Karnataka High Court
Sanulla vs Deputy Commissioner on 31 May, 1988
Equivalent citations: ILR1988KAR3316
ORDER K.A. Swami, J.
1. These petitions are connected. Hence they are heard together and are disposed of by this common order.
2. The land in question viz., S.No. 50/1 of Uruduve Paisari land in Negalli Karkalli village of Somwarpet Taluk measures 47 acres 72 cents. The petitioners made applications for grant of an extent of 4 acres each in the said survey number before the Tahsildar, Somwarpet under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Land Grant Rules'). The Tahsildar, after due enquiry by the order dated 16-8-1976 granted 4 acres to each of the petitioners herein except the petitioner in W.P.No. 10210/80 who was granted 5 acres on 23-5-77.
3. Pursuant to the grant, there was a measurement and the area granted to each of the petitioners was identified. Saguvali Chits were issued to the petitioners on 1-6-1977. The case of the petitioners is that they were also put in possession of the respective areas granted to them under the Land Grant Rules.
4.1. It appears, respondents 2 to 7 had made a representation as per Exhibit-C before the Deputy Commissioner, Kodagu, who is respondent-1 in all these petitions on 21-6-1979 regarding the lands granted to the petitioners. Exhibit-A in all the Writ Petitions is the order granting the land to each one of the petitioners. Exhibit-B is the saguvali chit granted to each one of them.
4.2. On receipt of the representation dated 21-6-1979, the 1st respondent passed an order on 4-7-1979-staying the operation of the grant of land made in favour of the petitioners. In view of the interim order of stay granted by the Deputy Commissioner, the petitioners voluntarily appeared and filed an application on 16-7-79 for vacating the interim order. As the application for vacating the interim order was not considered, some of the petitioners i.e., Manjunath, Rama Rao and S. Sanaulla approached this Court in W.P.No. 1 1900 to 11902 of 1974. This Court by the order dated 21-8-1979 directed the Deputy Commissioner to dispose of the application filed by the petitioners for vacating the interim order.
5. Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the Deputy Commissioner decided the case by the suo motu exercising the revisional power under Section 56 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') on 6-11-1979 and set aside the grants made in favour of the petitioners on the ground that Rules 6 and 9 of the Land Grant Rules are violated as it is not proved that the petitioners are the natives of Negalli Karkalli village or the near by villages of the same Taluk. He has also further stated that the action taken by the Tahsildar for granting the land is also illegal because the land in question is Uruduve Paisari land and the grant has been made without de-reservation of the same by the competent authority. The other contentions raised by respondents 2 to 7 have been negatived.
6. In these petitions, the petitioners have sought for quashing the aforesaid order of the Deputy Commissioner, Madikeri in LND.II. 168/79-80 dated 7-11-1979 produced as Exhibit-D in each one of these petitions.
7. The learned Government Pleader has produced the records of the case which were before the Deputy Commissioner when he heard and decided the case.
8. Sri S.G. Bhagwan, learned Counsel for the petitioners has advanced many contentions. It is contended that the representation made by respondents- 2 to 7 could not have been considered as a revision petition because it was filed beyond the period of four months; that there is no records to show that the Special Deputy Commissioner issued the notice to the petitioners that he intended to exercise suo motu revision on the grounds stated in the notice; that in the absence of such notice to the Deputy Commissioner on a representation which was filed beyond the period of 4 months, ought not to have exercised the suo motu jurisdiction while deciding the case; that the revisional powers could not have been exercised since the orders in question were passed by the Tahsildar under the Land Grant Rules and not under the Act; that the revisional power can be exercised only against the order or a proceeding under the Act and not the one passed under the Land Grant Rules; that the Special Deputy Commissioner did not either call for or receive the records pertaining to the case of the petitioners and in the absence of the records, having regard to the wordings contained in Section 56 of the Act, no revisional jurisdiction could have been exercised; that the order having been passed beyond the period of three years, the very exercise of jurisdiction having regard to the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 56 of the Act is without juris: diction; that the Land Grant Rules are a special law and are complete Code in themselves ; that they provide as to under what circumstances, the land granted can be cancelled; that as the Land Grant Rules specially provide for cancellation of the grant, the general law namely the Act could not have been applied and the revisional jurisdiction could not have been exercised under Section 56 of the Act.
