Karnataka High Court
Sri M R Raghuram vs Sri.M R Jayaram on 11 February, 2025
Author: K Somashekar
Bench: K Somashekar
1
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K.SOMASHEKAR
AND
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 1589 OF 2020 (PAR)
CONNECTED WITH
REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 1608 OF 2020 (DEC)
IN RFA 1589/2020
BETWEEN
SRI. M R RAGHURAM
S/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
R/AT GOKULA HOUSE
M S R ROAD, GOKULA
BANGALORE - 560 054.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. KUMBAR VASANT FAKEERAPPA - ADVOCATE)
AND
1. SRI.M R JAYARAM
S/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS
2. SRI. M R SAMPANGIRAMAIAH
S/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS
3. SRI. M R SEETHARAM
S/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS
4. SRI. M R PATTABHIRAM
S/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
2
5. SRI. M R JANAKIRAM
S/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
6. SRI. M R KODANDARAM
S/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
7. SRI. M R ANANDARAM
S/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS
8. SMT. M R PRABHAVATHI
D/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS
9. SMT. M R PADMAVATHY
D/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS
ALL ARE R/AT GOKULA HOUSE
M S RAMAIAH ROAD, GOKULA
BANGALORE-560054.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. SHASHI KIRAN SHETTY - SR. COUNSEL FOR SRI
JAGADEESH C K - ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENTS NO.1, 2, 5, 8 &
9; SRI. G KRISHNAMURTHY - SR. COUNSEL FOR SMT. BHAVANA
G K - ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENTS NO. 3 & 4; SRI. VIVEK
HOLLA - ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENTS NO. 6 &7)
THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER ORDER 96 OF CPC., PRAYING TO
SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 20.02.2020
PASSED BY THE LEARNED SR. CIVIL JUDGE JMFC AT
DEVANAHALLI IN O.S.507/2010.
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IN RFA 1608/2020
BETWEEN
SRI. M R RAGHURAM
S/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
R/AT GOKULA HOUSE
M S R ROAD, GOKULA
BANGALORE - 560 054.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. KUMBAR VASANT FAKEERAPPA - ADVOCATE)
AND
1. SRI.M R JAYARAM
S/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS
2. SRI. M R SAMPANGIRAMAIAH
S/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS
3. SRI. M R SEETHARAM
S/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS
4. SRI. M R PATTABHIRAM
S/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
5. SRI. M R JANAKIRAM
S/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
6. SRI. M R KODANDARAM
S/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
7. SRI. M R ANANDARAM
S/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS
4
8. SMT. M R PRABHAVATHI
D/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS
9. SMT. M R PADMAVATHY
D/O LATE M S RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS
ALL ARE R/AT GOKULA HOUSE
M S RAMAIAH ROAD, GOKULA
BANGALORE-560054.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. MADHUSUDHAN R NAIK - SR. COUNSEL FOR SRI
JAGADEESH C K - ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENTS NO.1, 2, 5, 8 &
9; SRI. G KRISHNAMURTHY - SR. COUNSEL FOR SMT. BHAVANA
G K - ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENTS NO. 3 & 4; SRI. VIVEK
HOLLA - ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENTS NO. 6 & 7)
THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER ORDER 96 OF CPC., PRAYING TO
SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 20.02.2020
PASSED BY THE LEARNED SR. CIVIL JUDGE JMFC AT
DEVANAHALLI IN O.S.1478/2006.
THESE RFAs HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON
22.01.2025 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF
JUDGMENT THIS DAY, K. SOMASHEKAR, J., DELIVERED
THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K SOMASHEKAR
AND
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
5
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K SOMASHEKAR) The appeal in R.F.A.No.1589/2020 is preferred by the appellant Shri M.R. Raghuram, challenging the judgment and decree dated 20.02.2020 rendered by the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Devanahalli, in O.S. No. 507/2010 and seeking to set aside the same, and in turn to grant the appellant one- tenth of the share in the 104 acres of land.
2. The appeal in R.F.A.No.1608/2020 is also preferred by the appellant Shri M.R. Raghuram, challenging the judgment and decree dated 20.02.2020 rendered by the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Devanahalli, in O.S. No. 1478/2006 and seeking to set aside the same, and in turn to grant declaration in respect of the documents pertaining to 2005 and 2006 as null and void.
3. Since common questions of fact and that of law arise for consideration in both these appeals which have been filed by the common appellant, these two appeals are taken up for 6 hearing together and are disposed of by this common judgment.
4. We have heard the learned counsel Shri Kumbar Vasanth Fakeerappa who is appearing for the appellant in both these appeals. Further, we have heard the Senior counsel Sri Madhusudhan R. Naik representing the learned counsel Shri Jagadeesh C.K. for Respondent Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 in RFA no. 1608 of 2020. Further, we have heard the Senior counsel Sri Shashi Kiran Shetty representing the learned counsel Shri Jagadeesh C.K. for Respondent Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 in RFA no. 1589 of 2020. We have also heard the learned Senior Counsel Shri G. Krishnamurthy representing the learned counsel Smt. Bhavana G.K. for Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in both the appeals inclusive of the learned counsel Shri Vivek Holla for Respondent Nos.6 and 7 in both the appeals.
5. The factual matrix of the appeals are as follows: 7
These appeals pertain to partition and ownership of agricultural lands situated in Akkalenahalli-Mallenahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk, acquired by late M.S. Ramaiah. The total extent of lands were approximately 666 acres, out of which 532 acres were orally partitioned on 01.04.1970 by M.S. Ramaiah among his family members, and 30 acres were retained by Mr. M.S Ramaiah. Further, land measuring 104 acres out of the 666 acres is disputed as to whether it was retained or apportioned. However, it is stated that the oral partition was recorded with a detailed sketch indicating the specific shares allotted to each of the members. After the death of Shri M.S. Ramaiah as on 25.12.1997, a Memorandum of Family Arrangement dated 25.07.1998, further confirmed the division of the remaining properties. The Appellant / plaintiff namely Sri. M.R. Raghuram, and the respondents / defendants, his siblings, were all beneficiaries under the partition.
6. However, it is stated that subsequently, disputes arose regarding two registered documents namely, the 8 "Memorandum of Confirmation of Oral Family Arrangement cum Partition" dated 18.11.2005 and the "Deed of Family Arrangement cum Partition" dated 28.08.2006. It was the allegation of the Appellant / plaintiff that these documents were executed without his consent and hence, he sought a declaration that they were not binding on him by filing a suit in O.S No.1478/2006 instituted on 19.01.2006, seeking permanent injunction to restrain the respondents / defendants from interfering with his possession of Schedule- 'A' properties and from alienating Schedule- 'B' properties, which Schedules are more fully described below. The suit in O.S No. 1478/2006 was subsequently dismissed on 01.08.2008, which was consequently challenged in RFA No. 1314/2008. Furthermore, another suit in O.S No. 507/2010 was instituted by the plaintiff / appellant herein seeking partition in respect of the 104 acres of land, which was earlier not partitioned in the year 1970. In the year 2012, O.S No. 1478/2006 was remanded back to the Trial Court for fresh consideration.
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7. During the pendency of the suit in O.S.No.507/2010, the appellant and the respondent nos. 3, 4, 6 and 7 are said to have entered into a registered 'Deed Of Family Settlement-Cum- Arrangement' dated 25.01.2017. Under these circumstances, a compromise petition dated 01.02.2017 was filed before the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Devanahalli. This compromise petition admitted the validity of the 2005 and 2006 documents concerning these respondents, which was opposed by Respondent no. 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9 in their objections. Thus the Trial court on 11.04.2017 ordered to defer the recordings of the compromise petition till the disposal of the suit. As against the said order, respondent nos. 3, 4, 6 and 7 filed a writ petition in W.P Nos.17228- 17231/2017 which was subsequently dismissed on 19.11.2018. Subsequently, on 12.12.2018 Respondent nos. 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9 filed an application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC in which they contended that the Appellant's admissions resolved the entire dispute and sought for dismissal of the suit. This 10 application was dismissed on 18.12.2018, against which Writ petition in W.P. Nos. 57679-80/2018 was preferred, challenging the order of the learned Trial judge. This Court by its order dated 11.11.2019, remitted the matter back to the Trial court for fresh consideration.
8. The Trial Court, by orders dated 20.02.2020 in O.S No. 1478/2006 and O.S No. 507/2010 dismissed both the said suits based on an application filed on 12.12.2018 under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. In the compromise petition, the appellant has admitted the validity of documents dated 18.11.2005 and 28.08.2006, which forms the crux of the dispute, upon which the appellant has appealed before this Court.
The schedule of properties is given below:
SCHEDULE "A" PROPERTIES Item No.I All that piece and parcel of land bearing Survey No.37/25, situated at Akklenahalli - Mallenahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, 11 Devanahalli Taluk, Bengaluru Rural District measuring 8 (eight) acres, bounded on the:
East by : Road and Property belonging to M.R. Raghuram, West by: Road and Land belonging to M.R. Anandaram, North by: Road and Chikkaballapura Bengaluru Rail Road, South by: Road and Land belonging to M.R. Prabhavathy.
Item No.II All that piece and parcel of land bearing Survey No.37/32, situated at Akklenahalli - Mallenahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk, Bengaluru Rural District measuring 3 (three) acres 3 (three) guntas, bounded on the:
East by : Gokul Farms Road, West by : Shettigere Village Boundary, North by Road and Land allotted to M.R. Pattabhiram, South by: Doddajala Village Boundary.
