Jharkhand High Court
Krishna Ram Sahu vs The State Of Jharkhand on 22 April, 2024
Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No. 2545 of 2020
1.Krishna Ram Sahu
2. Ashok Kumar Sahu
3. Devi Dayal Sahu ...... Petitioners
Versus
1.The State of Jharkhand
2. Ramji Singh ...... Opposite Parties
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
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For the Petitioners : Mr. Nilesh Kumar, Advocate For the State : Mrs. Nehala Sharmin, A.P.P. For the O.P. No.2 : Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, Sr. Advocate Mr. Sabyasanchi, Advocate Mr. Rakesh Kumar, Advocate 14/Dated: 22/04/2024 Heard Mr. Nilesh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mrs. Nehala Sharmin, learned counsel for the State and Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel learned counsel for the O.P. No.2.
2. This petition has been filed for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Argora P.S. Case No. 101 of 2020, pending in the Court learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Ranchi.
3. Subsequently cognizance has been taken by order dated 26.08.2022 which was challenged by I.A. No. 8598 of 2022 and by order dated 16.09.2022 the said I.A. was allowed. Thus order taking cognizance 26.08.2022 is also under challenge. Order dated 20.03.2021 by which process under section 82 of Cr.P.C. has been issued against the petitioners, is also under challenge.
4. The F.I.R. has been filed alleging therein that the informant is a resident of Ashok Bihar, Ranchi and he is a Developer. The informant has further alleged that he had entered into an Agreement with Krishna Ram Sahu on 20.11.14 for development of Flat in which at Khata No. 1261 and 1262 total area 109 decimals, out of 54.5 decimals of land had come into an agreement. 1 He has further stated that another Agreement was also entered into in between the parties in respect of Khata No.204, Plot No.1261, total area of which is 50- decimals and out of 15 decimals of area comes under the agreement for a consideration of Rs.20, 00, 000/= entered into for which five cheques were issued in favour of Devi Dayal Sahu on the same day for the same plot another 15 decimals of land was agreed into from plot No.1261 and 15 decimals of land and 3 decimals of land from plot No.1262 had been agreed for development, in which Rs.5, 00, 000/= was taken by Krishna Kumar Sahu and on various dates they have received total amounting Rs. 42,50,000/= but after receiving of the amount they were put hindrance in the construction work and when the informant enquired about the same they have said that agreement was revoked, but he has stated that the revocation was not done as per law. The informant had stated that the petitioners have cheated him and have committed fraud by taking Rs. 42, 50, 000/= in favour of the land but now, when he went for construction in the said premises, they were further demanded Rs.50, 00, 000/= as Rangdari and accordingly the present first information report has been instituted.
5. Mr. Nilesh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners are land lord and they have entered into sale and development agreement with the informant. He submits that the entire dispute is civil in nature however criminal colour has been given by the informant in the present case. He submits that two different agreements were entered into on 29.04.2016 for sale of portion of land and development of the said land. He draws the attention of the court to Clause 6 of the agreement contained at page 34 and submits that terms and conditions are there that within a year second party will pay entire amount and the execution of sale deed is to be 2 made. By way of referring clause 8, he submits that after receiving of the amount the possession was required to be provided by the petitioners to the informant. He further submits that the amount in question is not paid to the petitioners in its entirety in terms of agreement. Mr. Kumar further draws the attention of the Court to development agreement contained in Annexure-5 and submits that in view of Clause 28 there is arbitration clause. By way of referring Annexure-6 he submits that the Ranchi Municipal Corporation has directed the informant not to proceed with the construction work as the map was not approved by the Ranchi Municipal Corporation. He further submits that in view of all these developments the matter is of civil in nature however criminal case has been filed. He draws the attention of the Court to the supplementary affidavit and submits that in the said affidavit another agreement of settlement is brought on record. According to him even the terms and conditions of settlement was not fulfilled by the informant and in view of that the entire criminal proceeding is abuse of process of law. He further submits that the informant has already instituted two specific performance suits being Original Suit No. 58 of 2021 and Original Suit No. 382 of 2022 for execution of sale deed as well as for enforcement of development agreement. He further submits that the said suits are still pending in view of that if any case is made out that is civil in nature and to buttress this argument, he relied in the case of " Naresh Kumar and Another Vs. State of Karnataka and Another " 2024 SCC Online SC 268. He refers to para 6 and 8 of the said judgment which is quoted hereinbelow:-
"6. In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court recognized that although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature: This is what was held:
12. While exercising its Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the 3 High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein, Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court."
