Delhi District Court
Smt. Indiraa Bhasin vs Smt. Jasvinder Dhandial on 3 March, 2020
IN THE COURT OF ADITI GARG,
ADDITIONAL SR. CIVIL JUDGE (SHAHDARA),
KARKARDOOMA COURTS, DELHI
E. No. 312/19
CIS No.534/2019
In the matter of :
Smt. Indiraa Bhasin
W/o Sh. Chandra Haas Bhasin,
R/o 11/35783579, Netaji Subhash Marg,
Delhi110002 .....................Petitioner
Versus
1. Smt. Jasvinder Dhandial
W/o Sh. Avtar Singh,
R/o D390, Defence Colony,
New Delhi
Second Address:
11/3578, Netaji Subhash Marg,
Delhi110002
2. Sh. Jagdish Pal Singh
S/o Sh. Avtar Singh
R/o D390, Defence Colony,
New Delhi ....................Respondents
ORDER ON LEAVE TO DEFEND
1. The present eviction petition has been filed with respect of one shop at the ground floor at the property bearing number 357879, Netaji Subhash Marg, New Delhi, as shown in the red colour in the site plan, hereinafter referred to as the tenanted premises. It is stated that earlier the property was owned by the grandfather of the petitioner. After CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 1 of 23 his death, the tenanted property devolved upon the mother of the petitioner. The petitioner claims to be the owner and landlord of the tenanted premises vide Registered will dated 9.4.07, executed by mother of the petitioner,and she had passed away on 14.10.2017. That the suit property comprises of 3 shops at the ground floor and residential floors on the upper floors. That the younger son of the petitioner, namely Raaghav Bhasin, aged 18 years , is studying in Amity University , Noida, UP, and he is dependent upon the petitioner. He wants to do consultancy business of photography from the tenanted premises for his livelihood. He has no commercial space in Delhi.
2. Leave to defend by way of affidavit and application has been filed by the respondent, wherein the respondent had taken the following defences: i. That the respondent had paid Rs 9 lacs pagri to the petitioner. ii. That the petitioner had filed eviction petition against the tenants of the adjacent shops and leave to defend had been granted to the respective tenants.
iii. That the petitioner had acquired the tenanted premises by way of transfer, and therefore the petition is barred u/s 14(6) DRC Act iv. That the eviction petition is barred as the tenanted premises fall under Slum Area and no permission from the Slum Authority had been obtained.
v. That the need of the petitioner is in future and not of presentae and CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 2 of 23 therefore the petition is not maintainable.
vi. That the petitioner is having number of properties in Simla and one in East Patel Nagar, Delhi and another in Safdarjung Enclave , Delhi.
vii. That the petitioner is residing in Simla and visits the tenanted shop occasionally. That the floors above the tenanted premises are not being used for residential purposes and they are being utilized for commercial purposes. That the first floor and the mezzanine floor have been rented out in the year 2015 and office at third floor had been sold out to Internet company namely M/S Shivansh Telecommunication in Feb 2018. That M/S Khandani Shafakhana is being run from the second floor of the property. viii. That the son of the petitioner, namely Dhruv resides in Simla and he has no intention of starting his consultancy from Delhi. ix. That son of petitioner, Raghav Bhasin does not require the tenanted premises as he has full fledged house in Safdarjung Enclave which is best suited to fulfill the need of the petitioner. x. That the petitioner and her mother had been selling and letting out different properties, therefore, the need of the petitioner is not bonafide.
xi. That the respondent is deriving his earning from the tenanted shop and grave hardship is going to be caused to him in case leave is not granted.
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3. Reply to the leave to defend had been filed by the petitioners, stating that no pagri was paid as alleged. It is stated that the property in Simla is rented by the petitioner. It is further stated that the property at East Patel Nagar is the joint family property of husband of the petitioner, wherein her husband has a very small share, and the property is residential. That the other property in Simla is yet to be completed and otherwise the same is 300 kms away from Delhi. That the flat in Safdarjung Enclave is residential. It is denied that the petitioner is not residing at the tenanted premises. It is denied that the petitioner is residing at Simla. It is further stated that no commercial activity is permissible in the suit property above ground floor. Petitioner had denied the allegations raised by the respondent, had reaffirmed her bonafide need. It is further stated that no portion was sold off by the petitioner, however, her mother had sold off some part as she was in need of money.