Item No.III All that piece and parcel of land bearing Survey No.32, situated at Akklenahalli - Mallenahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, 12 Devanahalli Taluk, Bengaluru Rural District measuring 7 (seven) acres 8 (eight) guntas, bounded on the :
East by: Road and Lake, West by: Land bearing Survey No.33, allotted to the share of M.R. Kodandaram, North by: Land bearing Survey No.39, allotted to the share of M.R. Anandaram, South by: Road and Portion of land in survey No.37.
Item No.IV All that piece and parcel of land bearing Survey No.37/19, situated at Akklenahalli - Mallenahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk, Bengaluru Rural District measuring 12 (twelve) acres, bounded on the:
East by: Portion of land bearing survey No.37, allotted to the shares of M.R. Padmavathy and M.R. Seetharam, West by: Chikkaballapura Bengaluru Rail Road, portion of land bearing survey No.37, allotted to the shares of M.R. Pattabhiram and M.R. Kodandaram, North by: Bengaluru Chikkaballapura Rail Road, South by Portion of land bearing survey No.37, allotted to the shares of M.R. Seetharam and M.R. Sampangiramaiah and Road.13
Item No.V All that piece and parcel of land bearing Survey No.37/20, situated at Akklenahalli - Mallenahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk, Bengaluru Rural District measuring 18 (eighteen) acres, bounded on the:
East by: Road and Land bearing survey No.37, allotted to the share of M.R. Seetharam, West by: Road and Portion of land bearing survey No.37, allotted to the shares of M.R. Kodandaram, M.R. Pattabhiram and M.R. Anandaram, North by: Main access Road from N.H.7 to side and Portion of land bearing survey No.37, allotted to the shares of M.R. Anandaram and M.R. Pattabhiram, South by: Road and Portion of land bearing survey No.37, allotted to the shares of M.R. Seetharam, M.R. Raghuram and M.R. Pattabhiram.
Item No.VI All that piece and parcel of land bearing Survey No.37/21, situated at Akklenahalli - Mallenahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk, Bengaluru Rural District measuring 13 (thirteen) acres, bounded on the :14
East by : Road and Land bearing survey No.37, allotted to the share of M.R. Seetharam, West by: Road and Land bearing survey No.37, allotted to the share of M.R. Pattabhiram, North by: Portion of land bearing survey No.37, retained by M.S. Ramaiah, South by: Main Tar Road and Boundary of Mougidoddajala.
Item No.VII All that piece and parcel of land bearing Survey No.36/7, situated at Akklenahalli - Mallenahalli Village, Kasaba Hob Devanahalli Taluk, Bengaluru Rural District measuring 1(one) acre, bounded on the :
East by: Chikkaballapura Bengaluru Rail Road West by: National Highway, Bellary - Bengaluru, North by: Portion of land bearing survey No.36, allotted to the share of M.R. Pattabhiram, South by: Portion of land bearing survey No. 36, allotted to the share of M.R. Pattabhiram, SCHEDULE "B" PROPERTIES Item No.1 15 All that piece and parcel of immovable property being converted land marked as K in light blue colouring the annexed plan to the document termed as "memorandum of confirmation of oral family arrangement cum partition" dated 18-11-2005 and situated in survey Nos.33, 35, 37/3 (P), 37/12(P), 37/14(P), 37/15 , 37/17(P), 37/18, 37/27(P) and 38 of Akkelanahalli and Mallenahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk, Bengaluru Rural District, in all measuring 85 acres 29 guntas.
Item No.2 All that piece and parcel of immovable property being converted land marked as A- M.R. Jayaram, B- M.R Sampangiramaiah, C-M.R. Seetharam, D- M.R Pattabhiram, E- M.R Janakiram, F- M.R .Kodandaram, G- M.R. Anandaram, H- M.R. Prabhavathi, I- M.R. Padmavathy in the annexed plan to the document termed as "memorandum of confirmation of oral family arrangement cum partition" dated 18-11-2005 and situated in survey Nos.1, 2, 3/1 5/3, 6, 7, 16 8/1, 8/3, 9/1, 9/3 12/1, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 37/1, 37/2, 37/3 37/4 37/5 37/6, 37/7, 37/8, 37/9, 37/10, 37/11, 37/12, 37/13, 37/14, 37/16, 37/17, 37/22 , 37/23 , 37/24, 37/25, 37/26, 37/27, 37/28 37/29, 37/30, 37/32, 39 and 40 of Akkelenahalli and Mallenahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk, Bengaluru Rural District, in all measuring 408 acres 06 guntas.
9. Learned counsel Shri Kumbar Vasant Fakeerappa for the appellant contends that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Trial court is illegal, arbitrary, and unjust and that the learned Senior Civil Judge has erred in allowing the application filed by Respondents 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9 based on the so-called admission made by the appellant and in permitting the memo dated 06.12.2018, which is contrary to the established legal principles and deserves to be set aside.
10. It is further contended that a compromise petition must be read as a whole, and an order based on such a 17 petition can only be passed when all parties unambiguously admit to its terms. In the present case, the trial court failed to summon the parties to ascertain whether they accepted the terms of the compromise petition. Instead, the judgment was improperly rendered based solely on the application of some of the Respondents and the alleged admissions in the compromise petition. Hence, it is contended that such a judgment is unsustainable in law.
11. The learned counsel for the Appellant further contends that the trial court has also failed to consider that the Appellant had sought a declaration in the suit that the memorandum of confirmation and oral family arrangement cum partition dated 18.11.2005 are null and void. The alleged admission in the compromise petition regarding the title of Respondents 3, 4, 6, and 7 pertains directly to the subject matter of the suit. Without proper admission of the terms of the compromise by all parties, the suit could not have been dismissed based on I.A. No. 12 and the memo filed by the Respondents.
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12. It is further contended that the Trial court has erroneously relied upon Order 12 Rule 6 of the CPC. The reference to "admission" in this provision must be interpreted 'ejusdem generis', and a compromise petition does not fall within its ambit. A compromise petition inherently involves obligations and counter-obligations. Unless the entire document is admitted by all parties, the court cannot selectively rely on certain portions of the compromise petition to dismiss the suit.
13. In furtherance of the above contention, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of B.S. VISWANATH VS. CHANDIKA BEN J. MEHTA AND ORS (AIR 1990 KANT 142), the relevant paragraphs from the above judgement reads thus:
"8 . As can be seen from the above provision, the Court in its discretion has the jurisdiction to pass partial decree on the basis of the facts admitted, whether such admission is in the 19 pleadings or otherwise. The clear scope of the above provision is, the admission must be Such which is complete and sufficient to pass a partial decree, which the Court proposes to pass on the basis of admission."
14. Furthermore, the counsel has also relied upon a judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of KARAN KAPOOR V. MADHURI KUMAR, ((2022) 10 SCC
496)) to explicitly clarify the position and application of Order 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The relevant paragraphs from the judgement reads thus:
"19. Heard the learned counsel for both the parties and perused the records. Prior to appreciating the arguments in the facts and looking at the controversy involved in the present case, it is required to know the object and the purport to introduce Order 12 CPC. The relevant provisions are reproduced hereunder:
"1. Notice of admission of case.--Any party to a suit may give notice, by his pleading, or otherwise in writing, that he admits the truth 20 of the whole or any part of the case of any other party.
2. Notice to admit documents.--Either party may call upon the other party [to admit, within 7 [seven] days from the date of service of the notice any document,] saving all just exceptions; and in case of refusal or neglect to admit, after such notice, the costs of proving any such document shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the suit may be, unless the Court otherwise directs; and no costs of proving any document shall be allowed unless such notice is given, except where the omission to give the notice is, in the opinion of the Court, a saving of expense.
*** [2-A. Document to be deemed to be admitted if not denied after service of notice to admit documents.--(1) Every document which a party is called upon to admit, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of that party or in his reply to the notice to admit documents, shall 21 be deemed to be admitted except as against a person under a disability:
Provided that the Court may, in its discretion and for reasons to be recorded, require any document so admitted to be proved, otherwise than by such admission.
(2) Where a party unreasonably neglects or refuses to admit a document after the service of the notice to admit documents, the Court may direct him to pay costs to the other party by way of compensation.]
3. Form of notice.--A notice to admit documents shall be in Form No. 9 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require.
[3-A. Power of Court to record admission.--Notwithstanding that no notice to admit documents has been given under Rule 2, the Court may, at any stage of the proceeding before it, of its own motion, call upon any party to admit any document and shall, in such a case, record whether the party admits or refuses or neglects to admit such document.] 22
4. Notice to admit facts.--Any party may, by notice in writing, at any time not later than nine days before the day fixed for the hearing, call on any other party to admit, for the purposes of the suit only, any specific fact or facts, mentioned in such notice. And in case of refusal or neglect to admit the same within six days after service of such notice, or within such further time as may be allowed by the Court, the costs of proving such fact or facts shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the suit may be, unless the Court otherwise directs:
Provided that any admission made in pursuance of such notice is to be deemed to be made only for the purposes of the particular suit, and not as an admission to be used against the party on any other occasion or in favour of any person other than the party giving the notice.
