Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
A.S.V. Krishnam Rajudead vs The Deputy Director Of Enforcement on 28 March, 2025
Author: Ninala Jayasurya
Bench: Ninala Jayasurya
NJS, J & JS, J
CMSA_11_2024
CMSA_1
APHC010292602024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3494]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY,, THE TWENTY EIGHTH DAY OF MARCH
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NINALA JAYASURYA
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS SECOND APPEAL N
No: 11 OF 2024
Between:
A.S.V.Krishnam Raju (dead) ...APPELLANT
AND
The Deputy Director off Enforcement ...RESPONDENT
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. Mr.Y SREENIVASA REDDY Mr. C.V.NARASIMHAM NARASIMHAM Counsel for the Respondent:
1. Mr.JOSYULA JOSYULA BHASKARA RAO RAO, Standing tanding Counsel for Enforcement Directorate 2 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 The Court made the following JUDGMENT:
(Per Hon'ble Sri Justice Ninala Jayasurya) The present Appeal has been preferred against the order of the Appellate Tribunal under SAFEMA at New Delhi, dated 13.05.2024 passed in FPA-PMLA-227/HYD/2011. Vide said order, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the Miscellaneous Application i.e., MP-PMLA-
12750/HYD/2023 (Misc.), seeking to bring on record the Legal Representative of the deceased appellant, as also the appeal.
2. Heard Mr. C.V.Narasimham, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr.Josyula Bhaskar Rao, learned counsel for the respondent.
3. The brief narrative of the case for better appreciation and adjudication of questions of law may be stated thus:
4. One Mr.A.S.V.Krishnam Raju filed the above said appeal i.e., FPA- PMLA-227/HYD/2011 under Section 26 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (for short "the PMLA") against the orders passed by the Adjudicating Authority in OC No.38/2009, dated 14.01.2010. The genesis for the complaint was a letter dated 07.01.2009 addressed by Mr. B.Ramalinga Raju to the shareholders of M/s.SCSL (Satyam Computer Services Limited) intimating that books of accounts of M/s.SCSL were falsified and the financial figures were inflated and the FIR registered on 09.01.2009 on a complaint by one of the investors against Mr.Ramalinga Raju and other promoters of M/s.SCSL under Section 120B r/w Section 406, 420, 467, 471 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code. The case was 3 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 subsequently taken over by the CBI. Since the commission of offence under Section 467 of IPC is a scheduled offence under the PMLA, the Enforcement Directorate registered a case by filing ECIR dated 23.01.2009. Based on the charge sheet filed by the CBI dated 07.04.2009 and further investigations, having come to a conclusion that the offences of money laundering within the meaning of Section 3 of PMLA was committed, the Deputy Director of Enforcement Directorate, Hyderabad Zone Unit / the respondent issued a Provisional Attachment Order PAO No.1/2009, dated 18.08.2009, provisionally attaching the various properties of M/s SCSL and its Directors, including the properties of the appellant in the above mentioned appeal i.e., Mr.A.S.V.Krishnam Raju.
5. Subsequently, the respondent filed a complaint vide OC No.38/2009 before Adjudicating Authority as required under Section 5 (5) of the PMLA and the said authority issued notices to the defendants therein. Mr. A.S.V.Krishnam Raju, who was arrayed as defendant No.102 in the complaint, submitted his objections along with others. Thereafter, the Adjudicating Authority vide orders dated 14.01.2010 confirmed the order of Provisional Attachment and directed that the attachment of the properties shall: (a) continue during the pendency of the proceedings relating to the schedule offences before the Trial Court; and (b) become final after the guilt of the persons is proved in the Trial Court and order of such Trial become final.
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6. Aggrieved by the orders of the Adjudicating Authority Mr.A.S.V.Krishnam Raju filed the above mentioned appeal raising various grounds. During the pendency of the appeal, he died on 20.03.2018 leaving behind his legal heir one Smt.A.Santhi Padma Nagaveni, daughter. Seeking to record her as Legal Representative of deceased- appellant in the appeal pending before the Appellate Tribunal under SAFEMA, she filed a miscellaneous application and the same was dismissed vide impugned order. The Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal also dismissed the Appeal as abated in view of the death of the appellant in the said Appeal. Aggrieved by the said order, Smt.Nagaveni, filed the present appeal.