9. On the contrary, it is contended by Sri N. Devadas, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the 1st respondent that the representation filed by respondents 2 to 7 contained the grounds on the basis of which the. grants are now set aside; that the petitioners were served with a copy of the representation made by respondents 2 to 7; that they were represented by a Counsel and the case had been argued with reference to the contentions raised in the representation by respondents 2 to 7; that therefore, no prejudice whatsoever is caused to the petitioners by reason of suo motu exercise of power by the Deputy Commissioner; that the letter dated 21-7-1977 of the Tahsildar, Somwarpet addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Coorg shows that the records pertaining to the case were called for and submitted by him. Therefore, it is submitted by the learned Government Pleader that it is not necessary that an order under Section 56 while exercising the revisional jurisdiction should be passed within a period of three years; that in the instant case, such action is taken by the Deputy Commissioner within a period of three years in as much as, he has passed an interim order staying the operation of the grants within a period of three years ; that on the voluntary appearance of the petitioners, the case has been heard and decided. Therefore, the learned Government Pleader submits that the fact that the order was passed beyond the period of three years could not in any way affect the jurisdiction of the Deputy. Commissioner as the action was initiated within a period of three years. It is also further submitted that as long as the rules are framed under the Act, the procedure under the Land Grant Rules must be a proceeding under the Act because the Land Grant Rules do not have independent existence apart from the Act. The learned Government Pleader further submits that as the petitioners were not the residents of Negalli Karkalli village, the lands could not have been granted in their favour.
10. In the light of these contentions; the points that arise for consideration are as follows :
1) Having regard to the fact that the lands in question were granted under the Land Grant Rules, whether it was open to the Deputy Commissioner to exercise the power of Revision under Section 56 of the Act?
2) Whether the records of the case were called for and received; if not, whether the exercise of power under Section 56 of the Act was justified ?
3) Whether an order in exercise of the power under Section 56 of the Act ought to have been passed within a period of three years from the date of grant?
4) Whether the order of the Deputy Commissioner requires to be interfered?POINT NO. 1
11. The contention of the petitioners is that the Land Grant Rules are a complete Code in themselves as they provide for all matters relating to land grant and they also provide as to under what circumstances the land granted should be cancelled. Therefore, the general power under Section 56 of the Act is not available. Developing this contention, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that when a statute provides that a particular thing should be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner only and not in any other way. It is also submitted that a Special Law excludes the general law; therefore, the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 56 of the Act is excluded by reason of the provisions contained in the Land Grant Rules.
12. Sri N. Devadas, learned High Court Government Pleader canvasses for the contra position and submits that revisional power under Section 56 of the Act is available.
13. Section 197 of the Act gives power to the State Government to make rules by way of Notification hot inconsistent with the provisions of the Act to carry out the purposes and objects thereof and for the guidance of all persons in matters connected with the enforcement of the Act or in cases not expressly provided for thereunder. Clause (g) of Sub-section (2) of Section 197 provides that the State Government may make rules prescribing the period within which an application for revision may be made under Section 56. Clause (i) further enables the State Government to make rules regulating the disposal under Section 69 of land and other property vesting in the State Government. Section 69 of the Act provides for disposal of lands and other properties belonging to the State Government under Section 67 of the Act. It is in exercise of these powers the State Government has framed the Karnataka Land Grant Rules which provide for all the aspects relating to grant of land for agricultural purpose, lease of land to various institutions, societies, Boards etc., grant of land to Housing Board, Village Panchayats, Co-operative Societies and other statutory Boards, Religious and charitable institutions; grant of land for coffee cultivation; to industrial concerns and for house sites etc. The Land Grant Rules also provide as to who are entitled to grant of land and house sites and vests the power to grant in the various authorities. The Land Grant Rules also prescribe the conditions of grant.
