Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Hyderabad
M/S Karvy Computer Share Private ... vs Assessee on 25 October, 2013
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
HYDERABAD BENCH 'B', HYDERABAD
BEFORE SHRI CHANDRA POOJARI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER and
SMT. ASHA VIJAYARAGHAVAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER
MA No. 173/Hyd/2013
Arising out of ITA No. 328/Hyd/2012
Assessment year 2008-09
M/s. Karvy Computer- vs. The Asst. CIT
Share Pvt. Ltd. Circle-2(1)
PAN: AACCK2193D Hyderabad
Applicant Respondent
Applicant by: Sri P. Murali Krishna
Revenue by: Sri Solgy Jose Kottaram
Date of hearing: 25.10.2013
Date of pronouncement: 08.11.2013
ORDER
PER CHANDRA POOJARI, AM:
This Miscellaneous Application (MA) filed by the assessee is seeking recall of Tribunal order in ITA No. 328/Hyd/2012 for A.Y. 2008-09 dated 28.03.2013 with a view to rectify mistake apparent from record under subsection (2) of section 254 of Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. The learned AR submitted that the following errors had crept in the afore cited order of the Tribunal:
(i) In para-12 the Tribunal recorded the finding "The same issue was a subject matter of dispute before this Tribunal, Bombay Bench in the case of Kotak Securities Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT (124 TTJ 214) which was decided in favour of the assessee" contrary to the following facts on record:2 MA No. 173/Hyd/2013.
M/s. Karvy Computer-Share Pvt. Ltd. ============================
(a) Finding of the Assessing Officer in his order dated 31-12-2010 passed under section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in para 4.2 of his order which reads as under:
"As the payment to NSDL/CDSL is in the nature of professional services, the provisions of sec. 194J are attracted and tax was deductible at source under Chapter XVIIB of the IT Act."
(b) Finding of the Commissioner of income Tax (Appeals)-III, Hyderabad in ITA No. 0255/CIT(A)-III/10-11 dated 15-12-2011 in para 5.3 which reads as under:
"After considering the above detailed explanation furnished by the appellant clarifying that such payment has been made by them to NSDL and CDSL for providing access to their database for downloading the data electronically and from the manner of charging for the same by the depository, known as "BENPOS", at flat rates of Rs. 5,000/- or Rs. 10,000/- depending upon the number of records, in my considered view, such payment made by the appellant to NSDL and CDSL, shown under 'Settlement and Custody Fees' cannot he considered as falling under professional services, as defined under section 194J of the Act. Therefore, no tax was deductible at source on such payments made by the appellant to those depositories i.e. NSDL and CDSL".
(c) The issue in the case of Kotak Securities Ltd., was payment of the transaction charges to the BSE for BSE On-line 3 MA No. 173/Hyd/2013. M/s. Karvy Computer-Share Pvt. Ltd.
============================ Trading (BOLT) system and not payment of "BENPOS" at flat rates for downloading the data electronically.
Hence, the finding that the same issue was subject matter of dispute before the Tribunal, Bombay Bench in the case of Kotak Securities Ltd vs. Addl. CIT (124 TTJ 214) is a mistake apparent from record.
(ii) In para-13 the Tribunal recorded the finding "The facts considered by the Bombay High Court on this issue are similar to the facts of the assessee's case before us". The facts recorded by the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) in the assessee's case is payment of "BENPOS", at flat rates of Rs. 5,000/- or Rs. 10,000/- depending upon the number of records by providing access to their database for downloading the data electronically; whereas the payment covered in the Bombay High Court judgment is payment of transaction charges to the Stock Exchanges. Prima facie as the nature of the payments are totally different, the above finding is a mistake apparent from record.
(iii) National Securities Depository Ltd. (NSDL) raised the Invoice for the "BENPOS" in the names of the respective companies directly and the assessee paid the fees on behalf of the various clients under their instructions as a 4 MA No. 173/Hyd/2013. M/s. Karvy Computer-Share Pvt. Ltd.
============================ Trustee/Agent. Copies of the invoices were filed as per the directions of the Tribunal on 18-1- 2013. The Tribunal omitted to notice this fact while recording the above findings.
(iv) The Tribunal in para-11 of its order recorded the submission of the applicant that NSDL/CDSL declared the settlement and custody fees received from the Applicant as its income in their Income Tax Returns placing reliance on the judgement of the Calcutta High Court and the relevant observations are as under:
"Further he relied on the judgment of Calcutta High Court in the ease of CIT vs. Virgin Creations (lTAT No. 302 of 2011 (GA) 3200/2011 dated 23 November, 2011) wherein their Lordships relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of R.B. Jodhamal Kuthialal vs. CIT (82 ITR 570) and observed that the provisions, which has inserted the remedy to make the provisions workable, requires to be treated with retrospective operation so that reasonable deduction can be given to the section as well, decided the issue whether section 40(a)(ia) having retrospective operation or not."
