Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Narendra Meghwal vs The State Of Rajasthan on 30 April, 2026
Author: Anand Sharma
Bench: Anand Sharma
[2026:RJ-JD:20267]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4036/2026
PETITIONERS:
1. Narendra Meghwal S/o Nana Lal Meghwal, Aged About 39
Years, Resident Of 11-12, Nakoda Nagar Bedwas (Rural),
Debari, District Udaipur.
2. Ahari Shailesh S/o Devi Lal, Aged About 33 Years,
Resident Of Falla Kalawat Valdar, Bilakh Rishabhdeo,
District Udaipur.
3. Moti Singh S/o Rana Ram, Aged About 29 Years, Resident
Of Godaro Ki Dhani, Khokhar West, Tehsil Gida, District
Barmer.
4. Ganesh Kumar S/o Chutar Singh, Aged About 24 Years,
Resident Of Bhimda, Tehsil Baytu, District Barmer.
5. Manohar Singh S/o Narpat Singh, Aged About 28 Years,
Resident Of VPO Doodwa, Tehsil Pachpadra, Via Baytu,
District Barmer.
6. Rinku Panchal S/o Hashmukh Panchal, Aged About 36
Years, Resident Of Subhash Marg, Kushalgarh, District
Banswara.
7. Rohit Ahari S/o Laxman Lal Ahari, Aged About 24 Years,
Resident Of VPO Bildi, District Dungarpur, Pin Code
314001.
8. Ran Singh S/o Hab Singh, Aged About 33 Years, Resident
Of Uttarba, Tehsil Gadraroad, District Barmer.
9. Teekma Ram S/o Jaisa Ram, Aged About 33 Years,
Resident Of Nehron Ka Tala, Nokhara, Tehsil Gudamalani,
District Barmer.
10. Bhajan Lal S/o Bhagirath Ram, Aged About 33 Years,
Resident Of VPO Danta, Sarnau, Tehsil Sanchore, District
Jalore.
11. Deepak Kumar Damor S/o Basu Damor, Aged About 34
Years, Resident Of 35, Vageri Ka Vela Mukam, Post
Surata, Tehsil Jhotri, District Dungarpur.
12. Lalita Kumari Meena D/o Bhagwati Lal Meena, Aged About
30 Years, Resident Of VPO Khandi Obri, Tehsil Kherwara,
District Udaipur.
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13. Vishesh Kumar S/o Sardar Singh, Aged About 46 Years,
Resident Of X178, Ganesh Vihar, Post Nangal Purohithan,
Amer, District Jaipur.
14. Nanu Lal Damore S/o Deva, Aged About 45 Years,
Resident Of Ojariya, Metwala, Tehsil Garhi, District
Banswara.
15. Paras S/o Gopa Ram, Aged About 46 Years, Resident Of
Village Rawniyana, Tehsil Pipar City, District Jodhpur.
16. Dinesh Kumar S/o Aidan Ram, Aged About 22 Years,
Resident Of Rohila, Tehsil Sedwa, District Barmer.
17. Ramesh Kumar S/o Hari Ram, Aged About 27 Years,
Resident Of Bhatip Pamana, District Jalore.
18. Mithun Kumar Kalal S/o Banshi Lal, Aged About 33 Years,
Resident Of VPO Jhonswa, District Dungarpur. Pin Code
314035.
19. Bhupesh Patidar S/o Sukhlal Patidar, Aged About 40
Years, Resident Of Diwara Chhota, Tehsil Sangwara,
District Dungarpur.
20. Kartik Choubisa S/o Kamlesh Choubisa, Aged About 23
Years, Resident Of VPO Mowai, Tehsil Aspur, District
Dungarpur.
21. Bhavesh Patidar S/o Meghaji Patidar, Aged About 24
Years, Resident Of VPO Chitri, District Dungarpur. Pin
Code 314035.
Versus
RESPONDENTS:
1. The State of Rajasthan, through the Secretary to the
Government, Rajasthan, Jaipur.
2. The Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Department,
through the Secretary to the Government, Rajasthan,
Jaipur.
3. The Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Department,
through the Secretary and Commissioner, Rajasthan,
Jaipur.
4. The Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Department,
through the Additional Commissioner and Joint Secretary,
Rajasthan, Jaipur.
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5. The Rajasthan Staff Selection Board, through the
Chairman of The Board, Jaipur.
