Karnataka High Court
Range Gowda vs B K Narayana Rao on 19 September, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS 19TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE E.S. INDIRESH
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO.3343 OF 2006 (DEC)
BETWEEN:
1. RANGE GOWDA
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS.
1A. NANJUNDAPPA P R
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
S/O LATE RANGE GOWDA
1B. RAMALLINGAIAH P R
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS.
1B(i). SHARATH P R
AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS
S/O LATE RAMALINGAIAH
1B(ii). SUSHMA P R
AGED ABOUT 20 YEARS
D/O LATE RAMALINGAIAH
1B(iii). UMA
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
W/O LATE RAMALINGAIAH
ALL THE APPELLANTS 1B(I) TO (III)
ARE RESIDING AT PUTTAMADE HALLI
KASABA HOBLI,
TURUVEKERE TALUK
TUMKUR DISTRICT-572 221.
2
1C. SADANANDA MURTHY P R
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS
S/O LATE RANGE GOWDA
1D. P R MANJULA
SINCE DECEASED BY LRS.
1D(i). RAMAKRISHNA
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS.
APPELLANTS 1D(II) AND 1D(III)
ARE CONSIDERED AS LRS
1D(ii). SHIVAKUMAR B R
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS
S/O RAMAKRISHNA
1D(iii). LOHITH KUMAR B R
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS
APPELLANT NOS. 1D(II) AND 1D(III) ARE
RESIDING AT HCL 33/C,
HUTHA COLONY
WATER TANK ROAD,
BHADRAVATHI
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT-577 301.
ALL ARE OTHER APPELLANTS ARE RESIDING AT
PUTTAMADE HALLI,
KASABA HOBLI
TURUVEKERE TALUK
TUMKUR DISTRICT.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SMT. DEEPASHREE, ADVOCATE)
3
AND:
1. B K NARAYANA RAO
SINCE DECEASED BY LRS.
1A. MANJUSATHYAN S N
S/O LATE B K NARAYANA RAO
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS
1B. GOWRAMMA S N
D/O LATE B K NARAYANA RAO
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS
BOTH ARE R/AT SUNKALAPURA
KASABA HOBLI,
TURUVEKERE ALUK
TUMKUR DISTRICT.
2. THATAIAH
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS.
2A. KEMPAMMA
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS R2(B) TO R2(E)
2B. RAJANNA
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
S/O LATE TATAIAH
2C. BASAVARAJ
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
S/O LATE TATAIAH
APPELLANT NOS. 2(A) TO 2(C) ARE
RESIDING AT PUTTAMADIHALLI
TURUVEKERE TALUK
KASABA HOBLI,
MAYASNADRA
TURUVERKERE POST
TUMKUR DISTRICT.
4
2D. RUKMANI
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS
D/O LATE TATAIAH
W/O KEMPEGOWDA
DORANAHALLI VILLAGE AND POST
MAYASANDRA HOBLI
TURUVEKERE TALUK
TUMKUR DISTRICT.
2E. BHADRAMMA
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
D/O LATE TATAIAH
W/O RAMESH
R/AT CHANDURPURA
MAYASANDRA HOBLI,
PURA POST
TURUVEKERE TALUK
TUMKUR DISTRICT.
3. SRI GANGANNA
S/O MARIKALASAIAH
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
RESIDING AT ANEMALEPALYA
KASABA HOBLI,
TURUVEKERE TALUK
TUMKUR DISTRICT.
4. CHANNAVEERAIAH
SINCE DECEASED BY LRS
4A. NARAYANAPPA
S/O CHANNAVEERAIAH
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS
4B. MAHADEVAMMA
D/O CHANNAVEERAIAH
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
5
4C. KRISHNAPPA
S/O CHANNAVEERAIAH
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
4D. JAYAMMA
D/O LATE CHANNAVEERAIAH
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
4E. SHIVANNA
S/O LATE CHANNAVEERAIAH
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
4F. LAKASHMANA
D/O LATE CHANNAVEERAIAH
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS
4G. SRIRANGAMURTHY
D/O LATE CHANNAVEERAIAH
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
4H. CHANDRASHEKAR
D/O LATE CHANNAVEERAIAH
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
ALL ARE R/AT ANEMALEPALYA
KASABA HOBLI
TURUVEKERE TALUK
TUMKUR DISTRICT.
