Delhi High Court
Nirmal Kumar Jain And Ors. vs Municipal Corporation Of Delhi And Ors. on 21 July, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000(56)DRJ29
Author: K.S. Gupta
Bench: K.S. Gupta
JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J.
1. Common question of law arises for consideration in the Appeals and the writ petitions. Common arguments were addressed by learned counsel for the parties, therefore, the same are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2 L.P.A. 118/89 arises out of the judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court dated 8.9.1989 dismissing the writ petition of the appellants. Like the appellants other petitioners and appellants are seeking direction against the respondents for implementation of the resolutions passed by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi on 4.12.1970, 25.4.1972, 31.7.1.973, 21.12.1985, 20.2.1989 and 24.10.1989: for quashing of the direction/order dated 8.1.1990 of Lt. Governor, Delhi and dated 223.1990 of the Chief Secretary in his capacity as an officer exercising powers of the Corporation under Section 490(2)(b) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (for short "the Act"). In addition direction is sought for implementation of the judgment of this Court in C.W. 203/72 decided on 12.12.1.984 titled as Kalyan Samiti Nimri Colony (Regd.) and others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi etc. qua the appellants and the petitioners and to allot to them the quarters/flats, in their occupation, on ownership basis pursuant to the aforementioned resolutions of Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Some of the petitioners are also seeking direction for payment of retiral benefits, alleged to have been withheld by M.C.D. because of continuing to occupy the allotted accommodation, which they say is to be transferred to them because of the resolutions aforementioned. L.P.A.309/97 and 116/98 have also been preferred praying for setting aside the judgment of learned Single Judge and thereby allowing writ petitions by implementing the aforesaid resolutions of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi.
3. Facts have been narrated in detail by learned Single Judge in his judgment dated 8.9.1989 in C.W. 1662/88 (Nirmal Kumar Jain and others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi), which has given rise to L.P.A. 118/89. It will still be necessary for us in order to understand the submissions of learned counsel for the parties to make reference, in brief, to some of the resolutions of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi.
4. Having acquired various pieces of land, a scheme was formulated by the Corporation, known as "Northern City Extension Scheme I" for residential purposes with provision also for a shopping area. After development some of the plots were sold to private individuals, in the year 1937. Some of the plots were reserved for various Municipal purposes. A three storeyed building was constructed by the Corporation on Mandelian Road, Kamla Nagar, on a plot of land measuring 2750 sq. yards. 22 residential flats were constructed on the first and second floors with 30 shops on the ground floor. On 20.3.1968 Commissioner of the Corporation in his letter submitted a proposal for disposal of the shops and flats constructed on Mandelian Road through public auction. This was the stage when first resolution No. 143 was passed by the Corporation on 7.5.1968 after due approval from the Standing Committee, which reads:-
"Resolution No. 143.
Resolved that as proposed by the Commissioner in his letter No. 320/C&C dated 20.3.68 and recommended by the Standing Committee vide its resolution No. 900 dated 5.4.68, disposal of shops and flats by auction of 3 storeyed building at Mandelian Road, Kamla Nagar, be approved."
5. All the shops were disposed of in an auction held pursuant to the aforementioned resolution. However, the offers received in respect of residential flats were far below the reserve price. Auction was deferred. Second auction fixed for 6.10.1968 also remained unsuccessful as bids were for below the reserve price, which was determined on the basis of the market value. On 1.12.1969, a proposal was sent by the Commissioner of the Corporation that the flats be allotted to officers of the Corporation on the basis of their salary so that the Corporation may be in a position to gel a reasonable return. This led to passing of the second resolution No. 433 dated 27.7.1970, which reads:-
"Resolution No. 433"
Resolved that as proposed by the Commissioner in his letter No. 1772/C&C dated 1.12.1969 and recommended by the Standing Committee vide its Resolution No. 323 dated 14.5.1970 allotment of flats to the officers in three storeyed building at Mandelian Road on the terms and conditions specified in his letter referred to above be approved.
Resolved further that the cost of flats to be allotted to the officers be borne from the Revenue of the 'General Account' and transferred to the "Remunerative Project Account."
6. A special meeting of the Corporation was held on 4.12.1.970 in which another resolution No. 868 was passed extending the scope and ambit of he earlier resolution so as to make it applicable to some other municipal quarters, which reads:-
"Resolution No. 868This Special Meeting of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi resolves that the municipal quarters allotted to the municipal employees at Nimri, Azadpur, Dhaka, Kamla Nagar, Bungalow Road, Minto Road, Mandelian Road, Kashmiri Gate, Mori Gate, Bhargawa Lane, Civil Lines etc. be sold to the allottees on 'no profit no loss basis' and the allottees be charged at 15% of the assessed cost of the premises in the first instance and the balance in easy instalments spread over a period of ten years. This facility be given only to these municipal employees, who do not own any house within Delhi in their own name or in the name of any member of their family.
This meeting further resolves that efforts be made to make available plots of land on 'no profit no loss basis' to those employees, who are desirous of purchasing such plots for construction of houses, such employees be required to pay 30% of the cost of land in advance in easy instalments speared over till the development work of the land is completed.
This meeting of the Corporation also recommends to the Central Government that ownership rights of properties in Government employees colonies, the Industries Colonies, the Slum and J.J.Colonies be transferred to their allottees on easy instalment basis as prescribed in para (1) above.
Resolved further that the quarters build by the Slum Department of the Corporation be transferred to the sanitary staff in each ward.
Resolved also that the Committee of the three undertaking of the Corporation be asked to adopt similar resolutions to transfer the ownership rights of their residential quarters to their respective employees on 'no profit no loss basis.' Resolved further that priority be given to the sweepers and other Scheduled Caste Municipal employee in the matter of transfer or ownership rights of municipal properties allotted to them.
Resolved also that all such lands, which have been reserved for the construction of quarters for municipal employees be utilised for that purpose only and not for any other purpose."
7. In order to implement the aforementioned resolution, as per the opinion of the Legal Adviser and the Municipal Chief Auditor, there was a legal hurdle that the consideration at which any immovable properly may be sold by the Corporation, under Section 200(d) of (he Act, could not be less than the value at which such immovable property could be sold in normal and fair competition. It was opined that municipal quarters in some of the colonies had been built after taking loan from the Central Government and Delhi Administration. As per the terms and conditions, laid down by the Central Government and the Delhi Administration, quarters were to remain Municipal property and could not be sold to its employees. In view of this legal opinion, matter was again nut up before the Corporation to view its earlier decision taken through resolution No. 868 dated 4.2.1970. Corporation through its resolution No. 13 dated 25.4.1972 reiterated its earlier decision saying: -
"Resolution No. 13Resolved that the Corporation reiterates its previous decision regarding transfer of ownership rights of staff quarters as contained in its Resolution No. 868 dated 4.12.1970."
8. Lt. Governor of Delhi, in exercise of his powers conferred under Section 487 of the Act, raised an objection to the passing of the aforementioned resolution by the Corporation, which in his opinion was in violation of the mandate of Section 200(d) of the Act. Accordingly, through his letter dated 16.9.1972 he required the Corporation to show cause as to why a direction be not made for making arrangement for the proper performance of the duties required of the Corporation under Clause (d) of Section 200 of the Act, before the resolution is given effect to by the Corporation. Legal opinion was sought by the Corporation, which again advised the Corporation that the Corporation under Section 200(d) of the Act was under an obligation not to sell any immovable property below the market rate and that the decision of the Corporation contained in resolution No. 868 dated 4.12.1970 was not consistent with the mandatory provisions of law.
9. Again the matter was placed before the Corporation. On 31.7.1973 resolution No. 437 was passed by the Corporation reiterating the earlier resolutions. It was resolved that to overcome the legal hurdle, Government of India be requested to amend Section 200 of the Act. The resolution reads:-
"Resolution No. 437.
Resolved that the decision taken by the Corporation vide its Resolution No. 868 dated 4.12.1970 regarding transfer of ownership rights of staff quarters to their allottees on 'no profit no loss basis' be reiterated.
Resolved further that with a view to overcome the legal impediments in the way of the implementation of the resolution it be urged upon the Government of India to suitably amend the provisions of Section 200 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act and also revise the terms and conditions of the loan advanced to the Corporation for the construction of municipal quarters in colonies such as Azadpur, Dhakka, Nimri etc. so as to empower the Corporation to transfer the municipal quarters to their allottees on 'no profit no loss basis' and also to sell plots of land on 'no profit no loss basis' to such of the desirous municipal employees who do not own in Delhi any property or portion thereof in his own name or in the name of any his dependents."
10. In the meanwhile Kalyan Samiti Nimri Colony Association, being an Association of the occupants of some municipal quarters at Nimri filed writ petition (CW-203/73) in this Court praying for implementation of the resolutions passed by the Corporation so that the residential quarters be allotted, on ownership basis, to the occupants i.e. the members of the Association. The petition was admitted for hearing. Before the writ petition could be decided, on 9.2.1979 another decision was taken by the Corporation through resolution No. 937 resolving to transfer Municipal quarters to unauthorised occupants on hire purchase basis at the market price prevailing in 1974 plus interest up to 11% p.a. It reads:-
"Resolution No. 937Resolved that having considered the position explained by the Commissioner in this letter No. 6077/C&C dated 14.12.1978 and recommended by the Standing Committee vide its Resolution No. 844 dated 18.1.1979 unauthorised occupants of the municipal quarters in Nimri Municipal Colony be offered these quarters on hire purchase basis at the market value existing in 1974 plus interest upto date at 11% per annum and that the offer be made upon only to those who pay the first instalment within a period of 4 months from the date of offer."