6. The Secretary of The Rajasthan Staff Selection Board,
Jaipur.
For Petitioners : Mr. Mahaveer Bhanwariya Advocate.
For Respondents : Mr. I.R. Choudhary Additional
Advocate General assisted by Mr.
Pawan Bharti Advocate and Mr.
Manish Patel Advocate.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment Date of conclusion of arguments :: 20.04.2026 Date on which judgment was reserved :: 20.04.2026 Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced :: Full Judgment Date of pronouncement :: 30.04.2026
1. By way of filing of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have laid challenge to order dated 23.04.2025 whereby the vacant posts of Village Development Officer (VDO) pursuant to advertisement dated 06.09.2021 have been merged into the subsequent recruitment years 2024-25 and 2025-26. The petitioners have further prayed for issuance and operation of waiting/reserve list against the unfilled posts arising out of the said recruitment pursuant to advertisement dated 06.09.2021.
2. The facts, in brief, as pleaded by the petitioners are that an advertisement dated 06.09.2021 was issued by Rajasthan Staff Selection Board inviting applications from all eligible persons for recruitment on 3896 vacancies of Village Development Officer (for short 'VDO'), which were later increased to 5396 posts vide (Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM) (Downloaded on 30/04/2026 at 10:49:40 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:20267] (4 of 20) [CW-4036/2026] corrigendum dated 24.02.2022. The petitioners, being eligible, participated in the selection process and appeared in both preliminary and main examinations. However, they could not secure marks above the cut-off marks of their respective category and were not included in the final select list.
3. It is averred that results were declared in phases between 25.11.2022 and 18.05.2023. Certain candidates challenged the answer key before this Court in a batch of writ petitions led by S. B. Civil Writ Petition no. 11616/2022 which were disposed of vide judgment dated 07.06.2023 and directions were issued for re-evaluation of specific questions no. 132 and 144 and for preparation of revised merit lists without disturbing already appointed candidates.
4. Above judgment dated 07.06.2023 was challenged before the Division Bench by way of filing different intra-court Appeals, including D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 677/2024. It is further stated that during pendency of intra-court appeals, an interim order dated 05.01.2024 was passed directing the respondents to maintain status quo and not to proceed with further appointments. Ultimately, the Division Bench, vide judgment dated 13.10.2025, set aside judgment dated 07.06.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge.
5. According to the petitioners, despite availability of large number of vacant posts due to non-joining of selected candidates, the respondents failed to issue waiting list. Instead, vide impugned order dated 23.04.2025, such vacancies were merged into subsequent recruitment cycles. The petitioners contend that (Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM) (Downloaded on 30/04/2026 at 10:49:40 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:20267] (5 of 20) [CW-4036/2026] such action is arbitrary, contrary to statutory rules and circulars, as also violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
6. The respondents have opposed the writ petition by raising preliminary objections regarding its maintainability. It is contended that the writ petition suffers from gross delay and laches, having been filed nearly ten months after passing of the impugned order and after culmination of the subsequent recruitment process.
7. It is further contended that the petitioners have failed to implead necessary parties, namely those candidates, who have been selected in the subsequent recruitment against the merged vacancies, and therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties.
8. On merits, it is submitted that the petitioners, being such candidates who could not secure their names in the main select list, do not possess any vested right to seek appointment or issuance of waiting list. The respondents have placed reliance on circular dated 27.12.2021 issued by the Department of Personnel to submit that the waiting list could only be operated within a prescribed period of six months from the date of declaration of the main result, which period has already expired.
9. It is also contended that almost all advertised posts (more than 98%) have already been filled and the recruitment process has attained finality. The respondents further assert that initiation of a fresh recruitment process is within the domain of the employer and does not confer any enforceable right upon the petitioners.
