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[Cites 11, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

Venkatesh S/O Hanmantappa Kandakur, vs Rukmavva W/O Neelappa Jadar, on 15 November, 2017

Bench: S.Sujatha, H.B.Prabhakara Sastry

                                   R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP)

                             :1:


         IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
                 DHARWAD BENCH

  DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2017

                         PRESENT
       THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE S.SUJATHA
                            AND
THE HON'BLE Dr. JUSTICE H. B. PRABHAKARA SASTRY

       REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO.4063/2012 (SP)

BETWEEN:

SHRI. VENKATESH
S/O. HANMANTAPPA KANDAKUR
AGE: 49 YEARS, OCC: BUSINESS
R/O. SHIRUR PARK
VIDYANAGAR, HUBBALLI 580 022
                                               ... APPELLANT
(BY SRI. A. P. MURARI, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. SMT. RUKMAVVA
   W/O. NEELAPPA JADAR
   AGE: ABOUT 65 YEARS
   OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK
   R/O. NEAD DODDA HANAMANT
   DEVAR GUDI, NAGASHETTIKOPPA
   HUBBALLI 580 031.
   (AS PER ORDER DATED 16.12.2016
   RESPONDENTS 2 AND 3 ARE TREATED AS
   LRs OF DECEASED RESPONDENT NO.1)

2. SMT.LAXMAVVA
   W/O. HANAMANTAPPA BARKAR
   AGE ABOUT 41 YEARS
   OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK
   R/O. BYAHATTI,
   TQ. HUBBALLI 580 031.
                                     R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP)

                              :2:



3. SMT. LALITA, W/O. SOMU ALADAMARAD
   AGE: ABOUT 29 YEARS
   OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK
   R/O. NEAD DODDA HANAMANT
   DEVAR GUDI, NAGASHETTIKOPPA
   HUBBALLI 580 031.
                                              ... RESPONDENTS
(SRI. C. N. HARLAPUR, ADVOCATE FOR R2 & R3;
      R2 & R3 ARE LRs OF DECEASED R1)
                             ---

      THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96
OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE
THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 04.01.2012 PASSED BY
THE    PRINCIPAL SENIOR    CIVIL   JUDGE,   HUBBALLI   IN
O.S.NO.437/2007.

     THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT
THIS DAY, Dr.H.B.PRABHAKARA SASTRY J., DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:

                        JUDGMENT

The appellant was the plaintiff before the Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge at Hubballi in O.S.No.437/2007, whose suit for the relief of specific performance and for perpetual prohibitory injunction came to be decreed by the judgment and decree dated 04.01.2012, only to the extent of refund of earnest money with interest thereupon. It is against the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff has preferred this appeal.

R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) :3:

2. In his memorandum of appeal, the appellant has taken a contention that the Court below ought to have appreciated the fact that the appellant has performed his part of contract and was ever ready and willing to perform his part since the date of agreement and thereby he was deserving a decree for the specific performance of contract. Having regard to the fact that the defendants question as regards her signature on the agreement of sale dated 31.10.2006 was proved not only by the handwriting expert, but even verified by the Court on its own, the appellant's suit ought to have been decreed as prayed for. The Court below lost sight of the fact that a small portion of the property was put on sale to meet out necessities and those properties were ancestral. The defendants before witnessing the same ought to have objected to the same.

3. In response to the notice, the respondents are being represented by their counsel. During the pendency R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) :4: of the appeal, due to the death of respondent No.1, the remaining respondents No.2 and 3 were treated as the legal representatives of deceased respondent No.1.

4. Lower Court records were called for and the same were placed before this Court. Heard the arguments from both sides, perused the materials placed before the Court including the impugned judgment and decree and the memorandum of appeal.

5. In the light of the above, the point that arises for our consideration is:

i. Whether denial of the relief of specific performance of contract by the Court below requires any interference at the hands of this Court?

6. The present appellant was the sole plaintiff and the respondents No.1, 2 and 3 were respectively defendants 1, 2 and 3 in the Court below. For the sake of R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) :5: convenience, the parties would be referred with the rankings they were holding in the Court below.

