have to be recorded as mandatory.
24. The rationale behind the above precaution contained in clause
(b) of Section 9D(1) is obvious. The statement, recorded during 11 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 21-06-2016 00:02:23 ::: CWP No. 12615 of 2016, CWP No. 12616 of 2016, CWP No. 12617 of 2016 and CWP No. 12618 of 2016.
12inquiry/investigation, by the gazetted Central Excise officer, has every chance of having been recorded under coercion or compulsion. It is a matter of common knowledge that, on many occasions, the DRI/DGCEI resorts to compulsion in order to extract confessional statements. It is obviously in order to neutralize this possibility that, before admitting such a statement in evidence, clause (b) of Section 9D(1) mandates that the evidence of the witness has to be recorded before the adjudicating authority, as, in such an atmosphere, there would be no occasion for any trepidation on the part of the witness concerned.
25. Clearly, therefore, the stage of relevance, in adjudication proceedings, of the statement, recorded before a gazetted Central Excise officer during inquiry or investigation, would arise only after the statement is admitted in evidence in accordance with the procedure prescribed in clause (b) of Section 9D(1). The rigour of this procedure is exempted only in a case in which one or more of the handicaps referred to in clause (a) of Section 9D(1) of the Act would apply. In view of this express stipulation in the Act, it is not open to any adjudicating authority to straightaway rely on the statement recorded during investigation/inquiry before the gazetted Central Excise officer, unless and until he can legitimately invoke clause (a) of Section 9D(1). In all other cases, if he wants to rely on the said statement as relevant, for proving the truth of the contents thereof, he has to first admit the statement in evidence in accordance with clause (b) of Section 9D(1). For this, he has to summon the person who had made the statement, examine him as witness before him in the adjudicating proceeding, and arrive at an opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the 12 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 21-06-2016 00:02:23 ::: CWP No. 12615 of 2016, CWP No. 12616 of 2016, CWP No. 12617 of 2016 and CWP No. 12618 of 2016.
13statement should be admitted in the interests of justice.
26. In fact, Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, clearly sets out the sequence of evidence, in which evidence-in-chief has to precede cross-examination, and cross-examination has to precede re-examination.
27. It is only, therefore,
(i) after the person whose statement has already been recorded before a gazetted Central Excise officer is examined as a witness before the adjudicating authority, and
(ii) the adjudicating authority arrives at a conclusion, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that the statement deserves to be admitted in evidence, that the question of offering the witness to the assessee, for cross- examination, can arise.
28. Clearly, if this procedure, which is statutorily prescribed by plenary Parliamentary legislation, is not followed, it has to be regarded, that the Revenue has given up the said witnesses, so that the reliance by the CCE, on the said statements, has to be regarded as misguided, and the said statements have to be eschewed from consideration, as they would not be relevant for proving the truth of the contents thereof.
29. Reliance may also usefully be placed on para 16 of the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in C.C.E. V Parmarth Iron Pvt Ltd, 2010 (250) ELT 514 (All), which, too, unequivocally expound the law thus:
"If the Revenue choose (sic chose?) not to examine any witnesses in adjudication, their statements cannot be considered as evidence."
30. That adjudicating authorities are bound by the general principles of evidence, stands affirmed in the judgement of the Supreme 13 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 21-06-2016 00:02:23 ::: CWP No. 12615 of 2016, CWP No. 12616 of 2016, CWP No. 12617 of 2016 and CWP No. 12618 of 2016.
14Court in C.C. V Bussa Overseas Properties Ltd, 2007(216) ELT 659 (SC), which upheld the decision of the Tribunal in Bussa Overseas Properties Ltd v C.C., 2001 (137) ELT 637 (T).
31. It is clear, from a reading of the Orders-in-original dated 19.05.2016 and 01.06.2016 supra, that Respondents No.2 has, in the said Orders-in-Original, placed extensive reliance on the statements, recorded during investigation under Section 14 of the Act. He has not invoked clause
(a) of sub-section (1) of Section 9D of the Act, by holding that attendance of the makers of the said statements could not be obtained for any of the reasons contemplated by the said clause. That being so, it was not open to Respondent No.2 to rely on the said statements, without following the mandatory procedure contemplated by clause (b) of the said sub-section. The Orders-in-Original, dated 19/05/2016 and 01/06/2016, having been passed in blatant violation of the mandatory procedure prescribed by Section 9D of the Act, it has to be held that said Orders-in-Original stand vitiated thereby.