4. Rejoinder to reply to leave to defend had been filed by the respondent, reiterating the defences raised in the leave to defend.
5. Arguments heard address on the application for leave to defend by Ld. Counsel for the petitioners and Ld. Counsel for the respondent had filed written submissions.
6. I have perused the material on the record.
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7. Proviso (e) to Section 14(1) is a special provision which has been enacted by the legislature for the class of landlords who require the premises genuinely and their requirement is bonafide and they do not have any suitable accommodation. The essential ingredients for attracting the proviso (e) of the Section 14(1) are :
a) The said premises are bonafide required by the landlord either for himself or for his family member.
b) The landlord or the family member has no other reasonable suitable accommodation.
These twin thresholds are to be satisfied conjunctively in order to attract the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) and the absence of even one of the said ingredients clearly makes the said provision inapplicable.
The satisfaction of the two requirements of bonafide need and no reasonably suitable accommodation has been time and again emphasized by the Supreme Court of India in several cases and more recently in the case Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal, (2001) 5 SCC 705 wherein the Supreme Court observed thus: "The Legislature in enacting the provision has taken ample care to avoid any arbitrary or whimsical action of a landlord to evict his tenant. The statutory mandate is that there must be first a requirement by the landlord which means that it is not a mere whim or a fanciful desire by him;
further, such requirement must be bonafide which CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 5 of 23 is intended to avoid the mere whim or desire. The 'bonafide requirement' must be in presenti and must be manifested in actual need which would evidence the Court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. The legislative intent is made further clear by making the provision that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. This requirement lays stress that the need is pressing and there is no reasonably suitable alternative for the landlord but to get the tenant evicted from the accommodation. Similar statutory provision is made in subsection (e) of Section 12(1) of the Act in respect of accommodation let for residential purposes. Thus, the legislative mandate being clear and unambiguous, the Court is dutybound to examine not merely the requirement of the landlord as pleaded in the eviction petition but also whether any other reasonably suitable non residential accommodation in his occupation in the city/town is available. The judgment/order of the court/authority for eviction of a tenant which CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 6 of 23 does not show that the court/authority has applied its mind to these statutory requirements cannot be sustained and the superior court will be justified in upsetting such judgment/order in appeal/second appeal/revision. Bonafide requirement, on a first look, appears to be a question of fact. But in recording a finding on the question the court has to bear in mind that statutory mandate incorporated in Section 12(1)(f). If it is found that the court has not applied the statutory provisions to the evidence on record in its proper perspective then the finding regarding bonafide requirement would cease to be a mere finding of fact, for such erroneous finding illegally arrived at would vitiate the entire judgment."
Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean "in good faith and genuine i.e. without fraud or deceit". Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by "requires" is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase "required bonafide" is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 7 of 23 honest desire, in contradistinction with mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of the landlord and its bonafides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the court. In short, the concept of bonafide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own.
The meaning of "bonafide" in the context appears to be in two folds. (a) the need of the landlord must be a genuine one and not a frivolous one. (b) landlord is not motivated by extraneous considerations in trying to recover the possession from the tenant with a view to let it out again to another tenant at a higher rent.
8. The Delhi Rent Control Act is enacted to balance the rights of the landlord and the tenant. Section 14 (1) (e) DRC Act entitles the landlord to file a suit for eviction showing his bonafide requirement when he has no other alternate suitable accommodation so as to fit in his bonafide requirement. This Section is controlled by procedure enumerated in Section 25B DRC Act, which states that the summary procedure is to be followed and leave to defend is to be granted only CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 8 of 23 when the tenant has been able to raise any defence, which if proved, would disentile the landlord of the eviction relief.