5. Form of admissions.--A notice to admit facts shall be in Form No. 10 in Appendix C, and admissions of facts shall be in Form No. 11 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require.23
6. Judgment on admissions.--(1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions.
(2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced"
20. Thus, the scheme of Order 12 Rule 1 CPC prescribes that any party to a suit may give notice, by his pleading, or otherwise in writing that he admits the truth of the whole or any part of the case to another party. As per Rule 2 of Order 12 CPC, notice to admit the documents may be given by either party to the other party within the specified time for admission of a document and in case of refusal or admission of the document after the notice, 24 the cost of proving such document shall be borne by the party who neglects or refuse, which shall be based on the discretion of the court.
21. Order 12 Rule 2-A CPC enables the deemed admission if after notice the document has not been denied. The said notice is required to be given in Form 9 of Appendix "C"
of CPC. Rule 3-A confers overriding powers to the court, that even in absence of a notice to admit a document under Rule 2, the court may record such admission on its own motion or by calling upon a party. The court also has a power to record whether the party admits or refuses or neglects to admit such documents.
22. Rule 4 of Order 12 CPC relates to notice to admit the facts. Any party may by a notice in writing at any time not later than 9 days before the day fixed for the hearing, call upon any other party to admit for the purposes of suit only, any specific fact or facts, mentioned in such notice that is required to be answered within a specified time or within such further time as directed by the court in case of refusal or neglect to admit the same, the cost of 25 proving such fact or facts be paid by the parties as directed. By adding a proviso, it was made clear that the admission, if any, made in a proceeding would be relating to the same proceeding not for any other proceedings. The notice under Rule 4 is required to be given in Form 10 of Appendix "C" of CPC as prescribed in Rule 5.
23. Order 12 Rule 6 CPC confers discretionary power to a court who "may" at any stage of the suit or suits on the application of any party or in its own motion and without waiting for determination of any other question between the parties makes such order or gives such judgment as it may think fit having regard to such admission.
24. Thus, legislative intent is clear by using the word "may" and "as it may think fit" to the nature of admission. The said power is discretionary which should be only exercised when specific, clear and categorical admission of facts and documents are on record, otherwise the court can refuse to invoke the power of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. The said provision has been brought with intent that if 26 admission of facts raised by one side is admitted by the other, and the court is satisfied with the nature of admission, then the parties are not compelled for full-fledged trial and the judgment and order can be directed without taking any evidence.
Therefore, to save the time and money of the court and respective parties, the said provision has been brought in the statute. As per above discussion, it is clear that to pass a judgment on admission, the court, if it thinks fit, may pass an order at any stage of the suit. In case the judgment is pronounced by the court a decree be drawn accordingly and parties to the case are not required to go for trial."
15. To further substantiate the nature and scope of Order 12 rule 6 of the CPC, the counsel for the Appellant has relied upon the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of HARI STEEL & GENERAL INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ANOTHER V. DALJIT SINGH AND OTHERS, (2019) 20 SCC 425, the relevant portion of the judgment reads thus:
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25. In the judgment in Himani Alloys Ltd. v.
Tata Steel Ltd. [Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd., (2011) 15 SCC 273 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 376] , nature and scope of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC has been considered by this Court. In the aforesaid judgment this Court has held that the discretion conferred under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is to be exercised judiciously, keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant. Para 11 of the judgment read as under :
(SCC pp. 276-77) "11. It is true that a judgment can be given on an "admission" contained in the minutes of a meeting. But the admission should be categorical. It should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it.
Order 12 Rule 6 CPC being an enabling provision, it is neither mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary. The court, on examination of the facts and circumstances, has to exercise its judicial discretion, keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant, by way of an appeal on merits. Therefore unless the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional, 28 the discretion of the court should not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim. In short the discretion should be used only when there is a clear "admission" which can be acted upon. (See also Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India [Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120] , Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust [Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust, (2010) 4 SCC 753 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 262] and Jeevan Diesels & Electricals Ltd. v. Jasbir Singh Chadha [Jeevan Diesels & Electricals Ltd. v. Jasbir Singh Chadha, (2010) 6 SCC 601 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 745] .) There is no such admission in this case."
26. In the judgment in S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj [S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj, (2015) 9 SCC 287 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 589] , this Court has held that the power under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a right. It is further held in the aforesaid case that where the defendants have raised objections, which go to the root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise discretion under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. Para 8 of the judgment read as under : (SCC p. 291) 29 "8. The words in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC "may"
and "make such order ..." show that the power under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Judgment on admission is not a matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of the court. Where the defendants have raised objections which go to the root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise the discretion under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. The said rule is an enabling provision which confers discretion on the court in delivering a quick judgment on admission and to the extent of the claim admitted by one of the parties of his opponent's claim."
27. In the judgment in Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan [Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396] , while considering the scope of Order 8 Rule 10 and Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, this Court has held that the court is not to act blindly upon the admission of a fact made by the defendant in the written statement nor should the court proceed to pass judgment blindly merely because a written statement has not been filed by the defendant traversing the facts set out by the plaintiff in the plaint filed in the court.
28. In the aforesaid judgment, while considering the scope of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, post 30 amendment by amending Act, 1976 this Court has held as under : (Balraj Taneja [Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396] , SCC p. 408, paras 21-23) "21. There is yet another provision under which it is possible for the court to pronounce judgment on admission. This is contained in Rule 6 of Order 12 CPC which provides as under:
'6. Judgment on admissions.--(1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions.
(2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced.'
22. This rule was substituted in place of the old rule by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976. The Objects and Reasons for this amendment are given below:
31
Under Rule 6, where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on the admitted claim. The object of the rule is to enable a party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which, according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. The rule is wide enough to cover oral admissions. The rule is being amended to clarify that oral admissions are also covered by the rule.'
23. Under this rule, the court can, at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings, pass a judgment on the basis of admissions made by the defendant. But before the court can act upon the admission, it has to be shown that the admission is unequivocal, clear and positive. This rule empowers the court to pass judgment and decree in respect of admitted claims pending adjudication of the disputed claims in the suit."
29. By applying the ratio laid down by this Court in the aforesaid judgments, it is to be held that there are no categorical and unconditional admissions, as claimed by the respondent-plaintiffs. In view of the stand of the appellants that, pp. 3 and 4 of the 32 agreement dated 3-5-2005 are tampered and their signatures are fabricated, when a specific issue is already framed, it cannot be said that there are categorical and unconditional admissions by the appellants. Mere admission of entering into arrangement/contract on 7-4- 2005 and 3-5-2005 itself cannot be considered in isolation, without considering the further objections of the appellants that certain pages in the agreement are fabricated. In case the appellants prove that the agreement is fabricated as claimed, post-trial it goes to the root of the case on the claim of the respondent-plaintiffs. Hence, we are of the view that the aforesaid judgments fully support the case of the appellants.
30. The learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs Shri Shyam Divan, relying on the judgment of this Court in Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India [Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120] has submitted that in view of the balance sheets and resolutions of the company, they are to be considered as admissions otherwise it will amount to 33 narrowing down the scope of the Rule itself. In the aforesaid judgment itself, this Court has held that when a statement of admission is brought before the Court, as long as the party making the statement is given sufficient opportunity to explain such admissions, judgment on admission can be delivered. In the case on hand it is to be noted that the relief claimed under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC by filing a written application claiming admission only based on the statement made by the advocate in the bail application, and there is no other pleading admission, in the application filed by the respondent-plaintiffs. It is a trite principle that any amount of evidence is of no help, in absence of pleading and foundation in the application. It is true that when categorical and unconditional admissions are there, judgment on admission can be ordered, without narrowing down the rule but at the same time the judicious discretion conferred on the court is to be exercised within the framework of the rule but not beyond. Even on balance sheets of the company and the note of one of the Directors, it is the specific case of the 34 appellants that the third respondent, in connivance with the respondent-plaintiffs, is also working against the appellants. In that view of the matter the claim of the respondent- plaintiffs relying on the documents relating to the company is to be considered with reference to the defence of the appellants during trial in the suit.
31. In the judgment in Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust [Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust, (2010) 4 SCC 753 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 262] , this Court has interpreted the expression "otherwise" as used in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and has held that the scope of the said provision of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is wider in comparison to provision of Order 12 Rule 1 CPC. It is true that after amendment, scope of the rule under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is expanded but at the same time the expression "otherwise" inserted in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is also to be considered within the framework of the Rule but not beyond. In any event, even in a given case, the admissions are categorical and unconditional, whether any inference can be drawn on 35 admissions having regard to documents placed on record, is a matter to be considered having regard to facts of each case. There cannot be any straitjacket formula to extend the benefit of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC.
16. The learned counsel for the appellant further argued that since the respondents themselves have admitted objections regarding the validity of the compromise petition, the Court has erred in exercising its discretion under Order 12 rule 6 CPC. The counsel in furtherance of this argument has relied upon the case of S.M. ASIF V. VIRENDER KUMAR BAJAJ, ((2015) 9 SCC 287), rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the relevant paragraphs from the above case are cited thus:
"8. The words in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC "may"
and "make such order ..." show that the power under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Judgment on admission is not a matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of the court. Where the defendants have raised objections which go to the 36 root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise the discretion under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. The said rule is an enabling provision which confers discretion on the court in delivering a quick judgment on admission and to the extent of the claim admitted by one of the parties of his opponent's claim.