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10. Learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that the action of the respondents in merging the unfilled vacancies of the recruitment process initiated pursuant to advertisement dated 06.09.2021 into subsequent recruitment years is wholly arbitrary and illegal as also apparently curtail the legitimate rights of the petitioners of appointment through issuance of waiting list.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that once a recruitment process is initiated for a definite number of posts, the respondents are under legal obligation to carry the process to its logical end by filling up all available vacancies in accordance with the applicable statutory rules and executive instructions. Learned counsel submits that admittedly a substantial number of posts remained vacant due to non-joining of selected candidates, which fact stands acknowledged by the respondents themselves in various official communications and replies furnished under the Right to Information Act, 2005. Therefore, the respondents could not have abandoned the process midway or diverted such vacancies to subsequent recruitment cycles.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioners further argued that the respondents acted in clear contravention of circulars dated 18.10.2021 and 27.12.2021, which mandate preparation and operation of a reserve/waiting list. It is contended that the requirement of maintaining a reserve list is to ensure that vacancies arising on account of non-joining or disqualification are duly filled without necessitating a fresh recruitment. The failure of the respondents to prepare and operate such a list defeats the (Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM) (Downloaded on 30/04/2026 at 10:49:40 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:20267] (7 of 20) [CW-4036/2026] very purpose of the recruitment process and results in arbitrariness.
13. It is also argued by the learned counsel that the respondents themselves treated the recruitment process as subsisting, as is evident from inter-departmental communications, correspondence with the Selection Board and the steps taken for requisitioning waiting lists. Having consistently taken a stand that the process for issuance of a waiting list was under consideration, the respondents are now estopped from taking a contrary stand by merging the vacancies into future recruitments.
14. Learned counsel further submitted that the impugned order dated 23.04.2025 has been passed during the subsistence of interim order dated 05.01.2024 passed by the Division Bench, whereby the respondents were directed to keep the posts vacant and not to proceed further in the matter. It is argued that merging the vacancies into future recruitment amounts to altering the status of the vacancies and thereby, constitutes a clear violation of the judicial order. Such action, according to the learned counsel, is not only illegal but also undermines the authority of the Court.
15. It is also urged that the petitioners had a legitimate expectation that the vacancies arising out of the recruitment process in question would be filled from amongst the candidates, who participated therein, particularly when the process was kept alive due to pendency of litigation. The abrupt decision to merge the vacancies into future recruitment has frustrated such legitimate expectation and has resulted in grave prejudice to the petitioners.
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16. Learned counsel further argued that the delay in approaching this Court cannot be held against the petitioners, as the cause of action is continuing in nature. It is submitted that the respondents themselves kept representing that the process of issuing a waiting list was under consideration, and it is only upon issuance of the impugned order and subsequent developments that the petitioners were compelled to approach this Court.
17. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Ajmer Vs. Yati Jain & Others, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 80 and judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Mohd. Asalam Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11505/2019 decided on 09.01.2020).
18. Per contra, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondents has controverted the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners and submitted that the entire foundation of the petitioners' case is misconceived both on facts as well as in law. At the outset, it is contended that the petitioners, having admittedly failed to secure a place in the final merit list, do not possess any vested or enforceable right to seek appointment or even to claim consideration against alleged vacant posts. It is submitted that the claim of the petitioners is based on a mere expectation, which does not ripen into a legally enforceable right under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
19. Learned Additional Advocate General further submitted that the contention regarding an alleged obligation on the part of the respondents to fill all advertised vacancies is contrary to (Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM) (Downloaded on 30/04/2026 at 10:49:40 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:20267] (9 of 20) [CW-4036/2026] settled law. It is well established that even where vacancies exist, the State is not bound to fill all or any of them, and the decision in this regard falls within the exclusive domain of the employer, subject only to the test of arbitrariness, which is wholly absent in the present case.
20. In counter to the argument regarding mandatory operation of a waiting list, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the applicable circulars dated 18.10.2021 and 27.12.2021 did not create any indefeasible right in favour of candidates. The preparation and operation of a reserve list is contingent upon administrative exigencies and is further regulated by a definite time frame. In the present case, the main result was declared on 25.11.2022 and subsequent lists were issued up to 18.05.2023. The permissible period of six months for operation of any waiting list stood exhausted thereafter. Once the life of the waiting list expired, no direction can be issued to revive or operate the same.
21. It is further submitted that the petitioners have deliberately ignored the fact that almost the entire recruitment process stood concluded, with more than 98% of the advertised posts having already been filled. The marginal number of vacancies arising due to non-joining cannot be treated as conferring a right upon unsuccessful candidates to seek revival of the recruitment process.