5. S N KESHAVAPRASAD
S/O B K NARAYANA RAO
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
R/AT SUNKALAPURA
KASABA HOBLI
TURUVEKERE TALUK
TUMKUR DISTRICT.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI JAGADEESH MUNDARGI, ADVOCATE
6
FOR R2(A-E) AND R3;
R1(A) AND 1(B), R4(A) TO 4(H) AND R5
SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED)
THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION
100 READ WITH ORDER XLII RULE 1 AND 2 OF CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 19TH
SEPTEMBER, 2006 PASSED IN R.A. NOS. 13 OF 1999 AND 15
OF 1999 ON THE FILE OF THE PRINCIPAL DISTRICT JUDGE,
TUMKUR ALLOWING THE APPEALS AND SETTING ASIDE THE
JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 09TH JULY, 1999 PASSED IN OS
NO.54 OF 1989 ON THE FILE OF THE CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN)
TIPTUR.
IN THIS APPEAL, ARGUMENTS BEING HEARD, JUDGMENT
RESERVED, COMING ON FOR "PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS",
THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
This Regular Second Appeal is preferred by the legal representatives of the plaintiff, challenging the judgment and decree dated 19.09.2006 in Regular Appeal No.13 of 1999 and Regular Appeal No.15 of 1999 on the file of Principal District Judge at Tumkur, allowing the appeals by setting aside the judgment and decree dated 09th July, 1999 passed in Original Suit No.54 of 1989 by the Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.), Tiptur.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties in this appeal are referred to with their status and rank before the trial Court. 7
3. The relevant facts for adjudication of this appeal are that the plaintiff claims to be owner in possession of the suit schedule property. It is the case of the plaintiff that he has purchased item No.1 of suit schedule property from one Sannarangegowda and item No.2 from Obaiah and Rangaswamy for valuable consideration. It is further stated in the plaint that the plaintiff was depending upon the advice of the defendant No.1 for taking decision in the family affairs and the defendant No.1, taking advantage of the illiteracy of the plaintiff, concocted two sale deeds, viz. registered sale deeds dated 26th August, 1986 and 30th September, 1986, in respect of the suit schedule property. It is further stated in the plaint that there was no necessity for the plaintiff to sell the suit schedule properties and the defendant No.1, taking advantage of the innocence of the plaintiff, executed the aforementioned registered sale deeds and as such, the plaintiff has filed Original Suit No.54 of 1989 before the trial Court, seeking cancellation of registered sale deeds dated 26th August, 1986 and 30th September, 1986 and 29th August, 1988 with regard to the suit schedule property along 8 with consequential relief of declaration that the plaintiff is the owner in possession of the suit schedule property.
4. On service of notice, defendants entered appearance. The defence of defendant No.1 in the written statement is that the plaintiff is well aware about the contents of the alleged registered sale deeds and the said sale deeds have been executed by the plaintiff after receiving the consideration amount before witnesses and it is further stated that the plaintiff has sold the properties mentioned in the sale deeds to discharge the loan incurred by the plaintiff from one H.M. Basappa and his son and therefore, it is the contention of the defendant No.1 that the aforementioned sale deeds are valid and pursuant to the same, the plaintiff put the defendant No.1 in possession of the suit schedule property. It is also stated that defendant No.2 has sold item 2 of the schedule property to the third defendant for valuable consideration and therefore, sought for dismissal of the suit. Defendant No.1 has also filed additional written statement and contended that the plaintiff cannot challenge the sale deeds as long as the relief of permanent injunction subsists and the 9 plaintiff has not sought for possession of the schedule property. Accordingly, he sought for dismissal of the suit.
5. The defendant No.3 has filed written statement contending that he has purchased the suit schedule property from the first defendant and accordingly, sought for dismissal of the suit.
6. Based on the pleadings on record, the trial court framed issues and additional issues for its consideration. In order to establish their case plaintiff has examined himself as PW1 and produced 11 documents and the same were marked as Exhibits P1 to P11. On the other hand, defendants have examined seven witnesses as DW1 to DW7 and marked 21 documents as per Exhibits D1 to D21. The trial court, after considering the material on record, by its judgment and decree dated 09th July, 1999, decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff is the owner of suit schedule property and as such, directed the first defendant to put the plaintiff in possession of the suit schedule property. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the legal representatives of defendant No.1 have preferred Regular Appeal 10 No.13 of 1999 and defendant No.3 has preferred Regular Appeal No.15 of 1999 before the First Appellate Court and the said appeals were resisted by the plaintiff. The First Appellate Court, after considering the material on record, by its judgment and decree dated 19th September, 2006 allowed the appeals and as such, set aside the judgment and decree dated 09th July, 1999 passed in Original Suit No.54 of 1989 by the trial Court. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff has preferred this Regular Second Appeal.