7. Mr. Narasimham, learned counsel made submissions, inter alia, that the late Mr.A.S.V.Krishnam Raju, who was working as Assistant General Manager in M/s.Maytas Properties Ltd., purchased agricultural property of an extent of Ac.6-00 cents, for a valuable sale consideration out of the salary amounts received from M/s MAYTAS Pvt. Ltd., and the same was attached by the Enforcement authorities and the Adjudicating Authority confirmed the same without considering the objections of the Mr.Krishnam Raju. He submits that assailing the said order of the Adjudicating Authority an appeal vide FPA-PMLA-227/HYD/2011 was filed raising various factual and legal contentions and during the pendency of the said appeal Mr.Krishnam Raju died on 20.03.2018. He submits that the appeal was filed in the year 2010 and on receipt of intimation about its 5 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 hearing in the year 2023 received from the counsel representing Mr.Krishnam Raju, his daughter filed an application No.MP-PMLA- 12750/HYD/2023 (Misc.) to record her as legal representative of the deceased-appellant before the Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal, but the same was dismissed vide Order dated 13.05.2024 and the Tribunal also dismissed the Appeal on the premise that the same is abated. In elaboration, he submits that the Appellate Tribunal rejected the LR application on the ground that the same was filed beyond the normal period of limitation of 90 days as prescribed under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'C.P.C.'), and such an application beyond the reasonable period of 90 days may be filed, but it should be supported with an application for condonation of delay by explaining the reasons, but no such application was filed in the instant case. He submits that the order under challenge is misconceived, violative of principles of natural justice and not sustainable. Referring to the provisions of the PMLA and the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, he seeks to set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal.
8. The arguments of the learned counsel may be summarized as follows:
a) Section 72 of the PMLA enables the continuation of the appeal, even if the original appellant dies during the pendency of the appeal.6
NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024
b) The Appellate Tribunal went wrong in dismissing the appeal as abated when the legal representative of the deceased-appellant had filed an application to come on record so as to continue the proceedings.
c) The Appellate Tribunal went wrong in dismissing the LR application by referring to Limitation Act without appreciating that the said Act does not apply to the proceedings before the quasi-judicial authorities and Tribunals, but only to the Courts in terms of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.
d) Application of the provisions of C.P.C., i.e., Order 22 of C.P.C., by the Appellate Tribunal in the light of Section 35 (1) of the PMLA providing specifically that the Appellate Tribunal is not bound by the procedure laid down by the C.P.C., is wholly unsustainable.
e) No separate procedure with regard to filing of LR application under PMLA is prescribed nor were any rules framed, in the absence of which, dismissal of LR application on the premise that the same is barred by limitation is not tenable.
f) When PMLA does not prescribe limitation, resort cannot be made to the Limitation Act.
g) The impugned order is violative of principles of natural justice as the Appellate Tribunal did not give opportunity for filing a petition to condone the delay in making application for bringing the LR on record, assuming that the time limit under the Limitation Act is applicable.
h) When the special statute does not contain a provision for limitation, a broader and liberal approach shall be adopted while dealing with the applications filed by the Legal Representatives of the deceased parties.
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i) An appeal is statutory right and cannot be denied on technical grounds, more particularly when the right to property proposed to be denied.
j) The Appellate Tribunal went wrong in not noting that the property of the applicant's father was not confiscated, but only attached and that on the death of the appellant, the property attached has to be released.
9. The learned counsel also referred to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ganesan Rep. by its Power Agent G. Rukmani Ganesan v. Commissioner, Tamilnadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board and Others1; M.P. Steel Corporation v Commissioner of Central Excise2; Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and Others3; L.S. Synthetics Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd.,4 Commissioner of Sales Tax, UP, Lucknow v. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur5; U. Subadramma v State of Andhra Pradesh6; Indus Ind Media and Communication Ltd., Vs Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal and another7 etc., and seeks to set aside the order under appeals by answering the questions of Law in favour of the appellant.
10. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent made submissions to sustain the order of the Appellate Tribunal. He submits 1 (2019) 7 SCC 108 2 (2015) 7 SCC 58 3 (2008) 7 SCC 169 4 (2004) 11 SCC 456 5 (1975) 4 SCC 22 6 2016 (7) TMI 1514 = AIR 2016 SC 3095 = AIR 2016 SC (Crl) 1214 7 2012 SCC OnLine Bom 799-Bombay High Court 8 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 that the order of the Appellate Tribunal is well considered, contains cogent reasons and warrants no interference by this Court. He submits that the present appeal is filed only with a view to drag on the proceedings. Referring to the averments made in the counter affidavit, he submits that though Section 72 of the PMLA does not specify the time limit within which an application for bringing the legal representatives should be filed before the Tribunal, the other provisions of the Act i.e., Section 35 enables the Appellate Tribunal to regulate its own procedure including, by following the provisions of C.P.C., or the Limitation Act. He submits that the Appellate Tribunal had not committed any wrong as sought to be projected, as the provisions of the C.P.C., and Limitation Act are taken as guiding factors. He submits that the application to bring the legal representative on record should have been filed within 90 days, that in the present case, no explanation was offered for the delay and no petition was filed setting out sufficient reasons seeking condonation of delay in filing the LR petition. Therefore, the learned Appellate Tribunal was right in passing the impugned order, he adds.
11. Referring to Section 26(3) of the Act, the learned counsel for the respondent contends that the time limit for preferring the Appeal is also applicable to miscellaneous applications. He also submits that as the order under challenge was passed after hearing the counsel, the contention that the same is violative of principles of natural justice merits no appreciation. While relying on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme 9 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 Court of India reported in Puran Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others8; Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy and others9; Surendra Kumar v. Union of India10 and United Bank of India v. Golam Hossian Halder11 etc., he seeks to dismiss the appeal.
12. On a consideration of the submissions made, the following questions of law arise for adjudication -
A) Whether the impugned order by which the Hon'ble Tribunal dismissed the LR petition, and the appeal on the ground of delay in filing the LR petition is legal and correct in the absence of any specific limitation prescribed under Section 72 of PMLA?
B) Whether the Hon'ble Tribunal erred in applying the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to the proceedings under the PMLA when Section 35 of the PMLA clearly stipulates that the provisions of CPC are not applicable to it, in the absence of any regulations? C) Whether the impugned order of the Hon'ble Tribunal was passed in violation of principles of natural justice and dismissal of the LR petition and the appeal as abated without giving proper opportunity to the appellant to defend her case is sustainable?
8 (1996) 2 SCC 205 9 AIR 2003 SC 3592 10 2023 Law suit (All) 1291 11 1997 Lawsuit(Cal) 163 10 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024
13. For determination of the questions of Law with reference to the rival contentions, the relevant provisions of the PMLA, may be referred to. As per Section 2 (a) - "Adjudicating Authority" means an Adjudicating Authority appointed under sub-section (1) of Section 6 and; as per Section 2 (b) "Appellate Tribunal" means the Appellate Tribunal [referred to in] Section 25; Section 6 deals with Adjudicating Authorities, composition, powers etc., Chapter XI of the PMLA deals with the Appellate Tribunal and the provisions relating to the same.
14. Sections 25, 26, 35 and 42 of PMLA, which are relevant in the present context, are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:
25 : Appellate Tribunal: The Appellate Tribunal constituted under Sub-
section (1) of Section 12 of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 shall be the Appellate Tribunal for hearing appeals against the orders of the Adjudicating Authority and the other authorities under this Act. 26 : Appeal to Appellate Tribunal: 1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (3), the Director or any person aggrieved by an order made by the Adjudicating Authority under this Act, may prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.
