Punjab-Haryana High Court
Smt. Maya Devi And Anr. vs Rameshwar on 24 February, 1992
Equivalent citations: (1992)101PLR688
JUDGMENT G.R. Majithia, J.
1. This judgment disposes of Regular Second Appeal Nos. 815 and 837 of 1990. These are directed against the judgments and decrees of the first appellate Court affirming on appeal those of the trial Judge decreeing the suit of the plaintiff-respondent for possession by pre-emption of the suit land against the vendee-defendant-appellants.
2. The facts:-
Ram Bilas son of Sultan sold land measuring 12 Kanals being 240/6034th share of the total land measuring 301 Kanals J4 Marias comprised in Khewat No. 10 (Kittas 45) situated in village Bhangarh,. vide sale deed dated June 15, 1984 (Ex. D-2) to the vendee-defendant-appellants (hereinafter the vendees), that the plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter the plaintiff), being a co-sharer in the suit land, initiated the lis claiming possession by pre-emption ; that that the said lis was registered as Civil Suit No. 204 of 1985 (giving rise to Regular Second Appeal No. 815 of 1990); that Ram Sarup son of Sultan (brother of Ram Bilas-the vendor of the disputed land in Civil Suit No. 204 of 1985) sold land measuring 12 Kanals comprised in Khewat No. 10 being 240/6034th share of the total land measuring 301 Kanals 14 Marias comprised in Khewat No. 10, Khatauni Nos. 64 to 69 (Kittas 45) situated in village Bhangarh to the vendees by sale deed dated November 21, 1983; that the plaintiff being a co-sharer claimed possession by pre-emption by filing a suit registered as Civil Suit No. 194 of 1984 (giving rise to Regular Second Appeal No. 837 of 1990).
3. The trial Court, on appraisal of the evidence led by the parties, found that the plaintiff had a superior right of pre-emption being a co-sharer and decreed his claim for possession by pre-emption in both the suits.
4. The vendees aggrieved against the judgments and decree of the trial Court unsuccessfully challenged the same before the first appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 124-13 of 1989 and Civil Appeal No. 123-13 of 1989, respectively. The first appellate Court, on appreciation of the evidence, found that the plaintiff was a co-sharer in the suit land and had a preferential fight of pre-emotion. The contention of vendees that they had made their status as co-sharer when they purchased the land from the co-owners vide sale deeds dated June 14, 1984 and November 21, 1983 and thus, the plaintiff did not have a superior right of preemption on the date of sale, institution of the suit and the decree, was negatived. The other pleas that the vendees were tenants on the suit land and that they had improved upon the land were also negatived by the first appellate Court.
5. In these regular second appeals, the counsel for the vendees submitted that the vendees had purchased 240/6034th share of, the land measuring 301 Kanals 14 Marias from one co-owner vide sale deed dated November 21, 1983 and equivalent area from another co-owner vide sale deed dated June 15, 1984; thus, they had become co-sharers in the suit land after purchase from Ram Sarup a co sharer vide sale deed dated November 21, 1983 and the plaintiff did not have a better right than them when they had made the second purchase from another co-owner vide sale deed dated June, 15, 1984 and that the plaintiff did not have a superior right of pre-emption to pre-empt the sale effected in their favour on June 15, 1984 It was further contended that the pre-emptor must maintain his superior right of pre-emption on the date of sale, institution of the suit and the decree. The plaintiff did not have a superior right of pre-emption on these dates and the suits were not likely to succeed on this short ground. The submission is bereft of any merit. The right of pre-emption is a right of preferential purchase, and that the object of the law in recognizing this right is to retain property in the hands of the persons who are, more or less, intimately connected with it and who very naturally desire to keep out the strangers. So long, therefore, as a plaintiff, who claims pre-emption, can assert that he has a more intimate connection with the property than the vendee, the law gives him the exceptional privilege of compelling the latter to transfer the property to him. The vendee can improve status and urge that it has acquired the right at least equal to that of the pre-emptor. But the acquisition of a new status by the vendee after the sale as a result of which he wants to contend that he had at least equal right to that of the pre-emptor is subject to the provisions of Section 28-A of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (for short, the Act). Section 28-A was enacted to meet a case where the vendee improves his status by his voluntary efforts either during the pendency of the pre-emption suits or a bit earlier by acquiring requisite qualifications to compete with the intending pre-emptors. If the vendee, after acquiring necessary qualifications, wants to defeat the right of a pre-emptor, he cannot do so, on the basis of defeasible right thus acquired. A vendee cannot get any benefit in the presence of the provisions of this section, so long as his inchoate right of pre-emption remains defeasible and does not mature into absolute right by efflux of time by limitation. The section specifically provides for the case in which a vendee, who relies on improvement of status pendente lite in ease he loses the land on which his improved status depenns, as a result of being pre-empted. The effect of the mandate contained in Section 28-A is-that if the pre-emptor has moved for pre-emption of the sale as a result of which the vendee is likely to improve his status, the latter cannot he allowed to urge that it has acquired the status equal to that of the pre-emptor by acquiring equal right as that of the pre-emptor after the action for pre-emption has been initiated. In the instant case, the pre-emptor had enforced his right of pre-emption with regard to the second sale effected vide sale deed dated June 15, 1984 and in the light of the provisions of Section 28-A, the vendee cannot claim to have acquired a status equal to that of the vendor as a result of sale deed dated November 21, 1985 (subject-matter of Civil Suit No. 194 of 1984). Section 28-A of the Act furnishes a complete answer to the submission made by the counsel for the vendees.
6. For the reasons stated supra, the appeals fail and are dismissed, but with no order as to costs.