Madras High Court
M. Ramasamy And Anr. vs The Government Of Tamil Nadu ... on 16 March, 1995
Equivalent citations: (1995)2MLJ502
ORDER Kanakaraj, J.
1. The first petitioner is said to have purchased Survey No. 1221 -A measuring 1.72 1/2 acres out of a total extent of 3.45 acres on 17.11.1947 under registered sale deed. The patta for the land is said to stand in the joint names of three others. After the purchase, the land stands registered in the joint names of (1) Perumal Pillai and his two sons, viz., Rengasamy Pillai and Chinnasamy Pillai alongwith the name of the first petitioner. The second petitioner is said to be the widow of the said Rengaswamy Pillai, who dated on 10.8.1987. The first respondent is said to have issued a notification under Section 10 of the Land Acquisition Act, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') on 3.12.1987 in G.O.Ms. (Permanent) No. 2505 proposing to acquire to total extent of 5.07 acres comprised in Survey Nos. 1221/A and 1221/B, on the ground that the same is required for the purpose of providing house sites to Adi Dravidars. The name of the first petitioner does not find a place in the 4(1) notification. The first petitioner had not received any notice for the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The first petitioner, however, issued a Lawyer's notice on 16.3.1966 to both the respondents, claiming title to the property. The respondents did not send any reply. On 5.3.1989, the petitioners had received a notice under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act, calling upon them to attend to an enquiry on 14.3.1989 on which date, the petitioners did appear and objected to the very acquisition itself. The present writ petition is to quash the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act issued in G.O.Ms. (Permanent) No. 2505, dated 3.12.1987 and the declaration made under Section 5 of the Act in G.O.Ms. No. 1890 (Social Welfare), dated 27.7.1988.
2. The grounds taken in the writ petition and as elaborated by learned Counsel for the petitioners are as follows: (1) The notification and declaration are illegal because they fail to contain the name of the first petitioner, even though his name has been registered in the Village Accounts, (2) The petitioners did not have any opportunity to take part in the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, because of the failure, to give notice under the Rules framed under Section 55 of the Act. (3) Notwithstanding the Lawyer's notice, dated 16.3.1988, the declaration made under Section 6 of the Act also did not contain the name of the petitioners. (4) The purpose of acquisition has not been clearly spelt out in the notification because it has not stated as to which of the Adi Dravidars require provision of house sites.
3. A counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondents, wherein the issuance of the notification is not disputed. The names of such of those persons as ascertained from the Village Accounts were included in the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. It is also pointed out that Survey filed No. 1221/B does not belong to the petitioners and it belongs to one Maruthu Pillai that notices were issued on Perumal Pillai who is the father of Ramasamy Pillai and Chinnasamy Pillai and that the substance of the 4(1) notification was duly published in the locality as required by law. Perumal Pillai, who was served with a notice, did not appear for the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. At the Award enquiry on 14.3.1989, the petitioners did appear. It is also pointed out that the declaration made under Section 6 of the Act contained all the names and that it was not defective in any manner. According to the respondents, the notification is not vague and it cannot be invalidated on that ground. What is more, the counter affidavit further says that the award was passed and pronounced on 20.3.1989, possession of the lands was taken on 24.3.1989, necessary changes in the Villages Accounts were made on 26.3.1989 and pattas were distributed to the beneficiaries on 26.3.1989. The interim stay order granted by this Court was received by the respondents only on 5.4.1989.
