Telangana High Court
M. Jagadishwar vs M.Bharathi And 4 Others on 28 May, 2025
Author: T. Vinod Kumar
Bench: T.Vinod Kumar, P.Sree Sudha
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T. VINOD KUMAR
AND
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE P. SREE SUDHA
WRIT PETITION No. 13192 of 2010
&
CONTEMPT CASE No. 232 of 2022
COMMON ORDER:(Per Hon'ble Sri Justice T. Vinod Kumar) Since, the issue involved in this Writ Petition and the Contempt Case are inter-connected both the matters are being disposed of by this common order.
2. The Writ Petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is filed by the petitioners, with the following prayer:
It is therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue appropriate writ or order or direction more particularly one in nature of Writ of Certiorari calling the records in LGA.No.13/2008 dated 18.01.2010 passed by Special Court Under A.P.Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act Hyderabad, setting aside the Judgment and decree in LGA.No. 13/2008, dated 18.01.2010, on the file of Special Court Under A.P.Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act Hyderabad and also the Order and Decree dated 27.09.2007, passed by the Special Tribunal Cum III Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and consequently direct the Respondents 1 & 2 to deliver the possession of the premises bearing H.No.1-7-553 to 556 admeasuring 216 Sq.yds situated at Zamistanpur, Hyderabad to Petitioners and pass such other order or orders this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.
3. Petitioners in the Writ Petition are the petitioners/applicant in the LGOP No.39 of 1997 and LGA No. 13 of 2008. The Special Tribunal-Cum-III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil 2 Court, Hyderabad (in short 'Special Tribunal) in LGOP No.39 of 1997 vide order dt.27.09.2007 and the Special Court Under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act Hyderabad (for short 'Special Court) in LGA No.13 of 2008 vide judgment dated 18.01.2010 held that the petitioners/appellants herein failed to prove the respondents herein as 'land grabbers' and dismissed the same. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Special Court in LGA No.13 of 2008, the present Writ Petition is filed.
4. It is the case of the petitioners that, their father M. Shankaraiah was the absolute owner and possessor of the subject property bearing No.1-7-553 to 556 admeasuring 216 Sq Yds situated at Zamisthanpur, Hyderabad, which was purchased vide Registered Sale Deed dated 17.06.1970 from one M. Jagannatha Swamy and N.Sarojanamma along with her sister viz., Anusuyamma.
5. Petitioners contend that, as on the date of Sale there were tenants existing in the property and subsequent to the purchase of the property, the father of the petitioners used to collect the rents from tenants. When the tenants had defaulted in paying the rents, he filed RC.Nos.181 to 187 of 1973, in the Court of Rent 3 Controller at Hyderabad. Subsequent to the death of M Shankaraiah, the respondent Nos.1 & 2 i.e. legal heirs of the vendors had illegally grabbed the property. Challenging the illegal occupation of the subject property by the respondents, the petitioners had filed LGOP. No.39 of 1997 before the Special Tribunal.
6. Petitioners contend that, the Special Tribunal after considering the evidence had erroneously dismissed the LGOP No.39 of 1997 vide order dated 27.09.2007, contrary to the contents of the Registered sale deed, Ex.A-l i.e. Original Registered Sale Deed in favour of M Shankaraiah wherein it is stated that the possession was delivered to M Shankaraiah as on the date of execution of registered sale deed.
7. It is contended that, the respondent.No.2 produced the Xerox and Carbon copy of Agreement of sale which had no signatures of M Shankaraiah and it was concluded that on the date of execution of sale deed itself, he had entered into agreement of sale with the respondent No.2's father i.e. Jagannatha Swamy. Thus, the Special Tribunal by considering 4 the aforesaid evidence observed that the possession was not delivered to the petitioner's father i.e. M Shankaraiah.
8. The petitioners contend that, the Special Tribunal grossly erred in accepting the said evidence which is against the contents of the sale deed and thereby erred in accepting the document viz. Ex.B-1 i.e. Original Receipt dated 12.12.1975, which was allegedly executed by the father of the petitioner. It is also contended that the Court below did not consider the recitals of the Sale Deed executed by the father of respondent No.2 in correct perspective with regard to delivery of possession made in favour of the father of the petitioners.