11. With a view of expedite the matter with regard to transfer of quarters at Nimri Colony, resolution No. 1421 was passed by the Standing Committee of the Corporation on 12.4.1979 saying:-
"Resolution No. 1421 Resolved that the resolution regarding transfer of tenements constructed under Low Income Housing Scheme at Nimri Colony to the allottees moved by Shri Ishar Dass Khanna and seconded by Shri Babu Ram Gupta be referred to the Commissioner for report within one month."
12. In response to the aforementioned resolution of the Standing Committee, the Commissioner through his latter dated 5.2.1980 sent a report to the Standing Committee. While mentioning details of various resolutions passed from time to time the Commissioner strongly opposed the move of the Corporation for transfer of the quarters saying:-
"At present, the Corporation is not in a position to transfer the ownership of 324 quarters to its employs on hire purchase basis due to the reasons that the Corporation is already short of Municipal accommodation and as against a loan of Rs. 461 lacs received from Government of India under the LIG Scheme, the Corporation has already invested Rs. 85,13,818/-. Secondly, the ownership rights vest with the M.C.D. and Section 200(d) of the D.M.C. Act, docs not allow transfer of quarters except at a market rate in a fair competition. Moreover, the writ filed by the employees Association of the Nimri Colony against the M.C.D. is still pending in a Hon'ble High Court for want of decision and as such the same is still sub-judice."
13. Report of the Commissioner was considered by the Standing Committee of the Corporation on 28.2.1980 and the following resolution was passed:-
"Resolution No. 1156.
Having considered the report contained in Commissioner's letter No. 556/C&C dated 5.2.1980 resolved that it be recommended to the Corporation that municipal quarters in Nimri Municipal Colony be sold to allot tees/employees at the market price."
14. In response to resolution of the Standing Committee, the Corporation on 10.3.1980 again passed Resolution No. 1205 resolving to transfer Nimri Colony Municipal quarters at market rate. The resolution reads:-
"Resolution No. 1205 Resolved that having considered the report contained in Commissioner's letter No. 556/C&C dated 5.2.1980 and recommended by the Standing Committee vide its resolution No. 1156 dated 28.2.1980, municipal quarters in Nimri Municipal Colony be sold to allotteed employees at the market rate."
15. Municipal Corporation of Delhi was superseded in 1980 by Government of India. One of the grounds in the show cause notice for superseding the Corporation was:-
"The Corporation passed a resolution to sell staff quarters at Nimri Colony to occupants/allottees ignoring the fact that the quarters were meant to serve as an amenity to serving staff."
16. During the period of its supersession, the Commissioner was discharging the functions of the Corporation. In exercise of his powers conferred under Section 490(2)(b) of the Act, the Commissioner on 23.7.1980 took his decision No. 235 rescinding resolution No. 1205 dated 10.3.1980 saying:-
"In view of the position explained in Commissioner's letter No. 2513/C&C dated 6.6.1980 Corporation's Resolution No. 1205 dated 10.3.1980 regarding transfer of tenements constructed under Low Income Housing Scheme at Nimri Colony to the allottee is rescinded."
17. After elections to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi were held, the Standing Committee on 23.12.1983 adopted resolution No. 1972 recommending to the Corporation that municipal quarters at Nimri Colony be sold to the then allottees/unauthorized occupants on market value of 1974. Recommendation of the Standing Committee was considered by the Corporation and on 15.2.1984 resolution No. 924 was passed, which reads:-
"Resolution No. 924Resolved that having considered the position brought out by the Commissioner in his letter No. F.33/L&F/7702/C&C dated 17.11.1983 and the recommendation made by the Standing Committee vide its Resolution No. 872 dated 23.12.1983, Municipal quarters at Nimri Colony be sold to the present allottees authorised occupants of these quarters on the market value of 1974 which has already been calculated in the ease of eleven quarters of Nimri Colony sold to unauthorised occupants and on the same terms and conditions as contained in Corporation's Resolution No. 937 dated 9.2.1979."
18. After the aforesaid resolution had been passed the writ petition of Kalyan Srimati Nimri Colony (C.W. No. 203/72) came up for hearing. Learned Single Judge of this Court on 12.12.1984 allowed the writ petition directing that the resolution dated 10.2.1984 be acted upon without delay. Letters Patents Appeal No. 28 of 1985 was preferred against the judgment dated 12.12.1984 of learned Single Judge in C.W. 203/72, Kalyan Samiti Nimri Colony (Regd) and others V. Municipal Corporation of Delhi etc., dated 12.12.1984. The said Letters Patents Appeal No. 28/85 was dismissed in limini on 30.9.1985 by a Division Bench of this Court.
19. It appears that after the decision of Letters Patent Appeal an application was moved by the Kalyan Samiti seeking implementation of the judgment of learned Single Judge. In the said application further directions were issued. The said order as also the order of dismissal of Letters Patent Appeal were challenged by the Corporation by filling Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 9324 and 9325/88, which were dismissed by the Supreme Court on 31.8.1988. Six months' time, as prayed, was allowed to Municipal Corporation of Delhi to comply with the directions issued by learned Single Judge. Thus the directions issued in C.W. 203/72 stood duly implemented.
20. In May 1988 C.W. 1662/88 was filed by Nirmal Kumar Jain and others seeking implementation of Resolution No. 868 dated 4.12.1970 and the later resolutions passed by the Corporation for transfer, in their favour, of the residential flats at Mandelian Road.
21. A number of resolutions were passed thereafter by the Standing Committee of the Corporation from time to time. The Commissioner, through his letter dated 1.11.1988 put up a note with respect to the directions issued in C.W. 203/72 and on implementation of resolution and requesting for rescinding earlier resolution dated 15.2.1984. He also referred to the opinion of the Legal Advisor. By the said note the Commissioner desired that the matter be placed before the Corporation to rescind resolutions No. 868 and 13 dated 4.12.1970 and 25.4.1972 respectively. Inspite of the note of the Commissioner, the Standing Committee by resolution No. 1515 dated 21.12.1988 made its recommendation as follows:-
"Resolved that having considered the position brought out by the Commissioner in his letter No. F.33/L&E/5818/C&C dated 1.11.1988, it be recommended to the Corporation that the earlier decision taken vide Corporation resolution Nos. 868, 13 and 437 dated 4.12.1970, 25.12.1972 and 12.5.1973 respectively be reiterated."
22. This recommendation of the Standing Committee was approved by the Corporation by its resolution dated 15.2.1989, which recommended sale of the quarters at Nimri Colony at market value prevalent in 1974, to the present allottees/unauthorised occupants only.
23. On 8.9.1989 Civil Writ Petition No. 1662 of 1988 Nirmal Kumar Jain and others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi was dismissed by learned Single Judge. On 3.10.1989 L.P.A. No. 118 of 1989 was filed against the said decision. Division Bench on 5.10.1989, while issuing notice, stayed the operation of the judgment under appeal directing that the appellants will not be dispossessed and status quo will continue to be maintained with respect to the flats located at Mandalian Road.
Subsequent developments
24. On 27.12.1989 a notice was issued by the Central Government to the Corporation to show cause why the Corporation be not superseded. On 6.1.1990 the Ministry of Home Affairs notified that the Central Government, in exercise of powers conferred under Section 491 of the Act had superseded the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and appointed Chief Secretary, Delhi to exercise powers and perform duties of Municipal Corporation of Delhi. On 18.1.1990 an order was passed by the Lt. Governor directing the Corporation to rescind resolutions dated 4.12.1970, 25.4.1972, 31.7.1973, 21.12.1988, 20.2.1989 and 4.10.1989, except in so far as they related to the Nimri Colony. The order of Lt. Governor reads:-
"AND WHEREAS the said action of the Corporation of liquidating the Municipal assets in an unsuitable manner, thereby causing loss to the Corporation, in the opinion of the Lt. Governor of the Union Territory of Delhi, amounts to imperfect performance of duties imposed on the Corporation or any Municipal Authority by or under the said Act.
Now, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 487 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, read with Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs Notification No. 3/6/66-Delhi, dated 19.1.0.1966 the Lt. Governor of the Union Territory of Delhi, hereby directs the M.C.D. to rescind the Resolution No. 868 dated 4.12.1970, No. 13 dated 25.4.1972, No. 437 dated 31.7.1989, No. 1515 dated 2.1.1988, No. 789 dated 20.2.1989 and No. 944 dated 4.10.1989 (except the parts of these resolutions concerning Municipal employee at Nimri) and in consequence thereof all the aforesaid properties except that of Nimri Colony shall continue to vest in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi......."