7. This Court by order dated 22nd November, 2011 has formulated the following substantial question of law:
"a. Whether the lower Appellate Court is justified in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below?
b. Whether the appreciation of evidence by the lower Appellate Court is in accordance with law?"11
8. Heard Smt. Deepashree, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants and Sri Jagdeesh Mundargi, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
9. Smt. Deepashree, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that the interference of the First Appellate Court in respect of the well-reasoned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is incorrect. She further contended that the defendant No.1 had taken undue advantage of the fact that the plaintiff was acting as per his instructions and is said to have executed registered sale deeds dated 26th August, 1986 and 30th September, 1996 and there is no sale consideration effected between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 and therefore, the alleged sale deeds are invalid. She further contended that the defendant No.1 is having coconut and copra business and had taken the signature of the plaintiff by stating that he will get the loan for the purpose of agricultural activities and in that view of the matter, the finding recorded by the First Appellate Court requires to be interfered with in this second appeal. She also contended that the entire finding recorded by the First Appellate 12 Court is based on the evidence of DW2 who is none other than the son of respondent No.1 and she further argued that the alleged registered sale deeds are only nominal sale deeds since no consideration was made by the defendant No.1 in favour of the plaintiff and the defendant No.3 who has purchased the item No.2 of the schedule property is the attesting witness to Exhibits D1 and D2 which clearly establish the fact that defendants 1 and 3 have colluded with each other and therefore, she contended that the First Appellate Court has not properly re-appreciated the matter and as such, sought for interference of this Court with regard to the finding recorded by the First Appellate Court. She also made arguments with regard to the discrepancy in the date of Stamp Paper purchased with that of execution of Registered Sale Deeds. Accordingly, she sought for interference of this Court in this Second Appeal. In order to buttress her arguments, learned counsel for the appellant places reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of N.M.A. ABDUL MITHALIF v. SYED BIBI AMMAL AND OTHERS reported made in Civil Appeal No.2095 of 1972 decided on 26th April, 1979; in the case of RAM PRAKASH GUPTA v. RAJIV KUMAR GUPTA AND 13 OHTERS reported in (2007)10 SCC 59 with regard to Section 59 of the Limitation Act, 1968 and Section 47 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908.
10. Per contra, Sri Jagadeesh Mundaragi, learned counsel appearing for respondents invited the attention of the court to paragraphs 5 and 7 of the plaint and argued that there is no specific pleading in the plaint as to how the defendant No.1 has influenced the plaintiff to execute the registered sale deeds dated 26th August, 1986 and 13th September, 1986. He also referred to the entire plaint averments and argued that the pleadings do not constitute undue influence or fraud as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant and accordingly sought for interference of this Court.