(2) Any 2(reporting entity) aggrieved by any order of the Director made under sub-section (2) of Section 13, may prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.
(3) Every appeal preferred under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be filed within a period of forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order made by the Adjudicating Authority or Director is received and it shall be in such form and be accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed:
Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving an opportunity of being heard, entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of 11 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 forty-five days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period.
35. Procedure and powers of Appellate Tribunal:-
(1) The Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to the other provisions of this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall have powers to regulate its own procedure.
(2) The Appellate Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging its functions under this Act, the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908 ) while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely:-
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;
(c) receiving evidence an affidavits;
(d) subject to the provisions of Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, requisitioning any public record or document or copy of such record or document from any office;
(e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents;
(f) reviewing its decisions;
(g) dismissing a representation for default or deciding it ex parte;
(h) setting aside any order or dismissal of any representation for default or any order passed by it ex parte; and
(i) any other matter, which may be, prescribed by the Central Government.
(3) An order made by the Appellate Tribunal under this Act shall be executable by the Appellate Tribunal as a decree of civil court and, for this purpose, the Appellate Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil court.12
NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3), the Appellate Tribunal may transmit any order made by it to a civil court having local jurisdiction and such civil court shall execute the order as if it were a decree made by that court.
(5) All proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of Sections 345 and 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1874).
42. Appeal to High Court:-
Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law or fact arising out of such order. Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a period not exceeding sixty days.
Explanation:- For the purposes of this section, "High Court" means-
(i) the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the aggrieved party ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; and
(ii) where the Central Government is the aggrieved party, the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the respondent, or in a case where there are more than one respondent, any of the respondents, ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.
15. In the present case, as noted earlier, Mr.Krishnam Raju filed an appeal against the orders of the Adjudicating Authority before the Appellate Tribunal and the same was entertained, but during the pendency of the appeal, he died. In view of the same, his legal heir 13 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 Smt.Nagaveni, filed an application for bringing her on record as legal representative of the deceased-appellant, inter alia stating that she is having the rights and interest in the issue pending adjudication before the Appellate Tribunal.
16. In the order under challenge, the Appellate Tribunal opined that "Section 72 of the Act of 2002 does not provide limitation and this Tribunal is not bound by the procedure laid down under the Code of Civil Procedure where order 22 provides for substitution of deceased with legal heirs and if it is read with Article120 of Limitation Act, it provides limitation of three months from the date of death. The application in these Appeal have been preferred beyond the period of 90 days."
17. Stating that the question for its consideration would be about the application of C.P.C., and observing inter alia that it is not bound by the procedure under Code of Civil Procedure, but that does not mean that the provisions of C.P.C., cannot be applied to guide itself to take an appropriate measure to the requirements, and that Article 120 of the Limitation Act provides three (3) months period for filing an application, the learned Appellate Tribunal opined that it is appropriate to apply the said period of limitation, as otherwise the Tribunal is clothed with power to regulate its own procedure. It also observed that the reason for the application of Article 120 of the Limitation Act is to keep the proceedings alive in the hands of one who can pursue, otherwise it would be in the hands of a dead person, who cannot pursue the litigation and therefore, 14 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 the substitution of the deceased is to be made within a reasonable time. It expressed the view to the effect that application for substitution of deceased after reasonable period of three months can be filed, but it is to be supported by an application for condonation of delay, after explaining the reasons, but no application was filed for condonation of the delay in the case before it. It also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shri Puran Singh v. State of Punjab12. The Appellate Tribunal while dismissing the said application also dismissed the Appeal as abated. However, this Court is not inclined to subscribe to the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal.
18. Article 120 of the Limitation Act reads as follows:
Art.No. Description of Application Period of Time from which limitation period beings to run
120. Under the Code of Civil Ninety days The date of death of Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), to the plaintiff, have the legal representative of appellant, defendant a deceased plaintiff or appellant or respondent as or of a deceased defendant or the case may be.
respondent, made a party.