25. On 21.3.1990 Commissioner, Municipal Corporation made recommendation for rescinding the resolution and on 22.3.19990 the Chief Secretary, Delhi exercising his powers of Administrator of the Corporation, approved the proposal for rescinding the resolutions, which reads:-
"Item No. 354As proposed by the Commissioner in his letter No. F.33/AC(L&E)/5539/C&C dated 21.3.1990, the following Corporation resolutions are rescinded:-
1. Resolution No. 868 dated 4.12.1970.
2. Resolution No. 13 dated 25.4.1972.
3. Resolution No. 437 dated 31.7.1973.
4. Resolution No. 1076 dated 20.2.1989.
Further, as proposed by the Commissioner in his letter referred above, the following Standing Committee/Corporation resolution are recorded/dropped:-
1. Standing Committee Resolution No. 1445 dated 16.11.1988.
2. Standing Committee Resolution No. 1466 dated 30.11.1988.
3. Standing Committee Resolution No. 430 dated 17.5.1989.
4. Standing Committee Resolution No. 1309 dated 28.12.1989.
5. Corporation Resolution No. 795 dated 15.11.1998."
26. C.W. 2899/89 Jagdish Prasad and Ors. v. M.C.D. and Ors. was filed by some of the employees of Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (in short "DESU), alleging that they were allotted quarters in Tripolia, DESU Colony, in their capacity as employees of DESU and prayed that direction be issued for the sale of the flats to them. The claim was based on the allegations that there was a Low Income Group Housing Scheme of the Government of India under which loan was granted by the Central Government to the State Government to enable persons in the Low Income Group to build own houses. Respondents had obtained such loan and constructed quarters in the colony. Therefore, the respondents were bound to transfer the said quarters to the petitioners. The writ petition was dismissed. It was held that the Delhi Electric Supply Committee, an authority under Section 44 of the Act, had not passed any resolution like M.C.D. Property in question was constructed by the respondents for the benefit of its employees, who are in service. There was no promise held out to the petitioners that the property will be sold to them. Even the writ petitions filed by M.C.D. employees had been dismissed. Reference was made to the judgment of this Court delivered in C.W. No. 2521/89. Nigam Colony Dhaka Quarter Karamchari Parishad v. M.C.D. decided on 27.2.1991.
27. Few other petitions including Writ Petitions i.e. C.W. No. 1183/88 Puran Chand v. M.C.D. and C.W. 3255/96 Gokal Chand v. Union of India were also dismissed on similar reasonings. The petitioners therein carried the matter further in appeal by filing S.L.P. (C) Nos. 9011, 9012, 9013, 9015 and 9016 of 1991, which were dismissed by the Supreme Court holding that no legal right vested in the petitioners to claim any right of ownership in the quarters and thus they were not entitled to seek mandamus from the Court.
28. Decision of Lt. Governor dated 22.3.1990 rescinding the resolution passed by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi regarding sale of municipal quarters to its employees was challenged in C.W. No. 2407/90 (Jagdish Chandra Mehta v. M.C.D. and Ors. The said writ petition was dismissed on 8.8.1990 by a Division Bench of this Court. S.L.P. (C) No. 11129/92 Jagdish Chandra Mehta v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors.) was preferred against dismissal of the said writ petition, which was also dismissed by the Supreme Court on 30.8.1993.
29. Learned Single Judge of this Court on 6.11.1996 dismissed another writ petition (C.W. No. 4144/96) Jagdish Prasad Saxena v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Others by which the petitioners sought directions for implementation of various resolutions, namely 4.12.1970, 24.4.1972, 31.7.1973, 21.10.1985, 20.2.1989 and 4.10.1989. The petitioners had also sought implementation of the judgment in C.W. 203/72 Kalyan Samiti Nimri Colony v. M.C.D. Further appeal (L.P.A. No. 255/96) filed by Jagdish Prasad Saxena against the said decision of learned Single Judge was also dismissed on 18.11.1996.
30. C.W. 2095/92 is filed by tenants/Residents Welfare Association. The petitioners claim (hat in 1954-55 the Central Government introduced a scheme known as Low Income Group Housing Scheme, It was approved by the Municipal Committee, the predecessor of respondent No. 1 by resolution dated 27.4.1955. Pursuant to the said scheme land for construction of quarters was acquired by the Ministry of Rehabilitation for displaced persons. Cost of land was also paid by Ministry of Rehabilitation in 1956. Quarters were constructed and later on the same were unauthorisedly occupied by the Medical Superintendent of Silver Jubilee T.B. Hospital (now R.B.T.B. Hospital) under the control of respondent No. 1. The said quarters were occupied for purposes of allotment to the employees of the Hospital, which was controlled by the Delhi Administration but later on it was placed under the control of respondent No. 1 Corporation. The petitioners made reference to various resolutions of Municipal Corporation of Delhi for conferring ownership rights on allottees and on the same analogy on which other writ petitions were preferred, direction is sought for implementation of those resolutions and for allotment of the quarters to the petitioners. Besides other pleas taken by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to contest the petition, an additional plea has been taken in this petition that R.B.T.B. Hospital is in existence much before 1947. Hospital was handed over to the Government on 3.5.1946 whereafter it was again transferred to Municipal Committee, the predecessor of respondent No. 1 Corporation. Land on which quarters were constructed always belonged to the hospital. It has been specifically denied that land was allotted by the Ministry of Rehabilitation. Respondents say that no resolution was ever passed for transfer of the tenements in question to the allottees and none of the resolutions referred to in the writ petition make any reference to the quarters in question.
31. In C.W. 4043/92, the petitioner's case is that he was resident of Municipal Quarter No. 190 at Nimri Colony, which was allotted to him in the course of his service with the respondent Corporation. He stales that presently he is occupying flat No. D-11/4, 10, Rajpur Road, New Delhi, which was allotted to him in lieu of Quarter No. 190, Nimri Colony. The grievance of the petitioner is that he was also a member of the Association, namely, Kalyan Samiti Nimri Colony, which had filed writ petition in this Court, which was allowed on 12.12.1984. L.P.A.28/85 filed against the said judgment was dismissed on 30.9.1985. Special Leave Petition was also dismissed by the Supreme Court. His name was mentioned as one of the members of the association. Judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court was implemented by transferring ownership rights to the allottees but he was not given the same treatment. In his place allotment was made in favour of respondent No. 5. His case is that he is entitled to transfer of Quarter No. 190 in Nimri Colony or in the alternative transfer of another quarter in Nimri Colony, which may be available. Thus the dispute appears to be that instead of making allotment in his favour, allotment has erroneously made in favour of defendant No. 5.
32. Stand of respondent Corporation is that the petitioner was allotted Qr.No. D-11/4,10, Rajpur Road, New Delhi in lieu of Qr. No. 190, Nimri Colony. This allotment at Rajpur Road was made on his own request. He was allowed to surrender quarter at Nimri Colony. Transfer stood completed much prior to the decision of the Court, Resolution No. 924 dated 15.2.1984 passed by the Corporation was restricted to flats in Nimri Colony only and to no other colony. The order passed by the High Court in C.W. 203/72 and confirmed by the Supreme Court is not applicable to the petitioner or to any flat other than. Nimri Colony. It was specifically directed that flats at Nimri Colony be sold only to those who were actual occupants as on 5.12.1984. The petitioner was not in possession of fiat at Nimri Colony on that date.
33. Similar is the stand taken by respondent No. 5 in his reply affidavit wherein it has been stated that the petitioner had been complaining about quarter No. 190, Nimri Colony, Delhi, being of lower category and not being commensurate with his status and pay. It was on his request that he was allotted flat at Rajpur Road. On 4.8.1980 vide allotment letter No. 1762 fiat No. II/4,10, Rajpur Road, Delhi was allotted to the petitioner in lieu of quarter No. 190, Nimri Colony. The petitioner gave consent to the terms of allotment letter dated 5.8.1980. The petitioner was given vacant possession of flat at Rajpur Road and respondent No. 5 was allotted quarter No. 190, at Nimri Colony on 3.4.1982. Respondent No. 5 has also executed and got registered perpetual lease deed on payment of the premium, pursuant to the decision of learned Single Judge of this Court. Additionally it has been pleaded that the petitioner has not disclosed to the Court that he has already been allotted p lot bearing No. 187 MIG, Pocket VI. Sector III, Rohini, Delhi by the Delhi Development Authority and in terms of the judgment of learned Single Judge he is not entitled to any allotment.
CW.4164/9234. This is a petition filed by Municipal Corporation of Delhi through its Commissioner impleading G.L. Bakshi as the main respondent. The prayer made in the petition is to quash the order of Additional District Judge, Delhi dated 1.8.1992 in P.P.Appeal No. 93-94/1991 and thereby to restore the order of Estate Officer, M.C.D. dated 14.5.1987. It is alleged that proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 were initiated against G.L.Bakshi, who had been allotted municipal quarter in Azadpur Colony during the course of his employment. He retired on 10.6.1982. Quarter could be retained by him till 9.8.1982. As he overstayed, proceedings were initiated for vacation. Estate Officer after following due process of law passed an order directing G.L.Bakshi to vacate and to pay damages for the unauthorised occupation. Appeal was preferred before the Appellate Authority by G.L Bakshi. The Appellate Authority on 1.8.1992 set aside the order of Estate Officer by relying upon resolution No. 868 of the Municipal Corporation holding that the same had not been rescinded and, therefore, G.K. Bakshi was entitled to allotment of the flat in question.