7. The summary of the case of the plaintiff in the Court below is that, the plaintiff intending to purchase the suit property comprised in survey No.7A/2A admeasuring 37.08 guntas out of the 1 acre 2 guntas for a valuable consideration of a sum of `21,11,111/-, entered into an agreement of sale with one Neelappa Ningappa Jadar, who is said to be the husband of 1st defendant and the father of defendants No.2 and 3 respectively, on 31.10.2006. Pursuant to the said agreement of sale, the plaintiff has paid a sum of `7,11,111/- on 31.10.2006 itself to the vendor as earnest consideration amount. The vendor had agreed to execute the registered sale deed within three months from the date of the agreement of sale, but he died on 06.03.2007 and the defendants did not come forward to perform their part of contract by receiving the balance sale consideration amount. Failure on the part of the R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) :6: defendants to perform their part of contract made the plaintiff to file a suit in O.S.No.437/2007 on the file of the Court below.

8. The defendants in the Court below appeared through their counsel and filed their written statement, wherein they had primarily taken a contention denying the alleged execution of agreement of sale by Sri. Neelappa in favour of the plaintiff. They have also denied the execution of the said agreement of sale and receipt of part of sale consideration by Neelappa for his legal and family necessities. They have also denied the genuineness and authenticity of the alleged agreement of sale dated 31.10.2006. However, after the death of said Neelappa, they have succeeded him as his legal heirs. They further contended that the revenue records with respect to the suit schedule property stands in their name. They also took up a contention that the property in question was their ancestral property.

R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) :7:

9. Based on the above pleadings of the parties, the Court below framed the following issues:

i. Whether the plaintiff proves one Neelappa, S/o. Ningappa Jadar - husband of first defendant and father of 2nd and 3rd defendants has executed an agreement of sale on 31.10.2006 for total sale consideration of `21,11,111/- pertaining to suit property and received an advance amount of `7,11,111/- on the same day and agreed to execute the regular sale deed within three months?
ii. Whether the defendants prove that the suit schedule property is the ancestral property of father of defendant No.2 and 3 and to them?
iii. Whether the plaintiff proves that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract?
iv. What relief the parties are entitled to?
R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) :8: After recording the evidence led before it and hearing both sides, the Court below by its judgment and decree dated 04.01.2012, answered issues No.1, 2 and 3 above in the affirmative and decreed the suit of the plaintiff only for the refund of earnest money of `7,11,111/- with interest at the rate of 12% p.a. from 31.10.2006 till the date of realization from the defendants No.1 to 3. It is the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff has challenged in this appeal with a prayer for setting aside the said judgment and decree by allowing this appeal and to decree the suit.

10. Learned counsel for the appellant in his argument submitted that the defendants in the Court below had taken a defence that the suit property was ancestral property and there was no legal necessity for Neelappa to sell the said property and that they had also denied the very execution of sale deed by the said Neelappa in favour of the appellant/plaintiff. The Court R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) :9: below has answered all the three issues in affirmative which are in full favour of the plaintiff. Thus, after answering the issue regarding execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and plaintiff's readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, it was not proper on the part of the Court below to refuse the relief of specific performance in favour of the plaintiff. In his support, he also relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2017 (4) SCC 654 in the case of A. Kanthamani Vs. Nasreen Ahmed, which will be referred to at an appropriate stage later.

It is his further argument that, though it is considered that the vendor Neelappa had sold his undivided property, still the purchaser steps into the shoes of vendor. As such, out of 37.08 guntas falling to the family of Neelappa, his share can be ordered for specific performance.

R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 10 :

11. The learned counsel for the respondents in his argument, relying upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1999 SC 3571, in the case of Ravinder Kumar Sharma Vs. State of Assam and Others, submitted that even without filing cross-appeal or cross- objection, the respondent can question a finding given on an issue by the Court below. He further submitted that the finding of the Court below on issue No.3 regarding readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract by the plaintiff was erroneous, since there was no documentary evidence to prove the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff. He further stated, that the finding of the Court below that the agreement for sale was for legal necessity is also erroneous.

The learned counsel further relying upon another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2014 SAR (Civil) 1007 in the case of Telikicherla Sesibhushan (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Kalli Raja Rao (D) By Lrs. & Ors., submitted that the plaintiff has failed to prove that he was R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 11 : ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, as such, no relief in the form of specific relief can be granted in his favour.

