Central Information Commission
Nihar Ranjan Das vs Steel Authority Of India Ltd. (Sail) on 13 December, 2021
Author: Neeraj Kumar Gupta
Bench: Neeraj Kumar Gupta
के ीय सूचना आयोग
Central Information Commission
बाबा गंगनाथ माग ,मुिनरका
Baba Gangnath Marg, Munirka
नई द ली, New Delhi - 110067
ि तीय अपील सं या/Second Appeal No. CIC/SAIL1/A/2020/114150
Mr. Nihar Ranjan Das ... अपीलकता /Appellant
VERSUS
बनाम
CPIO ... ितवादी/Respondent
Steel Authority of India
Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela
Odisha-769011
Relevant dates emerging from the appeal:-
RTI : 20-11-2019 FA : 26-12-2019 SA : 05.05.2020
CPIO : 13-12-2019 FAO : 06-01-2020 Hearing : 07-12-2021
ORDER
1. The appellant filed an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) before the Central Public Information Officer (CPIO) Steel Authority of India, Rourkela, Odisha. The appellant seeking information on two points which are as under:-
"1. Let me know the details of investment of Hindustan Steel Limited contributory provident fund (P.F. accumulation of RSP employees) like the public institution, private institution & govt. institution, rate of interest, period of investment with institution name & year wise interest received with capital.
2. Let me know the details of investment in ILFS & DHFL with rate of interest & interest received with capital till now".
2. The CPIO vide letter dated 13-12-2019 informed the appellant that the HSLCPF is a separate legal entity, being managed by the Board of Trustee under EPF & MP Act, 1952 and EPF Scheme, 1952. Since its not managed by the RSP the information relates to the third party and there is fiduciary relationship and hence the same cannot be provided under section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act, 2005.
Page 1 of 6Being dissatisfied with the same, the appellant has file first appeal dated 26-12- 2019 and requested that the information should be provided to him. The FAA vide its order dated 06-01-2020, directed the CPIO to request the consent of the third party, within 20 days and disposed the appeal. In compliance of the FAA, the CPIO vide its letter dated 27.01.2020, informed the appellant that the Chairman (HSLCPF) did not give consent and hence the information cannot be furnished to him accordingly. Thereafter the appellant has filed a second appeal before the Commission on the ground that information sought has not been provided to him and requested to direct the respondent to provide complete and correct information.
Hearing:
3. The appellant attended the hearing through audio-call. The respondent, Shri P. K. Sahu, CPIO attended the hearing through video-call.
4. The respondent submitted their written submissions dated 02.12.2021 and the same has been taken on record.
5. The appellant submitted that the desired information has not been provided to him by the respondent on his RTI applications dated 20.11.2019.
6. The respondent while reiterating the replies of the CPIO/ FAA submitted that the concerned institution i.e. HSLCPF is a separate legal entity, not being governed by RSP Management as such they do not have any information pertaining to them. Further it was mentioned that though few executives and non- executives are nominated to the trust, RSP Management has no control over it and they can only request the information from them but cannot direct. However upon request as directed by the FAA vide its order dated 06.01.2020, the Chairman (HSLCPF) declined his consent being a separate legal entity.
7. Upon being queried by the Commission about the appointment of the members of the trust; the respondent submitted that upon the representation given by the trade union, the members of trust are being nominated by the RSP Management which is being headed by the ex-officio as the Chairman of the trust. The respondent further submitted that the members/ beneficiary of the trust can seek the information from the Chairman of HSLCPF but the same cannot be furnished to a third party as the same is being kept under fiduciary relationship.
8. The appellant vehemently denied the assertion made by the respondent and submitted that he is not a third party as he is an employee of RSP and also the beneficiary and hence the information be furnished to him accordingly.
Page 2 of 6Decision:
9. The Commission, after hearing the submissions of both the parties and after perusal of records, observes that the appellant has sought the details of investment of HSLCPF Trust and the issues related thereto. The Commission further observes that the respondent claimed that the HSLCPF Trust is not a public authority as the same functions independently without any control of the respondent over it. However the respondent failed to appraise the Commission that as to how HSLCPF Trust does not come under the definition of Section 2 (h) of the RTI Act, 2005.
10. It is an admitted fact that the HSLCPF Trust is constituted by the RSP for the benefit of its employees and the management of their PF contributions along with the contribution of the employer to function purely for their interest. Rules and regulations for the management of this HSLCPF Trust have been framed by the management of the public authority in consultation of their stake holders and represented through the trade unions which are also recognized by the public authority.
11. As per the rules of the EPF Trust, functional autonomy has been provided to the HSLCPF Trust so that it is independent of the commercial bearing of the public authority. This functional autonomy envisaged in the rules and regulations made by the public authority should not be construed as if it is an organization independent of the public authority and is not a public authority. It is clear that the origin of the Trust lies in the public authority as it could not have come into existence on its own without being created by the management of the RSP. Further the CGM, Finance, is the ex-officio Chairman as per the rules, which clearly indicates that the HSLCPF Trust comes under the ambit of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, 2005, which reads as under:
"public authority" means any authority or body or institution of self- government established or constituted--
.....................