(emphasis supplied)
8. Essentially, the present dispute between the parties relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by one of the parties, would not attract prosecution for criminal offence in every case, as held by this Court in Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2023) 5 SCC 360. Similarly, dealing with the distinction between the offence of cheating and a mere breach of contractual obligations, this Court, in Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, has held that every breach of contract would not give rise to the offence of cheating, and it is required to be shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise.
6. Relying on above judgment, he submits that merely a breach of contract by one party would not attract prosecution for criminal offence.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners further relied in the case of "Kunti and Another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another"(2023) 6 SCC 109. He refers to para 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the said judgment which is quoted hereinbelow:-
"9. However, we do not find the need to engage with the grounds as urged, because a perusal of the record in no uncertain terms reflects the dispute as being of a civil nature. This Court recently, in Sarabjit Kaur V. State of Punjab observed that : (SCC p. 363, para 13) "13. A breach of contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to keep up promise will not be enough to initiate criminal proceedings."
10. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in ARCI v. Nimra Cerglass Technics (P) Ltd., while deliberating upon the difference between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating, observed that the distinction depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of the alleged incident. If dishonest intention on the part of the accused can be established at the time of entering into the transaction with the complainant, then criminal liability would be attached.
11. In Vijay Kumar Ghal v. State of W.B.2, one of us, (Krishna Murari J.) observed in reference to earlier decisions as under: (SCC pp. 139- 40, paras 24-25) "24. This Court in G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. observed that it is the duty and obligation of the criminal court to exercise a great deal of caution in issuing the process, particularly when matters are essentially of civil nature.
25. This Court has time and again cautioned about converting purely civil 4 disputes into criminal cases. This Court in Indian Oil Corpn.2 noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. The Court further observed that (Indian Oil Corpn.2, SCC p. 749, para 13) '13.... Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not Involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged."
12. Having regard to the above well-established principles and also noting that the present dispute is entirely with respect to property and more particularly buying and selling thereof, it cannot be doubted that a criminal hue has been unjustifiably lent to a civil natured issue."
8. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that a breach of contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioners further relied in the case of "Binod Kumar and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Another" (2014) 10 SCC 663. He refers to para 10, 11 and 19 of the said judgment which is quoted hereinbelow"-
"10. In Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd., this Court has summarised the principles relating to exercise of Jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash complaints and criminal proceedings as under: (SCC pp. 747-48, para 12) "12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few-Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angres, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Laf, Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gil, CBI v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla, Rajesh Bajaj v. State (NCT of Delhi), Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd., Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haquela. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even If they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations.
Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with malafides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients off the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the compilainit, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have 5 not been stated in detaill, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purelly a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also Involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been avalled, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not."
11. Referring to the growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases, in paras 13 and 14 of Indian Oil Corpn. case, it was held as under: (SCC pp. 748-49) "13. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes Into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable breakdown of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not Involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. In G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P.ia, this Court observed:
(SCC p. 643, para 8) '8... It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before Issuing process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which the High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice..
19.. Even if all the allegations in the complaint taken at the face value are true, in our view, the basic essential ingredients of dishonest misappropriation and cheating are missing. Criminal proceedings are not a shortcut for other remedies . Sine no case of criminal breach of trust or dishonest intention of inducement is made out and the essential ingredients of sections 405/420 I.P.C. are missing, the prosecution of the appellants under sections 406/120B I.P.C. is liable to be quashed"
10. Relying on the above judgement he submits that the basic essential ingredients of dishonest misappropriation and cheating are missing in the present case and in view of that entire criminal proceeding may be quashed.