19. Further, the Order 22 of C.P.C., deals with death, marriage and insolvency of parties and Order 22, Rule 2 contemplates the procedure where one of the several plaintiffs or defendants dies and right to sue survives. The said provisions which are the basis for the orders under challenge cannot be made applicable to the PMLA, which is a special enactment. In fact, the Code of Civil Procedure had limited application to 12 (1996) 2 SCC 205 15 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 the Appellate Tribunal in respect of the matters as set out in Section 35, extracted above. From a plain reading of the said provision, it is clear that the Appellate Tribunal is not bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, but it should be guided by the principles of natural justice and it shall have the powers to regulate its own procedure. When the provision i.e., Section 35 contemplates the application of Code of Civil Procedure to the extent indicated therein and that the Appellate Tribunal is not bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, provisions of Order 22 C.P.C., though there is no absolute bar, in the opinion of this Court cannot be pressed into service, in the absence of any regulations / rules formulating the procedure or making it applicable to the matters before the Appellate Tribunal, more particularly in view of the Section 72 of the Act, which enables continuation of proceedings in the event of death or insolvency. The said section reads as follows:
72. Continuation of proceedings in the event of death or insolvency:- 1) Where -
a) any property of a person has been attached under Section 8 and no appeal against the order attaching such property has been preferred; or
b) any appeal has been preferred to the Appellate Tribunal, and-
(i) in a case referred to in clause (a), such person dies or is adjudicated an insolvent before preferring an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal; or
(ii) in a case referred to in clause (b), such person dies or is adjudicated an insolvent during the pendency of the appeal, 16 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 Then, it shall be lawful for the legal representatives of such person or the official assignee or the official receiver, as the case may be, prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal or as the case may be, to continue the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, in place of such person and the provisions of Section 26 shall, so far as may be, apply, or continue to apply, to such appeal. (2) where -
(a) after passing of a decision or order by the Appellate Tribunal, no appeal has been preferred to the High Court under Section 42; or
(b) any such appeal has been preferred to the High Court, then -
(i) in a case referred to in clause (a), the person entitled to file the appeal dies or is adjudicated an insolvent before preferring an appeal to the High Court, or
(ii) in a case referred to in clause (b), the person who had filed the appeal dies or its adjudicated an insolvent during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court, then, it shall be lawful for the legal representatives of such person, or the official assignee or the official receiver, as the case may be, to prefer an appeal to the High Court or to continue the appeal before the High Court in place of such person and the provision of Section 42 shall, so far as may be, apply, or continue to apply, to such appeal. (3) The powers of the official assignee or the official receiver under sub-
section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be exercised by him subject to the provisions of the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909 (3 of 1909) or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (5 of 1920), as the case may be.
20. A close reading of the above provision of law, to the mind of this Court, is indicative of the intention of the legislature of continuation of proceedings in the event of death or insolvency and it shall be lawful for the legal representative of an appellant, who dies during the pendency of an appeal to continue the same before the Appellate Tribunal in the place 17 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 of the deceased - appellant. No time limit was prescribed for making of an application for continuation of proceedings / appeal by the legal representatives of the appellant.
21. At this juncture, it may be appropriate to refer to the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent that as Section 26 stipulates 45 days time for preferring appeal against the order made by the Adjudicating Authority, the same shall be applicable in case of L.R., applications. The said contention is far-fetched. The provisions specifically dealing with filing of appeal cannot be extended to L.R., applications, thereby introducing something, which is not contemplated by the Legislature.
22. Insofar as the applicability of the Limitation Act is concerned, in Ganesan's case referred to supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with an appeal arising under the provisions of the Tamilnadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (for short 'the Act'). In the said case, the Commissioner of Endowments passed an order condoning the delay of 266 days in filing the appeal. Challenging the same, a writ petition was filed before the High Court of Madras. The learned Single Judge, dismissed the writ petition holding that in appeal proceedings before the Commissioner, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is fully applicable and there is sufficient cause and the delay was rightly condoned by the Commissioner. Against the orders of the learned Single Judge, a Writ Appeal was preferred and a Division Bench, after referring 18 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 to the provisions of the Act held that it does not exclude the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963.