9. Petitioners contend that, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 on 01.05.2019 with an intention to change the nature of the property and in order to cause severe loss to the petitioners had demolished the entire structures existing in the subject property. Consequently, the petitioners filed I.A. No.1 of 2019 in W.P. No.13192 of 2010 seeking a direction restraining the respondents not to make any constructions in the subject premises, to which the Respondents Nos.1 & 2 through an undertaking stated that they are only demolishing an already existing old building, 5 which is in a dilapidated condition and asserted that they will not make any constructions over the subject property. The High Court recording the same by its order dated 10.07.2019 disposed the interlocutory application.
10. The petitioners contend that, the respondents Nos.1&2 however, alienated the subject property to the respondent Nos.3 to 7 by different sale deeds. Consequently, the petitioners filed I.A. No.2 of 2020 seeking a direction not to alienate the subject properties to third parties, and the petitioners also filed another interlocutory application vide I.A No.3 of 2020 seeking to implead the purchasers i.e. respondent Nos.5 and 6. This Court by an interim order dated 08.06.2021 directed the respondent No. 7 herein not to alienate the subject property. However, the respondents started constructions in the subject property which is in clear violation of the undertaking given by the Respondents Nos.1 & 2.
11. It is further contended that, the respondents Nos.1 & 2 in order to avoid the contempt proceedings had alienated the subject property to the newly impleaded respondents. Consequently, the petitioners herein filed I.A. No.4 of 2020 6 seeking to direct the respondents not to make any constructions, and this Court by an interim order dated 19.07.2021 directed the respondents not to make any constructions or structures in the subject property premises.
12. The petitioners contend that, intentionally all the respondents are making constructions in the subject property in violation of the order dated 19.07.2021 passed in I.A. No.4 of 2020, which amounts to contempt of Court punishable under Sections 10 to 12 of the Act.
13. Per Contra, the respondent No.2 contends that, Jagannatha swamy is the owner of the subject property who purchased the same along with his two sisters i.e. Sarojanamma and Anasuyamma wherein the respondent No.1's father was holding 1/8th share and Jagannatha swamy purchased undivided share of 1/4th from Anasuyamma vide Registered Sale Deed dated 30.04.1968.
14. It is further contended that, in June 1970 Jagannatha swamy and Sarojanamma borrowed Rs.6000/- from M Shankaraiah i.e. the father of the petitioners, who obtained Registered Sale Deed dated 17.06.1970 towards security and also executed 7 contemporaneous agreement on the same day in favour of Sarojanamma and another, and even after full discharge of the debt, the Sale Deed was not returned and also never acted upon. Subsequently, Jagannatha swamy i.e. the father of the respondent No.2 and Sarojanamma continued in possession of the property which later devolved upon the respondents herein.
15. Respondents further contend that, in a criminal case vide C.C. No.7 of 1979, M Shankaraiah gave evidence and stated that Jagannatha swamy and Sarojanamma are the owners of the subject property and further stated that the respondents had been in possession for a statutory period and also acquired title by adverse possession. Therefore, it is contended that the petitioner's father is not the owner of the subject property. Consideration by Special Court:
16. Basing on the respective contentions, the Special Court had framed the following issues for consideration: -
i. Whether the petitioners were ever in possession of the petition schedule property?
ii. Whether Ex.A-1 sale transaction was nominal and was never acted upon by the parties thereto?
iii. Whether the respondents are land grabbers as defined under Section 2(d) of the Act?8
17. Before the Special Tribunal, the petitioners got themselves examined as PW-1 & 2 and got marked documents i.e. Exs.A-1 to 7. On behalf of the respondents, RWs-1 to 3 were examined and got marked documents Ex. B-1 to 26.
18. The documents relevant for ascertaining the facts of the case would be the i) Registered Sale Deed dated 17.06.1970 in favour of M Shankaraiah marked as Ex.A-1; ii) Property Tax Receipts paid to MCH, Hyderabad marked as Ex.A-2, iii) Registered Sale Deed dated 30.04.1968 executed by Anasuyamma in favour of M Jagannatha Swamy marked as Ex.A-3; iv) Original Receipt dated 12.12.1975 executed by M Shankaraiah marked as Ex.B-1 and v) Certified Copy of Judgment in CC No.7 of 1979 marked as Ex.B2.
The Special Court in LGA No. 13 of 2008 basing on the oral and documentary evidence adduced on both sides and having regard to the points for consideration had observed as under:
I. Para-8:....The LGOP was filed in December 1996. The time gap between the date of filing of LGOP and the date of Ex.A-2 being more than 6 years it would not render any assistance to the petitioners to prove their possession from the date of Ex.A-1 (17-06-1970) to the date of alleged dispossession in 1986.