32. The said orders-in-Original, dated 19/05/2016 and 01/06/2016, passed by Respondent No.2 are, therefore, clearly liable to be set aside.
33. Insofar as the writ petitions filed by M/s Ambika International CWP 12615 of 2016 and M/s Jay Ambey Aromatics CWP 12617 of 2016 are concerned, they are allowed by setting aside the Orders-in-Original, dated 19/05/2016 and 01/06/2016, passed by Respondent No 2 and impugned therein. Resultantly, the Show Cause Notices, issued to Ambika and Jay Ambey, are remanded, to Respondent No 2 for adjudication de novo, by following the procedure contemplated by Section 9D of the Act, 14 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 21-06-2016 00:02:23 ::: CWP No. 12615 of 2016, CWP No. 12616 of 2016, CWP No. 12617 of 2016 and CWP No. 12618 of 2016.
15and the law laid down by various judicial authorities in this regard, including the principles of natural justice, in the following manner:
(i) In the event that the Revenue intends to rely on any of the statements, recorded under Section 14 of the Act and referred to in the Show Cause Notices issued to Ambika and Jay Ambey, it would be incumbent on the Revenue to apply to Respondent No 2 to summon the makers of the said statements, so that the Revenue would examine them in chief before the adjudicating authority, i.e. before Respondent No 2.
(ii) A copy of the said record of examination-in-chief, by the Revenue, of the makers of any of the statements on which the Revenue chooses to rely, would have to be made available to the assessee, i.e. to Ambika and Jay Ambey in this case.
(iii) Statements recorded during investigation, under Section 14 of the Act, whose makers are not examined in chief before the adjudicating authority, i.e. before Respondent No 2, would have to be eschewed from evidence, and it would not be permissible for Respondent No 2 to rely on the said evidence while adjudicating the matter. Neither, needless to say, would be open to the Revenue to rely on the said statements to support the case sought to be made out in the Show Cause Notice.
(iv) Once examination-in-chief, of the makers of the statements, on whom the Revenue seeks to rely in adjudication proceedings, takes place, and a copy thereof is made available to the assessee, it would be open to the assessee to seek permission to cross-examine the persons who have made the said statements, should it choose to do so. In case any such request is made by the assessee, it would be incumbent on the adjudicating authority, i.e. on Respondent No2 to allow the said request, as it is trite and well-
15 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 21-06-2016 00:02:23 ::: CWP No. 12615 of 2016, CWP No. 12616 of 2016, CWP No. 12617 of 2016 and CWP No. 12618 of 2016.
16
settled position in law that statements recorded behind the back of an assessee cannot be relied upon, in adjudication proceedings, without allowing the assessee an opportunity to test the said evidence by cross-examining the makers of the said statements. If at all authority is required for this proposition, reference may be made to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arya Abhushan Bhandar v U.O.I., 2002(143)ELT 25 (SC), Swadeshi Polytex v Vollector, 2000 (122) ELT 641 (SC).
34. In the case of M/s Fine Aromatics CWP 12616 of 2016 and M/s Shiva Mint Industries CWP 12618 of 2016, identical to those which had been issued to Ambika and Shiva Mint and which stand adjudicated by Respondent No.2 vide Orders-in-Original dated 19.05.2016 and 01.06.2016 supra, have been issued, and are presently pending adjudication before Respondent No.2. No further orders would be required to be passed, in the said writ petitions, apart from directing that Respondent No.2 would adjudicate the said Show Cause Notices by following the procedure prescribed in para 33 supra. Therefore, CWP 12616 of 2016 and 12618 of 2016 stand disposed of accordingly.
(M. JEYAPAUL) JUDGE (AMIT RAWAL) JUDGE June 17, 2016 p.singh 16 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 21-06-2016 00:02:23 :::