22. Learned Additional Advocate General has also strongly opposed the contention regarding violation of the interim order dated 05.01.2024. It is submitted that the said interim order merely restrained further appointments during pendency of the (Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM) (Downloaded on 30/04/2026 at 10:49:40 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:20267] (10 of 20) [CW-4036/2026] appeal and did not create any right in favour of the petitioners to claim continuation of the recruitment process indefinitely. Moreover, upon final disposal of the appeals on 13.10.2025, the interim order automatically stood vacated. The administrative decision taken thereafter, including restructuring and merging of vacancies, cannot be said to be in violation of any subsisting judicial direction.
23. Addressing the plea of legitimate expectation, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that such expectation, if any, must be founded on a legal right or consistent past practice, which is absent in the present case. Mere internal correspondence or inter-departmental communications cannot create any enforceable right in favour of the petitioners, particularly when the statutory framework does not mandate issuance of a waiting list beyond the prescribed period.
24. It is further contended that the writ petition suffers from gross delay and laches. The impugned order was passed on 23.04.2025, whereas the present writ petition has been filed in February, 2026, after the subsequent recruitment process had not only commenced but had substantially progressed. Entertaining the writ petition at such a belated stage would unsettle the entire selection process and cause serious prejudice to candidates who have already been selected.
25. Learned Additional Advocate General also submits that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties, as the petitioners have failed to implead candidates who have been selected against the posts in the subsequent recruitment. Any order passed in the present writ (Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM) (Downloaded on 30/04/2026 at 10:49:40 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:20267] (11 of 20) [CW-4036/2026] petition would directly affect their rights, and in their absence, no effective adjudication can be made.
26. Lastly, it is submitted that the decision to merge the unfilled vacancies into subsequent recruitment cycles is a decision taken in administrative wisdom, keeping in view the overall requirements of the department and the need for efficient public administration. Such decisions are not amenable to judicial review unless shown to be arbitrary, mala fide or contrary to statutory provisions, none of which has been demonstrated by the petitioners. Hence, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed as being devoid of merit. Learned Additional Advocate General relied upon judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hari Om Meena & Another Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others (D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 251/2025 & other connected appeals decided on 16.05.2025).
27. This Court has given its thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and has meticulously examined the pleadings and material placed on record.
28. At the outset, it is not in dispute that the petitioners participated in the recruitment process pursuant to advertisement dated 06.09.2021 but failed to secure their place in the final select list. The foundation of the petitioners' claim rests upon the assertion that certain vacancies remained unfilled due to non- joining of selected candidates and, therefore, the respondents were under an obligation to operate waiting/reserve list and fill such vacancies from amongst the candidates of the same recruitment.
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29. However, the aforesaid contention cannot be accepted in view of the settled legal position governing recruitment matters. It is trite law that mere participation in a selection process does not confer any vested or enforceable right to appointment. Even inclusion of a candidate in a select list or waiting list does not create an indefeasible right to be appointed. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shankarsan Dash vs. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47, authoritatively held that a candidate whose name appears in the select list/ waiting list acquires no indefeasible right to appointment and the State is not bound to fill up all the vacancies. The said principle has been consistently reiterated in Asha Kaul (Mrs) & Another vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Others, (1993) 2 SCC 573, wherein it was held that inclusion in a select list merely confers a right to be considered and not a right to appointment.
30. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements, it is clear that even a candidate included in a select list does not acquire an absolute right to appointment, much less a candidate who has not been selected at all. The petitioners, therefore, stand on a much weaker footing and cannot claim any enforceable right to seek issuance or operation of a waiting list.
31. The argument of the petitioners that the respondents were under mandatory obligation to fill all advertised vacancies also does not merit acceptance. It is well settled that the State, as an employer, retains the discretion to decide as to how many posts are to be filled and even if vacancies exist, there is no corresponding legal duty cast upon the employer to fill all such vacancies. The scope of judicial review in such matters is limited (Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM) (Downloaded on 30/04/2026 at 10:49:40 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:20267] (13 of 20) [CW-4036/2026] and does not extend to directing the employer to fill vacancies in a particular manner, unless the action is shown to be arbitrary or contrary to statutory provisions.
32. The reliance placed by the petitioners on circulars dated 18.10.2021 and 27.12.2021 is also misconceived. A perusal of the said circulars indicates that the operation of a waiting/reserve list is subject to a prescribed time frame. In the present case, the main result was declared on 25.11.2022 and subsequent lists were issued up to 18.05.2023. The respondents have satisfactorily demonstrated that the permissible period of six months for operation of the waiting list stood exhausted thereafter. Once the validity period of the waiting list has expired, no direction can be issued for its revival operation thereafter.