12. As observed above, the Court below in its finding has held that the plaintiff has proved that Sri.Neelappa S/o. Ningappa Jadar, husband of deceased respondent No.1 - Smt. Rukmavva and father of the remaining two respondents, has executed an agreement of sale on 31.10.2006 in favour of the plaintiff before it for a total sale consideration of a sum of `21,11,111/- with respect to the suit schedule property and also had received an advance amount of `7,11,111/- on the same day, by agreeing to execute the regular sale deed within three months. The Court below has also observed that the defendants could able to prove that the suit schedule property is the ancestral property of the father of defendants No.2 and 3 in the Court below. Further, the said Court also held that the plaintiff could able to prove R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 12 : that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. However, in spite of answering all the three issues in the affirmative, by observing that, as the defendants have succeeded to the estate of the deceased, which is undivided, it is quite difficult for the plaintiff to get the sale deed registered in his name from the defendants, the Court below did not grant the relief of specific performance of contract, but in the alternative, ordered for refund of the earnest money with interest thereupon payable by the defendants to the plaintiff.

13. In the light of the above findings, the plaintiff by filing this appeal has only sought for the relief of specific performance of contract. As such, the finding of the Court below regarding the defendants agreeing to sell the suit schedule property in favour of the plaintiff for a valuable consideration and receipt of a part of the sale consideration and also its finding holding that the suit R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 13 : schedule property was ancestral property of the defendants, are not in dispute.

14. It is to be observed that, it is a plaintiff's appeal, who is a decree holder and that the defendants in the Court below, who are the respondents herein, have not preferred any cross-appeal or cross-objection challenging the finding of the Court below. However, the learned counsel for the respondent in his argument relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravinder Kumar Sharma Vs. State of Assam and Others reported in AIR 1999 SC 3571 submitted that, as per the said judgment, he need not have to prefer any cross-appeal or cross-objection, but can attack an adverse finding given by the Court below.

In the said judgment of Ravinder Kumar Sharma (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment at paragraph No.22 with respect to Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure was pleased to observe that the R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 14 : respondent - defendant in an appeal, without filing cross- objection, can attack an adverse finding, upon which decree in part has been passed against the respondent. For the purpose sustaining the decree to the extent the lower Court had dismissed the suit against the defendants/respondents, the filing of cross-objection, after the 1976 amendment is purely optional and may not mandatory. It is relying upon this judgment, the learned counsel for the respondent attacked the finding of the Court below given on issue No.3, wherein it was held that the plaintiff was able to prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the duty under the contract.

15. In a judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant rendered in the case of A. Kanthamani Vs. Nasreen Ahmed reported in (2017) 4 SCC 654, the Hon'ble Supreme Court at para 24 of its judgment has pleased to observe as below:

R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 15 : "The expression "readiness and willingness" has been the subject-matter of interpretation in many cases even prior to its insertion in Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. While examining the question as to how and in what manner, the plaintiff is required to prove his financial readiness so as to enable him to claim specific performance of the contract/agreement, the Privy Council in a leading case which arose from the Indian courts (Bombay) in Bank of India Ltd. v. Jamsetji A.H. Chinoy reported in 1949 SCC OnLine PC 81, approved the view taken by Chagla A.C.J., and held inter alia that, "It is not necessary for the plaintiff to produce the money or vouch a concluded scheme for financing the transaction to prove his readiness and willingness."

16. In another judgment, relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent and delivered in the case of Telikicherla Sesibhushan (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Kalli Raja Rao (D) By Lrs. & Ors. reported in 2014 SAR (Civil) 1007, with respect to Section 16(c) of the Specific R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 16 : Relief Act, the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to observe that, in a suit for specific performance of contract, averment and proof by plaintiff that he has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him is mandatory - Failure to do so will disentitle him for relief of specific performance of the contract of sale - Clause (c) of Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that specific performance of contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which he has been prevented or waived by the defendant.

It is in the light of these judgments, the point whether the appellant/plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract has to be analysed.