4. I have perused the records with reference to the allegations and the counter allegations. A perusal of the 4(1) notification says that as against Survey No. 1221/A, the name shown is Perumal Pillai, S/o. Ramaswamy Pillai. As against Survey No. 1221/B, the name shown in Thangavelu, S/o. Seerangam Pillai. When we come to the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, we find as against Survey No. 1221/A2, the following names as shown. Ramaswamy, son of Marutha Pillai, Rengaswamy and Chinnasamy, sons of Perumal Pillai. As against Survey No. 1221/B, the Name Marutha Pillai, son of Pallikondan Pillai is shown. In the notice under Sections 9(1) and 10 of the Act, as against Survey No. 1221-A2, the following three names are given. (i) Marutha Pillai, son of Ramaswamy, (ii) Kalliyammal, wife of Rengaswamy and legal heirs, (iii) Perumal Pillai, S/o, Chinnaswamy. Thus it is seen that the first petitioner's name did find place in the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, even though it was submitted in the 4(1) notification. Consequently, the first petitioner is right in his contention that he was prevented from appearing for the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, because no notice was served on him for such an enquiry. The notice under Section 5-A of the Act was only served on Perumal Pillai and he did not appear for the enquiry. When a lawyer's notice was given on 16.3.1988, it was the plain duty on the respondents to have called upon the first petitioner to submit his objections and considered the same in accordance with law. To this extent, I have no doubt in my mind that the acquisition proceedings are vitiated. But this will not conclude the matter.
5. The 4(1) notification only stated that the land was required for the purpose of providing house sites to the Adi Dravidars, but did not say the name of the village to which the Adi Dravidars belonged. The declaration made under Section 6 of the Act, however, made it clear that the acquisition was for the purpose of providing houses sites to the Adi Dravidars of Pudukanjamanur. I am therefore of the opinion that since the declaration made under Section 6 of the Act has clearly stated the purpose of the acquisition without any ambiguity, it cannot be stated that the acquisition proceedings are vitiated on this ground.
6. The point for consideration is whether the petitioners can be given the relief, as sought for by them. Learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents says that inasmuch as the acquisition proceedings are complete, in the sense that possession had already been taken and handed over to the beneficiaries, it may not be proper to set aside the notification and declaration under the Act or the declaration only, after giving an opportunity to the respondents to proceed with a fresh enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. He also contends that the petitioners are guilty of laches because at least from the date when they issued a lawyer's notice on 16.3.1988, they must be imputed with the knowledge of the acquisition proceedings and the writ petition was filed on 16.3.1989, exactly one year thereafter. Even assuming that the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made only 27.7.1988, the petitioners are guilty of laches. For the purpose of proving that possession had been taken and pattas had also been issued to the beneficiaries, learned Government Advocate referred me to the files, containing a document signed by the Village Administrative Officer and the State Revenue Inspector, certifying that the lands were taken possession on 24.3.1989. The said document is attested by about eleven persons. There is also evidence to establish that as may as one hundred and thirty-eight beneficiaries (Adi Dravidars) had signed the allotment orders made to them and the list contains the names and the father's names of the allottees against each one of the allottees. The signature of the respective allottees has been obtained. There is also a sketch showing the allotment of the sites to the respective beneficiaries. I do not think that I will be justified in ignoring this evidence and proceed on the basis that possession of the lands had not at all been taken by the respondents. In this regard, learned Counsel for the petitioners has also produced before me an Adangal Account Extract for the Faslis 1339 to 1402, which shows the name of the first petitioner, as being the person cultivating the lands. The Adangal Accounts are prepared by the Village Administrative Officer. The very same Village Administrative Officer has certified the taking of possession by the respondents. I do not wish to attach too much significance to the Adangal Accounts. What is more, in this case when the petition for interim stay came up before this Court for confirmation, Lakshmanan, J., has held on 9.9.1993, that possession had been taken and changes had also been effected in the Revenue Records and consequently, and vacated the interim stay granted earlier.
7. Even so, learned Counsel for the petitioners argues that inasmuch as the entire acquisition proceedings are null and void, the writ petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of laches, learned Counsel for the petitioner goes to the extent of contending that there was no valid acquisition proceedings at all in so far as the first petitioner is concerned because his name did not find a place in the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. But, it must be remembered that the first petitioner's name finds a place in the declaration under Section 6 of the Act and the petitioners have now came forward only to challenge the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and the declaration made under Section 6 of the Act.