11. Mr. Kumar, further submits that merely taking certain advance is not a case of cheating and to buttress this argument he relied in the case of 6 "M N G Bharateesh Reddy Vs. Ramesh Ranganathan and Another"2022 SCC Online SC 1061. He refers to para 17 of the said judgment which is quoted hereinbelow:-
17. In Dalip Kaur v. Jagnar Singhs a two-judge bench of this Court held that a dispute arising out of a breach of contract would not amount to an offence of cheating under section 415 and 420. The relevant extract is as follows: "9. The ingredients of Section 420 of the Penal Code are:
"(i) Deception of any persons;
(il) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property; or
(iii) To consent that any person shall retain any property and finally intentionally Inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit."
10. The High Court, therefore, should have posed a question as to whether any act of inducement on the part of the appellant has been raised by the second respondent and whether the appellant had an intention to cheat him from the very inception. If the dispute between the parties was essentially a civil dispute resulting from a breach of contract on the part of the appellants by non- refunding the amount of advance the same would not constitute an offence of cheating. Similar is the legal position in respect of an offence of criminal breach of trust having regard to its definition contained in Section 405 of the Penal Code. (See Alay Mitra v. State of M.P. (2003) 3 SCC 11: 2003 SCC."
12. On the point of cheating he further relied in the case of "Uma Shankar Gopalika Vs. State of Bihar and Another"(2005) 10 SCC 336 . He refers to para 6 and 7 of the said judgment which is quoted hereinbelow:-
" 6. Now the question to be examined by us is as to whether on the facts disclosed in the petition of complaint any criminal offence whatsoever is made out much less offences under Sections 420/120-B IPC. The only allegation in the complaint petition against the accused persons is that they assured the complainant that when they receive the insurance claim amounting to Rs 4,20,000, they would pay a sum of Rs 2,60,000 to the complainant out of that but the same has never been paid. Apart from that there is no other allegation in the petition of complaint. It was pointed out on behalf of the complainant that the accused fraudulently persuaded the complainant to agree so that the accused persons may take steps for moving the Consumer Forum in relation to the claim of Rs 4,20,000. It is well settled that every breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases breach of contract would amount to cheating where there was any deception played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat 9 has developed later on, the same cannot amount to cheating. In the present case it has nowhere been stated that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420 IPC.
7. In our view petition of complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all much less any offence either under Section 420 or Section 120-B IPC and the present case is a case of purely civil dispute between the parties for which remedy lies before a civil court by filing property constituted suit. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of 7 court and to prevent the same it was just and expedient for the High Court to quash the same by exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC which it has erroneously refused."
13. Relying on above judgments he submits that matter is arising out of a contract and there is no allegation that from the very inception any intention of cheating is there.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that it is well settled that if the agreement is revoked the arbitration clause still exists and in view of that arbitrator can be appointed and to buttress this argument he relied in the case of "Ashapura Mine-Chem Limited Vs. Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation" (2015) 8 SCC 193. He refers to para 20, 29 and 33 of the said judgment which is quoted hereinbelow:-
"20. In this context, we find, the reliance placed upon by Mr Dushyant Dave, learned senior Counsel for the appellant on the decisions in Reva Electric Car Co. (P) Ltd., Today Homes and Infrastructure (P) Ltd. and Enercon (India) Ltd. fully support the stand of the appellant. The decision In Reva Electric Car Co. (P) Ltd. was a case which arose under Section 11 of the Act. A question was raised on behalf of the respondent in the said case to the effect that with the termination of the MoU itself, the arbitration clause would cease to exist. Dealing with the said question, the learned Judge has held as under In paras 54 and 55: (Reva Electric Car case, SCC p. 107)
54. Under Section 16(1), the legislature makes it clear that while considering any objection with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, the arbitration clause which formed part of the contract, has to be treated as an agreement Independent of the other terms of the contract. To ensure that there is no misunderstanding, Section 16(1)(b) further provides that even if the Arbitral Tribunal concludes that the contract is null and vold, it should not result, as a matter of law, in an automatic invalidation of the arbitration clause. Section 16(1)(a) presumes the existence of a valid arbitration clause and mandates the same to be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. By virtue of Section 16(1) (b), It continues to be enforceable notwithstanding a declaration of the contract being null and void. In view of the provisions contained in Section 16(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, It would not be possible to accept the submission of Ms Ahmad that with the termination of MoU on 31-12-2007, the arbitration clause would also cease to exist.