9. In the suit for eviction filed by the respondent landlord, the appellant tenant has admitted the relationship of tenancy and the period of lease agreement; but resisted the respondent-plaintiff's claim by setting up a defence plea of agreement for sale and that he paid an advance of Rs 82.50 lakhs, which of course is stoutly denied by the respondent landlord. The appellant-defendant also filed the suit for specific performance, which of course is contested by the respondent landlord. When such issues arising between the parties ought to be decided, mere admission of relationship of landlord and tenant cannot be said to be an unequivocal admission to decree the suit under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC."
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17. In substantiating his argument the learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the case of RAJ A. MENDA AND ORS. VS. RANI RASAMANI REAL ESTATE AND ORS (ILR 2007 KARNATAKA 2627), delivered by this very Hon'ble Court, the relevant paragraphs from the judgement are cited below:
"52. In order to invoke the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC it is well established that, the exercise of discretion of Court in passing a decree or judgment on admission, at the first place, such relief cannot be claimed by the plaintiffs as of right. In exercising the discretion, the Court has to satisfy its judicial consensus on such discretion, admission must be clear, unequivocal, unconditional, unambiguous so that it may not be necessary for the Court to wait till the determination of other questions and the defendants making such admission have no right of defence at all and there is no possibility to succeed in the suit and the admissions must be taken as a whole and not in part. Order 12 Rule 6 CPC requires an absolute admission which could workout by itself and it is not proper to make a decree under the said provision, if 38 the admission is not absolute and incapable of being worked out by itself. This Court as well as the Apex Court time and again have held that in order to pass a decree under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC admission must be complete and sufficient to pass partial decree. When there is no clear admission and if the admission sought to be drawn is based on inference, it cannot be construed as absolute admission in terms of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and the said provision cannot be invoked.
53. Though many judgments are relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff on the question of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC it would not be necessary to refer to each one. However the principle enunciated in all the judgments is that, there has to be absolute, clear unequivocal admission which is complete and sufficient and which works out by itself and there is no possibility of success by a party making such admission.
54. In our view the trial court was not justified in invoking Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, merely on the basis of the reply given by one Chandru Raheja on behalf of K. Raheja Group when the plaintiffs have denied that the K. Raheja is a legal entity, reply of 39 Chandru Raheja is of no assistance, for dismissing the suit at this stage. This matter is required to be decided based on the evidence."
18. In furtherance of his contention, the counsel has relied upon the case of this very Hon'ble Court in CREF FINANCE LIMITED VS. SRI SHANTHI HOMES PRIVATE LTD. COMPANY AND ORS (AIR 2006 KANT 54), the relevant paragraphs are cited as thus:
"7 . When an application is filed under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, objections are filed by the respondents denying in toto, the said documents would partake the character of a disputed documents. Under Section 18 of the Evidence Act, an opportunity is to be given to the respondents to explain the said admissions and in what situation those admissions were made. But however, this is a matter to be decided during the course of trial and not at a stage, when the application is being considered under order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mr. B.S. Viswanath v. Chandikaben J. Mehta MANU/KA/0021/1990 : AIR 1990 Kant 142 has held that as can be seen from the provision, the Court in its discretion has the jurisdiction to pass partial decree on 40 the basis of the facts admitted, whether such admission is in the pleadings or otherwise. The scope of the above provision is, the admission must be such which is complete and sufficient to pass a partial decree, which the Court proposes to pass on the basis of admission. The same view is taken in the case of Janardhan Jog v. Srikrishna (supra) that the admission must be absolute and capable of being worked out by itself. It is also to be noticed that so far as the admission as contemplated under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure is concerned should independently stand without there being any interlink support and unless that is established, a decree under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be granted."
19. In the same context, the learned counsel has placed reliance on yet another case of this Hon'ble Court in JANARDHAN JOG VS. SRIKRISHNA, 1989 (3) KAR LJ 65, the relevant paragraphs of the judgement are herein stated for reference:
"9. An admission contemplated by Order 12 Rule 3 CPC, has to be an absolute admission, capable of being worked out by itself. The other questions to be 41 determined in the suit, on decree being made under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, should be such independent questions, reliefs granted on which should be capable of being granted without affecting the former decree (i.e., the one passed on the basis of admission). If the admitted fact cannot independently stand, and the ultimate relief or reliefs to be granted in the suit is interlinked with those facts, then, it will not be a proper exercise of the discretion, to make a decree under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC."
20. Hence, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant in both the appeals that the Trial Court has improperly relied upon a registered document dated 25.01.2017, which is referred to in the compromise petition. This reliance is perverse and premature as the said document is a matter of evidence, and its validity or admissibility can only be determined at the appropriate stage of the proceedings.
21. It is further contended that the impugned judgment is contrary to the earlier order passed by the trial court on 11.04.2017, which was confirmed by the Hon'ble High Court 42 in its order passed in W.P. No. 17228-17231/2017. The current judgment is in direct violation of the binding precedent set by the Hon'ble High Court in the said writ petition, thereby rendering it unsustainable.
22. The learned counsel for the Appellant finally submits that the trial court has erred in passing an order based on the memo dated 6.2.2018, despite the fact that the Appellant's counsel had endorsed on the memo that they had no instructions to file objections, is pressed upon.
23. It is also pertinent to note that Respondents 3, 4, 6, and 7 who were signatories to the compromise petition, did not object to the dismissal of the suit. The trial court failed to appreciate that the suit should have culminated in a decree based on the compromise petition. Hence, the learned counsel for the Appellant seeks this Court to allow the appeal in RFA No.1589/2020 and to set aside the judgement and decree dated 20.02.2020 in O.S No.507/2010 and in turn to grant the appellant one-tenth of the share in 43 the 104 acres of land. Further, the learned counsel for the appellant has prayed to allow RFA No.1608/2020 and to set aside the judgment and decree dated 20.02.2020 in O.S.No.1478/2006 and consequently declare documents of 2005 and 2006 as null and void.
24. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel Shri G. Krishna Murthy representing Respondent Nos.3 and 4 contends that the Appellant's admissions regarding the family settlements, and the specific relinquishments by Respondents No. 3, 4, 6, and 7 unequivocally establish that the properties in question were duly partitioned, leaving no further claim by the Appellant against these respondents. Therefore, the appeals lack merit and deserve to be dismissed.
25. In support of the above contention, the learned counsel for the respondent 3 and 4 has relied upon the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. V. United Bank of India 44 and Ors, (2000) 7 SCC 120, the relevant paragraphs of the judgment are cited below:
"12. As to the object of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, we need not say anything more than what the legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. In the Objects and Reasons set out while amending the said Rule, it is stated that "where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled".
We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where the other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed.
13. The next contention canvassed is that the resolutions or minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors, resolution passed thereon and the letter 45 sending the said resolution to the respondent Bank cannot amount to a pleading or come within the scope of the Rule as such statements are not made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise. When a statement is made to a party and such statement is brought before the court showing admission of liability by an application filed under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and the other side has sufficient opportunity to explain the said admission and if such explanation is not accepted by the court, we do not think the trial court is helpless in refusing to pass a decree. We have advertised the basis of the claim and the manner in which the trial court has dealt with the same. When the trial Judge states that the statement made in the proceedings of the Board of Directors' meeting and the letter sent as well as the pleadings when read together, leads to unambiguous and clear admission with only the extent to which the admission is made in dispute, and the court had a duty to decide the same and grant a decree, we think this approach is unexceptionable."
26. Learned Senior Counsel Shri G. Krishnamurthy representing Respondent Nos.3, 4, 6 and 7 in both the appeals has referred to the List of documents filed along with 46 their written statement filed before the Trial Court. The documents include, i) Copy of the Village map of Akkalenahalli and Mallenahalli villages issued on 16.08.1975 showing the unofficial markings of different portions; ii) Copy of the memorandum of oral partition dated 01.04.1970 which consists of page No.3 to Page No.12; iii) Copies of survey sketches in respect of schedule properties - 37 in number;
iv) Coloured survey sketch of schedule properties; v) Copies of tax paid receipts - 13 in number; vi) Copy of memorandum of confirmation of Oral Family Settlement dated 25.07.1998; vii) Copy of Memorandum of Confirmation of Oral Family Arrangement-cum-partition dated 18.11.2005;
viii) Coloured map of properties belonging to defendants after re-arrangement and consolidation under memorandum dated 18.11.2025; ix) Coloured map of properties jointly held by defendants under memorandum dated 18.11.2005;
x) Copy of memorandum of understanding dated 20.01.2006; xi) Copies of extracts from the Mutation Register and xii) Copies of land tax assessment register. 47
27. Learned Senior Counsel Shri G. Krishnamurthy has emphatically submitted for consideration of these documents in support of his arguments and contends that it is not required to interfere with the judgment and decree rendered by the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Devanahalli as regards the application been filed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
28. The learned Senior Counsel Shri G. Krishna Murthy further contends that the genesis of the dispute originates from the properties purchased by late Sri M.S. Ramaiah in 1951, measuring 666 acres of agricultural land in Kalenahalli Marenahalli Village, Devanahalli Taluk. On April 1, 1970, late Sri M.S. Ramaiah executed a family partition deed covering an extent of 561 acres 36 guntas, out of which 30 acres 26 guntas were retained by him and 104 acres 10 guntas were excluded from partition due to various constraints such as gramatana, quarry areas, and tenant rights. The remaining 531 acres and 10 guntas were partitioned among family members. The Appellant, under this partition, was allotted 48 specific survey numbers amounting to 51 acres 8 guntas. Subsequently, on November 17, 1997, the Appellant purchased 8 additional acres in Sy. No.37/25 through a registered sale deed. Following the demise of late M.S. Ramaiah on December 25, 1997, a Memorandum of Confirmation of Oral Family Settlement was executed on July 25, 1998, wherein the remaining properties retained by late M.S. Ramaiah, including 30 acres and 26 guntas, were distributed among family members. As a result, the Appellant's share, inclusive of properties acquired through partition and purchase, totalled 62 acres 11 guntas.
29. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that significant development occurred on November 18, 2005, when all the Respondents, excluding the Appellant, executed a Registered Memorandum of Confirmation of Oral Family Arrangement-Cum-Partition Deed. This arrangement aimed to reorganize the properties for better utilization. The deed specifically dealt with an extent of 85 acres 29 guntas, which was held jointly by the Respondents, and marked as "K" in 49 the annexed plan in this Appeal. This arrangement was further solidified through subsequent deeds, including a Registered Deed of Family Arrangement Cum Partition dated August 28, 2006, wherein the properties jointly held by the Respondents and those acquired through gift deeds were divided among them, allocating individual shares to each Respondent.
30. The learned Senior Counsel further contends that the Appellant, being dissatisfied with these arrangements, instituted O.S.No.1478/2006, seeking a declaration that the Memorandum of Confirmation of Oral Family Arrangement dated November 18, 2005, was not binding on him. The Appellant later amended the plaint to include a challenge to the Registered Deed of Family Arrangement dated August 28, 2006. However, the learned Trial Court dismissed the suit on August 19, 2008, citing insufficiency of court fees and other grounds. Although the Appellant appealed against this order in RFA 1314/2008, the matter was remanded for fresh consideration on February 23, 2012.
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31. The learned Senior Counsel Shri G. Krishna Murthy further emphasized that on 25.01.2017, a significant compromise was reached. A "Registered Deed of Family Settlement Cum Arrangement" was executed between the Appellant and Respondents No. 3, 4, 6, and 7. In this settlement, the Appellant was declared the absolute owner of Schedule 'A' property and accepted and received a sum of Rs.6.5 crores as consideration for relinquishing his share in the agricultural properties. In return, the Appellant agreed to withdraw O.S. No. 1478/2006 and O.S. No. 507/2010 against Respondents No. 3, 4, 6, and 7. A compromise petition was filed under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC to effect this agreement. The Appellant explicitly acknowledged the validity of the "Memorandum of Confirmation of Oral Family Arrangement Cum Partition" dated November 18, 2005, and declared that it did not affect his rights. The Appellant also confirmed that Respondents No. 3, 4, 6, and 7 are rightful owners of the properties allotted to them under the said arrangement. Incidentally, Respondents No. 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9 51 raised objections to this compromise, and contended that the settlement would prejudice their rights and that the compromise petition was inseparable from the dispute concerning the entire property. Consequently, this Hon'ble Court, in its order dated 19.11.2018, dismissed the writ petitions filed by Respondents No. 3, 4, 6, and 7 challenging the objections, observing that the disputes regarding the document dated November 18, 2005, were inseparable from the larger issues in the suit. Furthermore, it held that accepting the compromise petition would prejudice Respondents No. 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9.
32. The learned Senior counsel further submits that the Trial Court, on 20.02.2020, considered the objections and the application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC and held that the Appellant had categorically admitted the validity of the document dated 18.11.2005, as it pertained to Respondents No. 3, 4, 6, and 7. The court emphasized that the conduct of the parties is crucial in such adjudication, and the wide scope of Order XII Rule 6 CPC allowed for a decision on the matter. 52 Consequently, the application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC was allowed, and the suits against Respondents No. 3, 4, 6, and 7 were dismissed.
33. In furtherance of the above argument, the learned Senior Counsel for respondents 3 and 4 has relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of NAGINDAS RAMDAS V. DALPATRAM ICHHARAM ALIAS BRIJRAM AND ORS, ((1974) 1 SCC 242)), the relevant portion of the judgement is cited below for reference:
"28. We do not find any force in the contention of Mr Dholakia, that the facts admitted in the compromise, itself were insufficient to make out even a prima facie ground for eviction mentioned in Section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act, merely because the tenant had made an application for fixation of standard rent, which was still pending at the time of passing of the decree. By admitting to pay the arrears of rent and mesne profits at the rate of Rs 15 per month, the tenant had clearly withdrawn or abandoned his application for fixation of standard rent. The admission in the compromise was thus as 53 admission of the material facts which constituted a ground for eviction under Section 12(3)(a). Rent was admittedly payable by the month; since the application for fixation of fair rent stood withdrawn, there was no dispute with regard to the amount of standard rent. Further, the rent was admittedly in arrears for a period of more than six months; so much so that in the present case, the tenant had neglected to pay the balance of arrears, amounting to Rs.152/50, even long after the decree and the landlord was compelled to recover the same by execution.
34. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent explained further that regarding O.S. No.507/2010, the Trial Court observed that Respondents No. 3, 4, 6, and 7 had relinquished all claims over the Appellant's share and the properties in question, indicating that the schedule properties were not joint family properties and were not available for partition.
35. The learned Senior counsel Sri Madhusudhan R. Naik representing the learned counsel Shri Jagadeesh C.K. 54 for Respondent Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 in RFA no. 1608 of 2020 and the Senior counsel Sri Shashi Kiran Shetty representing the learned counsel Shri Jagadeesh C.K. for Respondent Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 in RFA no. 1589 of 2020 contend that the appeals filed by the Appellant are frivolous and baseless, aimed at perpetuating unjust litigation among siblings for over 19 years.
36. Both the learned Senior Counsel reiterate the factual background of the case that late M.S. Ramaiah partitioned certain lands among himself, his two wives, and ten children, through an oral family arrangement on 01.04.1970, which partition was reflected in a 'Wardi note.' He contends that over time, nine of the children mutually re- arranged their scattered holdings into consolidated blocks for better enjoyment. They formalized this re-arrangement through two registered documents:
(i) The Memorandum of Confirmation of Oral Family Arrangement Cum Partition dated 18.11.2005 and 55
(ii) The Deed of Family Arrangement Cum Partition dated 28.08.2006.
37. It is contended that the Appellant, however, did not join this re-arrangement, and his share under the original oral partition remained untouched. Despite the fact that the Appellant's share was unaffected, he filed a suit in O.S. No. 1478/2006 before the Senior Civil Judge, Devanahalli, seeking a declaration and permanent injunction against the Respondents 1 to 9, alleging that the two documents had shifted his properties to a disadvantageous location by re- aligning roads. Further, during the pendency of the suit, the appellant and Respondents 3, 4, 6, and 7 filed a compromise petition under Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC, stating that the documents in question did not affect the appellant's interests. They sought dismissal of the suit against Respondents 3, 4, 6, and 7 while allowing it to continue against the remaining Respondents. Respondents 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9 opposed this partial compromise, arguing that the dispute, involving common documents and in-severable 56 issues, could not be resolved selectively against a few Respondents.
38. The learned Senior Counsels further contend that the Trial court, recognizing the in-severable nature of the dispute, deferred consideration of the compromise petition until the final disposal of the suit. This order was challenged by Respondents 3, 4, 6, and 7 in W.P. No. 17232/2017, which this Hon'ble Court dismissed on 19.11.2018, affirming the Trial court's decision. Subsequently, Respondents 3, 4, 6, and 7 filed a memo requesting the dismissal of the suit against them based on an alleged settlement deed dated 25.01.2017. The Respondents 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9 opposed this memo, arguing that it sought to dilute and circumvent the orders of this Hon'ble Court and the trial court. The Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the trial court, without addressing the objections raised by the Respondents 1, 2, 5, 8 and 9, dismissed the suit against Respondents 3, 4, 6, and 7. Aggrieved by this, the Respondents 1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 filed a Civil Revision Petition (C.R.P No. 11/2019), which, 57 along with other proceedings, was remanded for reconsideration to the Trial Court. Upon rehearing, the trial court rightly allowed the Respondents' application under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC and dismissed the suit in its entirety, which is now challenged in this appeal.
39. The Learned Senior Counsels finally emphasized that the Appellant's admissions in the compromise petition dated 01.02.2017, acknowledging the validity of the challenged documents of 2005 and 2006 concerning Respondents 3, 4, 6, and 7, amount to an 'admission' under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC. Given the in-severable nature of the dispute, it is contended that the Appellant cannot selectively pursue the suit against some Respondents (1,2,5,8 and 9) while withdrawing it against others (3,4,6 and 7) and that the trial court rightly recognized that the Appellant's admission rendered the suit untenable and warranted dismissal.
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40. In furtherance of this argument, the learned Senior Counsels for the Respondents Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 have relied upon a judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of KARAM KAPAHI AND ORS. VS. LAL CHAND PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUST AND ORS, (AIR 2010 SC 2077). The relevant paragraphs of the judgement are extracted thus:
"47. Prior to amendment the Rule read thus:
6. Judgment on admissions. - Any party may, at any stage of a suit, where admissions of facts have been made, either on pleadings or otherwise, apply to the Court for such judgment or order as upon such admission he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties and the Court may upon such application make such order or give such judgment, as the Court may think just.