23. In the appeal carried against the said decision, referring to the earlier legal precedents including M.P.Steel Corporation's case, wherein it was inter alia opined that the Limitation Act applies only to Courts and not to the Tribunals etc; the Hon'ble Supreme Court answered the questions formulated by it at Para Nos.60.1 and 60.2 as follows:
60.1 The applicability of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act is with regard to different limitations prescribed for any suit, appeal or application when to be filed in a court.
60.2 Section 29 (2) cannot be pressed in service with regard to filing of suits, appeals and applications before the statutory authorities and tribunals provided in a special or local law. The Commissioner while hearing of the appeal under Section 69 of the 1959 Act is not entitled to condone the delay in filing appeal, since, provision of Section 5 shall not be attracted by strength of Section 29 (2) of the Act.
24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court ultimately allowed the appeal by concluding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable as per the scheme of the 1959 Act.
25. In M.P.Steel Corporation's case, the appellant before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was challenging the order of Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT). The Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay stating that the same was filed beyond the period of 60 days + 30 days provided for in Section 128 of the Customs Act. On Appeal, CESTAT dismissed the 19 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 appeal stating that the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) had no power to condone the delay beyond the period specified in Section 128 of the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia examined the point as to whether the Limitation Act applies to only Courts and not to Tribunals with reference to a series of decisions, wherein it was laid down that the Limitation Act applies only to Courts and does not apply to quasi judicial bodies.
26. Referring to the decisions in Parson Tools & Plants and Consolidated Engg. Enterprises, the Hon'ble Supreme Court at Para No.32 opined as follows:
"32. Obviously, the ratio of Mukri Gopalan( reported in (1995) 5 SCC
5) does not square with the observations of the three-Judge Bench in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises (reported in (2008) 7 SCC 169). In the later case, this Court has unequivocally held that Parson Tools (reported in 1975 SCC (Tax) 185) is an authority for the proposition that the Limitation Act will not apply to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals. To the extent that Mukri Gopalan (reported in (1995) 5 SCC
5) is in conflict with the judgment in Consolidated Enggl. Enterprises case, it is no longer good law."
27. After thorough analysis of the matter, the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the order of CESTAT and remanded the same for consideration on merits.
28. In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises case, a Three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with a matter arising under the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, vis-à-vis, 20 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 the provisions of the Limitation Act, J.M.Panchal, J, speaking for himself and Bala Krishnan, C.J., while observing that on review of the provisions of the Act of 1996, no provision was found which excludes applicability of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an application submitted under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and that on the contrary Section 43 makes the provisions of Limitation Act applicable to Arbitration proceedings held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside the award made by the arbitrator. In a separate, but concurring judgment, Raveendran, J., at Para No.44 held as follows:
"44. It may be noticed at this juncture that the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes the period of limitation only to proceedings in courts and not to any proceeding before a tribunal or quasi-judicial authority. Consequently Section 3 and 29 (2) of the Limitation Act will not apply to proceedings before the tribunal. This means that the Limitation Act will not apply to appeals or applications before the tribunals, unless expressly provided."
29. In L.S.Synthetics Ltd., case referred to supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to examine the provisions of the Special Courts (Trial of offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992. A Three Member Bench inter alia held that the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable only in relation to certain applications and not all applications, despite the fact that the words "other proceedings" were added in the long 21 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 title of the Act in 1963, and that the provisions of the said Act are not applicable to the proceedings before bodies other than courts, such as a quasi judicial Tribunal or even an executive authority. At Para No.41 the Apex Court held that "a statute of limitation bars a remedy and not a right. Although a remedy is barred, a defence can be raised. In construing a special statute providing for limitation, consideration of plea of hardship is irrelevant. A special statute providing for special or no period of limitation must receive a liberal and broader construction and not a rigid or a narrow one. The intent and purport of Parliament enacting the said Act furthermore must be given its full effect." The Hon'ble Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have no application in relation to the proceedings under the Special Court (Trial of offences relating to the Transactions in Securities) Act.