14. Rule 25 of the Land Grant Rules provides that any grant of land made under the Land Grant Rules shall be liable to be cancelled and the land resumed by the authority which granted it where the grant has been obtained by making false or fraudulent representations or is contrary to the Land Grant Rules. The proviso therein further provides that no such cancellation shall be made without giving the grantee an opportunity of being heard. Thus there is no doubt that the Land Grant Rules provide for all the aspects relating to the grant of land and they also provide under what circumstances the authority which has granted the land can cancel it. In addition to this, the learned Counsel has also placed reliance on the wordings contained in Section 49 of the Act. It is submitted that Section 49 of the Act specifically states that an appeal shall lie from every original order passed under the Act or the Rules made thereunder and from every order made in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure; whereas in Section 56 Of the Act, the word 'Rules' is not found. Therefore, it is contended that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction against the orders passed under the Land Grant Rules is specifically excluded by the Act itself.
15. Therefore, the question necessarily arises as to whether the absence of the word 'Rules' in Section 56 of the Act will deprive the revisional authority to exercise its power against the order of grant where no appeal is preferred against such grant.
16. It appears to me that acceptance of this contention will lead to serious incongruity. It is not in dispute that the order granting the land is appealable under Section 49 of the Act. When such an appeal is preferred, the Appellate Authority would be exercising the power under Section 49 of the Act. If it confirms the original grant, it merges in the order of the Appellate Authority and thereby it will become an order passed under Section 49 of the Act and in that event it will be open to the revisional authority to exercise the revisional power either suo motu or on an application made by the aggrieved party within a period of four months from the date of the order. That being so, when an order of grant is confirmed or modified or set aside by the Appellate Authority, it becomes revisable by the revisional authority. Whereas the very order if it is not challenged in the appeal, in case the contention is accepted, will be immune from the revisional jurisdiction. Such a situation could not have been intended by the legislature. In case the grant is made by the granting authority beyond its jurisdiction and such an order is not challenged in the appeal, it will remain unchallenged and it will not even be amenable to revisional jurisdiction as contended by the petitioners. Consequently it leads to very serious incongruity in as much as the order passed without jurisdiction will become unassailable, if no appeal is preferred.
17. To test it with illustrations :- If in the purported exercise of power, the Tahsildar grants 10 acres of land for cultivation as an agricultural land, to the extent it exceeds 2 hectares, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Tahsildar. Such an order, if not appealed, will remain. There may be cases in which nobody is interested in filing an appeal. In such an event, the revisional authority cannot exercise its suo motu jurisdiction because the order is the one passed under the Land Grant Rules. Consequently, the order of the Tahsildar to the extent it suffers from lack of jurisdiction remains undisturbed. It is one of the cardinal principles of interpretation of a statute that it should not be construed in such a manner so as to lead to absurd situation. Therefore, I am of the view that though the word 'Rules' is not found in Sub-section (1) of Section 56 of the Act, since the Land Grant Rules are framed under the Act, even though they are complete code by themselves, any order passed under the Land Grant Rules is an order passed under the Act itself in as much as the Land Grant Rules are framed under the Act and they have no existence independent of the Act and they are to be read as part of the Act having regard to Sub-section (4) of Section 197 of the Act which specifically provides that every rule made under the Act shall have effect as if enacted in the Act.
18. In addition to this, it is also pertinent to notice that Rule 25 of the Rules which provides for cancellation of the grant is restricted to granting authority only and that too on certain grounds stated therein; whereas the revisional power under Section 56 of the Act empowers the authority to examine and satisfy itself as to the legality and propriety of the proceedings of the Officer. Therefore, the scope of both the powers are quite different and they are independent and distinct. There is no overlapping of the powers. In addition to this, even the order cancelling the grant passed by the granting authority is also appealable and revisable. Therefore, I am of the view that the absence of the word 'Rules' in Sub-section (1) of Section 56 of the Act does not make any difference nor it has affected the exercise of revisional power under Section 56 of the Act. No doubt if a statute provides that a particular thing has to be done in a particular manner, the authority has no option but to act accordingly. The proposition is unexceptionable. (See J.K. C.S. & W. MILLS v. STATE OF U.P., ; STATE OF BIHAR v. J.A.C.. SALDANNA, and A.K. ROY v. STATE OF PUNJAB, ) But the interpretation placed by me des not in any way conflict with the proposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions; as already pointed out, the scope of revisional power is wider than the scope of power of granting authority to cancel the grant. Further both the modes of exercise of power are provided by the statute itself. Therefore, there is no question of deviation from the directions contained in the statute when the authority exercises the revisional jurisdiction.