55. As noticed earlier, the disputes that have arisen between the parties clearly relate to the subject matter of the relationship between the parties which came into existence through MoU, Clearly, therefore, the disputes raised by the petitioner need to be referred to arbitration. Under the arbitration clause, a reference was to be made that the disputes were to be referred to a single arbitrator. Since the parties have failed to appoint an arbitrator under the agreed procedure, it is necessary for this Court to appoint the arbitrator." (emphasis supplied "29. Having thus ascertained the legal position regarding the stand-alone 8 agreement relating to arbitration with particular reference to arbitration agreement in a legal transaction between the parties, when we refer to Clause 27 of the Mou, we wish to find out whether the said clause satisfies the principles set down and applicable to a stand- alone arbitration agreement. When we refer to Clause 27, we find that in the event of failure of an amicable settlement at the bilateral level relating to a dispute or difference arising between the appellant and the respondent to be reached as contained in Clause 26 of the Mou, then such unresolved dispute or difference concerning or arising from the Mou, Its Implementation, breach or termination whatsoever, Including any difference or dispute as to the interpretation of any of the terms of the Mou, is referable to the sole arbitrator appointed by the appellant and the respondent. Therefore, irrespective of the question or as to the fact whether the MoU fructified Into a full-fledged agreement, having regard to the non-fulfilment of any of the conditions or failure of compliance with any requirement by either of the parties stipulated in the other clauses of MoU, specific agreement has been entered into by the appellant and the respondent under Clause 27 to refer such controversies as between the parties to the sole arbitrator by consensus. Therefore, when consensus was not reached at between the parties for making the reference, eventually it will be open for either of the parties to invoke Section 11 of the Act and seek for reference of the dispute for arbitration.
33. In the light of our above conclusion, we hold that the learned Judge having failed to appreciate the legal position as regards the existence of an arbitration agreement in the MoU Irrespective of the failure of the parties to reach a full-fledged agreement with respect to the various terms and conditions contained in the MoU for a joint venture, the said conclusion and judgment of the learned Judge is liable to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. Since the respondent has expressed its disinclination to agree to express its concurrence and thereby the parties failed to appoint an arbitrator under the agreed procedure, it is necessary for this Court to appoint an arbitrator. Therefore, while setting aside the judgment Impugned in this appeal, we hereby appoint Hon'ble Ms. Justice Rekha Manharlal Doshit, resident of C-5, 402, Deo Sangam Flat, Guartgam Road, Near Gandhi Nagar, Gujarat, former Chief Justice of Patna High Court and former Judge of the Gujarat High Court as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes that have arisen between the parties on such terms and conditions as the sole arbitrator deems fit and proper. Undoubtedly, the learned sole arbitrator shall decide all the disputes arising between the parties under the MoU, without being influenced by any prima facie opinion expressed in this order with regard to the respective claims of the parties."
15. Relying on the above judgements, he submits that case is civil in nature and for that criminal case has been filed. He further submits that both the agreements were revoked by the petitioners as the terms and conditions were not fulfilled by the informant and revocation was also published in the paper and the revocation was made on 03.03.2020 whereas the present F.I.R. has been lodged on 20.03.2020. He further submits that after the revocation the F.I.R. has been lodged which is counter blast of said revocation. On these grounds he submits that the entire criminal proceeding may be quashed. 9
16. Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2 by way of referring Clause 6 of the agreement contained at page 41 submits that construction was required to be completed within three years and further six months grace time was there however, the petitioners have interfered and they have filed the petition with Ranchi Municipal Corporation and in view of that it has been delayed and the role of the petitioners are there and to buttress this argument he refers to Annexure-6 which is order of the Ranchi Municipal Corporation dated 05.08.2019. By way of letter dated 01.08.2020 he submits that one of the co-sharer filed application before the Ranchi Municipal Corporation stating that these petitioners have made illegal objection. He submits that all these delays on the intervention of the petitioners in view of that criminal breach is made out and in view of the above, this petition is not fit to be quashed. He submits that High Court is not required to roam into at this stage under section 482 of Cr.P.C and all these disputes can be subject matter of trial only.