35. In CW.4442/94, the petitioners are seeking direction for conferment of ownership right on them, the allottees of fiats mentioned in the petition on the same analogy on which the allottees of Nimri Colony were granted ownership rights. The petitioners claim that they are the employees of the respondent Corporation. From time to time the respondents constructed residential accommodation in different parts of Delhi. Quarters were also constructed on land of Nimri village known as Nimri Colony Part II. Representation was made to the Commissioner for transfer of ownership rights. Representation was rejected by the Administration (Land & Estate Development) in violation of the judgment of this Court dated 26.4.1994 delivered in CW.5183/93, which the petitioners had preferred earlier, wherein specific direction was given to the Commissioner as well as to the Secretary (SLG) and Administrator (MCD) to dispose of the representation in accordance with law. It is claimed that the case of the petitioners is not different from those, who have already been transferred flats in Nimri Colony. Construction was carried out for residential accommodation for being allotted, on 'no profit no loss basis'. Total number of tenements to be built was approximately 968, Pursuant to the request of the respondent Corporation loan was made available to the Corporation for construction of flats, Government of India laid down, some specific conditions. Condition No. 5 reads:-
"Agency for construction of Houses.
Houses under this scheme can be constructed by either or the agencies mentioned below:-
1. The individual himself;
2. The Cooperative Society; and
3. The State Government or any authority designated by it provided however that if it is the State Government or any authority designated by it which builds the houses, the houses must be sold outright or on a hire purchase basis to Cooperatives or individuals. The State Government cannot continue to be permanent owners and rent these houses."
36. The petitioners claim that the respondent Corporation is under a legal obligation to sell the houses to them either on outright sale or on hire purchase basis. The petitioners allege that their case is not different in any manner from the earlier case pertaining to Nimri Colony because both the colonies are located on the same piece of land, which was acquired in 1957 for the purpose "of construction of flats for the employees of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Phase II was similarly constructed. There is no distinction between Phase-I and Phase-II. Nimri Colony Phase II occupies only l/10th of the total area of Nimri Colony. There is no reason why the petitioners be discriminated against vis-a-vis other similarly situate employees, who had since been conferred ownership rights. The respondents initially constructed 640 quarters in accordance with the terms of the loan. 168 flats were constructed later on the same land. Allottees of 640 flats constructed earlier cannot be treated as a class distinct from the members of the petitioners, who are the remaining 168 allottees and as such direction deserves to be issued to the respondents for treating the petitioners alike.
CW. 3388/9537. In this petition direction has been sought against the respondents to pay to the petitioners gratuity, dearness relief and other retirement benefits with over due interest including damage charged, alleged to have been illegally deducted by the Corporation from the dues payable to them and not to deduct any amount on the ground of not vacating the accommodation occupied by them. It is alleged that CW.2051/94 was filed by the Residents Welfare Association and others. The petitioners had also joined as petitioners in the said writ petition, praying for transfer of quarters occupied by them on 'no profit no loss basis'. Similar other petitions were pending in this Court. During pendency of these petitions, the petitioners retired and became entitled to retirement benefits including gratuity, dearness relief, leave encashment etc. Indirect pressure was being put on the petitioners to vacate quarters by withholding their legitimate dues and also to make them liable for damages for over staying in the allotted quarters. They claim that as they are entitled to transfer of the allotted quarters and are further entitled to the reliefs prayed for.
CW. 711/9638. In this petition it is alleged that on 4.12.1970 resolution was passed by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi for sale of flat to the allottees on 'no profit no loss basis.' Allottees were to be charged 15% of the assessed cost in the first instance and the balance in easy instalments spread over a period of 10 years. This facility was given only to those municipal employees, who did not own any house within Delhi in their own name or in the name of any member of their family. It was also resolved that efforts be made to make available plots of land on no profit no loss basis to those employees who were desirous of purchasing such plots for construction of house. Such employees were to be required to pay 30% of the cost of land in easy instalment speared over a period till development work of the laud is completed. It is alleged that on 21,6.1971 Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Disposal Undertaking vide its resolution No. 725 dated 263.1971 had resolved that vacant land available at Okhla and Coronation Piller be allotted to Class-I officers and to other employees respectively for construction of houses on no profit no lo;,;, basis. This resolution was duly approved by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi vide its resolution No. 90 dated 21.8.1971. The petitioners thereafter making similar submissions, as were made in the other connected matters, have prayed for similar directed is against the respondents to implement the judgment of this Court in C.W. 203/72 Kalyan Simiti Nimri Colony & others v. M.C.D. thereby to implement various resolutions for the allotment of quarters on ownership basis or in the alternative mandamus directing the respondents to allot a plot of land approximately 3/4th of an are out of vast vacant land situated at Coronation Pillar preferably adjoining the 16 acres of land already earmarked at Coronation Piller for employees of the Undertaking.
39. In the light of the aforementioned factual back-drop arguments were heard. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the object of various resolutions passed by Municipal Corporation of Delhi will have to be seen. The primary object was to provide proper housing facility to its employees, who do not own any house in Delhi. These were beneficial resolutions passed for the benefit of the employees on 'no profit no loss basis.' After making reference to the provisions of the Act, it was contended that it was within the competence and power of the Corporation to provide loan to its employees. Resolutions passed by the Corporation are intra vires of the Act. Even judging from the point of reasonableness the resolutions cannot be held to be ultra vires of the Act. The Commissioner is an authority of Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Commissioner cannot be equaled with Corporation. Once a decision is takenby the Corporation, it is the function of the Commissioner to implement the same. It is the Corporation, which is to acquire and hold property. The Commissioner does not have such a power. The Commissioner has to carry out the executive functions. Powers of Corporation under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 arc not circumscribed by the conditions mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 200 of the Act. Clauses (a) to (e) of sub section (2) of Section 200 of the Act are subject to limitation contained in the Act. It was further urged that keeping in view the position as existed when the resolutions were passed, it cannot be said that the decision of the Corporation was unreasonable.Since the resolution itself contained reason that M.C.D. had failed to realise costs, in order to realise costs, the Corporation evolved a method of allotment and ultimately resolved to transfer to the allottees the flats, on no profit no loss, basis. Passing of resolutions had the effect of holding out a promise to the employees. Because of such a promise and assurance the petitioners did not seek allotment of flats elsewhere. Thus the petitioners acted to their detriment. Because of the assurances held out to the petitioners by the Corporation, the Corporation is estopped from taking up the stand that the resolutions stand rescinded. The action of rescinding of resolutions is hit by principle of promissory estoppel. Directions deserve to be issued for transfer of quarters to the employees.
40. Mr. Kaul appearing on behalf of some of the petitioners contended that power of disposal of municipal property is that of Corporation. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court will not sit in appeal over the decision of the Corporation but will interfere only on the established norms that whether the view taken by the Corporation was a possible view, which could be taken or can it be said that no reasonable person could have taken a decision to pass such a resolution. Power of Corporation in general cannot be curtailed by regulations conferring powers on Commissioner. When efforts of M.C.D. failed to dispose of the property to realise costs, a fair and reasonable decision was taken for transfer of the flats. The Corporation is expected to be a model employer. Having passed such a resolution in discharge of its functions, it cannot be said that the same are unreasonable. The duty of Commissioner was to implement the resolutions of the Corporation. The Commissioner could not have said that he will not implement it. In his individual capacity he might subscribe to a different view or might he having a different approach but in the capacity as Commissioner he was bound to act in consonance with the resolutions of the Corporation. Mr. Kaul further submitted that two objections were raised by the legal advisor of the Corporation in respect of resolution dated 4.1.2. 1970: (a) Section 206(d) requires that Municipal Corporation of Delhi cannot sell its immovable property at less than the price it can fetch in normal and fair competition, therefore, resolution was not in conformity with the said provision of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act; and (b) restriction on sale of Municipal quarters in colonies constructed after taking loans from the Central Government and Delhi Administration since the terms of loan stated that quarters constructed would remain Municipal property. He contended that the market value will have to be construed as on the relevant date, which would be the date of resolution, namely, 4,12.1970 and not market value of a later date. Escalation in real estate had not taken place as on that date. As such the actual cost of construction and value of land was the market value. Learned counsel urged that an attempt was made to dispose of shops and fiats at Mandelian Road by public auction. Some flats and shops were sold below market price. Offer in respect of residential quarters was far below reserve price, which was communicated to the Corporation. Even the attempt to call for lenders did not evoke favourable response. Accordingly, it was proposed that the residential flats be allotted to employees. Scheme was for construction of shops and flats for sale to public. Thus requirement of Section 200(d) of the Act stood complied with. In the alternative, it was contended that requirement of Section 200(d) of the Act is only a limit on the powers of Commissioner. It does not limit the power of the Corporation under Section 3(2) of the Act wherein there was no such prohibition not to sell the property less than the price it can fetch in normal and fair competition. The second objection of the legal advisor was not applicable to the other colonies including Mande Han Road.