9. Before reverting to the facts of the present case, it is imperative to discuss in a nutshell the intention of the legislature while enacting the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
Delhi Rent Control Act was enacted so as to safeguard the interest of the tenant and landlord.
Section 14 enumerates the circumstances under which the landlord can get the premises evicted from the tenant. Essential ingredients of Section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act, 1958 are as under : i. Petitioner is the owner/landlord in respect of the tenanted premises;
ii. He requires the premises bonafidely for himself or for family members dependent upon him;
iii. He has no other reasonable suitable accommodation.
In the present petition, the respondent has raised following defences :
1. That the respondent had paid Rs 9 lacs pagri to the petitioner. Firstly, the respondent had not filed any document in support of the defence taken by him. Furthermore, even if it is assumed that the respondent had given Rs 9 lacs, then also, the payment of the pagri amount does not confer any ownership rights on the respondent CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 9 of 23 and the respondent is at liberty to claim the amount given by taking recourse of law. Since the respondent had been paying the rent, he would be at best a tenant under the petitioner. The defence taken is thus rejected.
2. That the petitioner had filed eviction petition against the tenants of the adjacent shops and leave to defend had been granted to the respective tenants.
The eviction petitions filed against the other tenants was for the bonafide need of the petitioner herself. Furthermore, one such order where leave to defend had been granted had been set aside by Hon'ble Delhi High court and eviction orders have been passed. Hence the defence taken by the respondent is rejected.
3. That the petitioner had acquired the tenanted premises by way of transfer, and therefore the petition is barred u/s 14(6) DRC Act. 14(6) DRC Act applies only where a new right in the property is acquired by way of transfer. In the present case, the petitioner had not acquired a new right in the property by way of will. Hence the bar of section 14(6) DRC is not applicable. Defence is rejected accordingly.
4. That the eviction petition is barred as the tenanted premises fall under Slum Area and no permission from the Slum Authority had CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 10 of 23 been obtained.
It had been held in Madan Lal Gupta Vs. Ravinder Kumar 2000 (2) RCR 698 (SC)/ 17 (1980) Delhi Law Time 344 that Slum Act is not applicable on section 14 (1)(e) DRC Act. The defence is thus rejected.
5. That the need of the petitioner is in future and not of presentae and therefore the petition is not maintainable.
It has been held in Smt. Rajwanti Deve & Anr. Vs. S. Amar Singh 1987 (2) RCR 564;Raghubir Singh vs Virender Kumar 1994 RLR 183;Silverstone Mfg. Co. vs Usha Sai 1995 RLR 24 that the petitioner is entitled to file eviction petition for the growing needs of his children. The petitioner in the present case had stated that the tenanted premises are required for her son. In Mohd Ayub and naother V Mukesh Chand AIR 2012 SC881, it was held that requirement of the petitioner to settle her son cannot be termed as a pretense.
In the present case, the requirement of the petitioner to settle her son who is currently studying cannot be termed as pre mature or fanciful.
Hence the defence taken is rejected.
6. That the petitioner is having number of properties in Simla and one in East Patel Nagar, Delhi and another in Safdarjung Enclave , Delhi.
CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 11 of 23 In Anil Bajaj v. Vinod Ahuja (2014) 15 SCC 610 it has been held that it is not impermissible for the landlord to carry on business from several premises and that it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord how the property belonging to landlord should be utilized by him for the purpose of his business and cannot be a reason for grant of leave to defend.
Similarly, in Ramesh Chand vs. Uganti Devi, 157 (2009) DLT 405, it has been clearly held that"A tenant who alleges that landlord has at his disposal other accommodation has to place before the Ld. ARC some material to show that the landlord has a specific alternative accommodation at his disposal". Mere bald allegation with respect to availability of additional accommodation with the petitioner does not hold any basis and cannot be a basis to deny the petitioner of his right to vacate the tenanted premises for his bonafide requirement".