R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 17 :

17. The plaintiff in his plaint has made a specific averment that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract throughout and that, in that regard he has issued legal notice calling upon the defendants to execute the registered sale deed as per the agreement to sale executed by deceased Neelappa, the vendor. No doubt the defendants have denied the said plaint averment in their written statement. The agreement for sale which is at Ex.P2 is dated 30.10.2006. As per the recitals of that agreement, the purchaser of the property has paid a part of consideration of a sum of `7,11,111/- to the vendor Neelappa out of the total consideration of `21,11,111/-. It was further agreed to between them that the purchaser was required to pay the balance amount of sale consideration within three months from the date of agreement. In the meantime, the vendor was required to get the land surveyed, map prepared and boundaries fixed at his own cost. It was thereafter the registered sale deed was agreed to be executed.

R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 18 :

18. As per Ex.P3, certificate of death of Neelappa, the said vendor died on 06.03.2007. With no much delay, the purchaser/plaintiff caused a legal notice issued to the present respondents who are the legal representatives of deceased vendor calling upon them to execute the registered sale deed in his favour by receiving the balance sale consideration. This is evident from the legal notice at Ex.P5. In the said legal notice itself, the plaintiff has clearly stated that he had been ready and willing to perform his part of the duties as a purchaser, and that the respondents/purchasers in the legal notice are required to execute the sale deed by receiving balance sale consideration.

19. Thus, at the very first instance, the plaintiff has shown his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the duty. However, the respondents throughout have remained silent regarding the dischargal of the obligation on the part of the vendor by getting the land R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 19 : surveyed and map prepared and also by the boundaries fixed to the land. It is thereafter, the plaintiff got issued one more legal notice to the respondents as could be seen at Ex.P12 and dated 09.10.2007 once again reiterating that he has been ready and willing to perform his part of the duty and calling upon the addresses therein to execute the registered sale deed in his favour by accepting the balance sale consideration.

20. In this way, the plaintiff has been throughout showing that he has been ready and willing to perform his part of the duty. In A. Kanthamani's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was also pleased to observe with respect to Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act that, to show readiness and willingness to perform essential terms of the contract by the purchaser, he proving financial readiness being a question of fact, he need not prove possession of sufficient money or vouch for specific scheme for financial transaction. It was also observed in R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 20 : that case, that, payment of more than half of sale consideration was made in advance to the vendor/defendant and loan taken by the LIC for payment of balance amount by the plaintiff. It was held that the same was indicative of the plaintiff's readiness and willingness to perform his/her part of agreement. In the instant case, it cannot be ignored of the fact that the plaintiff has established that he had paid the considerable part of sale consideration amounting to a sum of `7,11,111/- as earnest money. That being the case, when he has paid a considerable amount as earnest money and at the earliest point of time has approached the legal representatives of the deceased vendor calling upon them to receive balance of sale consideration and to execute the sale deed in his favour as per the agreement, it can be inferred and concluded that the plaintiff was throughout ready and willing to perform his part of the obligation under the contract. As such, the finding of the Court below on issue No.3 holding that the plaintiff has proved R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 21 : that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract cannot be found fault with.

21. The learned counsel for the respondents in his argument submitted that granting the relief of specific performance of the contract being discretionary, the Court below has exercised it judiciously, as such, the circumstance of the case does not warrant any interference in it.

22. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 speaks about discretion as to decree in specific performance. It reads as below:

"20. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance.--
(1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal.

R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 22 : (2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance:--

(a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or
(b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff; or
(c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance.

Explanation 1.--Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b).

Explanation 2.-- The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 23 : from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract. (3) The court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance.

(4) The court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the party."

23. Goyle's in his book on 'Law of Specific Performance' (3rd edition, Eastern Law House 2003 edition at page 255) after relying upon the judgments in E. Venkatakrishna Reddy Vs. Minor Amara Babu (1971) 2 MLJ 466 and Kallathil Sridharan Vs. Komath Pandyala Prasanna (1996) 6 SCC 218 was pleased to comment as below:

"A contract for sale by the mother of the coparceners all of whom were minors for necessity and for the benefit of the family, will not be enforced by the R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 24 : Court if the circumstances transpire to show that the enforcement would be unjust and detrimental to the interest of the minors, particularly when the sale seems to be a distress sale and the value of the property had considerably increased."

The same author in his very same book at page 262, after referring to Halsbury's Law of England (4th Ed., Vol. 44(1), para 869), has extracted a passage from the Halsbury's said work which is reproduced hereinbelow:

"Specific performance may not be ordered where the performance would involve, even without any impropriety on the part of the plaintiff, great hardship to the defendants, so much so, that it would not be unreasonable and harsh to grant equitable relief. Such hardship may be apparent on the face of the contract, or latent and the result of collateral matters in which event the court is more likely to refuse performance."