41. It was urged that the principles on which judgment in Civil Writ No. 203/72 proceeded would hold good and apply to all other similar colonies to which effect also the legal advisor had rendered his advise stating that principle having been decided against Municipal Corporation of Delhi, same would apply to other colonies; after resolutions had been passed by the elected wing of the Corporation, the same were binding on the Commissioner and it was his duly to give effect to the same. On failure of Commissioner to discharge his functions, writ of mandamus can be issued directing him to do so. Learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of Division Bench of this Court in Risal Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 30(1997) DLT 253. Mr. Kaul vehemently contended that the reasonings in the impugned judgment of learned Single Judge that the Commissioner is a persona designata and his consent under Section 200(d) of the Act was necessary to sell property is not sustainable in law. The reason that the Commissioner was not bound to give effect to the resolution of Corporation is contrary to the provisions of the Act. Moreover, there was no pleading to this effect made on behalf of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi in its reply.
42. It was contended that the Corporation being legal entity by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act has the power to acquire, hold and dispose of property, which vests in the Corporation, therefore, the power under the Act to sell the properly also vests in the Corporation. The Commissioner being subject to decision of the Corporation is bound to take all steps to give effect to the resolutions. The Commissioner had no power to sit over the judgment of elected body. Sub-section (d) of Section 200 of the Act confer power on the Commissioner subject to approval by the Corporation but it does not take away the power of the Corporation to act suo moto. In the absence of any non-obstante clause, Sub-section (d) of Section 200-of the Act has to be read with the powers, which the Corporation has under Section 3(2) and Section 41 of the Act to "dispose of its property. The Commissioner being subservient to Corporation can be removed by the Corporation by virtue of the powers conferred on the Corporation under Section 54(2)(a) of the Act. Therefore, learned Single Judge was not right in observing that only the Central Government could remove the Commissioner. Reference was made by learned counsel to a decision in O.P. Bhalora and Anr. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi C.W. 2274/81 decided on 27.9.1997. Under the provisions of Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 200 of the Act, power has been vested with the Commissioner for disposal of movable and immovable property of lesser value, which power is further circumscribed by Sub-section (g) of Section 200 requiring the Commissioner to immediately report to the Corporation and to the Standing Committee about disposal under Section 200(a) and (b). The Commissioner thus has only limited power of disposal under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 200. Power under _ Clause (c) of Section 200 with the Commissioner is that he may with the sanction of the Corporation lease, sell, let out on hire or transfer any movable or immovable property belonging to the Corporation. The condition in Clause (d) of Section 200 of the Act to transfer at a price prevalent in fair and normal competition is not an absolute condition. Sub-section (f) of Section 200 of the Act provides that Sub-sections (a) to (c) of the Act will apply to every disposal of the property subject to any condition or limitations specified under other provisions of the Act. Therefore, the same must be deemed to be subject to Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act and necessarily it implies that the Corporation has every power to dispose of the property. Resolutions for disposal of property, therefore, meet the test of reasonableness.
43. It was further argued that providing for housing for its employees is a welfare measure under the discretionary functions of the Corporation as enumerated in Clause (n) of Section 43 of the Act. Clause (o) of Section 43 provides for measures for welfare of Municipal officers and employees including sanctioning of loans for constructions of houses. In case loans can be given for construction of houses, certainly the Corporation can build houses and transfer the same to its employees at a cost based on no profit no loss basis. Being a wholesome provision and for the welfare of the employees, public body like Municipal Corporation is expected to act as a model employer in discharge of its functions.
44. Learned counsel further urged/that in case reasonings of learned Single Judge is upheld that Commissioner is not duty bound to follow the orders and dictates of the Corporation, the same is likely to lead to a state of complete chaos. The Commissioner is only one of the authorities specified to carry out the functions and is subject to directions of Supreme Body, namely, General House. Reliance on decision in City Municipal Council Mandya v. State of Mysore and Ors., 1975 Mun. & Corp. Cases 491 is misplaced since that was a case where Corporation itself had sanctioned funds and reconsidered its own decision, which the Corporation can do subject to plea of estoppel and other pleas. He contended that most of the colonies of Municipal Corporation of Delhi were constructed after taking loans from Delhi Administration and it cannot be an acceptable proposition that if a property is constructed after taking loan, the property would not belong to Corporation. Learned Single Judge tried to distinguish the reasonings in Kalyan Samiti Nimri case (supra) on the basis that flats were constructed after taking loan from Delhi Administration, therefore, the same cannot be regarded as property of Corporation and on the ground that possibly the effect of Sub-sections (b) and (c) of Section 200 of the Act was not considered. Mr. Kaul urged that the decision in Kalyan Samiti Nimri's case (supra) was affirmed up to Supreme Court. Oversight of legal provisions cannot be imputed in such a situation. Kalyan Samittee's case (supra) cannot be limited only to its own facts. Specifically in the impugned judgment, it was stated that Corporation had done its duty and in all fairness passed a resolution in accordance with the decision it had taken as far back in the year 1970.
45. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon a number of decisions in support of his submissions that power vests in the Corporation to dispose of its property and in case a decision was taken by the Corporation to dispose of the same, such decision will not be liable to be interfered with. The circumstances under which the Court would interfere with exercise of such power by the Corporation are limited. The Court is not to substitute its own decision to that of the Corporation. It cannot be assumed even prima facie that bodies like local bodies will exceed their power. Local authorities are entrusted by Parliament with the power to take decisions on matters for which knowledge and experience of that authority can best be trusted. Only in case the decision on a matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have come to that decision then the Court will be justified in interfering. The Court may have a different view than the view, which local authority may have on matters of high public policy, but Courts will not act as an arbiter of the correctness of one view over the other. Reference was made to a decision in Associated Provisional Picture House Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, 1948(1) K.B. 223. It was urged that the very concept of administrative discretion involves the right to choose between more than one possible courses of action. Two reasonable persons can come to two opposite conclusions on the same set of facts without forfeiting their title to be regarded as reasonable. While determining the validity of action taken by public representative bodies such like Municipal bodies. Court ought to be slow to hold that the same is void for unreasonableness. An elected wing of the system cannot be imputed with general motives like malafide and it cannot be presumed that an elected body like Municipal Corporation of Delhi would act contrary to law specialty keeping in mind that exercise of such power is always subject to judicial review and it cannot be accepted that when there is unlimited power to buy property, disposal of the same property can take place only with the consent of the Commissioner. Reference by learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment only to a passage from 5th Edition of the Administrative Law by Professor Wade on the generosity of statutory bodies like the Corporation to distribute funds in a way, which may be contrary to the interest of the tax payers under the heading "misplaced philanthropy", without reference to the other passages in the same book is not justified. Subsequent passages had watered down the principle considerably, which recognise the concept of principle of model employer. It has been observed that the doctrine that power must be exercised reasonably has to be reconciled with no less important a doctrine that the Court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority. It has to be appreciated that social philanthropy is bound to find an important place in our decision making process and has to be seen in the social context in India, which is a welfare state. Local authorities as an model employer is entitles to have due regard to the interest and welfare of its working force. The scheme of allotment of houses to its employees on "no profit no loss basis" has to be seen in this context. Such a social welfare measures cannot be held to be illegal in the Indian social context. Three reasons were assigned by learned Single Judge in the judgment holding that exercise of power to allot in Nimri colonies case was improper and none of them would apply to the case in hand. In cases like L.P.A.118/89 unlike Kalyan Simiti's case (supra) quarters were built for sale. Allotment in Kalyan Samiti Nimiri's case was finally upheld by the Supreme Court. Principle of promissory estoppel would apply not only in cases of written representations but even otherwise. Resolutions by Corporation amount to representation to the employees and the public at large. There is specific allegation in the writ petitions that the petitioners expected the flats to be allotted to them for residence on ownership basis in due course of time and as such they never thought of buying other property or land for their own residence. Citizens dealing with public body like Municipal Corporation of Delhi are bound to act on the faith of their resolutions and it would be a sad day in the administration of these bodies if they would decide to go back on their resolutions.
46. It was argued that learned Single Judge placed reliance on the decision in Krishan Dass v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, C.W.266/73 decided on 26.8.1974 to the effect that writ of mandamus cannot be issued to the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Delhi to enter into contract since writs are issued only for enforcing legal duty or legal right. Reliance on this decision is also not justified. On one hand learned Single Judge observed that question need not be decided yet has found force in the argument by observing that resolution in the said case was of DESU and not of Corporation. DESU is one of the Municipal Authority mentioned in Section 44 of the Act along with the Commissioner. Resolution was subject to approval by the Corporation. As such judgment was not applicable to the present case. Resolutions passed by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi in the appellants case created a vested right in their favour. They had legitimate expectation that they will be treated fairly and resolutions will be duly implemented. Non implementation of decision in Kalyan Samiti's case (supra) vis-a-vis other cases amounts to violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Employees are all identically situated. Some of them happened to occupy Nimri quarters at some stage and other. Others were occupying different quarters. They cannot be denied the benefit, which was implemented in favour of those in whose favour decision was rendered and judgment upheld by Supreme Court.