The Tribunal did not give any decision on this legal Issue in its operative portion. Hence it is a mistake apparent from record.
3. Thus, according to the AR provisions of section 194J of the Act are not applicable as the impugned payment was not made for professional or technical services and it was only a reimbursement of expenditure. Further, he submitted that there is no finding in the Tribunal order regarding the nature of services rendered by the assessee 5 MA No. 173/Hyd/2013. M/s. Karvy Computer-Share Pvt. Ltd.
============================ so as to say whether the expenditure incurred by the assessee falls under the category of professional services or not so as to attract the provisions of section 194J of the Act.
4. On the other hand, the learned DR submitted that consideration of present arguments of the assessee's counsel amounts to review of earlier order of the Tribunal which is not permissible u/s. 254(2) of the Act.
5. We have heard both the parties at length. The learned AR tried to explain that the payment made by the assessee is not towards professional charges. According to him, it was paid only towards data access charges so that it would not attract the provisions of section 194J of the Act. He also submitted before us that the issue is not covered by the judgement of Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Kotak Securities Ltd. (340 ITR 333) (Bom). In our opinion, in the present case, while adjudicating the issue, the Tribunal considered the entire facts of the case and observed in paragraph 13 that the assessee has availed managerial services from NSDL/CDSL for which the assessee has paid the fees. Taking support from the judgement of Bombay High Court, it was held by the Tribunal that the assessee is liable to deduct TDS on the impugned payment.
6. Further, it is well settled that statutory authority cannot exercise power of review unless such power is expressly conferred. There is no express power of review conferred on this Tribunal. Even otherwise, the scope of review does not extent to re-hearing of the case on merit.
6 MA No. 173/Hyd/2013.M/s. Karvy Computer-Share Pvt. Ltd.
============================ It is held in the case of CIT vs. Pearl Woollen Mills (330 ITR
164):
"Held, that the Tribunal could not readjudicate the matter under section 254(2). It is well settled that a statutory authority cannot exercise power of review unless such power is expressly conferred. There was no express power of review conferred on the Tribunal. Even otherwise, the scope of review did not extent to rehearing a case on the merits. Neither by invoking inherent power nor the principle of mistake of court not prejudicing a litigant nor by involving doctrine of incidental power, could the Tribunal reverse a decision on the merits. The Tribunal was not justified in recalling its previous finding restoring the addition, more so when an application for the same relief had been earlier dismissed."
7. The scope and ambit of application of section 254(2) is very limited. The same is restricted to rectification of mistakes apparent from the record. We shall first deal with the question of the power of the Tribunal to recall an order in its entirety. Recalling the entire order obviously would mean passing of a fresh order. That does not appear to be the legislative intent. The order passed by the Tribunal under s. 254(1) is the effective order so far as the appeal is concerned. Any order passed under s. 254(2) either allowing the amendment or refusing to amend gets merged with the original order passed. The order as amended or remaining un-amended is the effective order for all practical purposes. An order under s. 254(2) does not have existence de hors the order under s. 254(1). Recalling of the order is not permissible under s. 254(2). Recalling of an order automatically necessitates rehearing and re- adjudication of the entire subject-matter of appeal. The dispute no longer remains restricted to any mistake sought 7 MA No. 173/Hyd/2013. M/s. Karvy Computer-Share Pvt. Ltd.
============================ to be rectified. Power to recall an order is prescribed in terms of Rule 24 of the ITAT Rules, 1963, and that too only in case where the assessee shows that it had a reasonable cause for being absent at a time when the appeal was taken up and was decided ex-parte. Judged in the above background the order passed by the Tribunal is indefensible.
8. The words used in s. 254(2) are 'shall make such amendment, if the mistake is brought to its notice'. Clearly, if there is a mistake, then an amendment is required to be carried out in the original order to correct that particular mistake. The provision does not indicate that the Tribunal can recall the entire order and pass a fresh decision. That would amount to a review of the entire order and that is not permissible under the IT Act. The power to rectify a mistake under s. 254(2) cannot be used for recalling the entire order. No power of review has been given to the Tribunal under the IT Act. Thus, what it could not do directly could not be allowed to be done indirectly.