48. In the 54th Law Commission Report, an amendment was suggested to enable the Court to give a judgment not only on the application of a party but on its own motion. It is thus clear 59 that the amendment was brought about to further the ends of justice and give these provisions a wider sweep by empowering judges to use it 'ex debito justitial, a Latin term, meaning a debt of justice. In our opinion the thrust of the amendment is that in an appropriate case, a party, on the admission of the other party, can press for judgment, as a matter of legal right. However, the Court always retains its discretion in the matter of pronouncing judgment.
49. If the provision of order 12 Rule 1 CPC is compared with Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, it becomes clear that the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is wider in as much as the provision of order 12 Rule 1 CPC is limited to admission by 'pleading or otherwise in writing' but in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC the expression 'or otherwise' is much wider in view of the words used therein namely:
'admission of fact...either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing'
41. The learned Senior Counsels for the Respondent Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 in both appeals have also relied on an Apex Court judgment in the case of UTTAM SINGH 60 DUGGAL & CO. LTD. V. UNITED BANK OF INDIA AND ORS, ((2000) 7 SCC 120)), (supra).
42. The learned Senior Counsels have further relied on a judgment in THIRU JOHN AND ORS. V. RETURNING OFFICER AND ORS. ((1977) 3 SCC 540)) to argue that a clear and unequivocal admission by a party constitutes substantive evidence, thereby shifting the burden of proof onto the party making the admission. The relevant paragraph is stated below:
"15. It is well settled that, a party's admission as defined in Sections 17 to 20 fulfilling the requirements of Section 21 of Evidence Act, is substantive evidence proprio vigore. An admission, if clearly and unequivocally made, is the best evidence against the party making it and though not conclusive, shifts the onus on to the maker on the principle that "what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so and until the presumption was rebutted the fact admitted must be taken to be established".61
43. The learned Senior counsels have further relied on a judgment in the case of ARUN GENERAL INDUSTRIES LTD. VS. THE RISHAB MANUFACTURERS (PR.) LTD. AND ORS, (AIR 1972 MP 147) to explain the application of Order 12 rule 6 under the CPC, the relevant paragraph from the judgement is cited below:
"7. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, it would appear that the case before me falls within the scope of Order XII, Rule 6 CPC and no sufficient grounds have been assigned to induce me to hold either that the order under revision was unjust to the plaintiff or that the learned Judge in making a direction for delivery of possession to him 'without prejudice to the rights of the parties' in terms of that rule, had acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction. Relying upon Dularsingh's case (AIR 1937 Nag 184) (supra.) the learned counsel urged that the pleadings can be dissected. There can hardly be any quarrel with that proposition which has already been stated earlier. It is equally true that if an admission is made 62 subject to a condition, it must either be accepted subject to that condition or not accented at all. These principles, however, are not applicable here. In this connection, the learned counsel draws my attention to the opening words of paragraph 15 of the plaint which read "In case it is held", for his submission that the right to the alternative relief arises only upon an adjudication that there was a frustration of the contract consequent upon the alleged surrender of 99.36 acres of land and therefore the primary relief of specific performance cannot be had. On the contrary, the plaintiff's claim consists of two distinct portions and nothing prevented the defendant from confessing judgment to one portion "without prejudice to the rights of the parties" as regards the other portion of the claim."
44. Thus, learned Senior counsel Sri Madhusudhan R. Naik representing the learned counsel Shri Jagadeesh C.K. for Respondent Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 in RFA no. 1608 of 2020 and the learned Senior counsel Sri Shashi Kiran Shetty representing the learned counsel Shri Jagadeesh C.K. for 63 Respondent Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 in RFA no. 1589 of 2020, emphasizes that the appellant's claim is based on a false premise, as his share under the original partition was neither disturbed nor affected. The appellant's selective approach to pursuing the suit violates established principles of law and fairness. Hence, it is their contention that the Trial court's decision to dismiss the suit in its entirety, is legally sound and does not warrant interference by this Hon'ble Court. On these grounds, they pray for dismissal of both these appeals.
45. The Learned counsel Shri Vivek Holla representing Respondent nos. 6 and 7 in both these appeals, emphasized the Appellant's admissions in the compromise petition dated 01.02.2017, acknowledging the validity of the challenged documents of (i) The Memorandum of Confirmation of Oral Family Arrangement Cum Partition dated 18.11.2005 and
(ii) The Deed of Family Arrangement Cum Partition dated 28.08.2006, concerning only Respondents 3, 4, 6, and 7, amount to an 'admission' under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC and relied upon several judgments of various courts to 64 substantiate that the trial court was correct in recognizing the Appellant's admission, thereby rendering the suit untenable, and warranting its dismissal.
46. The learned counsel for Respondent Nos.6 and 7 relied upon the following case laws, to establish his arguments:
i) KARAM KAPAHI AND ORS V. LAL CHAND PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUST AND ORS, ((2010) 4 SCC 753))
40. If the provision of Order 12 Rule 1 CPC is compared with Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, it becomes clear that the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is wider inasmuch as the provision of Order 12 Rule 1 CPC is limited to admission by "pleading or otherwise in writing" but in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC the expression "or otherwise" is much wider in view of the words used therein, namely:
"admission of fact ... either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing".
41. Keeping the width of this provision (i.e. Order 12 Rule 6 CPC) in mind this Court held 65 that under this Rule admissions can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case (see Charanjit Lal Mehra v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan [(2005) 11 SCC 279] , SCC at p. 285, para 8). Admissions in answer to interrogatories are also covered under this Rule (see Mullas's Commentary on the Code, 16th Edn., Vol. II, p. 2177).
ii) BARNWAL MARKETING AND ORS VS. GEE PEE INFOTECH PVT. LTD, (2015) 3 BC 652 "28. However, in the case of Peerless Abasan Finance Ltd.-vs.-M/s. Gagan Polymers (P) Ltd. reported in 2002 (4) ICC 194, in paragraph 6 of the judgment K.J. Sengupta, J. held as follows:-
"I have considered the entire submissions made in both the two applications, I would like to pronounce combined judgment on the issue in its entirety. As far as the plea of Mr. Mitra that I cannot pronounce judgment relying on a document being the letter which was written before filing of the suit is concerned, I am of the view that the aforesaid piece of evidence, which is sought to be relied on admission, is an 66 acceptable admission within the meaning of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the word 'otherwise' means and includes any piece of admission whether it is made before filing the suit or subsequently."
iii) HSBC BANK VS. SILVERLINE TECHNOLOGIES LTD. AND ORS, (AIR 2006 BOM 134) "19. This leads me to the next ancillary issue which has been argued by the learned Counsel for the defendants that suit is based on enforcement of judgment and decree and not based on the settlement agreement arrived at between the parties. It has been contended that the settlement agreement being merged in the judgment and decree of the foreign Court no decree can be passed by this Court in the present Notice of Motion. Insofar as aforesaid contention is concerned, I find no substance in the present case as held by the Apex Court in the case of Uttam Singh Duggal and Co. Ltd. (supra) that the Court is empowered under Order 12, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code to pass a decree on the basis of any admission including the documents which are not forming 67 part of the proceedings. In the present case, settlement agreement is very much a part of the present proceeding. In para 5 of the said plaint, the said agreement has been specifically pleaded and the said settlement agreement is annexed at Ex. A to the plaintiff.
In my opinion, merely because relief sought is for decree in terms of judgment already entered into by the American Court it cannot be stated that this Court is not empowered to pass a decree on the basis of admission contained in the said settlement agreement which is forming part of the suit proceeding.
20. I am of the opinion that there is a clear cut unequivocal, unambiguous admission of liability on the part of defendant No. 1 and 2 as recorded in writing and therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to decree and judgment under Order 12, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code for decree on admission. Accordingly, I make the present notice of motion absolute and decree the suit for the sum of US 17,919,603.68 with interest thereon @ 9% p.a. from the date of the suit till payment and/or realisation. The Notice 68 of Motion and Suit both are disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.
iv) NEPC MICON LIMITED VS. M/S SIEMENS LTD, ((2004)1 MAD LJ 395)) "11 . As we stated earlier and at the risk of repetition, we cannot but state that the appellant/defendant admitted that Rs. 76 lakhs and odd is due and payable by him by his letter dated 16.9.94 and also in the Memorandum of Compromise dated 29.11.95 as well as through letters dated 29.12.95 and 2.1.96 followed by issuance of two cheques for the said amount, which when presented have bounced. It is, therefore, clear that the appellant/defendant has admitted his liability through the above documents and the learned single Judge was justified in passing a decree for the admitted amount in terms of Order 12, Rule 6, C.P.C. The appeal deserves to be dismissed and it is, accordingly, dismissed."
v) NATIONAL TEXTILE CORPORATION LTD. AND ORS. VS. ASHVAL VADERAA (2010 SCC ONLINE DEL 544) 69 "17. It is settled law that admissions need not be made expressly in the pleadings. Even on the constructive admissions Court can proceed to pass a decree in plaintiff's favour. In order to invoke the provisions of Order XII Rule 6 CPC, admissions de hors pleadings may also be considered as is evident from the use of the word "otherwise" in the said provision. See Shikhar Chand v. Mst. Bari Bai MANU/MP/0018/1974 :
AIR 1974 MP 75; K. Kishore v. Allahabad Bank MANU/DE/0910/1997 : 1997 (41) DRJ 698;
Uttam Singh Srivastava v. Sanjiv Tuli MANU/DE/0424/2005 : 119 (2005) DLT 202; Rama Ghei v. U.P. State Handloom Corporation MANU/DE/0322/2001 : 91 (2001) DLT 386 and R.N. Sachdeva v. R.L. Mahajan Charitable Trust MANU/DE/0910/1997 : 1997 (41) DRJ 698. Such admissions may be contained in documents written or executed between the parties before the action is brought or even from the statements of parties recorded in the Court, including statements recorded under Order X Rule 1 CPC. Admissions may also be gleaned from vague and nonspecific denials made in the pleadings and documents, which on the face of it appear to 70 have been deliberately made in order to mislead the Court, or gathered from the non-traversal of specific averments made in the pleadings and documents."
vi) PUNJAB AND SIND BANK VS. FRONTLINE CORPORATION LTD (AIR 2023 SC 2786) "26. We find that the present appeal deserves to be allowed on another ground also. Undisputedly, the jurisdiction which was exercised by the Division Bench was analogous to the one exercised Under Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of Wander Ltd. and Anr. v. Antox India P. Ltd.