8. I will now refer to certain clinching decisions which go against the petitioners, in the, matter of laches and completion of acquisition proceedings. The decision in Hari Singh v. State of U.P. , the following passage is apposite:
At the out set we are of the view that the writ petition filed in July, 1982 questioning the notification issued in January, 1980 after a delay of nearly two and half years is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches only. It is no doubt true that the appellants have pleaded that they did not know anything about the notifications which had been published in the Gazette till they came to know of the notices issued under Section 9(3) of the Act but they have not pleaded that there was no publication in the locality of the public notice of the substance of the notification as required by Section 4(1) of the Act. It should be presumed that official acts would have been performed duly as required by law.
In this case, I have already noticed the fact that the substance of the 4 (1) notification was published in the locality. In the decision in P. Chinnana v. State of A.P. , the facts were as follows: A regulated market sought for acquisition on 23.4.1976. A notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the Act and published in the Government Gazette on 21.7.1977. The said notification had invoked an emergency clause dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. Consequently, a declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made immediately thereafter, a notice under Section 9(1) of the Act was issued and thereafter possession was taken on 10.7.1978. The Supreme Court observed that taking of possession had vested the land absolutely in the State Government free of all encumbrances. Two writ petitions were filed seeking to quash the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in respect of a portion of the land purchased in April, 1977. Those writ petitions were disposed of on 23.8.1982 quashing the declaration under Section 6 of the Act and the dispensation of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act and giving liberty to the Government to conduct a fresh enquiry and proceed further in the matter. The authorities proceeded to conduct a fresh 5-A enquiry and issued a fresh declaration on 29.11.1984 in respect of that portion of the land viz., 1 acre and 29 guntas. Thereafter, Writ Petition No. 13439 of 1986 was filed questioning the fresh declaration. That writ petition was dismissed on 10.3.1989. Again Writ Petition No. 7689 of 1989 was filed and it was also dismissed writ appeals were filed against the said judgments, dated 10.3.1989 and 30.3.1989. The writ appeals were disposed of on 3.8.1993, even though a fresh ground was taken in the Appeals relating to the validity of the declaration made under Section 6(1) of the Act and on the ground that it was barred by limitation. It is in this context that the Supreme Court considered the entire issue and not only dismissed the civil appeals but also held as follows:
Thus, in the circumstances of the case in respect of the land of the appellants, when publication of Section 4(1) notification was made on 21.7.1977, when declaration under Section 6 was published on 21.7.1977 and taking possession of that land under Section 17(1) by the Collector was made on 10.7.1978 and the vesting in the State Government of that land had occurred on that day, setting aside by the judgment of the High Court in W.P. No. 3416 of 1978 of merely the direction given by the Government relating to non applicability of Section 5-A of the land, given on 7.7.1977, in our view did not enable to court order the starting of fresh proceedings for acquisition of the land concerned under Section 5-A, inasmuch as, that land concerned on Section 4(1) notification had already become the land of the Government....
Holding that the appellants were guilty of laches and that the raising of the additional ground should be treated in the same manner as a fresh writ petition, the Supreme Court observed as follows:
In fact, in relation to acquisition proceeding involving acquisition of land for public purposes, the court concerned must be adverse to entertain writ petitions involving the challenge to such acquisition where there is avoidable delay or laches since such acquisition, if set aside, would not only involve enromous loss of public money but also cause undue delay in carrying out projects meant for general public goods....
9. Learned Counsel for the petitioners brought to my notice the observation of the Supreme Court that it was open to the High Court when it quashed the dispensation of the 5-A enquiry to have directed the revesting of the land in the landowners. In my opinion, this observation will not be of any avail to the petitioners. This is because the petitioners names have been found in the declaration under Section 6 of the Act and the petitioners had admittedly knowledge of the acquisition proceedings from 16.3.1988. The prayer in the writ petition is to quash the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Such a prayer is clearly barred by limitation and laches. Learned counsel for the petitioners also has referred to certain other decisions of this Court on the ground of laches, but I am not inclined to refer to the same because of the overwhelming authority of the judgment of the Supreme Court to which I have already made a reference. Exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, I am therefore not inclined to exercise my discretionary power and grant any relief to the petitioners in this case.
10. The writ petition fails and is dismissed. No costs.