19. For the reasons stated above, point No. 1 is answered in the affirmative.
POINT NO. 220. It is contended by learned Counsel for the petitioners that having regard to the provisions contained in sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 56 of the Act, it is necessary to call for the records and until the records are received, it is not open to the authority to modify, annul or reverse the order sought to be revised. Sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 56 of the Act are as follows:
"56. Power of revision ;- (1) The Tribunal, any Revenue Officer not inferior in rank to an Assistant Commissioner and any Survey Officer not inferior in rank to a Superintendent of Land Records or an Assistant Settlement Officer in their respective departments may call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate officer under this Act or under Section 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908) for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself, as the case may be, as to the legality or propriety of the proceedings of such officer.
Explanation :- For the purpose of this sub-section. - (i) Special Deputy Commissioner shall be deemed to be not subordinate to the Deputy Commissioner; and
ii) all revenue officers shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Tribunal.
2) If in any case, it shall appear to the Tribunal or to such Officer aforesaid, that any decision or order or proceedings so called for should be modified, annulled or reversed. Tribunal or such Officer may pass such order as may be deemed fit.
Provided that no order shall be modified, annulled or reversed unless notice has been served on the parties interested and opportunity given to them of being heard.
21. The records of the case placed before the Court by the learned Government Pleader do not contain the records pertaining to the applications filed by the petitioners for grant of land and the order passed by the Tahsildar granting the land. It is not contended before me that there were other records before the Deputy Commissioner apart from the records placed before the Court when the Deputy Commissioner passed the impugned order. I have gone through the records contained in two files. The order sheet maintained by the Deputy Commissioner does not disclose that the records of the case were called for at any time from the Tahsildar, Somwarpet. There is a letter dated 15th June 1977 bearing No. LND II 55/77-78 from the Deputy Commissioner to the Tahsildar, Somwarpet sending the mass petition received by him from Janatha Paksha and Kannada Chaluvaligars of Somwarpet objecting for grant of land in Sy.No. 46/22, 50/1, 80/2 and 181/2 of Negalli Karkalli village and further requesting the Tahsildar to take necessary action in the case immediately and submit a detailed report by 20th June 1977 without fail. It is also further stated therein that the subordinate officers and. officials are instructed to hear the grievance of the public politely and to help them solving their problems. There is also another letter dated 5-10-1977 bearing No. LND II 347/77-78 from the Deputy Commissioner, Kodagu to the Tahsildar, Somwarpet forwarding a petition presented by K.V. Nagaraj of Somwarpet in respect of grant of land in Negalli Karkalli and Nandigunda villages. In this letter, the Deputy Commissioner has asked the Tahsildar to enquire and make a report with connected records if any. Of course, in this communication, there is no mention of S.No. 50/1 of Uruduve Paisari land in Negalli Karkalli village. Pursuant to these letters, the records do not reveal that a report was submitted by the Tahsildar along with the records. It is also not stated so by the Deputy Commissioner in the course of his order.
22. In the other file, there is a tetter dated 21-7-1977 bearing No. LND/Msc/11/77-78 from the Tahsildar to the Deputy Commissioner, Kodagu, stating that the connected land grant files on the above subject is submitted. The subject of the letter relates to 'Mass petition of the villagers of Negalli-Karkalli village objecting for grant of Uruduve S.No. 50/1 of Negalli Karkalli village. The records forwarded along with the letter relates to the applications filed by respondents 2 to 7 and not to those filed by the petitioners and the enquiry held by the Tahsildar and the order of grant passed by him. Thus before the Deputy Commissioner there was neither an order of grant passed by the Tahsildar in favour of the petitioners nor the records pertaining to the grants made in favour of the petitioners. In short, there were no records pertaining to the case of the petitioners before the Deputy Commissioner. It is fairly submitted by the learned Government Pleader that from the records, it is not possible to point out that the records pertaining to the applications of the petitioners were called for by the Deputy Commissioner and submitted by the Tahsildar. Thus the fact remains that the Deputy Commissioner has exercised the jurisdiction without calling for the records and without even looking into the records relating to grant of lands to any of the petitioners.