33. The contention that the recruitment process was subsisting and that the respondents were estopped from merging the vacancies into subsequent recruitment cycles is also without substance. Mere internal correspondence or inter-departmental communications indicating that the matter was under
consideration cannot confer any legal right upon the petitioners.
Administrative deliberations do not crystallise into enforceable rights unless culminated into a binding decision in accordance with law.
34. The plea regarding violation of interim order dated 05.01.2024 also does not impress this Court. The said interim order merely restrained the respondents from proceeding with appointments during pendency of the appeal. It neither directed continuation of the recruitment process indefinitely, nor created any right in favour of the petitioners. Moreover, upon final disposal (Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM) (Downloaded on 30/04/2026 at 10:49:40 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:20267] (14 of 20) [CW-4036/2026] of appeals on 13.10.2025, the interim order stood vacated and thereafter, the respondents were well within their authority to take appropriate administrative decisions, including restructuring or merging of vacancies.
35. The argument of legitimate expectation, as advanced on behalf of the petitioners, is equally untenable. Legitimate expectation cannot be invoked in the absence of a legal right or a consistent and enforceable practice. In the present case, neither the statutory framework nor the governing circulars confer any right upon the petitioners to demand issuance or operation of a waiting list beyond the prescribed period.
36. Another significant aspect which cannot be overlooked is the delay and laches on the part of the petitioners. The impugned order is dated 23.04.2025, whereas the present writ petition has been filed after a lapse of considerable time, by which stage the subsequent recruitment process had already been initiated and had substantially progressed. Entertaining the writ petition at such a belated stage would not only unsettle the entire selection process, but would also adversely affect the rights of third-party candidates who have already been selected. The law is well settled that writ jurisdiction being discretionary, relief can be declined on the ground of delay alone where such delay results in prejudice to others.
37. In this regard, the legal position stands reinforced by authoritative pronouncements. In Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Ajmer Vs. Yati Jain & Others (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a wait-listed candidate does not have any vested or indefeasible right to appointment and no (Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM) (Downloaded on 30/04/2026 at 10:49:40 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:20267] (15 of 20) [CW-4036/2026] mandamus can be issued in absence of a requisition by the appointing authority. In the present case, the petitioners are not even wait-listed candidates and seek a direction for issuance and operation of a reserve list, which is impermissible in law. Relevant part of the above judgment is quoted hereunder:
"81. What is a waiting list? What is the extent of right that could be claimed by a wait-listed candidate for securing an appointment? For answering this question, one may immediately read the decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Assn. v. State of Gujarat32. Relevant extracts from it read as follows:
8. Coming to the next issue, the first question is what is a waiting list?; can it be treated as a source of recruitment from which candidates may be drawn as and when necessary?; and lastly how long can it operate? These are some important questions which do arise as a result of direction issued by the High Court.
A waiting list prepared in service matters by the competent authority is a list of eligible and qualified candidates who in order of merit are placed below the last selected candidate. How it should operate and what is its nature may be governed by the rules. Usually it is linked with the selection or examination for which it is prepared. For instance, if an examination is held say for selecting 10 candidates for 1990 and the competent authority prepares a waiting list then it is in respect of those 10 seats only for which selection or competition was held. Reason for it is that whenever selection is held, except where it is for single post, it is normally held by taking into account not only the number of vacancies existing on the date when advertisement is issued or applications are invited but even those which are likely to arise in future within one year or so due to retirement etc. It is more so where selections are held regularly by the Commission. Such lists are prepared either under the rules or even otherwise mainly to ensure that the working in the office does not suffer if the selected candidates do not join for one or the other reason or the next selection or examination is not held soon. A candidate in the waiting list in the order of merit has a right to claim that he may be appointed if one or the other selected candidate does not join. But once the selected candidates join and no vacancy arises due to resignation etc. or for any other reason within the period the list is to operate under the rules or within reasonable period where no specific period is provided then candidate from the waiting list has no right to claim appointment to any future vacancy which may arise unless the selection was held for it. He has no vested right except to the limited extent, indicated above, or when the appointing authority acts arbitrarily and makes appointment from the waiting list by picking and choosing for extraneous reasons.