24. It is a settled principle of law that the relief of specific performance is discretionary. The said discretion cannot be exercised and specific performance cannot be given merely because it is lawful to do so. But it is R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 25 : covered by some judicial principles. The grant of this relief is the discretion of the Court and cannot be claimed as a matter of right.

25. Pollock & Mulla in their book on "The Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts," [14th Edition, Volume II (LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa Publication at page 1999)] after referring to two cases of Bombay High Court reported in AIR 1945 Bom 481 (Jethalal Nanshah Modi Vs. Bachu) and AIR 1915 Bom 109 (Gangabai Vs. Sonabai), was pleased to observe that, "In exercising discretion, the Court should take into account the circumstances of the case, the conduct of the parties, and the respective interests under the contract. An agreement which inflicts more injury upon the defendant than confers a benefit on the plaintiff will not be enforced."

26. In the instant case, the finding of the Court below that the property is ancestral property is not disputed. It is also not in dispute that to the family of deceased Neelappa, a share in the land property totally R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 26 : measuring 37.08 guntas has fallen. The respondents have succeeded to the estate of the deceased which is undivided. That being the case, when the original respondents are the widow and daughters of the deceased vendors and presently it is only the daughters of deceased vendor identifying the said property falling into the share of the respective sharers demarking the property, would cause greater hardship to the vendors. When the comparative hardship is weighed between the appellant and the respondents, obviously greater hardship would be on the daughters of the deceased vendor, who are the present respondents. Therefore, since the performance of the contract involves some hardship on the respondents, which they did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the appellant, the matter would squarely fall under Section 20(2)(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and as such, exercising of discretion would be in not to decreeing the specific performance. As such, the refusal by the Court below in R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 27 : awarding the specific performance of the contract, but in the alternative decreeing the suit only for refund of the earnest money with interest thereupon cannot be found fault with. However, considering the nature of transaction which involves an agreement for sale with respect to a land property and the escalation in the prices of the land, generally every year, we are of the view that the interest of the appellant/plaintiff would be best protected by giving an increase in the rate of interest awarded by the Court below.

27. The Court below has awarded interest at the rate of 12% p.a. from the date 31.10.2006 till the date of realization of the amount from defendants No.1 to 3.

In Hemanta Mondal & others Vs. Ganesh Chandra Naskar reported in 2015 AIR SCW 6014 and in Ramesh Chand (dead) through Legal Representatives Vs. Asruddin (dead) through Legal Representatives reported in (2016) 1 SCC 653, in a R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 28 : similar circumstance of the case where the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that instead of granting decree of specific performance, the plaintiff could be compensated by directing the appellant to pay reasonable and sufficient amount to him, was pleased to not accept the lower rate of interest awarded by the Court below and ordered payment of interest at the rate of 18% p.a. In the instant case also, considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the judicial principles discussed above, we are of the opinion that it is a fit case where instead of granting decree of specific performance, the plaintiff/appellant can be compensated by directing the respondents/defendants to pay a reasonable and sufficient amount to him. We are of the view that mere refund of `7,11,111/- with interest at the rate of 12% p.a. as directed by the Court below would be highly insufficient. In our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to direct the defendants/respondents in R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 29 : the main appeal (legal representatives of the deceased vendor and deceased respondent No.1), to pay `7,11,111/- along with interest at the rate of 18% p.a. from the date 31.10.2006 till the date of realization of the amount.

28. Accordingly, we proceed to pass the following order:

ORDER The appeal is allowed in part.
The judgment and decree dated 04.01.2012 passed by the Principal Senior Civil Judge at Hubballi in O.S.No.437/2007 is modified to the extent that the rate of interest awarded at 12% p.a. is enhanced and fixed at 18% p.a.. The rest of the terms of the order passed by the Court below in its impugned judgment and decree remains unaltered.
R.F.A.No.4063/2012 (SP) : 30 : The appeal of the plaintiff for the relief of specific performance of the contract as per the agreement for sale dated 31.10.2006 is dismissed.
No costs.
Draw modified decree accordingly.
SD/-
JUDGE SD/-
JUDGE gab