23. The contention of the learned Government Pleader is that it is not mandatory that the revisional authority should call for the records and without calling for the records, he can exercise the revisional jurisdiction. As the revisional jurisdiction is intended to satisfy as to the legality or propriety of the proceedings of the officer such satisfaction as to the legality and propriety of the proceedings of the officer cannot be obtained by the revisional authority without the records before it. It is because of this, Sub-section (1) provides - "may call for and examine the record of any enquiry or the proceedings." Sub-section (2) which relates to the extent of power of revision, specifically provides that 'any decision or proceedings so called for.' A reading of sub-Sections (1) and (2) together leaves no doubt that calling for the records by the revisional authority is mandatory. The word 'may' used in Sub-section (1) in the context in which it is used shall have to be construed as 'shall.' Wherever a statute enjoins upon the public authority to do a certain thing in a particular manner or to exercise the power vested in it in a particular manner in relation to rights of the parties concerned therein, even though the statute may use the word 'may' it shall in the context it is used mean 'shall' only as otherwise the object of the statute' itself will be defeated. Therefore, the Deputy Commissioner acted illegally in exercising the revisional jurisdiction without calling for the records of the proceedings and even without a copy of the order before him which he has set aside in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction.
24. However, the learned Government Pleader drew the attention of the Court to the contents of the order of the Deputy Commissioner and submitted that the Deputy Commissioner has referred to the contents of the applications of Smt. Makaranda, Sri Rama Rao, Sri Manjunatha, Sri Satish and Sri Sanaulla and in the absence of the records, it was not possible for the Deputy Commissioner to refer to the contents of the applications. As long as the records before the Deputy Commissioner did not contain the applications of the petitioners and the orders passed thereon by the. Tahsildar, and the connected records, the mere fact that the contents of the applications are referred to during the course of the order by the Deputy Commissioner which might have been due to the production of the copies of the applications by respondents 2 to 7 cannot be held to satisfy the requirement of Subsections (1) and (2) of Section 56 of the Act. It is further submitted by the learned Government Pleader that having regard to the fact that the petitioners except Manjunatha (petitioner in W.P.No. 19933/79) were not the residents of Negalli Karkalli village, there was a clear contravention of Rule 6 of the Rules. Therefore, on the face of the records, the grant made in their favour was not sustainable. Regarding the petitioner in W.P. 10210/80, it is submitted that apart from the fact that he was not a resident of Negalli Karkalli village, the grant made by the Tahsildar was in excess of his power as more than 2 hectares i.e., an extent of 5 acres was granted to him.
25. The grant of the land in question is for agricultural purpose and not for coffee plantation. Therefore, it is governed by Rules 4 to 9 of the Land Grant Rules. Rule 6 of the Land Grant Rules provides for priority. It provides that in disposing of land among persons belonging to category (iv) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 5, the following order of priority shall be observed :
i) landless persons residing in the village;
ii) insufficient holders residing in the village ;
iii) landless persons residing in other villages in the same or adjacent taluk;
iv) others.
Category No. (iv) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 relates to reservation of 25% of land to others. The grant of such category of land i.e., category No. (iv) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 has to be made in the order of priority provided under Rule 6. As per Rule 6, landless persons residing in the village; insufficient holders residing in the village; landless persons residing in other villages in the same or adjacent taluk and others are to be granted in the order of priority.
26. The records do not reveal and it is not the finding of the Deputy Commissioner also that there were landless persons, in the village or that there were insufficient holders residing in the village in question. In the absence of such a finding, setting aside of the grants made in favour of the petitioners after the expiry of two years cannot be held to be legal and proper. The Deputy Commissioner ought to have verified the aforesaid two aspects. In the presence of landless persons residing in the village and insufficient holders residing in the village, the grant made in favour of the petitioners except the petitioner in W.P.No. 19933/79 would have become vulnerable. As regards category No. (iii) relating to landless persons residing in other villages in the same or adjacent taluk, it is not the case of the respondents and it is not also the reasoning of the Deputy Commissioner that the petitioners are sufficient holders of land. Therefore, they being the residents of the village in the same Taluk, in the absence of a finding that they are sufficient land holders, they can very well fall in category (iii). Even otherwise, there is no finding in terms of category No. (iii). Thus I am of the view that before exercising the revisional jurisdiction, the Deputy Commissioner ought to have recorded a finding on holding an enquiry in terms of Rule 6 of the Land Grant Rules. In the absence of such a finding, merely because the petitioners (except the petitioner in W.P.No. 19933/79) were not the residents of the same village, the Deputy. Commissioner could not have set aside the grant after 3 1/2 years. Therefore, I am of the view that under the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the absence of a finding in terms of Rule 6 of the Land Grant Rules, the order setting aside the grant in exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the Deputy Commissioner is not justified.