30. A conspectus of the above decisions makes it clear that when the specific Act does not prescribe limitation, the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be made applicable. As noted earlier, no regulations were framed providing for time limit in respect of applications for continuation of the proceedings under Section 72 by the legal representative on the death of the appellant. In the absence of the same, the Tribunal artificially brought in the 90 days time limit which is not tenable and its order rejecting the application on the premise that it was filed beyond the period of 90 days time is erroneous.
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31. Further, PMLA is a complete Code itself and Section 72 of the Act enables continuation of the appeal by the legal representative/s of the deceased - appellant, without imposing any conditions. A plain reading of Section 72 of the Act, makes it clear that it shall be lawful for the legal representative of a deceased- appellant to continue the appeal before the appellant Tribunal. A right to continue the appeal has been statutorily provided under Section 72 (1) (b) of the Act, and deprivation of the same on the ground of Limitation or for want of petition to condone the delay is not just. The order under challenge, in the considered opinion of this Court is contrary to the statutory provisions and the same is not sustainable. In the light of the conclusions, the order of the appellate Tribunal in dismissing the L.R., Petition is not correct. Accordingly, Question No.1 is answered.
32. The order of the Tribunal pressing into service the provisions of C.P.C., i.e., Order 22 and thereby dismissing the appeal as abated is also not tenable. Even if the appeal is abated, the right conferred under statute viz., Section 72 cannot be taken away on the ground that no formal application to condone the delay was filed. As noted earlier, Section 35 provides for limited application of the provisions of the C.P.C., and no regulations have been framed formulating the procedure / applicability of provisions of C.P.C., under Order 22 etc. If the Appellate Tribunal's order dismissing the appeal as abated is to be accepted, the same would render Section 72 (1)(b)(ii) of the Act otiose. The very fact 23 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 that continuation of appeal or filing of an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal in terms of Section 72(1) and continuation of appeal or filing of appeal before the High Court under Section 72 (2) would indicate that the proceedings under the Act can be continued even after the death of a party / appellant and that the death would not automatically result in termination of the proceedings.
33. Further, in the present case, the legal heir of the deceased / appellant filed the application to record her as legal representative while the appeal is pending. The Appellate Tribunal, in such circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Court should have allowed the same and decided the matter on merits taking a liberal view rather than rejecting it on technicalities.
34. The learned counsel for the respondent sought to impress this Court by relying on the decisions in 1) Puran Singh & Others v. State of Punjab & Others13, 2) Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Collie Sangham v. K.Suresh Reddy & Others14 and 3) United Bank of India v. Golam Hossian Halder15, but the same are not of much aid, in view of the conclusions arrived at by this Court with reference to the statutory provisions and the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed supra.
13 (1996) 2 SCC 205 14 AIR 2003 SCC 3592 15 1997 LawSuit(Cal) 163 24 NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024
35. Though the order under challenge indicates that the Appellate Tribunal had heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the legal representative of the deceased - appellant, in consonance with the principles of natural justice, as the same is not sustainable for the conclusions arrived at supra, the same is liable to be set aside. Questions of Law 2 and 3 are answered, accordingly.
36. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order passed in MP-PMLA-12750/HYD/2023(Misc.) and FPA-PMLA-227/HYD/2011 dated 13.05.2024 are set aside. The application filed by the legal representative of deceased appellant before the Appellate Tribunal under SAFEMA at New Delhi stands allowed and the matter is remanded for passing orders in the appeal on merits, by affording opportunity of hearing to the legal representative of the deceased-appellant and the respondent, in accordance with Law. No order as to costs.
Consequently, the Miscellaneous Applications pending, if any, shall also stand dismissed.
____________________ NINALA JAYASURYA, J ____________________ SUMATHI JAGADAM, J SSV/BLV Dt. 28.03.2025.
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NJS, J & JS, J CMSA_11_2024 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NINALA JAYASURYA THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM C.M.S.A.No: 11 of 2024 Date: 28.03.2025 SSV/BLV