11. In the light of the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, I have carefully examined the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and perused original records. The suit is filed by the plaintiff seeking cancellation of registered sale deeds dated 26th August, 1986; 30th September, 1986 and 29th August, 1988 in respect of the 14 suit schedule items 1 and 2. Item No.1 of the suit schedule property was purchased by the plaintiff as per the registered sale deed dated 19.3.1984 (Exhibit D20) and Item No.2 was purchased by the plaintiff under registered sale deed dated 28th April, 1980 (Exhibit D21). The case of the plaintiff is that he is an illiterate and except affixing signature he does not know reading or writing and therefore, he was entirely depending upon the advice of the defendant No.1 who is known to him for a considerable period. On careful examination of evidence of PW1, I do not find any deposition of PW1 which could indicate that the defendant No.1 dominated over the plaintiff. I find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that there is no proper explanation to prove that the defendant No.1 was prevailing over the plaintiff in day-to-day affairs. In this regard, though the PW1 deposed that he has affixed signature on the sale deeds referred to at Exhibits P10 and P11 at the instance of defendant No.1, however, PW1 has not proved that the said sale deeds have been executed with undue influence/an element of fraud. In this regard, paragraph 2 of the examination-in-chief dated 03rd February, 1993 would indicate that the plaintiff is 15 having worldly knowledge about the transaction made with regard to selling the schedule properties as per Exhibits P10 and P11. In his cross-examination dated 04th December, 1987, PW1 deposed about the execution and registration of the sale deeds. The same reads as under:
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(emphasis supplied)
12. Though the case of the plaintiff is that he was solely depending upon the advice of defendant No.1, however, in the cross-examination, PW1 deposed as follows:
"£À£ÀUÉ NzÀÄ §gÀºÀ §gÀĪÀÅ¢®è. £À£ÀUÉ gÀÄdÄ ªÀiÁqÀĪÀÅzÀÄ MAzÉà UÉÆvÀÄÛ £À£ÀUÉ ªÀÄÆgÀÄ d£À UÀAqÀÄ ªÀÄPÀ̼ÀÄ, CªÀgÀÄ ªÀÄÆgÀÄ d£ÀgÀÄ ¥Áæ¥ÀÛ ªÀAiÀĸÀÌgÁVzÁÝgÉ. £Á£ÀÄ £À£Àß ªÀÄPÀ̼À ¸ÀAUÀqÀ ªÀiÁvÀÄPÀvÉ £Àqɹ, ªÉÆzÀ®Ä ªÀÄvÀÄÛ FUÀ ªÀåªÀºÁgÀ ªÀiÁqÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ºËzÀÄ."
(emphasis supplied) 18
13. Though the learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended about the Karnataka Registration Rules, 1972 and placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court relating to Article 56 of the Limitation Act, however, the said plea has not been raised before the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court and therefore, in view of the fact that the said plea has not been raised before the courts below, appellant cannot be permitted to raise the new plea in the second appeal. Though the entire case of the plaintiff revolve around the undue influence/fraud committed by defendant No.1, however, considering the finding recorded by the trial Court with regard to issues 4A and 4B, I am of the view that the plaintiff has not proved the factual aspects on record with cogent evidence and accordingly, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is contrary to law and the said aspect has been rightly considered by the First Appellate Court and arrived at a conclusion that the there was no undue influence or fraud played by the defendant No.1 against the plaintiff and the same requires to be confirmed in this appeal. Though the learned counsel appearing for the appellant placed reliance on the 19 judgment in the case of ABDUL MITHALIF (supra) regarding limitation, the same is not applicable to the facts on record, as on perusal of the plaint, the knowledge of the plaintiff, as narrated in the plaint, is inadequate and incomplete and therefore, the First Appellate Court, having taken note of the said fact, has rightly answered the point No.1 in the negative. The First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the evidence as required under Order XLI Rule 31 of Code of Civil Procedure, has rightly come to the conclusion that the registered sale deeds referred to above, were executed for the purpose of discharging the debt of one H.M. Basappa and his son, and also for the purpose of performance of marriage, so also, for family necessities. A careful examination of evidence of DW3 and DW4 who are the attesting witnesses to the aforementioned sale deeds, would indicate that the sale made by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant No.1 is not a nominal one, but with an intention to get consideration out of the sale of the items 1 and 2 of the schedule properties. It is an undisputed fact that the plaintiff has signed the sale deeds in the presence of the witnesses and it is not the case of the plaintiff that he denied the 20 execution of the sale deed in favour of the defendant No.1 and in that view of the matter, even if there is a minor discrepancy in the evidence of the parties, the First Appellate Court could not have answered point No.5 in negative holding that the finding recorded by the trial Court requires interference. Though in the pleadings and in the evidence, the plaintiff alleged fraud/undue influence while execution of the aforementioned registered sale deeds, however, the plaintiff has not proved the same with cogent evidence as to how the registered sale deeds are executed with an element of fraud/undue influence or are of suspicious nature. That apart, the plaintiff himself admits that he used to discuss with his children with regard to the family affairs including the major transactions to be made with regard to the family properties and in that view of the matter, the contention raised by the plaintiff that the plaintiff was solely depending upon the advice of the defendant No.1 cannot be accepted, after having executed the registered sale deeds referred to above and on this aspect also the finding recorded by the First Appellate Court is just and proper, which does not call for interference in this appeal. That apart, if at all the case of 21 the plaintiff that the alleged two sale deeds are nominal and has been obtained by the defendant No.1 fraudulently, the plaintiff ought to have resorted to file complaint against the defendant No.1 before the competent criminal Court alleging the element of fraud or undue influence and the sale deeds have been obtained illegally. In the absence of these aspects, I am of the opinion that the plaintiff has not established his case in accordance with law with cogent evidence to arrive at the conclusion that these two Sale Deeds are nominal in nature. It is also to be noted that the transfer of consideration in the sale deed has been mentioned in these two sale deeds and therefore, I am of the opinion that the First Appellate Court was justified in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court on re- appreciation of the evidence on record as enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of SANTHOSH HAZARI VS. PURUSHOTTAM TIWARI reported in AIR 2001 SCC 965, wherein at paragraph 14 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
"14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot 22 be a substantial question of law. To be substantial, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis."
14. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to the interference on the concurrent findings of the courts below. In 23 the case of KASHMIR SINGH v. HARNAM SINGH AND ANOTHER reported in AIR 2008 SC 1749, has observed as under:
"The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well recognized exceptions are where (i) the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence;
(ii) the Courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the Courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. 'Decision based on no evidence', not only means cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding."
15. While dealing with the scope of Section 100 of CPC with regard to the concurrent findings of trial Court and the first appellate Court on the ground that the plaintiff was unable to prove his title, in the case of NASIB KAUR AND OTHERS v. COLONEL SURAT SINGH (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS., AND OTHERS reported in (2013)5 SCC 218, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC is limited only to decide the substantial question of 24 law which arises in a case and therefore, the High Court shall confine only with regard to the substantial question of law framed therein and cannot interfere with the facts. It is further observed in the aforementioned judgment that, whether the first appellate Court being a last Court to decide the lis between the parties on facts, had decided the core issue involved between the parties.
16. In the case of S. SUBRAMANIAN v. S. RAMASAMY ETC., reported in AIR 2019 SC 3056, while observing that question of law cannot be considered to be as substantial question of law, at paragraph-8.2 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:
"8.2. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that as per catena of decisions of this Court and even as provided under Section 100 of the CPC, the Second Appeal would be maintainable only on substantial question of law. The Second Appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. The existence of 'a substantial question of law' is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. As observed and held by this Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (AIR 1999 SC 2213) (Supra), in a second appeal 25 under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First Appellate Court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower Court were erroneous being:
(i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law;
OR
(ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court;
OR
(iii) Based on in-admissible evidence or no evidence.
It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if the First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in Second Appeal. It is further observed that the Trial Court could have decided differently is not a question of law justifying interference in second Appeal."
17. In the case of HARYANA STATE AND OTHERS v. GRAM PANCHAYAT VILLAGE KALEHRI reported in 2016(6) SCALE 157, at paragraph-15 of the judgment, has held as under: 26
"15. As a matter of fact, having regard to the nature of controversy and keeping in view the issues involved, such as the issue regarding ownership rights coupled with the issue regarding proper interpretation of documents (exhibits) to prove the ownership rights over the suit land, we are of the view that these issues do constitute substantial questions of law, viz., whether the Courts below were justified in properly interpreting the documents/exhibits relied upon by the parties for determining the ownership rights over the suit land? In other words, we are of the view that where the Court is required to properly interpret the nature of the documents, it does not involved any issue of fact as such but it only involves legal issue based on admitted documents. It is, therefore, obligatory upon the High Court to decide the legality and correctness of such findings as to which party's documents are to be preferred for conferring title over the suit land. In this case, the High Court could do so only when it had first admitted the appeal and framed substantial questions of law as required Under Section 100 of the Code."
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ISHWAR DASS JAIN (DEAD) THROUGH LRS., v. SOHAN LAL (DEAD) BY LRS. reported in 2000(1) SCC 434 has held that, even if there is a concurrent finding of fact by the Courts below, the findings be 27 interfered with by the High Court under Section 100 of CPC, if the Courts below have omitted to consider the vital evidence which could have led to a different conclusion or when inadmissible evidence was relied upon which resulted in arriving at a different conclusion. The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court read as follows:
"Under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate Court without doing so. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered, would have led to an opposite conclusion. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate Court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. In either of the above situations, a substantial question of law can arise."
19. Following the aforementioned dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the substantial questions of law framed above is 28 answered in favour of the defendants. In the result, I pass the following:
ORDER
1. Appeal dismissed;
2. Judgment and decree dated 19th September, 2006 passed in Regular Appeal No.13 and 15 of 1999 is confirmed.
3. Suit in OS No.54 of 1989 is dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE lnn