27. Accordingly, point No. 2 is answered as follows;
"The records of the case pertaining to the applications of the petitioners and the order passed thereon were not shown to have been called for by the Deputy Commissioner. As such the exercise of revisional jurisdiction in the absence of the records and in the absence of a finding in terms of Rule 6 of the Land Grant Rules was not justified."POINT NO. 3
28. The contention of the petitioners is that the lands were granted to the petitioners on 16-8-1976 (except the petitioner in W.P.No. 10210/80 who was granted on 23-5-1977) whereas the impugned order was passed by the Deputy Commissioner in exercise of his suo motu revisional jurisdiction on 6-11-1979 beyond the period of three years, in so far it related to the petitioners, except the petitioner in W.P.No. 10210/80. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the proviso to Subsection (3) of Section 56 of the Act which reads:
"Provided that any Revenue Officer or Survey Officer referred to in Sub-section (1) may exercise power under this Section in respect of any order against which no appeal has been preferred under this Chapter at any time within three years from the date of the order sought to be revised."
The stress is laid on the words 'exercise power' and it is submitted that 'exercise power' means rendering decision in exercise of the revisional power and not merely initiating the proceedings. On the contrary, it is submitted by learned Government Pleader that the requirement of the proviso to Sub-section (3) of the Act is satisfied if the revisional authority takes action to exercise the revisional power within a period of three years. It is submitted that if the revisional authority decides to issue notice to the party in whose favour the order is passed, to show cause as to why the order should not be set aside or annulled in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction, the requirement of the law is satisfied and thereafter it does not matter whether or not the order is passed within a period of three years.
29.1. In KESHAV TRADING CO. v. THE COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES, a Division Bench of this Court while interpreting similar words contained in Section 22A(2) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, relating to exercise of revisional power, has held that a mere initiation of exercise of revisional power is sufficient and there need not be a final order passed within the stipulated period. No doubt the learned Counsel for the petitioner has sought to distinguish the decision on the ground that the word used in Section 22A(2) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 is 'exercisable' whereas in the proviso to Section 56(3) of the Act, the words used are 'exercise power' therefore, it is necessary for the revisional authority to exercise power within a period of three years. In other words, it is contended that passing of the order within a period of three years from the date of the order sought to.be revised is a must. It appears to me that the distinction sought to be made is without difference. In fact, in the very decision, the word 'exercise' is also considered. It is stated that the word 'exercise' means to 'put in action'. In other words, no sooner the revisional authority decides to issue notice, its exercise of power is put in action. Therefore, in the instant case, such a decision is apparent from the records and it is within three years.
29.2. Even otherwise, acceptance of the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner will make the enactment unworkable. For example, even if the action is initiated under Section 56 of the Act, to exercise suo motu the revisional jurisdiction within a period of six months from the date of the order, the proceeding may go on for over a period of three years in as much as the power cannot be exercised without notice and without hearing. Therefore, there is every likelihood of the proceeding being carried on beyond the period of three years even though the action is initiated within a period of three years or within a period of one year. Consequently, exercise of revisional jurisdiction is rendered nugatory. Such a consequence is not intended by the legislature when it states that the authority may exercise power at any time within three years from the date of the order sought to be revised. Therefore, I am of the view that the requirement of the proviso is satisfied if the action is taken to exercise the power of revision either by issue of notice or by calling for the records for the purpose of revision. The order as such either revising modifying, reversing or affirming may be passed at any time but not necessarily within a period of three years. Hence the point raised for determination is answered in the negative.