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9. A waiting list prepared in an examination conducted by the Commission does not furnish a source of recruitment. It is operative only for the contingency that if any of the selected candidates does not join then the person from the waiting list may be pushed up and be appointed in the vacancy so caused or if there is some extreme exigency the Government may as a matter of policy decision pick up persons in order of merit from the waiting list. But the view taken by the High Court that since the vacancies have not been worked out properly, therefore, the candidates from the waiting list were liable to be appointed does not appear to be sound. This practice, may result in depriving those candidates who become eligible for competing for the vacancies available in future. If the waiting list in one examination was to operate as an infinite stock for appointments, there is a danger that the State Government may resort to the device of not holding an examination for years together and pick up candidates from the waiting list as and when required. The constitutional discipline requires that this Court should not permit such improper exercise of power which may result in creating a vested interest and perpetrate waiting list for the candidates of one examination at the cost of entire set of fresh candidates either from the open or even from service.
(emphasis ours)
82. Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Assn. (supra) was cited with approval in Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab33. This Court observed, and we say rightly, that waiting lists are not perennial sources of recruitment and that candidates on the waiting list have no vested right to be appointed except to the limited extent that when a candidate selected does not join and the waiting list is still operative.
83. In Rakhi Roy v. High Court of Delhi34, once again this Court reiterated that a waiting list cannot be used as a reservoir to fill up vacancies which come into existence after issuance of notification/advertisement.
84. The rationale behind preparing fresh select lists and not operating stale lists was considered by this Court in M.P. Electricity Board v. Virendra Kumar Sharma35. While allowing the appeal carried by the employer from the decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, this Court had this to say:
5. Any scheme for selection will depend upon the terms on which selections are made. In the present case, there is a scheme as provided in the circular dated 9-12-1968 and that circular also provided for the panel to be valid/current for a particular period namely one year. After that period, the list would lapse and fresh panel has to be prepared. If that is the scheme, none of the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent would be of any assistance.
The High Court is also not justified in relying upon the decision in Shivsingh case [(1988) 1 MPWN 24] inasmuch as the scheme of appointment was entirely different. Moreover the validity/currency of panel was for a particular period; that is a salutary principle, behind that Rule so that after the selections are made (Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM) (Downloaded on 30/04/2026 at 10:49:40 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:20267] (17 of 20) [CW-4036/2026] and appointments to be made may take long time, it is possible that new candidates may have become available who are better or more qualified than those selected, and if they are appointed it would be in the best interests of the institution. Hence we do not think there was any justification for the High Court to have interfered in the matter and directed appointment of the respondent. The order made by the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent shall stand dismissed.
(emphasis ours)
85. A similar case such as the present is the one decided by this Court in U.P. Public Service Commission v. Surendra Kumar36. It would be useful to reproduce below what was ruled by this Court:
12. Having heard the learned counsel on both sides, we have perused the order dated 18-5-2018 passed by the High Court and other material placed on record.
For the purpose of operating wait-list, the Government of Uttar Pradesh has issued instructions from time to time. It is clear from the various government orders that wait-list period is valid only for a period of one year. Though requisition is made for making selection for 178 number of posts, but the appellant Commission, after declaring results of the examination, has made initial recommendation for substantive number of posts i.e. 156 posts vide letter dated 12-8-2010. It appears that the said list is prepared by including candidates who have submitted all the requisite documents within the period prescribed. Further recommendations were also made, but there is no reason for not computing the period of one year from 12-8-2010. When recommendations were made for substantive number of posts on 12-8- 2010, we are of the view that period of one year for operating wait-list is to be computed from 12-8-2010 but not from the last recommendation made for one post, vide letter dated 28-8-2012. The reason for restricting 156 names in the initial recommendation vide letter dated 12-8-2010, is explained in Para 11 of the counter-affidavit filed before the High Court.
(emphasis ours)
86. The key aspects of a waiting list, in relation to service law disputes, that can be deduced from the aforesaid decisions is this:
(i) a waiting list is normally prepared after the select/merit list is drawn;
(ii) it would include candidates who have qualified the recruitment examination but are not so meritorious such that they can be immediately appointed on the number of vacancies advertised;
(iii) such list would operate like a merit-based queue for vacancies that remain unfilled after offers of appointment given to the candidates in the select/merit list are not accepted;
(iv) a waiting list has a limited validity period;
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(v) validity period of a waiting list depends on the recruitment rules and should no such period be mentioned, it can bona fide be operated till the next advertisement is issued without, however, violating provisions in such rules, if any, requiring recruitment process to be initiated either semi-annually or annually; and
(vi) an opportunity to a candidate in the waiting list for securing appointment arises only when vacancies remain unfilled after the process of appointing candidates from the select/merit list is over and hence, it is regarded as a procedural outcome which is part of a structured process rather than a fortuitous circumstance.