Furthermore, In Ram Swaroop v. Viney Kumar Mahajan dated 24th July, 2017 in RC Rev. No. 112/2016 and Lalta Prasad Gupta v. Sita Ram dated 2nd August, 2017 in RC Rev. No. 352/2017, it has been held that leave to defend application has to be treated differently from a written statement and on the basis of simple denial of averments in the petition for eviction or by merely making vague averments, leave to defend cannot be obtained and that if the same were to be permitted there would be hardly any case where leave to defend would be refused in as such as the CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 12 of 23 Advocates with their skillful drafting would be able to take pleas in the application for leave to defend irrespective of whether there is any merit therein or not.
Section 25 (B) 5 of the Delhi Rent Control Act requires the tenant to, in the application for leave to defend, disclose facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Rent Act. If the facts disclosed, even though disputed by landlord, even if believed, would not dis entitled the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction under Section 14 (1) (e), then also, no leave to defend has to be granted. Only if the facts disclosed in the application for leave to defend are such which though are disputed by the landlord but on trial if proved would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act, can leave to defend be granted.
When the tenant does not produce anything at all before the Court on the basis whereof there is any chance of the tenant proving what he has stated, the only inference is that the facts disclosed are not capable of being proved and/or not capable of disentitling the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Rent Act.
Hence, the defence taken by the respondent is rejected.
7. That the petitioner is residing in Simla and visits the tenanted shop occasionally. That the floors above the tenanted premises are not CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 13 of 23 being used for residential purposes and they are being utilized for commercial purposes. That the first floor and the mezzanine floor have been rented out in the year 2015 and office at third floor had been sold out to Internet company namely M/S Shivansh Telecommunication in Feb 2018. That M/S Khandani Shafakhana is being run from the second floor of the property.
It is a a well settled law that the tenant cannot dictate the landlord to fulfill his need from the upper floors. In Uday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen Maheshwari (2010) 1 SCC 503, it was held that it is not for the Courts to say that the landlord should shift to the first floor or any higher floor as it is well known that shops and businesses are usually conducted on the ground floor, because the customers can reach there easily. It was reiterated that the Court cannot dictate to the landlord which floor he should use for his business and that is for the landlord himself to decide.
In Viran wali vs Kuldeep kochar 174 (2010) Delhi Law Times, 328 RCR 124/2010 , it was held that It sounds really strange that the owner/landlord should be at the mercy of the tenant for running of his own business in the property owned by him, as per the dictate of tenant. It is well settled law that the shop situated at the ground floor is more convenient than the shop situated at the basement of the premises. The respondent being the owner/landlord of the premises has all the right and choice to start his own business in the premises more suitable and convenient to him.
The landlord knows his need the best and he is the best judge of CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 14 of 23 his need. The defence taken is rejected.
8. That the son of the petitioner, namely Dhruv resides in Simla and he has no intention of starting his consultancy from Delhi. The present eviction petition has been filed for the bonafide need of Raghav, hence defence taken is rejected.
9. That son of petitioner, Raghav Bhasin does not require the tenanted premises as he has full fledged house in Safdarjung Enclave which is best suited to fulfill the need of the petitioner.
It is stated by the petitioner that the property at Safdarjung Enclave is residential, and no document had been filed by the respondent to contradict the same. The property is otherwise a flat, which is meant to be used for residential purposes. The defence taken is thus rejected.
10. That the petitioner and her mother had been selling and letting out different properties, therefore, the need of the petitioner is not bonafide.
The respondent had been unable to show the availability of alternate available commercial accommodation. The properties which the respondent had alleged to have been sold, were sold by the mother of the petitioner. The need of the petitioner to settle her son cannot be said to be devoid of bonafide intention. Even CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 15 of 23 otherwise, the remedy u/s 19 DRC is available to the respondent in case the petitioner does not utilize the tenanted shop after eviction for the said bonafide need. Hence, the defence taken is rejected.
11. That the respondent is deriving his earning from the tenanted shop and grave hardship is going to be caused to him in case leave is not granted.