POINT No. 430. In the light of the finding recorded on point No. 2, the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner is liable to be interfered with. In addition to this, it also appears to me that in the absence of any finding recorded by the Deputy Commissioner that the petitioners were sufficient holders of lands and they were not landless persons and also in view of the fact that they have been in possession and cultivating the land since the date of grant, and the object of the Land Grant Rules is also to grant the lands to landless persons, of course on observing certain priorities as prescribed, but there is no finding that the persons entitled to priority were in existence and were deprived of the right of priority, the order of the Deputy Commissioner requires to be interfered with. In the case of the petitioner in.W.P.No. 19933/79, he being a resident of the same village, there was no ground whatsoever to interfere with the grant made in his favour. As far as the other petitioners are concerned, it is already pointed out that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction is not justified.
31. Of course one more aspect of the matter is also required to be dealt with. The grant made in favour of the petitioner in W.P.No. 10210/80 to the extent it exceeds two hectares is beyond the power of the Tahsildar. To that extent, it requires to be modified.
32. The next question that will arise for consideration is whether the proceeding has to be remitted to the Deputy Commissioner or it has to be left at that. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that pursuant to the saguvali chits, the petitioners have been in possession and cultivating the lands personally and continuously for a period of 11 years. Therefore it will be highly unjust and inequitous to remit the matter for fresh consideration that too in the absence of a finding that the petitioners are the holders of lands and are not landless persons. In the case of Manjunatha, it is submitted that he being a resident of the same village, there is no question of remitting the matter as in his case there is no contravention of the Land Grant Rules. On the contrary, the learned Government Pleader submits that as the Deputy Commissioner has not held an enquiry and recorded a finding in terms of Rule 6 of the Land Grant Rules, it is necessary to remit the matter to the Deputy Commissioner to consider the case afresh in the light of the findings recorded by this Court. It is further submitted that by remitting the matter, no injury is caused to the petitioners because the grants need not be set aside and it is open to them to establish that the grants are valid.
33. It appears to me that the fact that the petitioners have been in possession and cultivating the lands granted to them personally for a continuous period of 11 years should weigh in their favour. But this fact has to be proved by the petitioners. Therefore if it is found that pursuant to the saguvali chits, they have been put in possession of the lands granted to them and made improvements in the lands, in such a case, it appears to me that, even if the matter has to be remitted, except the case of Sri Manjunatha - the petitioner in W.P.No. 19933/ 70 - it should be on a condition that if the petitioners satisfy that pursuant to the grants made in their favour, they were put in possession and they have been cultivating the lands and they have made improvements, there need not be any further enquiry into the validity or otherwise of the grants made in their favour and the proceeding shall stand closed and the grants affirmed.
34. For the reasons stated above, the Writ Petitions are allowed in the following terms:
i) The order dated 7-11-1979 bearing No. LND.II. 168/79-80 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Kodagu, produced as Annexure-D in each one of these petitions is quashed.
ii) The proceedings relating to the grants made in favour of the petitioners (except Sri Manjunatha - the petitioner in W.P. No. 19933/79) are remitted to the Deputy Commissioner, Kodagu, for fresh determination in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this order subject to a condition that the Deputy Commissioner shall first give notice to the parties fixing a date for inspection either by himself or through any of his Gazetted subordinates, determine as to whether the petitioners were put in possession pursuant to the saguvali chits issued in their favour and have been personally cultivating the lands granted and have made improvements in the lands. If it is found that the petitioners have been cultivating the lands and have made improvements in the lands in question, further enquiry pursuant to the remand shall not be pursued and the grants of land made in favour of the petitioners shall stand affirmed. As far as the grant made in favour of the petitioner in W.P.No. 10210/80 is concerned, the Deputy Commissioner is directed to modify the grant to the extent it exceeds two hectares.
iii) On the contrary, if it is found otherwise, the revision proceeding may be proceeded with in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this order on giving a further notice to the petitioners except Manjunatha, the petitioner in W.P.No. 19933/79 stating that the grounds on which the order granting the land to them is proposed to be revised and affording them an opportunity to putforth their say and adduce evidence, if any, and of hearing.