17. Learned counsel for the State submits that chargesheet has been submitted in view of that case is made and the learned court has rightly taken cognizance.
18. In view of above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record including the contents of F.I.R. as well as agreements which are on record. It is an admitted position that the agreement was entered into between the parties for sale of agreement and for development of part of land. In view of paper publication contained in Annexure-7 it is crystal clear that revocation was made on 03.03.2020 whereas the F.I.R. was registered on 20.03.2020 which clearly suggests that after revocation the present F.I.R. has been lodged. The relevant 10 clauses of the agreement speak of terms and conditions to be fulfilled by both the parties. In one of the clause referred by Mr. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel for the O.P. No.2 the agreement was there that building in question will be completed within three years and six months grace time was provided inspite of that building has not been completed. Annexure-6 is a document i.e. order dated 05.08.2019 of the Ranchi Municipal Corporation which suggests that Ranchi Municipal Corporation has directed the informant not to proceed with the construction as map was not passed by the Ranchi Municipal Corporation. In the supplementary affidavit settlement agreement has been brought on record and the terms and conditions of settlement was provided therein. The informant has agreed that he will not rely on the allegation of cash amount so far F.I.R. is concerned and he will only rely on the bank transactions. Further it was agreed that informant will pay a sum of Rs. One crore thirty eight lakhs and seventy five thousand to the petitioners however, the said amount was not fulfilled and further it was revoked by the petitioners and that settlement was to be implemented within nine months. It was not implemented within 9 months thereafter it was revoked by the petitioners. Further two suits were instituted by the informant being Original Suit no. 58 of 2021 and Original Suit No. 382 of 2022 which are meant for execution of sale deed and enforcement of the development agreement. Filing of those two suits clearly suggest that matter is arising out of a civil dispute if any however the criminal case has been registered against the petitioners. In this background the Court is only to find out whether a case of quashing of entire criminal proceeding including order taking cognizance are made out or not.
19. The dispute which has been considered hereinabove clearly speaks of that arising out of two agreements as well as 3rd agreement being 11 settlement between the parties. The revocation is also there and for that two suits have been instituted by the informant. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court is required to see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence or not and in such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is in fact, adopted as has happened in the present case, the High Court is required not to hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent the abuse of process of the court.
20. The judgments relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the case of Naresh Kumar (supra), Kunti (supra), Binod Kumar (supra), Bharateesh Reddy (supra), Uma Shankar Gopalika (supra) and Ashapura Mine-Chem Limited (supra) are helping the petitioners.
21. As the facts of the present case is identical to the facts of those cases on which the learned counsel for the petitioners has relied. Further Clause 28 of the development agreement speaks of arbitration clause. Once arbitration clause is there for resolving out any dispute informant was required to invoke that and without invoking the same the present F.I.R. has been filed. Even if the said agreement was revoked by the petitioners in the light of judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the case of Ashapura Mine-Chem Limited (supra) the said remedy is still there to the informant.
22. In view of above facts, reasons and analysis the Court comes to a definite conclusion that to allow the proceeding will amount the abuse of process of law and accordingly, the entire criminal proceeding including order taking cognizance dated 26.08.2022 and order dated 20.03.2021 by which process under section 82 of Cr.P.C. has been issued against the 12 petitioners, in connection with Argora P.S. Case No. 101 of 2020, pending in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Ranchi are quashed.
23. This petition stands allowed and disposed of. Pending I.A, if any, stands disposed of. Interim order is vacated.
24. It is made clear that pending suit if any will be decided in accordance with law without being prejudice to this order as this order has been passed considering the parameters of proceeding under section 482 of Cr.P.C.
( Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Satyarthi/A.F.R. 13