9. In the case of CIT vs. Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages (P) Ltd. (2007) 207 CTR (Del) 119; (2007) 293 ITR 163 (Del), their Lordships while considering the powers of the Tribunal under s. 254(2) of the IT Act, 1961 observed as under:
"Under s. 254(2) of the IT Act, 1961, the Tribunal has the power to rectify mistakes in its order. However, it is plain that the power to rectify a mistake is not equivalent to a power to review or recall the order sought to be rectified. Rectification is a species of the larger concept of review. Although it is possible that the pre- requisite for exercise of either power may be similar (a mistake apparent from the record), 8 MA No. 173/Hyd/2013. M/s. Karvy Computer-Share Pvt. Ltd. ============================ by its very nature the power to rectify a mistake cannot result in the recall and review of the order sought to be rectified."
10. Thus the scope and ambit of application u/s. 254(2) is as follows:
(a) Firstly, the scope and ambit of application of s.
254(2) of IT Act is restricted to rectification of the mistakes apparent from the record.
(b) Secondly, that no party appearing before the Tribunal should suffer on account of any mistake committed by the Tribunal and if the prejudice has resulted to the party, which prejudice is attributable to the Tribunal's mistake/error or omission, and which an error is a manifest error, then the Tribunal would be justified in rectifying its mistake. The "rule of precedent" is an important aspect of legal certainty in the rule of law and that principle is not obliterated by s. 254(2) of the Act and non-consideration of precedent by the Tribunal causes a prejudice to the assessee.
(c) Thirdly, power to rectify a mistake is not equivalent to a power to review or recall the order sought to be rectified.
(d) Fourthly, under s. 254(2) an oversight of a fact cannot constitute an apparent mistake rectifiable under the section.
(e) Fifthly, failure on the part of the Tribunal to consider an argument advanced by either party for arriving at a conclusion is not an error apparent on record, although it may be an error of judgement.
9 MA No. 173/Hyd/2013.M/s. Karvy Computer-Share Pvt. Ltd.
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(f) Sixthly, even if on the basis of a wrong conclusion the Tribunal has not allowed a claim of the party it will not be a ground for moving an application under s. 254(2) of the Act.
(g) Lastly, in the garb of an application for rectification under s. 254(2) the assessee cannot be permitted to reopen and reargue the whole matter as the same is beyond the scope of s. 254(2) of the IT Act.
11. Keeping in mind the above parameters, now we proceed to consider and dispose of the Miscellaneous Application filed by the assessee as under.
12. In the instant case, the Tribunal while deciding the appeal of the assessee vide order dated 28th March, 2013 not only considered the elaborate arguments advanced by the Authorised Representatives of both the parties but also took into consideration the written synopsis filed by the AR for assessee before it. Generally the main purpose of the Tribunal for calling for written synopsis from the parties is that nothing is ignored or any point in issue which was raised during the course of arguments or which could not properly be noted by the Members in the log book while hearing the arguments of the parties, is left unconsidered. It means that it is always the endeavour of the Tribunal that while passing the order it considers all the arguments as well as the written synopses submitted by the parties.
13. In this regard, we would like to mention that in the order, the Tribunal first meticulously mentioned the arguments of the learned AR for the assessee, the points 10 MA No. 173/Hyd/2013. M/s. Karvy Computer-Share Pvt. Ltd.
============================ raised by him then the relevant case-laws relied upon by the AR of the assessee. Thereafter, the Tribunal considered the same and passed a speaking order for not entertaining the claim of the assessee. While rejecting the claim of the assessee the Tribunal placed reliance on the judgement of Bombay High Court CIT vs. Kotak Securities Ltd. (340 ITR
333) (Bom) which is directly on the issue raised by the assessee.
14. We may mention herein that we might have committed an error of judgement in wrongly applying/ interpreting the judgement of the Bombay High Court as mentioned on the matter, but the assessee is free to explore the remedy available under the law.
15. In the result, MA filed by the assessee is dismissed.
Order pronounced in the open court on 8th November, 2013 Sd/- Sd/-
(ASHA VIJAYARAGHAVAN) (CHANDRA POOJARI)
JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
Hyderabad, dated 8th November, 2013 tprao Copy forwarded to:
1. M/s. Karvy Computer-share Pvt. Ltd., 46, Avenue No. 4, Karvy House, Street No. 1, Road No. 10, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad.
2. The Asst. Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle-2(1), 8th Floor, B Block, IT Towers, Hyderabad.
3. The CIT(A)-III, Hyderabad.
4. The CIT-II, Hyderabad.
5. The DR - 'B' Bench, ITAT, Hyderabad