47. The act of rescinding or resolutions, which had been reiterated from time to time, amount to violating the will of the elected representatives. Vested right had accrued in favour of the employees, who had not acquired residential accommodation in the hope and faith of the representations given out by the Corporation. Resolution stood implemented qua Nimri. After the decision of the Supreme Court, the Corporation had no option but to implement the resolution. A back door method had been found out not to implement the judgment in Nimri Colony's case (supra) qua the other persons. Resolutions have been rescinded in malafide and illegal exercise of power.
48. To meet the submissions made on behalf of the appellants and petitioner in addition to the grounds taken by learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition of the appellants, it was contended on behalf of the respondents that the Commissioner is a persona designata under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act with regard to disposal of property. His authority cannot be questioned. In case a particular act is required to be done in a particular manner by the statute, it is the fundamental principle of law that it must be done in that way alone or not at all. It was vehemently contended by Mr. Arun Jaitley on behalf of Municipal Corporation of Delhi to allot houses to its employees and there is also no corresponding legal right vested in the employees, therefore, mandamus cannot be issued. It was contended that judgment in Kalyan Samiti's case (supra) is per curium. It does not deal with the scope and ambit of Section 200 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. Doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable being an equitable doctrine. It must yield when equity so requires. Resolution can only be a part of decision making process. There is no question of any legal right vesting in favour of the appellants merely on passing of. the resolutions. Doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot give rise to a legally enforceable right and in any case has to be balanced against the requirement of public interest. There is also no question of any discrimination since there is no equality in illegality. It was vehemently contended that larger public interest demands that mandamus as sought for be not granted since it will amount to depriving allotment to a large number of existing municipal employees waiting for living accommodation. The employees are entitled to enjoy the allotted accommodations only for the duration they are in Municipal service. Giving effect to the resolutions is likely to have the effect of depriving large number of Municipal Corporation employees of all the residential quarters of whatever category they are and making the same not available to the employees who are still working and discharging their duties. It was pointed out that total number of regular Municipal employees was to the tune of approximately one lakh. Total number of Municipal quarters was about 3200. Considerable number of employees are still on waiting list. This appeal and the petitions if allowed relate to about 950 employees. Most of them have either expired or retired. Some are still in service. In the absence of any legal duty cast on the municipal authority to allot houses to its employees, no legal right vest in the appellants and the petitioners, therefore, there was no question of granting mandamus. Rightly the petition was dismissed.
49. On behalf of respondent/M.C.D., Mr. Jaitley further urged that no public body or State can pass resolutions, which may be contrary to the express provisions of a statute. Resolutions in question were not passed in accordance with the mandates of the Act. Resolutions are of a general nature. No promise was ever held out by the Competent Authority. There is no question of applicability of doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. As the implementation of the resolutions would have been contrary to the mandate of law, rightly decision was taken by the Competent Authority to rescind the resolutions. Resolutions of the Corporation and of the Standing Committee were not in the nature of legally enforceable rights inasmuch as neither the Standing Committee, nor the Corporation were competent to extend any promise for sale of Municipal Property. The authority to sell the property under the Act is that of the Commissioner together with the Corporation.
50. On behalf of Jal Nigam similar arguments were addressed on the basis of which C.W.2809/89 was dismissed by Division Bench on 14.3.1991.
51. Learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment held that though Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act provide for the Corporation to hold and dispose of property, the said sub-section, however, specifies that the power to hold and dispose of property is subject to provisions of the Act. Even though the power to dispose of may exist with the Corporation but the manner in which this power can be exercised is contained in Section 200 of the Act. In order to analyse the scope of Section 200 of the Act, learned Single Judge made reference to Sections 197 and 198 and observed that the immovable property belonging to the Corporation can be disposed of only by the Commissioner either with the sanction of the Standing Committee or of the Corporation. He further held that whereas with regard to acquisition of immovable property no decision thereon can be taken by the Corporation alone but immovable property can only be disposed of with the concurrence of the two entities, one of which must be the Commissioner. According to him the use of words "The Commissioner may with the sanction of the Corporation lease, sell, let out or hire or otherwise transfer any property, movable, belonging to the Corporation ...", in Clause (c) of Section 200 give an indication that the initiative or proposal for sale of municipal property ordinarily arise from the Commissioner. It was held that the Commissioner was one of the Municipal Authorities. Therefore, his concurrence for sale of the property was required. Following the decision of Karnataka High Court in City Municipal Council, Mandya v. State of Mysore and Ors., 1975 Municipalities and Corporation Cases 491, it was held that the Corporation could not direct the Commissioner to sell the flats to the appellants and the resolution of the Corporation did not give any right to them for transfer of the flats. Relying upon the decision of Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Another v. Hari Kishan Sharma, , learned Single Judge concluded that the power to sell immovable property conferred by Section 200 of the Act is to be exercised by the Commissioner with the sanction of the Standing Committee or the Corporation, as the case may be. This power of the Commissioner cannot be usurped either by the Standing Committee or by the Corporation itself. In other words, the sanctioning authority, namely, the Standing Committee of the Corporation cannot also exercise the powers of the Commissioner and decide on its own to sell immovable property. Immovable property belonging to the Corporation can be sold by the Commissioner with the sanction of the Standing Committee or the Corporation and the said property cannot be sold by the Corporation without the Commissioner agreeing to such a sale. It was held that as the Commissioner at no point of time gave his consent to the sale of the quarters rather he had been opposing the sale by bringing it to the notice of the Corporation that the same is contrary to the provisions of Sub-section (d) of Section 200 and is also not in the interest of the Corporation, no direction can be issued to the respondent Corporation for sale of the Municipal quarters in favour of the petitioners. Learned Single Judge also held that the Corporation could sell immovable property only if the price at which it is sold is not less than the one which is arrived at in normal and fair competition. Sub-section (d) of Section 200 contemplates that the immovable property may be sold only at market price, which price is to be determined in normal and fair competition. On this analysis, learned Single Judge held that the resolutions passed by the Corporation were not in consonance with the provisions of the statute. Learned Single Judge also remarked that as the Corporation is an elected body and has a limited term, the Legislature thought it fit not to confer on the Corporation unguided or unbridled power with regard to sale of immovable property. Two checks have been placed under the Act as regards sale of immovable property, namely, (a) the decision to sell must have the concurrence of the Commissioner and the Corporation; and (b) the sale should be at a value determined according to Section 200(d). Referring to the passage from Professor Wade Administrative Law under the heading "Misplaced Philanthropy" it was held that the property whether movable or immovable cannot be disposed of by the Corporation with a view to favour any one if disposal of such property is not contemplated by the provisions of the Act and is not in the interest of the Corporation. If such a power is conceded to the Corporation, it would follow that, in law, the Corporation can sell Municipal property at less than market value to other persons to whom favour is sought to be shown. The corporators are in a sense trustees of the Municipal fund and property and they have to act in the best interest of the Corporation. According to learned Single Judge, the Commissioner was perfectly justified in not consenting to the transfer of the quarter in favour of the petitioner. Learned Single Judge also held that the Commissioner was not merely an employee of the Corporation and was not obliged to implement all the resolutions, which are passed by the Corporation. As a Chief Executive, he ordinarily would be required to comply only with valid and legal decisions of the Corporation. Where the Commissioner is required to apply his own mind and to take a decision, he would be failing in his duty if he merely carries out the dictates of the Corporation without applying his mind. It was also held by learned Single Judge that no representation was ever made for sale of the property at any time by the Commissioner and as such there was no question of promissory estoppel.
52. As will be noticed from the aforementioned narration of the events that before us no new points were urged except taking up a different approach on the same grounds in order to substantiate the claim of the appellants and the petitioners. As such we may not repeat the reasonings again, which prevailed with learned Single Judge since we fully agree with the same on all counts. In addition it may be observed that there has been much change in the circumstances after learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition by the impugned judgment, which is under challenge in L.P.A. No. 118/89. Subsequent developments, which have happened alone are sufficient to dispose of the appeals and the writ petitions. The reasonings and decision of learned Single Judge has in fact been duly approved by the Supreme Court in a different case.
53. We have made a mention of CW.2899/89. Jagdish Prasad and others had filed the said writ petition. They were employees of the Delhi Electric Supply undertaking and were allotted quarters in Tripolia DESU Colony. Allotment was made to them in their capacity as employees. They claimed that there was a Low Income Group Housing Scheme by the Government of India under which loan was granted by the Central Government to the State Government for the purpose of enabling persons in Low Income Group to build their own houses. They claimed that the respondents had obtained such loan and construct quarters in the colony. Therefore, respondents were bound to transfer the said quarters to the petitioners. Division Bench in its judgment dated 14.3.1991 held that no resolution had been passed by Delhi Electric Supply Committee, which was the authority under Section 44 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, with regard to the selling of the quarters to the petitioners or any one of them. The term of loan stated that all quarters constructed under Low Income Group Housing should continue to be owned by Delhi State Electricity Board and Should not be sold to their employees. Division Bench while dismissing the writ petition also held that similar other writ petitions had been filed wherein similar question had been raised in which Municipal Corporation of Delhi had passed resolution resolving to transfer municipal in favour of the employees. Such writ petitions were dismissed on the ground that sale could not be effected without concurrence of the Commissioner as envisaged under the Act. This decision was challenged in Supreme Court. The said Leave Petition along with other connected special leave petitions filed against later decisions of the Division Bench dated 19.3.1991 and 22.3.1991 dismissing similar writ petitions on similar grounds came up for hearing and were dismissed on 17.12.1992. Supreme Court held that though it may be desirable and wishful thinking that the Welfare State may provide house to every citizen and especially to persons belonging to Low Income Group and falling in the lower strata of the society, however, this is a stupendous task looking to the vast population of this country and the limited financial resources and as such no direction can be given by the Courts in this regard on the basis of a broad submission that erstwhile employees were entitled to such a right as an ordinary citizen. It was also held that employees were no longer in service. There was a great dearth of housing accommodation in Delhi and large number of employees were already in service and standing in queue for allotment of residential quarters. There was no legal right to claim right of ownership on the basis of resolutions and as such the petitioners therein were not held entitled to any relief.