In Prem Prakash Malik vs Ram Gopal Rajvanshi on 29 August, 2012 RC.Rev.344/2011, Delhi High Court, it had been held that "If a landlord pleads paucity of space which is very evident from the current factual scenario, then it cannot be said that such a plea is guided by any ulterior motive or is unfounded. The landlord cannot be directed to squeeze himself into a space, which is not sufficient to meet the requirement of himself and his sons, who are dependent on him for commercial premises, only to prevent any hardship to the tenant. It is not open to the Court or the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how he should adjust himself only to preclude the tenant from being evicted." Similarly in Ajit Singh Vs. Inder Saran & Ors, 1979 (1) RCR, 602, it was held that It is irrelevant that eviction would cause hardship to tenant."
Hence, in view of the above judgments, it is settled that the hardship which would be caused to the tenant cannot be the ground for granting leave, when the need of the petitioner is bonafide. The defence is thus rejected.
10. It has been held in Baldev Singh v. Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC 778, that the legislative intent of expeditious disposal of application for ejectment of tenant filed on the ground of requirement by the landlord CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 16 of 23 of the premises for his own occupation. A special category of landlords requiring the premises for their own use has been created. If there is any breach by the landlord, the tenant is given a right of restoration of possession. The landlord who evicts a tenant on the ground of own requirement is not only prohibited from letting out the premises or disposing of the same but also required to use the same for his own use only. These restrictions and conditions inculcate in strong presumption that the need of the landlord is genuine, the conditions and restrictions imposed on the landlord make it virtually improbable for the landlord to approach the Court for ejectment of tenant. Unless his need is bonafide, no unscrupulous landlord in all probability, under the Section, would approach the Court for ejectment of a tenant considering the onerous conditions imposed on him. This inbuilt protection in the Act for the tenant implies that whenever the landlord would approach the Court, his requirement shall be presumed to be genuine and bonafide. It was further held that a heavy burden lies on the tenant to prove that the requirement is not genuine.
In view of the above, it can be seen that the respondents have not been able to raise any defence which if proved, would disentitled the petitioner of the relief of eviction. Hence, the leave to defend is denied to the respondents.
Ownership as well as existence of landlordtenant relationship :
11. It is stated by the petitioner that earlier the tenanted CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 17 of 23 property was owned by the grandfather of the petitioner. After his death, the tenanted property devolved upon the mother of the petitioner. The petitioner claims to be the owner and landlord of the tenanted premises vide Registered will dated 9.4.07, executed by mother of the petitioner,and she had passed away on 14.10.2017. The petitioner had placed on record the copy of will dated 9.4.07, death certificate of her mother Mrs Shashi Kumari Kaintal, and house tax receipts. The respondent had admitted that he was paying rent to the mother of the petitioner.
The concept of ownership in a landlordtenant litigation governed by rent control law has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. Ownership is a relative term, the import whereof depends on the context in which it is used. The word "owner" is not used in the Act in the context of an absolute owner. In this regard reference can be have to the decision of the Apex Court in "Shanti Sharma & Ors. Vs. Ved Prabha & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 2028", wherein it was held that : "14. The word 'owner' has not been defined in this Act and the word 'owner' has also not been defined in the Transfer of Property Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant appears to be is that ownership means absolute ownership in the land as well as of the structure standing thereupon. Ordinarily, the concept of ownership may be what is contended by the counsel for the appellant but in the modern context where it is more or less admitted that all lands belong to the State, the persons who hold properties will only be lessees or the CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 18 of 23 persons holding the land on some terms from the Govt. or the authorities constituted by the State and in this view of the matter it could not be thought of that the Legislature when it used the term 'owner' in the provision of Sec. 14 (1) (e) it thought of ownership as absolute ownership. It must be presumed that the concept of ownership only will be as it is understood at present. It could not be doubted that the term 'owner' has to be understood in the context of the background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. This Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the same time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bonafide requirement is one of such grounds on the basis of which landlords have been permitted to have eviction of a tenant. In this context, the phrase 'owner' thereof has to be understood, and it is clear that what is contemplated is that where the person builds up his property and lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use, he should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction, the only thing necessary for him to prove is bonafide requirement and that he is the owner thereof. In this context, what appears to be the meaning of the term 'owner' is visavis the tenant i.e. the owner should be something more than the tenant."