.................... or order made by the appropriate Government, and includes any--
(i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed;
(ii) non-Government organization substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government;"
12. In this regard, the Commission referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in DAV College Trust and Management Society V. Director of Public Instruction, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9828 OF 2013, wherein it was held as under:
Page 3 of 6"15. If we analyse Section 2(h) carefully it is obvious that the first part of Section 2(h) relates to authorities, bodies or institutions of selfgovernment established or constituted (a) under the Constitution;
(b) by any law of Parliament; (c) by any law of State Legislature or (d) by notification made by the appropriate Government. There is no dispute with regard to clauses (a) to (c). As far as clause (d) is concerned it was contended on behalf of the appellant that unless a notification is issued notifying that an authority, body or institution of self government is brought within the ambit of the Act, the said Act would not apply. We are not impressed with this argument. The notification contemplated in clause (d) is a notification relating to the establishment or constitution of the body and has nothing to do with the Act. Any authority or body or institution of self government, if established or constituted by a notification of the Central Government or a State Government, would be a public authority within the meaning of clause
(d) of Section 2(h) of the Act.
16. We must note that after the end of clause (d) there is a comma and a big gap and then the definition goes on to say 'and includes any -' and thereafter the definition reads as:
"(i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed;
(ii) non Government organisation substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government;" The words 'and includes any', in our considered view, expand the definition as compared to the first part. The second part of the definition is an inclusive clause which indicates the intention of the Legislature to cover bodies other than those mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) of Section 2(h).
17. We have no doubt in our mind that the bodies and NGOs mentioned in subclauses (i) and (ii) in the second part of the definition are in addition to the four categories mentioned in clauses (a) to (d). Clauses (a) to (d) cover only those bodies etc., which have been established or constituted in the four manners prescribed therein. By adding an inclusive clause in the definition, Parliament intended to add two more categories, the first being in subclause
(i), which relates to bodies which are owned, controlled or substantially financed by the appropriate Government. These can be bodies which may not have been constituted by or under the Constitution, by an Act of Parliament or State Legislature or by a notification. Any body which is owned, controlled or substantially financed by the Government, would be a public authority. A perusal of the definition of 'public authority' shows that 'public authority' would mean any authority or body or institution established or constituted apart from other things by the notification issued by an order made by the Page 4 of 6 appropriate Government. It is to include even anybody owned, controlled, or substantially financed or non-Government Organization substantially financed directly or indirectly by the funds provided by the appropriate Government. It is undisputed that the petitioners are receiving substantially grant-in-aid from the Chandigarh Administration. Once a body is substantially financed by the Government, the functions of such body partake the character of public authority'. The definition of expression 'public authority' itself shows that 'public authority' would include any organization body owned, controlled, or substantially financed directly or indirectly by funds provided by the Government or even the non- government organization which is substantially financed. The petitioner has claimed that they are getting only 45% grant-in-aid after admitting that initially the grant-in-aid paid to them was to the extent of 95%. If on account of policy of the Government the grant-in-aid to the extent of 95% which was given initially allowing the petitioner to build up its own infrastructure and reducing the grant-in-aid later would not result into an argument that no substantial grant-in-aid is received and therefore it could not be regarded as 'public authority'. Therefore, we do not find any substance in the stance taken by the petitioner that it is not a 'public authority'."
13. In another matter of Ravneet Kaur v. The Christian Medical College, Ludhiana, AIR 1998 P H 1, (1997) 116 PLR 320 a Five-Judges Full Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court, has considered the question as to whether the functions discharged by a private body like Dayanand Medical College, Ludhiana or Christian Medical College, Ludhiana are public functions or private functions. The Full Bench has taken a view that since the institutions discharge public functions, it cannot be regarded as a private individual limiting the powers of the Court in issuance of directions including prerogative writs. It has further been held that imparting of education is a public function irrespective of any financial aid. Once the institutions like the petitioners are performing public functions affecting the life of a huge segment of the society and in addition are receiving substantial grant-inaid then it cannot be argued that it is not a 'public authority'. Therefore, for the additional reason, detailed in Ravneet Kaur's case (supra), the writ petition would not survive and the question posed has to be answered against the petitioners. No other argument has been advanced."
14. The Commission observes that HSLCPF Trust came into existence only by an initiative of the public authority to watch the interest of its own employees. The rules and regulations of its operations provides an autonomy from the direct control of the RSP management, yet its constitution and methods of nomination of trustees is controlled by the public authority. Since the very purpose of its Page 5 of 6 constitution is to protect the benefits of its employees/ beneficiaries and to invest their money for the optimum returns. Hence the Commission finds that the HSLCPF Trust is an entity which is fully covered under section 2(h)(i) of the RTI Act, 2005, as an entity controlled by the public authority. Moreover, a beneficiary seeking the information about the investments made from his money into various financial products should not be denied or rather should be shared with all the beneficiaries' suo-moto as part of an annual report/ documents prepared by the entity. Hence denial of information by the HSLCPF Trust is bad in law.
15. In view of the abovementioned ratios, facts & circumstances, the Commission therefore directs the respondent that if the appellant is their employees and bonafide beneficiary, the information sought should be shared with him as per the provisions of the RTI Act, 2005. If in case the information sought by the appellant has any commercial bearing upon the respondent the same should be denied under the relevant provisions of the Act. The abovementioned direction should be complied by the respondent within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of this order under the intimation to the Commission.
16. With the above observations, the appeal is disposed of.
17. Copy of the decision be provided free of cost to the parties.
नीरज कु मार गु ा)
Neeraj Kumar Gupta (नीरज ा
सूचना आयु )
Information Commissioner (सू
दनांक / Date : 07-12-2021
Authenticated true copy
(अिभ मािणतस यािपत ित)
S. C. Sharma (एस. सी. शमा ),
Dy. Registrar (उप-पंजीयक),
(011-26105682)
Addresses of the parties:
1. CPIO
Steel Authority of India
Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela
Odisha-769011
2. Mr. Nihar Ranjan Das
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