II. Para-9:.....Ex.B-2 is the CC of Judgment in C.C. No.7/1979 on the file of X Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad filed by Shankaraiah against Jagannathaswamy and Sarojanamma 9 alleging that they were inducing and collecting rents from the tenants of the petition schedule property, suppressing the fact that they sold the petition schedule land to the complainant (Shankaraiah) and causing wrongful loss to him. The said C.C. ended in acquittal. The fact that it is alleged specifically that Jagannathswamy and Sarojanamma were collecting the rentals must be taken note of as admission on the part of Shankaraiah that Jagannathaswamy and Sarojanamma were in possession of the property.Ex.B-3 is the original electricity bill dated 18/6/1997, Ex.B-4 is the property tax receipt dated 14/8/1996 for the period 1/4/1975 to 31/3/1996 and Ex.B-5 is the water bill dated 15/12/1997 relating to the petition schedule property which would afford proof of possession of the respondents.
III. Para-10:.....RW-2 claims to have resided in a portion of the petition schedule property for 25 years where after he shifted to Seetharamnagar, Malkajgiri. He used to pay rent of Rs.14/- initially, which was later enhanced gradually to Rs.300/- by the time of his vacating the premises. ... Thus, it goes without dispute that he was the tenant in the premises for quite a long period. He says that he paid the rents to Jagannathaswamy. R.W.3 claims to be a neighbour to the petition schedule property. He says that all the tenants used to pay the rents to Jagannathaswamy till he died in the year 1981. Thus, it can be seen that in C.C.7/1979 Late Shankaraiah admitted that Jagannatha-swamy and Sarojanamma were collecting rents from the 7 tenants. Ex.B-3 to B-5 and the evidence of R.Ws.2 & 3 firmly go to show that it was Jagannathswamy, who was in possession of the property......The petitioners could not establish that they were in possession of the property at any point of time much less till 1986.10
IV. Para-12:....The fact that Shankaraiah himself filed a Crl. Case against Jagannathswamy and Sarojanamma is proof positive to show that the applicants were never in possession of the same..... NeitherShankaraiah nor the petitioners till the LGOP was filed before lower court in December 1996 made any attempt to recover possession of the petition schedule property from June 1970. Thus, they kept silent for more than 26 years. This conduct of theirs coupled with the above facts renders assistance in coming to the inference that the plea of the respondents that Ex.A-1 was executed as security for the debt incurred by Jagannathaswamywas true. The sale consideration under Ex.A-1 is Rs.6000/-. The pleadings of the respondents and the evidence of R.W.1 are categorical in saying that, Ex.A-1 was executed to serve as security for discharge of the debt of Rs.6000/-.....In Ex.B-1 Late Shankaraiah clearly admitted about Rs.6000/-debt owed by Jagannathswamy and Sarojarramma. A reference is also made to an agreement dated 17th June 1970 executed in respect of the petition schedule property. Ex.A-1 sale deed is also dated 17/6/1970 and the sale consideration was Rs.6000/-. In fact, P.W.1 was confronted with the Xerox copy of the agreement dated 17/6/1970 and also Ex.B-1 receipt and he denied the signatures therein standing in the name of his father Shankaraiah. The original agreement must be in possession of Shankaraiah only. However, since the document was a Xerox copy and Shankaraiah died it appears that the respondents gave up the idea of getting it marked in evidence. We have compared the signatures of M.Shankaraiah obtaining on Ex.B-1 with that of his signatures obtaining on the certified photo copies of Vakalaths (Exs.B-13 to B-19) and certified photo copies of petitions (Exs.B-6 to B-12) in the seven R.C.Cs. Nos. 181 to 187/1973 on the file of Principal Rent Controller of Hyderabad. Those photo signatures are very clear and fit for 11 comparison. The questioned signature on Ex.B-1 tallies with the signatures obtaining in the above documents Exs.B-6 to B-19 in all respects like formation of letters, alignment, speed slant etc., Under Ex.B-1 receipt an amount of Rs.5000/- was paid. Only an amount of Rs.2500/- out of it was appropriated towards (partial) discharge of debt of Rs.6000/-. If the respondents wanted to press into service a forged receipt they would as well have filed a forged receipt for the entire amount due instead of for Rs.2500/-only. This would also probabalise the genuineness of Ex.B-1 receipt. Thus, viewed from any angle Ex.B-1 can be held to be true and genuine. As already stated the fact that the Shankaraiah and the petitioners kept quite for more than 26 years would also support the plea of the respondents that only as security for discharge of debt Ex.A-1 sale deed was executed by Jagannathaswamy and Sarojanamma otherwise Late Shankaraiah would not have kept quite so long and allowed Jagannathaswamy to collect rentals. Thus, the very conduct of the father of the petitioners and the petitioners also would fortify our conclusion that Ex.A-1 was only a nominal sale deed and it was never acted upon.