MANU/SC/0595/1990 : 1990 (Supp) SCC 727 "14 . The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had 71 ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph [ MANU/SC/0001/1960 : (1960) 3 SCR 713 : AIR 1960 SC 1156]: (SCR 721) "... These principles are well established, but as has been observed byViscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton [1942 AC 130]'...the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an 72 order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case." The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle."
27. It has been held by this Court that the Appellate Court would not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. It has been held that an appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. It has further been held that the Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. It has been held that if the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court 73 would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion.
47. Basing his submission on the above case laws, the learned counsel Shri Vivek Holla for Respondent Nos.6 and 7 prays for dismissal of the present appeals as being without any merit.
48. In the context of the contentions advanced by the learned Senior Counsels and the respective learned counsel for the parties, it is relevant to state that RFA 1589 of 2020 (arising out of O.S. No. 507 of 2010) was filed for partition and separate possession of 104 acres out of 666 acres owned by the late M.S. Ramaiah. The appellant sought a declaration of rights and a share of 1/10th of the undivided property. This suit was dismissed by the trial court based on Order XII Rule 6 CPC, citing unambiguous admissions by the appellant in compromise petitions and associated documents. 74
49. On the basis of the case on hand and the contentions advanced by the respective counsel for both the parties, the issues that would arise for consideration in the above appeals are,
1) Whether the trial court's reliance on Order XII Rule 6 CPC to dismiss the suits was legally justified?
2) Whether the admissions by the plaintiff / appellant herein in the compromise petition constitute binding, unequivocal admissions under the law?
50. In order to answer the issues, it is relevant to refer to Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, which empowers Courts to deliver judgments based on admissions only if, i) the admission is clear, unequivocal, and unqualified; ii) No further evidence is required to adjudicate the matter.
51. The Appellant, in the compromise petition dated 01.02.2017, explicitly admitted the validity of the 2005 and 75 2006 documents regarding defendants Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7, including the title and possession of their respective properties, particularly, paragraph 2 of the "compromise petition" stated that defendants Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7 are entitled to properties as per the 2005 and 2006 documents. Further, the Appellant had agreed not to pursue claims against them.
52. As regards admission, it is relevant to refer to a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of UTTAM SINGH DUGGAL & CO. LTD. V. UNITED BANK OF INDIA, ((2000) 7 SCC 120)) :: (2000 SCC ONLINE SC 1134) "12. As to the object of Order 12 Rule 6, we need not say anything more than what the legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. In the Objects and Reasons set out while amending the said Rule, it is stated that "where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the 76 relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled". We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where the other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed.
53. Further, in this regard, it is relevant to refer to a judgment in the case of TIRATH RAM SHAH CHARITABLE TRUST & ORS. VS. MRS. SUGHRA BI @ SUGHRA BEGUM (DECD.) (2015 SCC Online Del 13655) ".. 11. The object of Order XII Rule 6 CPC is that once there are categorical admissions made by a party, then the litigation should not be permitted to linger on unnecessarily and in appropriate cases, on an application filed by a party under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, asking for a decree on the basis of the said admissions, the Court ought to exercise its discretion and bring an end to such litigation by passing appropriate 77 orders. The other consideration, while passing a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, is to ensure that the judicial process is not abused and a person entitled to relief, is granted such relief without delaying the passing of a decree in his/her favour, or making him/her go through the rigorous of a trial. Para 12. In the case of Charanjit Lal Mehra Vs. Smt. Kamal Saroj Mahajan, MANU/SC/0191/2005 : (2005) 11 SCC 279, the Supreme Court has held that an admission under Order XII Rule 6 CPC can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case and that order XII Rule 6 CPC has been enacted to expedite trial and where the Courts find that the suit can be disposed of on such admissions, it should not hesitate from doing so. It is also relevant to refer to the observations of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vijaya Myne Vs. Satya Bhusan Kaura MANU/DE/9812/2006 : 142 (2007) DLT 483, where in the light of innumerable authorities on Order XII Rule 6 CPC, it was held that admissions can be constructive admissions and need not be specific or expressive, which can be inferred from vague and evasive denial in the written statement 78 while answering specific pleas in the plaint and further, that admissions can even be inferred from the facts and circumstances of a case."
54. It is also relevant to refer to a judgment in the case of CHARANJIT LAL MEHRA AND ORS. VS. KAMAL SAROJ MAHAJAN AND ORS.( AIR 2005 SC 2765), wherein it is held thus:
"8. Learned counsel made an alternative submission that the revision petition was not maintainable and the lease deed is not registered one and therefore, it is not maintainable. None of these objections were raised by the defendants before the learned Single Judge. Even before the trial court, the non-registration of lease deed (which did not prescribe any term) was not put in issue, it is only devised now to some how defeat and delay the eviction and possession of the premises to the landlady. In fact, Order XII Rule 8 C.P.C. is enacted for the purpose of and in order to expedite the trials it there is any admission on behalf of the defendants or an admission can be interred from the facts and circumstances of the case without any dispute;79
then, in such a case in order to expedite and dispose of the matter such admission can be acted upon....."
55. In the case of "USHA RANI JAIN VS. NIRULAS CORNER HOUSE PVT. LTD." ((1998) 73 DLT 124), it is held thus:
"18. The object of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is to enable a party to obtain a speedy judgment, at least, to the extent of the admissions of the defendant to which relief the plaintiff is entitled to. The rule permits the passing of the judgment at any stage without waiting for determination of other questions. It is equally settled that before a court can act under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, the admission must be clear, unambiguous, unconditional and unequivocal. Admission in pleadings are either actual or constructive. Actual admission consists of facts expressly admitted either in pleadings or in answer to interrogatories."80
56. The above decision was relied by the Delhi High Court in the case of "Shivraj Yadav and Ors. vs. Arun Nirula (02.08.2022 - DEL HC) 2022 SCC Online Del 2352"
57. It is also relevant to refer to the judgment in the case of HIMANI ALLOYS LTD. VERSUS TATA STEEL LTD., ((2011) 15 SCC 273)), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the power under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is discretionary, which should be exercised only when the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional. The Apex Court, however, held that such a judgment under Order XII Rule 6 CPC could be based on admissions contained in documents other than pleadings, and in fact, observed that a judgment could be given, even on the basis of an admission contained in the minutes of a meeting. The relevant extracts of the said decision read as under:
"4. Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code provides that where admission of facts have been made in the pleadings or otherwise, whether oral or in 81 writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order on give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions."
58. Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, deals with admissions and their admissibility. It states that, "Admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the person who makes them, or his representative in interest; but they cannot be proved by or on behalf of the person who makes them, except in the following cases--"
1. When it is of such a nature that, if the person making it were dead, it would be relevant as between third persons under Section 32.
2. When it consists of a statement of the existence of any state of mind or body, relevant or in issue, made at or about the time when such state of mind or body 82 existed, and is accompanied by conduct rendering its falsehood improbable.
3. If it is relevant otherwise than as an admission.
59. On a careful consideration of the above case laws and the definition of 'admission' under Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, it is found that the Appellant's admission in the compromise petition dated 01.02.2017 clearly falls within the scope of Section 21 as an admission, against the interest of the Appellant himself. The admission validates the 2005 and 2006 documents concerning the rights of Respondents Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7, as a result rendering the Appellant's subsequent claims untenable.
60. As per Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act itself, these admissions are relevant and can be used against the Appellant, especially as they were made in judicial proceedings and are accompanied by corroborative evidence (i.e., the compromise petition and family settlement deeds). 83
61. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of THIRU JOHN AND ORS. VS. RETURNING OFFICER AND ORS. (AIR 1977 SC 1724), wherein the relevant portion of the said judgment reads thus:
"15. It is well settled that, a party's admission as defined in Sections 17 to 20 fulfilling the requirements of Section 21, Evidence Act, is substantive evidence proprio vigore. An admission, if clearly and unequivocally made, is the best evidence against the party making it and though not conclusive, shifts the onus on to the maker on the principle that "what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so and until the presumption was rebutted the fact admitted must be taken to be established".
62. In this regard, it is also relevant to refer to Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, of 1872, which applies to statements made in a deed, meaning the person who executed the deed cannot later contradict the facts stated 84 within it. A party is stopped from denying facts admitted in earlier proceedings. In the present case, the Appellant, through compromise and subsequent actions, accepted the rights of defendants Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7 as per the 2005 and 2006 documents. Thus, the Appellant cannot now assert claims contrary to these admissions, particularly when the admissions were recorded in a legal proceeding.
