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[Cites 3, Cited by 1]

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Janak Raj vs Chandigarh Administration on 8 December, 2000

Author: K.S. Garewal

Bench: K.S. Garewal

ORDER
 


Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.

 

1. We have a bunch of 17 petitions. The petitioners in 11 of these cases except in CWP No. 6336 to 6339, 6341 and 6342 of 1999 are aggrieved by the public notice dated May 6, 1999 by which they were directed to vacate the land and re move the immovable items. The petitioners pray that the notice be quashed. Counsel for the petitioners has referred to the facts in CWP No. 6344 of 1999. These may be briefly noticed.

2. The petitioner alleges that it is engaged in the business of marble on Mohali road Sectors 51-52, Chandigarh. It made a representation to the Adviser, U.T. Administration on September 11, 1998 for allotment of a site for doing the business. The representation was submitted through the President of the Marble Traders Association. In response to the representation, the President was informed vide letter dated October 7, 1998 that the request for allotment of a site for marble market is under consideration. The petitioner alleges that despite this communication, a seven days public notice was pasted on the Notice Board on May 6, 1999 calling upon it to vacate the site. It is alleged that the action is discriminatory as others who are similarly placed have been allotted sites while no allotment has been made to the petitioner. On these premises, the petitioner prays that the impugned notice of May 6, 1999, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure P-4 with the writ petition be quashed.

3. A written statement has been filed on behalf of the respondents. It has been categorically averred that "the petitioner is an encroacher upon Government land which stands already acquired..," The petitioner has no "vested" right. The land in Village Nizampur Kumbra measuring 48.69 acres was acquired for the development of 3rd phase of Chandigarh. After the announcement of the award land vested in the Respon-

dent-Administration. Most of the land owners have already accepted the compensation.

Counsel for the parties have been heard.

4. Mr. G.C. Dhuriwala, counsel for the petitioners has contended that the Administration has acted in violation of Article 14 as it has allotted plots for different trades and to marble dealers by following a policy of pick and choose. It has been further submitted that the petitioners were in occupation of the land prior to the acquisition and that in accordance with the scheme prepared by the Chandigarh Administration, the petitioners in all the cases are entitled to the allotment of sites. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted by Mr. Sanjeev Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

5. The two questions that arise for consideration are :-

(i) Are the respondents guilty of having violated Article 14 of the Constitution ?
(ii) Is the action of the respondents in not allotting any plot to the petitioners in violation of any scheme ?

Reg : (i) Mr. Dhuriwala contends that the respondents have acted in a discriminatory manner as various persons who were similarly situated have been treated differently. However, despite being asked, learned counsel for the petitioners is unable to cite any instance from the petitions to show that a person who was similarly situate as any of the petitioners has been treated in a different manner. No instance has been quoted. No person has been named. No details regarding differential treatment have been given. In para 7, a wholly vague statement has been made that "the petitioner is being discriminated because other similarly situate persons have been allotted sites..." Still further, no person who may have been allotted any site has been impleaded as a party. In this situation, it cannot be said that the respondents have violated Article 14 or that they are guilty of the charge of discrimination.

6. It is well settled that the charge of discrimination has to be proved by the person who levels it. In the present case, the petitioners have not been able to discharge this onus. Resultantly, on the pleas as raised in these petitions, it cannot be said that the action of the respondents suffers from the vice of discrimination.

7. The first question is, consequently, answered against the petitioners.

Reg : (ii) Mr. Dhuniwala submits that the petitioners have been in occupation of the sites much prior to the date of acquisition. Thus, before removing them from the sites they have to be accommodated under the schemes framed by the Chandigarh Administration. Is it so?