V. Para-13:....we hold that the petitioners were never in possession of the petition schedule property and Ex.A-1 was a nominal sale deed executed as security for the debt incurred by Jagannathaswamy and Sarojanamma from Shankaraiah and it was never acted upon by the parties thereto.
VI. Para-14:....Petitioners have failed to prove their possession of the petition schedule property at any point of time after Ex.A-1 sale deed. Ex.A-1 being nominal and having not been acted upon, Petitioners have no legal title to the property. Therefore, it cannot be held that the respondents are land grabbers. 12 VII. Para-15: Both sides also referred to a decision of A.P. High Court in Mohammad Vajahath Hussain @ Fasi Vs. Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, Hyderabad and another. 2007 (5) ALD 6 (D.B). In this case the schedule property was described as house with appurtenant land. The Division Bench held:
****** So what need be looked into is pleading. If the petition schedule property has been described as building with appurtenant land, Land Grabbing court will not have jurisdiction, but if it is alleged that land is grabbed along with the existing super structures or building thereon it will become the property in dispute and this court will have jurisdiction.
VIII. Para-16:The learned counsel for the appellant has cited a ruling of this Court rendered in Shantha BaiVs. Mohd. Iqbal 2000 ALD (LGC) 40 wherein it is held that building which is alleged to have been grabbed does not fall within the definition of land and the Special Court will have jurisdiction only in the case of land or in a case where the land is grabbed and subsequently a building was erected thereon.
IX. Para-17: In the present case, the details of the property are mentioned in column No.7, 8 and 9 as under:
7). Survey Number and Sub- H.No.1-7-553 to 556, Divisional number. situated at Jamistanpur, Musheerabad.
8). ****
9). **** It may be noted that as against column No.7 houses numbers are given as 1-7-553 to 556. It evidently indicates that there are 4 houses or a single house bearing 4 house numbers in portions is in existence. Even in Ex.A-1 sale deed the property is described 13 as house bearing Nos.1-7-553 to 556 (Old No.552/A, Block No.7), situated at DayaraJamistanpura, Mushirabad admeasuring 216 square yards. Therefore, what was purchased under Ex.A-1 was house only, but not land. This is not the case where the land is grabbed first and subsequently building was erected thereon. Therefore, Applying both the above decisions, it must be held that this Court has no jurisdiction.
19. The Special Court by applying the decisions of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of Mohammad Vajahath Hussain (Supra) and Shantha Bai (Supra) recorded its finding as above and had held that, the subject property purchased under Ex.A-1 was 'house' but not 'land' and it is not the case where the land is grabbed first and subsequently building was erected. Thus, it held that it did not had jurisdiction under the Act, and accordingly dismissed the appeal.
20. Heard, Sri P.S.P. Suresh Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Sri D. Jagadeeswar Reddy, learned Counsel for respondent Nos.2, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10, Sri M. Vishnuvardhan Reddy, learned Counsel for respondent No.7, learned Government Pleader for Assignment for respondent No.3 and 4 and perused the record.
14
21. It is to be noted that, the Special Tribunal on the evidence adduced by both the parties had observed that, the respondents had grabbed 'house' which was already in existence, and it is not the case where respondents have grabbed the 'land' first upon which have constructed a house thereon unauthorizedly, thus, it held that the respondents are not the land grabbers under the Act.
22. The Special Tribunal, while deciding the question as to the 'land grabbing' had held that it is an activity of grabbing of any 'land' by a person or group of persons without any lawful entitlement and with a view to take illegal possession of such lands etc. and further held that 'land' includes right over the land, benefits to arise out of land and buildings, structures and other things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to earth. Accordingly, by placing reliance on the decision in the case of Shantha Bai (Supra) wherein, it was held that, building which is alleged to have been grabbed does not fall within the definition of 'land' and the Special Court will have jurisdiction only in case of 'land' or 'when the land is grabbed subsequently building was erected there on', the Special Tribunal gave a categorical finding that the house grabbed by the respondents cannot be called as an act of land grabbing 15
23. Thus, the view taken by the Special Court is that if an existing building itself is grabbed, the same will not fall within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal or the Special Court and if the land is grabbed thereafter the structures are raised, it may fall within the jurisdiction of the same.