63. We find justification in the submission of the learned counsel for the respective respondents that the Trial court has rightly applied Order XII Rule 6 CPC, as admissions which resolved the core issues of ownership and partition between the Appellant and Respondents Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7. The further trial would have been redundant and against the judicial economy, as the Appellant's admissions eliminated the need for evidence.
64. In the case of ELUMALAI AND ORS. VS. M. KAMALA AND ORS.(2023 SCC ONLINE SC 84), it has been held thus:
85
" ......The effect of the estoppel cannot be warded off by persons claiming through the person whose conduct has generated the estoppel. We also find no merit at all in the attempt to draw a distinction based on religion. The principle of estoppel applies without such distinction."
65. In the case of PARMA NAND VS. CHAMPA LAL AND ORS., (AIR 1956 ALL 225), it has been held thus:
"11. Estoppel by deed is based on the principle that when a person has entered into a solemn engagement by a deed under his hand and seal as to certain facts, he shall not be permitted to deny any matter which he has so asserted. It is a rule of evidence according to which certain evidence is taken to be of so high and conclusive nature as to admit of no contradictory proof (Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Vol. 13, Para. 513, page 456)."
66. For the purpose of consideration of the grounds urged in these two appeals, it is relevant to refer to the 86 object and scope of Order XII Rule 6 CPC. It enables either party at any stage of the suit to move for judgment on the admissions which have been made by the other side. However, the rule is permissive which does not preclude a party to the proceedings but a judgment on admission is not a matter of right but it is in the discretion of the Court. The court must be satisfied that the admissions made are clearly unambiguous, definite and unequivocal. Therefore, for exercise of discretion by the Court under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, the admission must be unequivocal. Where the plaintiff relied on some documents to assert admission by the defendant, but the said documents were of the character of disputed documents, it was held that such disputed documents cannot form the basis of admission for the purpose of decree. Whereas in order to invoke the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, it is well-established that the exercise of discretion of the Court in passing a decree or judgment on admission, the Court has to satisfy its judicial conscience. In a suit for partition, where in spite of 87 admission of relationship between the parties, there were different issues which were yet to be decided, it was held that the Trial Court rightly refused to exercise discretion in an application filed under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. But a decree can be passed under this rule on the basis of an admission, whether it is contained in the pleadings or elsewhere. Such an admission may be in writing or may be oral. No particular form of admission is necessary. Keeping in view the reasons stated in their application filed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC and also keeping in view the pleadings made in the suit initiated by the plaintiff against the defendant, the same has to be considered by exercising discretionary powers. Order XII Rule 6 CPC is an enabling provision to both the parties to the proceeding and the object of the rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment, at least to the extent of admission of the parties to the proceeding.
88
67. Both the suits in O.S. No. 507 of 2010 and O.S. No. 1478 of 2006 involved disputes regarding the same properties and parties, with overlapping admissions by the Appellant. The Appellant's admissions in the compromise petition dated 01.02.2017 acknowledged the validity of the 2005 and 2006 documents for defendants Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7 and his disinterestedness in prosecuting claims against these defendants. The trial court's reliance on Order XII Rule 6 CPC was proper, as the admissions were unequivocal and settled the primary issues.
68. In the instant appeals, both the learned counsel for the appellant and also the learned Senior Counsel for the respective respondents have facilitated plethora of decisions for consideration as regards the scope of Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC on admission.
69. In O.S.No.1478/2006, paragraph 30 of the judgment and decree rendered by the Court of the Senior Civil Judge & JMFC, Devanahalli, reveals that the plaintiff / 89 appellant had filed objection to I.A.No.31 filed by defendant Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9. It is pertinent to note that though the plaintiff filed objections to I.A.No.31 under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC filed by Defendants 1, 2, 5, 8 and 9, but on the memo of the defendants 3, 4, 6 and 7, the plaintiff had endorsed that he had no instructions to file objections. Even in the course of arguments, the plaintiff's counsel had made the same submission. The Trial Court observed that it need not wait for the plaintiff's counsel until he obtained the plaintiff's instructions. Further, it held that it was clear that the plaintiff did not oppose the memo filed by the defendant nos.3, 4, 6 and 7. On the other hand, the plaintiff admitted the settlement with defendant Nos.3, 4, 6 and 7 in the compromise petition under Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC. This clearly showed the conduct of the plaintiff / appellant herein. Hence, the question that arose before the Trial Court was whether the statement of the plaintiff / appellant came within the purview of Order XII Rule 6 of CPC. 90
70. Order XII Rule 6 CPC relates to judgments on admission where the admission of facts have been made either on pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of a party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions. A plain reading of Order XII Rule 6 CPC makes it abundantly clear that it is open to the Court to pass a judgment on admissions in the pleadings or otherwise. The said provision clearly indicates that it is open to the Court to pronounce judgment on statement made by the parties and documents on record can be taken note of dehors the pleadings. Admission may be made either specific or constructively. Further, Section 17 to 20 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 also has been referred by the learned Trial Judge in the said judgment.
71. The proceeding in O.S.No.1478/2006 had been initiated by the plaintiff / appellant for declaration to declare 91 that the registered document termed as "Memorandum of confirmation of oral family arrangement cum partition dated 18.11.2005 bearing No.DNH-1-04097-2005-06 and deed of family arrangement cum partition dated 28.08.2006 registered as No.475/2006-07 are not binding on the plaintiff / appellant. The said document was marked as Exhibit D4 and Exhibit D5 in the recital of the deed dated 18.11.2005, which has also been considered by the Trial Court while rendering the judgment and decree on admissions. These are the contentious contentions urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the parties in the rank of respondents in both these appeals.
72. Whereas in the aforesaid proceedings, the plaintiff had admitted the shares allotted to the defendant Nos.3, 4, 6 and 7 under the registered family arrangements dated 18.11.2005 and 28.08.2006 by confirming the same in the compromise petition as well as the registered agreement dated 25.01.2017 entered by the plaintiff with Defendant Nos.3, 4, 6 and 7, which amounted to admission on the part 92 of the plaintiff regarding validity of those documents. Since the said documents cannot be divided separately between the defendants 1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 on the one hand and defendants 3, 4, 6 and 7 on the other hand, hence, the Trial Court held that there was a clear admission on the part of the plaintiff as the benefit of confirmation given by the plaintiff enures to the benefit of defendant Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 also. Hence, the Trial Court held that the suit will not survive against the defendants 1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 in view of the admission of the plaintiff. The same has been held by the Court of the Senior Civil Judge & JMFC, Devanahalli in the proceedings in O.S.No.1478/2006.
73. In respect of the proceedings in O.S.No.507/2010, the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in UTTAM SINGH DUGGAL & Co. Ltd. Vs. UNITED BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS (2000 (7) SCC 120) (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that the learned Trial Judge took the view that the pre-requisites of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC has been satisfied in this case and that on a plain 93 reading of the resolution of the Board dated 30.05.1990, there could be no doubt that the petitioner had made a clear, unambiguous and unconditional acknowledgement of its liability to the Bank. The object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment of the lis in between the party to the proceedings. Thus, in the case on hand, the pre-requisites for an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is satisfied and hence, the Trial Court came to a conclusion that the suit would not survive as against Defendant Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9. Hence, the Trial Court had held that in view of the admission of the plaintiff, the dispute involved in the suit is resolved. Therefore, both the memo dated 06.12.2018 and I.A.No.12 under Order XII Rule 6 deserved to be allowed. Hence, the Trial Court held that the suit would not survive as against the defendants 1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 in view of the admission of the plaintiff and hence the Trial Court had rightly held that no more dispute subsists between the parties and accordingly, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff in O.S.No.507/2010. 94
74. The admissions by the Appellant in the compromise petition constituted a deliberate and conscious acknowledgement of facts, binding on him under Section 115 of the Evidence Act and Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The admissions preclude the need for further evidence or trial, ensuring judicial efficiency. Hence, we are of the considered opinion that the Trial court's judgment aligns with established legal principles and the dismissal of the suits does not affect the rights of defendants Nos. 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9 to assert their claims independently. Hence, the issues framed above, are answered in the affirmative and the dismissal of O.S. No. 507 of 2010 and O.S. No. 1478 of 2006 by the Trial court under Order XII Rule 6 CPC requires to upheld for the reasons that, i) the admissions by the plaintiff / appellant in the compromise petition are binding, clear, and unequivocal; ii) the application of Order XII Rule 6 CPC is justified, as further trial would have been redundant; iii) The trial court's judgment aligns with established legal 95 precedents and ensures procedural fairness and judicial economy.
75. In view of the aforesaid reasons and findings, it is deemed appropriate to state that there is no illegality or absurdity committed by the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Devanahalli in rendering the judgment and decree dated 20.02.2020 in O.S. No. 1478/2006 and O.S.No. 507/2010 which are under challenge in both the appeals. Accordingly, we proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
i) The appeal filed by the appellant in RFA No.1589/2020 as well as the connected appeal in RFA No.1608/2020 are hereby dismissed.
ii) The judgment and decree dated 20.02.2020 passed by the Senior Civil Judge & JMFC, Devanahalli in O.S.No.507/2010 is hereby upheld.96
iii) The judgment and decree dated 20.02.2020 passed by the Senior Civil judge & JMFC, Devanahalli in O.S.No.1478/2006 is also upheld.
SD/-
(K.SOMASHEKAR) JUDGE SD/-
(VENKATESH NAIK T) JUDGE KS