In another case law, "Rajender Kumar Sharma & Ors. Vs. Leela Wati & others, 155 (2008) DLT 383", it was laid down that a landlord is not required to prove absolute ownership as required under CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 19 of 23 Transfer of Property Act and he is required to show only that he is more than a tenant. Same was the ratio of decision given in "Jiwan Lal Vs. Gurdial Kaur & Ors. 1995 RLR 162." Further, the High Court of Delhi made important observations in the decision given in the case titled as "Ramesh Chand Vs. Uganti Devi, 157 (2009) DLT 450" it has been held that it is settled preposition of law that in order to consider the concept of ownership under Delhi Rent Control Act, the Court has to see the title and right of the landlord qua the tenant. The only thing to be seen by the Court is that the landlord had been receiving rent for his own benefit and not for and on behalf of someone else. If the landlord was receiving rent for himself and not on behalf of someone else, he is to be considered as the owner, howsoever imperfect his title over the premises may be. The imperfectness of the title of the premises cannot stand in the way of an eviction petition under Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act, neither the tenant can be allowed to raise the plea of imperfect title or title not vesting in the landlord and that too when the tenant has been paying rent to the landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act creates estoppels against such a tenant. A tenant can challenge the title of landlord only after vacating the premises and not when he is occupying the premises. In fact, such a tenant who denies the title of the landlord, qua the premises, to whom he is paying rent, acts dishonestly......".
The respondent had acknowledged the petitioners to be the landlord in the petition under Section 27 DRC Act, hence, he is estoped from challenging the ownership of the petitioners under Section 116 of CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 20 of 23 The Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
Hence, in view of the above, it can be averred that the petitioner is entitled to file the eviction petition and get the tenanted premsies evicted u/s 14 (1)(e) DRC Act.
Bonafide requirement :
12. The present eviction petition had been filed for the the younger son of the petitioner, namely Raaghav Bhasin, aged 18 years. It is stated that he is studying in Amity University , Noida, UP, and he is dependent upon the petitioner. He wants to do consultancy business of photography from the tenanted premises for his livelihood. He has no commercial space in Delhi.
On this issue, reliance can be placed on the judgment tiled as "Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., reported as AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 100", whereby it was held that :
".....The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a primafacie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by Courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 21 of 23 landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bonafides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself....".
Hence, in view of the above, the need of the petitoner to settle her son from the tennated premsies is considered to be bonafide.
Availability of alternative suitable accommodation :
13. The petitioner had stated that they have no other suitable accommodation available to them and the tenanted premises is the best suitable for the bonafide need.
14. In Labhu Lal v. Sandhya Gupta, 173 (2010) DLT 318, it was held that "Before leave to defend is granted, the respondent must show that some triable issues which disentitled the applicant from getting the order of eviction against the respondent and at the same time, entitled the respondent to leave to defend existed. The onus is prima facie on the respondent and if he fails, the eviction follows."
15. In view of the discussion made above, the respondents herein have been unable to raise any defence which is substantial or which if proved, would disentitle the petitioner of the relief of eviction. Merely vague pleas have been taken by the respondents which are not substantiated primafacie. Since no such defence has been raised by the CIS No. 534/2019 Indiraa Bhasin vs Jasvinder Dhandial and ors. Page no. 22 of 23 tenant, leave to defend is denied to him.
16. Hence, the application for leave to defend filed by respondent is ordered to be dismissed. Consequently, eviction order is liable to be passed against the respondent u/s Section 25 B (4) of the Act. In view of above, petitioners are held entitled for recovery of the tenanted premises, one shop at the ground floor at the property bearing number 357879, Netaji Subhash Marg, New Delhi, as shown in the red colour in the site plan,. However, the petitioners would not be entitled to initiate execution proceedings for recovery of possession of the tenanted premises before expiration of six months from today in view of provisions given in Section 14 (7) of the Act. Keeping in view the facts & circumstances of the case, no order as to costs.
Announced in open Court (Aditi Garg)
on 3rd Day of March 2020 ASCJ (Shahdara)
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi
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