54. Another writ petition CW.2407/90 (Jagdish Chander Mehta v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others) was dismissed by Division Bench on 8.8.1990. In the said writ petition decision of Lt. Government dated 22.3.1990 whereby he rescinded earlier resolutions passed by the Corporation on 4.12.1970, 25.4.1972, 31.7.1973, 21.12.1988, 20.2.1989 and 4-10-1989 regarding sale of Municipal quarters to the employees was challenged. Division Bench while dismissing the writ petition held that the main reason for rescinding earlier resolutions was that the said resolutions were contrary to Clause (d) of Section 200 of the Act. It: was further held that this is a valid ground for rescinding the earlier resolutions inasmuch as in another writ petition No. 1662/88 Nirmal Kumar Jain and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi decided on 8.9.1988, it had been held that such proposal for transfer is contrary to the provisions of Clause (d) of Section 200 of the Act. (Needless to add that L.P.A. 118/89 is against the said decision in CW.1662/88) Special Leave Petition was preferred against the decision of Division Bench dismissing CW. 2407/90. The said Special Leave Petition (C) No. 11129/92 was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 30.8.1993. No. interference was made with the decision of this Court.
55. Another subsequent development, which has taken place after learned Single Judge decided the writ petition, which has given rise to L.P.A. 118/89 is the act of passing of resolution rescinding all resolutions on which the appellants or the petitioners are seeking mandamus against the respondents for transfer of quarters or land to them. In view of this subsequent development also, it may not be necessary for us to go in details on the legality and validity of the earlier resolutions on the basis of which right is claimed by the appellants in L.P.A. 118/89 and in the other cases.
56. The events leading to rescinding of the resolutions have already been noticed above but again may be reiterated that on 1.4.1980 show cause notice was issued by the Central Government for superseding the Corporation. One of the grounds for supersession, inter alia, was that "the Corporation passed the resolution to sell staff quarters in Nimri Colony to the occupants/allottees ignoring the fact that the quarters were meant to serve as an amenity to serving staff. In Satish Chandra Khandelwal v. Union of India and Ors., ILR (1981) 1 Delhi 917 the act of the Central Government superseding the Corporation was challenged. Full Bench of this Court upheld this ground as an abuse of power. On 23.7.1980 the Commissioner, who was functioning as an Administration of the Corporation, on account of supersession of the elected representative, in exercise of his powers under Section 490 of the Act passed a resolution rescinding the earlier resolutions regarding transfer of tenements constructed at Nimri Colony to allottees. It was pointed out during argument that there was no rescinding of the resolution dated 4.12.1970. After fresh elections to the Corporation, the Corporation comprising elected representatives on 15.2.1984 again passed a resolution restoring the earlier resolutions for sale of quarters to the occupants of Nimri Colony. On 12.12.1983 learned Single Judge decided CW. 203/72 thereby directing transfer of quarters to occupants of Nimri Colony. Letters Patent Appeal against the said decision was dismissed in limine. Special Leave Petition was also dismissed as withdrawn. Judgment was ultimately implemented. On 1.11.1988 the Commissioner again wrote to Municipal Corporation of Delhi requesting for rescinding the resolutions. Despite this the Standing Committee on 21.12.1988 again reiterated resolution dated 4.12.1970. On 20.2.1989 Municipal Corporation of Delhi passed a resolution accepting the recommendation of the Standing Committee thereby reiterating the earlier resolution dated 4.12.1970.
57. On 6.1.1990 Ministry of Home Affairs notified that the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred under Section 491 of the Act had superseded the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and appointed Chief Secretary, Delhi to exercise powers and perform duties of Municipal Commissioner. On 18.1.1990 Lt. Governor of Delhi in exercise of power under Section 487 of the Act directed Municipal Corporation of Delhi to rescind resolutions dated 4.12.1970, 25.4.1972, 31.7.1973,21.12.1988, 20.2.1989 and 4.10.1989 except in so far as they related to those flats of Nimri Colony, for which the resolutions had been implemented. Needless to add here that the judgment of learned Single Judge directing transfer of some of the quarters of Nimri Colony had already been implemented by that time. On 21.3.1990 recommendation was made by the Commissioner in his letter dated 21.3.1990, narrating history for rescinding of the resolutions of the Corporation and of Standing Committee. The same were placed before the Chief Secretary exercising the powers of Corporation under Section 490(2)(b) of the Act. The matter was examined by the Chief Secretary, who on 22.3.1990 in exercise of his powers of the Corporation resolved to rescind four resolutions of the Corporation and five resolutions of the Standing Committee. No other resolution was passed thereafter by the Corporation. Thus once again resolutions were rescinded and for valid reasons. In view of the recession of the resolutions, as observed above, it may not be necessary for us to go into the legality and validity of the earlier resolutions.
58. On the question of rescinding of the resolutions by the Administrator and its effect, Mr. Kaul and other learned counsel appearing for the appellants and the petitioners contended that the resolutions passed in 1970 by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi had been reiterated from time to time by the Elected Body. At the time when the Corporation had been superseded the Administrator had sought to rescind the resolution in a totally arbitrary and illegal manner. The will of the elected representative cannot be nullified in this fashion. Vested rights had accrued in favour of the parties like the employees who had not acquired residential accommodation on the faith of the representations, as contained in the resolutions. The rescinding of the resolutions is also to be understood in the context that the resolutions stand implemented qua some of the employees of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi but not in case of others. Employees who have been left out cannot be discriminated against in this fashion. In view of the opinion of the legal advisor the Corporation had no option but to implement the resolution qua others. A back door method has been found out not to implement the judgment in Nimri case qua other parties and the resolutions have been rescinded in malafide, illegal and improper manner during the pendency of the appeals and writ petitions and the same cannot come in the way of the appellants and the petitioners in getting the requisite relief.
59. Needless to add here that the authority and competence of the Chief Secretary in exercise his powers of Commissioner to pass order dated 21.3.1990 rescinding earlier four resolutions of the Corporation and five of the Standing Committee is not under challenge in either of the petitions or appeal. What is stated is that the said resolution has been passed in a totally arbitrary and illegal manner and with malafide object to deprive the petitioners of their right. Scope of interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction qua the said resolution is very limited. In Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1947) 2 A.E.R. 680 it was held that the test to be applied to find out if the decision was illegal or suffers from procedural improprieties or was one, which no sensible decision maker could on the material before him and within the frame work of law have arrived at, the Court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether action was not bonafide. The Court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The Court would not, however, go into the correctness of the choice made by the decision making authority amongst the various alternatives open to it. Nor could the Court substitute its own decision to that of the decision making authority. These principles have been reiterated in a number of decisions by the Supreme Court. We need make reference to only one of such decision in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SC 651. Chief Secretary while taking decision took into consideration the provisions of Clause (d) of Section 200 of the Act that the resolutions of the Corporation and those of the Standing Committee were not consistent with the said Clause (d) of Section 200 inasmuch as transfer of immovable property was not being done in a normal "and fair competition and that the transfer of staff quarters would amount to illegal liquidation of municipal assets and would benefit those Municipal employees only who happen to be allottees/occupants of the quarters. Such an action on the part of the Corporation of liquidating Municipal assets in an unsuitable manner amounted to causing loss to the Corporation, which in the opinion of the Administrator, amounted to imperfect performance of duties imposed on the Corporation.