8. In the present case, it is the admitted position that the land was acquired by the Administration. The award was given on March 26, 1998 and December 23, 1998. These dates are mentioned in the public notice which is impugned by the petitioners There is no averment in the petitions to indicate as to which is the land in occupation of the petitioners. What are the particulars of that land ? Since when are the petitioners in occupation? Who is the owner of the land? What is the nature of the petitioners' right on the land? There is nothing on the record to even remotely suggest that the petitioners have any right, title or interest in the property. The respondents have categorically averred in the written statement that the petitioners have encroached upon the land. No replication has been filed to controvert this categorical statement. Thus, it appears that the petitioners have no title or right in the land which is in their occupation and that they have encroached upon it.

9. Mr. Dhuriwala submits that the petitioners have to be treated as oustees and, thus, alternative sites have to be allotted to them.

10. It is undoubtedly correct that the Chandigarh Administration has been framing schemes for the allotment of sites etc. to different categories of people. However, in each of the schemes, conditions of eligibility have been laid down. A procedure has been prescribed. It is only those persons who fulfil the conditions of eligibility that are entitled to be considered. In the present set of cases, counsel for the petitioners has not been able to refer to any averment in any of the petitions which may show that the petitioners have relied upon any scheme. No reference to any scheme framed by the Administration is shown to have been made in any of the petitions. In the absence of a clear reference to a particular scheme and without showing that the petitioners fulfil the conditions of eligibility, they are not entitled to claim that the respondents have acted in violation of the provisions of the scheme. Since the petitioners have not even shown that reliance has been placed on any scheme, even the second question has to be answered against them. We do so.

11. Mr. Dhuriwala has placed reliance on two decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. He has referred to the decision in S.B. Kishore v. Union of India and others, AIR 1991 SC 90. It is contended that the owner of land is entitled to allotment under the scheme and delay in claiming the relief cannot stand in his way.

12. It is undoubtedly correct that in view of the decision of their Lordships in S.B. Kishore's case (supra), an owner if eligible under a scheme may be entitled to the allotment of a plot. However, in the present cases, it has not even been averred that the petitioners are owners of any plots. Thus, the claim of their being allotted any alternative site under a scheme to which no reference has been made cannot be sustained.

13. Reference has also been made to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Savitri Devi v. State of Haryana and others, 1995(3) RCR (Civil) 199. This was also a case where the claim of oustees to the allotment of alternative sites under a scheme was sustained. However, in the present cases, the petitioners have not shown their entitlement to the allotment of any plot under any scheme. Thus, the petitioners can derive no advantage from these two decisions.

14. Out of the 17 cases referred to above, the position in CWP Nos. 6336 to 6339, 6341 and 6342 of 1999 is slightly different.

15. The petitioners herein have been allotted sites by the Chandigarh Administration. Their only complaint is that the area allotted to them does not have the basic facilities. Mr. Dhuriwala submits that it is not possible for the petitioners to shift till basic amenities are provided.

16. Mr. Sanjeev Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents has stated that the claim of these petitioners had been considered by the appropriate authority at the relevant time. Since the land was available, the plots were allotted on the basis of eligibility. As for the basic amenities, he has filed an affidavit of the Chief Engineer in CWP No. 6336 of 1999. On the basis of this affidavit, the counsel has stated that the basic amenities like roads, electricity, water supply and sewerage will be provided to the plot-holders by December 31, 2001. He further states that the impugned notices shall not be implemented against them till the facilities are provided. If the facilities are provided before the date given in the affidavit, the petitioners shall be liable to vacate.

17. Since the petitioners in these six cases have been allotted plots and the Administration has undertaken that they will not be forced to shift till the basic amenities are provided, we find that these writ petitions have been rendered infructuous.

18. Before parting, we may observe that it has not been suggested on behalf of the petitioners in the remaining 11 petitions that their cases are identical to those six petitioners. Nor have the petitioners challenged the allotment of plots to the six petitioners in these cases.

No other point has been raised.

In view of the above, the six petitions viz. CWP Nos. 6336 to 6339, 6341 and 6342 of 1999 are disposed of as having been rendered infructuous. The remaining petitions are found to be wholly jacking in merit and are dismissed with costs.

A copy of this order may be given dasti to the counsel for the parties on payment of usual charges.

19. Petitions dismissed.