24. The Special Court by considering the documents marked as Ex.A-1 had noted that the subject property alleged to be grabbed is a 'house' but not 'land' and noted that as it is not the case where the land is grabbed first and subsequently building was erected thereon, the Special Court had no jurisdiction under the Act. The Special Tribunal and Special Court took the aforesaid view by placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Mohammad Vajahath Hussain (Supra).
25. However, the decision of this Court in Mohammad Vajahath Hussain (Supra) has been reversed by the Apex Court in Safiya Bee v. Mohd. Vajahath Hussain1 wherein it was observed as under:
11. The basic question to be considered is whether the High Court was correct in holding that the Appellant's application under Section 7A of the Act was not maintainable before the Special 1 (2011) 2 SCC 94 16 Tribunal "as the property in dispute was a building with its appurtenant land". The Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 was enacted to prohibit the activity of land grabbing in the State of Andhra Pradesh and to provide for matters connected therewith.....
Section 2(c) defines 'land' as hereunder:
'land' includes rights in or over land, benefits to arise out of land and buildings, structures and other things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth The above definition of 'land' makes it clear that the expression 'land' includes "buildings, structures and other things attached to the earth". In view of such inclusive definition of 'land', grabbing a building attached to the earth amounts to land grabbing for the purposes of this Act. Hence, the High Court erred in holding that the Act applies to the land but not to the buildings. The High Court was clearly wrong in holding that "if an application is filed seeking possession of building along with its appurtenant land, because the building in question is in existence on the land and is surrounded by the vacant land, it cannot be said that it is a case of grabbing of land". In our view, if a building along with the land on which it stands is the subject matter of the application under Section 7A of the Act, such application is maintainable before the Special Tribunal. The distinction drawn by the High Court between "building with appurtenant land" and "land along with building" is artificial and hyper-technical and it defeats the very purpose of the legislation. In the light of the definition of 'land' under Section 2(c) of the Act, both the above descriptions practically mean the same thing vis-�-vis 'land grabbing' and there is no logic or justification for drawing a distinction between them. Hence, the High Court erred in holding that the application filed by the Appellant was not maintainable before the Special Tribunal.17
26. In view of the law declared by the Apex Court that, the Act applies not only to the lands, but also to the buildings along with the land on which stands is the subject matter of the application under the Act.
27. The Special Court and Tribunal erred in holding that the building alleged to have been grabbed does not fall within the definition of 'land'. Further it also erred in holding that only occupation of the open land and construction of a building thereon can be treated as 'land grabbing' under the Act.
28. The Special Court on the authenticity of the Ex.B-1, recorded as under:
"Para-12.....PW-1 was confronted with Xerox Copy of agreement dated 17.06.1970 and Ex.B-1 receipt and he denied the signatures therein standing in the name of his father Shankaraiah. The original agreement must be in possession of Shankaraiah only. However, since the document was a Xerox copy and Shanakariah died it appears that the respondents gave up the idea of getting it marked in evidence....".
The Special Court, however, while considering the evidence placed before it, ought to have the document in question to the forensic authorities to verify the correctness of the claim of the petitioner/applicant, that the signatures of their father late. M. Shankaraiah are forged, instead of itself comparing with the 18 signature on the certified copies of vakalat in RCC's filed seeking eviction of tenants during his lifetime.
29. In the light of the above discussion, this Court is of the view that the application filed by the petitioner under Section 7A of the Act before the Special Tribunal was maintainable and that the Special Tribunal and Special Court in appeal had jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute raised therein.
30. In view of this above, since, the LGOP No.39 of 1997 and LGA No.13 of 2008 filed by the petitioner herein before the Special Tribunal and Special Court are maintainable, the impugned order of the Special Court dated 18.01.2008 in LGA No.13 of 2008 and order of the Special Tribunal dated 27.09.2007 in LGOP No.39 of 1997 holding that the appeal and petition are not maintainable cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside.
31. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed and the order in LGOP. No.39 of 1997 dated 27.09.2007 and LGA No.13 of 2008 dated 18.01.2010 are set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Special Tribunal for consideration afresh. 19
32. It is made clear that the Special Tribunal may decide the Land Grabbing Case uninfluenced by the findings recorded by this Court.
33. In view of the order passed in W.P. No. 13192 of 2010, the Contempt Case is closed. No order as to costs.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any shall stand closed.
____________________ T. VINOD KUMAR, J _________________ P.SREE SUDHA, J Date: 28.05.2025 VSV/MRKR