89. Having noticed what a waiting list means and to what extent a wait-listed candidate has any right, courts have to bear in mind the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India 37 that a candidate included in a select/merit list does not have an indefeasible right of appointment even if a vacancy exists.
90. On a conspectus of the decisions of this Court governing the field of a select/merit list as well as waiting list, as understood in service jurisprudence, the law seems to be well-settled that when a candidate included in a select/merit list has no indefeasible right of appointment, it would be too far-fetched to think that a candidate in the waiting/reserve list would have a better right than a candidate in the select/ merit list. We, thus, hold that a wait-listed candidate has no right of appointment, much less an indefeasible right, except when the governing recruitment rules permit a small window authorizing appointments therefrom in the specified exceptional circumstances and the appointing authority, for no good reason, denies or refuses an appointment or the reason assigned therefor is found to be arbitrary and/or discriminatory and that too, when the waiting list has not expired. What should be given primacy, therefore, is the nature and extent of right prescribed by the relevant rules."
38. In Mohd. Asalam (supra), as relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners, Co-ordinate Bench of this Court was considering altogether different facts and question of law, therefore, the above judgment is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
39. In the case of Hari Om Meena & Another (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has categorically held that mere participation in the recruitment process does not confer any enforceable right to appointment and the State retains discretion to decide the number of posts to be filled. It was further held that (Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM) (Downloaded on 30/04/2026 at 10:49:40 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:20267] (19 of 20) [CW-4036/2026] even existence of vacancies does not create a corresponding right in favour of candidates. Para 9 of the above judgment is relevant and the same is being quoted as under:
"9. In our opinion, the plea of malafide exercise of power by the State-respondents is not available to the appellants to challenge the decision not to fill up all the advertised vacancies. Whatever may be the reason, a recruitment process cannot continue for years together after publication of the result. It shall be clear breach of mandate under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India if a direction is issued to fill up the unfilled advertised vacancies after about 12 years. Any appointment in the Government must be made having due regard to the merit of the candidates and, therefore, we find that the writ Court did not commit any error in law while ordering that the appointment against the vacant 392 posts shall be made by examining the merit position, eligibility and other credentials for the post of L.D.C. This is a well-settled position in the law that a mere participation in the recruitment exercise does not provide a legal right to the candidate to seek appointment. In "Jatendra Kumar v. State of Punjab" (1985) 1 SCC 122, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is open to the Government to decide how many appointments would be made. In "State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwar"
(1974) 3 SCC 220, the candidates securing less than 55% marks were not selected whereas there was a requirement under the rules to secure only 45% marks. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the existence of vacancies does not give any legal right to a selected candidate to claim appointment. In "Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India" (1991) 3 SCC 47, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that a candidate in the select list shall have no vested right to seek appointment and in a given case the employer can take a decision not to make appointment to a particular post or number of vacancy. Pertinently, the State-respondents have brought to the notice of the Court that a fresh recruitment process has been initiated vide advertisement dated 29th August 2024 after the recruitment process of 2013 came to an end."
40. Applying the aforesaid principles, this Court finds that the petitioners cannot claim any enforceable right either for issuance of a waiting list or for appointment against alleged vacant posts.
41. This court is also of considered view that the decision of the respondents to merge the unfilled vacancies into subsequent recruitment cycles is essentially an administrative and policy decision. Such decisions are taken in the larger interest of efficient public administration and are not amenable to judicial interference (Uploaded on 30/04/2026 at 09:28:52 AM) (Downloaded on 30/04/2026 at 10:49:40 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:20267] (20 of 20) [CW-4036/2026] unless shown to be arbitrary, mala fide or in violation of statutory provisions. The petitioners have failed to establish any such infirmity in the impugned action.
42. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds that the petitioners have failed to make out any case warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The claims raised by the petitioners are devoid of merit both on facts and in law as also contrary to the settled principles governing public employment.
43. Accordingly, the writ petition filed by the petitioners, being devoid of any merit and substance, is hereby dismissed.
44. Pending applications, if any, also stand dismissed.
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