60. On the decision taken by the Chief Secretary jurisdiction and scope for us is limited viz. to see whether the decision is absurd or perverse. The Chief Secretary took into consideration the view expressed by learned Single Judge in his decision on the scope of Section 200 of the Act. It cannot be said that it was absurd on the part of the Chief Secretary to rely upon the said decision or that the view taken by Chief Secretary is perverse. In any case the view taken can be said to be a possible view of the matter on the material before the Chief Secretary. Whether or not in the facts and circumstances it was necessary and desirable to rescind the resolutions or not was within the competence of the Chief Secretary, who took the decision on the basis of relevant material. It is not the case of the appellants and the petitioners that irrelevant material was taken into consideration. One of the factor taken into consideration was the number of flats available with the Corporation, number of serving employees and whether it would be in the interest of the Corporation to rescind the resolution or not. At this stage, we may point out that of about 925 allottees in various municipal quarters located in different parts of the City, such as, Nimri Colony, Dhaka Colony, Azadpur Colony, Mandelion Road, Kamla Nagar, Bhamashah Market, Srinivas Puri, Naniwala Bagh, Lodhi Colony, Model Town, Ashok Nagar, Bunglow Road, Rajpur Road, Boulvard Road, Greater Kailash, Minto Road, Thompson Road and Jahangir Road, about 380 employees have already retired from Municipal service and about 80 employees are stated to have expired. Municipal Corporation is stated to be possessing about four thousand Municipal quarters. Total number of employees with Municipal Corporation of Delhi are stated to be about 1,00,000 in addition to other temporary employees. In case interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act, as interpreted by the Court, was taken into consideration along with other relevant material and also the acute shortage of accommodation, as was also noticed by the Supreme Court in Jagdish Prasad and other's case (supra), it cannot be said that the order rescinding resolutions is perverse. There is no legal duty imposed on the Municipal Corporation to allot houses to its employees. Municipal Corporation of Delhi is neither under an obligation nor is legally bound by the mandate of law to allot houses to its employees. When there is no such legal duty on the Corporation, there cannot be any corresponding legal right in the employees to claim for such a benefit.
61. In Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. Governing Body of the Nalanda College, Bihar Shariff and Ors., , it was held that in order that mandamus may issue to compel an authority to do something, it must be shown that the statute impose a legal duty on that authority and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. This principle has been reiterated in Slate of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha and Ors., ; Mani Subrat Jain and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Others, ; Chinleput Bottlers v. Majestic Bottling Company, ; and State of U.P. and Ors. v. Harish Chandra and Ors., .
62. The mere fact that to some of the allottees of Nimri Colony transfer of the quarters was made pursuant to the decision of learned Single Judge of this Court, cannot be a ground to issue mandamus to the respondents to make similar transfer in favour of the appellants and petitioners in these cases, more particularly when the basis on which the allotment was made is not surviving. In the said decision of learned Single Judge, scope of Section 200 was not considered, which later on was duly considered by another learned Single Judge in the impugned decision. Only thereafter decision was taken for rescinding the resolutions. The appellants and the petitioners cannot claim equality since it was found that it was not permissible for the Corporation to have passed resolutions for transfer of quarters. Therefore, there cannot be equality in illegality. In Chandigarh Administration and Anr. v. Jagjit Singh and Anr. (1995) 1 S.C.C. 785 it was held:-
"Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the fact and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent authority to repeal the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law-indeed, wherever it is possible, the Court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent authority to repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law."
63. The appellants/petitioners cannot seek mandamus on mere legitimate expectation since legitimate expectation is not an independent legal enforceable right. A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. Due observance of its obligation as part of good administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its instrumentalities with this element forming a necessary component of the decision making process in all State actions. Mere reasonable expectation or legitimate expectation of a citizen by itself cannot be a distinct and enforceable right. Whether the expectation of a citizen is reasonable or legitimate is a question of fact in each case. Whereas the question arises, it has to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial security.
64. In Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle feed Industries, (1993) 1 S.C.C. 77 doctrine of legitimate expectation and its becoming an enforceable right was considered. In the instant case, it was alleged by the petitioners that they expected the Municipal Corporation to transfer to them the allotted quarters, as per the resolutions, as was done in the case of some of the allottees, pursuant to the decision of Single Judge of this Court. But this legitimate expectation cannot give rise to a right to the petitioners since their case was required to be examined on merits. In the meanwhile, judicial verdict came that resolutions were bad for the reasons stated in the judgment. In number of cases writ petitions were dismissed. Thereafter a decision was taken to rescind the resolutions. Thus there is no question of any right much less a legally and enforceable right vesting in favour of the petitioners. Allowing the petitioners and appellants claim at this stage would amount to depriving a vast number of Municipal employees of the benefit of the use of the quarters during the tenure of their employment with the Corporation for which purpose alone the quarters are available. They can use it only for the duration of their employment and not beyond that.
CW.851/9065. The petitioner's case is that it is a society registered under the provisions of law governing Co-operative Societies established for common benefit of its members particularly with the object of making house sites available to them. It is stated that most of the members of the society comprise of the employees of Water, Sewage and Supply and Disposal Undertakings and belong to Lower Income Group. Considering the fact that the employees have been representing for adequate facilities from time to time respondent No. 2 on 26.3.1971 passed resolution No. 725 resolving that the land lying vacant at Coronation Pillar be allotted to the employees under the Regulations and bye-laws approved by them on 'No profit no loss basis'. By a separate resolution No. 90 dated 21.6.1971, the said resolution was duly approved by respondent No. 1. After the aforementioned resolution was passed, a society comprising 500 employees was formed and got registered in 1971 known as Jal Mal Karamchari Co-operative Group Housing Society. The petitioner society kept on asking for allotment of plot of land, pursuant to the resolution dated 26.3.1971. Delhi Development Authority had also given an offer to the petitioner society, on its application, for allotment of 2 acres land through letter dated 16.11.1976. In reply dated 29.11.1976 the petitioner stated that they had about 500 members. As such their requirement could not be met by allotment of 2 acre land only. Requirement would be for about 15 acres. Delhi Development Authority through its letter dated 25.6.1977 replied to the petitioner society that all members could not be accommodated by D.D.A. as availability of land with it was limited only to the extent of 2 acres. The petitioner society received a letter on 29.11.1979 in response to its letter dated 20.11.1979 in which respondent No. 2 had fixed a meeting between the petitioner society and its officers on 23.12.1979. An offer was made to the petitioner society for allotment of land at Rs. 8/- per sq.yard, which the petitioner society immediately accepted. On 20.4.1980, respondent No. 2 sent another letter to the petitioner to the effect that allotment could only be made if liquidation proceedings against the Society were withdrawn. Reply was sent by the petitioner pointing out that liquidation proceedings could be withdrawn in case an official letter is sent by respondent No. 2 to respondent No. 3 indicating allotment of land. Accordingly, a letter was sent by respondent No. 2 to the Registrar, Co-operative Societies on 20.4.1981 stating that respondent No. 2 intends to allot piece of land to the petitioner society at North Sewage Treatment Plant, Coronation Pillar near Model Town, Delhi. After completion of necessary formalities a request was made that proceedings for liquidation or deregistration may be withdrawn. On 22.7.1980 respondent No. 2 informed the petitioner that it had recommended to allot land at Rs. 3,00,000/- per acre plus ground rent. Reply was sent and respondent No. 3, in the meanwhile, withdraw liquidation proceedings. Letter was sent by respondent No. 2 for submitting a list of members along with a certificate that none of the members owned a flat or house in Delhi in his name or in the name of his dependent. List was supplied on 13.5.1981. There was exchange of letters thereafter. Petitioner's case is that more than 12 years had passed, after resolutions were passed for allotment of land but respondents have not bothered to fulfill their statutory and contractual obligation. The petitioners have questioned the legality and validity of letters dated 14.6.1985 and 12.7.1985 and have sought mandatory direction for implementation of resolution No. 725 dated 26.3.1971, alleged to have been approved by respondent No. 2 vide resolution No. 90 dated 21.6.1971.
66. Petition has been opposed by the respondents. On behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2, it is submitted that demand of society for allotment of land was considered by respondents and the same was rejected of which petitioners were duly informed through Annexure-R.2 stating that it may not be possible for the Corporation to transfer its land to the society for construction of houses/flats. Petitioners were advised to approach the Delhi Development Authority for allotment of land for society. Such rejection was reiterated by the respondents in various other correspondence. The respondents have denied that any offer was made to the petitioner for allotment of land, as alleged by the petitioner.
67. The Delhi Development Authority in its reply stated that the petitioner society was offered allotment through letter dated 16.11.1976 in Paschim Puri and Pitampura. The society was required to deposit Rs. 5,000/- as earnest money. After issuance of the letter, the society requested for allotment of 15 acres of land. Since land to that extent was not available in Paschim Puri and Pitampura, request could not be acceded to. The society was informed vide letter dated 25.6.1977 that all members can be adjusted in Budella area where some land was available for allotment but the society did not deposit the earnest money of Rs. 5,000/- within the stipulated period.
68. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner's claim is only for an area of 15 acres to be allotted to them. It is contended that proposed meeting was held and proposal of the respondent was accepted. Letter dated 22.4.1980 is a conclusive letter in all respects meeting all requirements of law.
69. In so far as the claim of the writ petitioners in this C. W.851/90 is concerned seeking quashing of letters (Annexures P.25 and P.17) and for issuing mandamus to implement resolutions No. 725 and 90 dated 26 3.1971 and 26.6.1971 respectively are concerned, needless to add that by mere passing of resolution, no right is vested in the petitioners to seek mandamus and no writ can be issued on that basis directing the . respondents to make allotment of land. May be that at one stage land was earmarked but in the absence of any legal and vested right in the petitioners for allotment, no direction can be issued against the respondent for making allotment. Moreover, it has been brought to our notice that on and from 6.4.1998 Delhi Water Board has come into existence, on coming into force of Delhi Water Board Act, 1998. It was the case of the respondents that the petitioner society was formed voluntarily by some of the employees of the Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Disposal Undertaking. Most of the employees have since ceased to be in the employment. There were more than 15000 employees when reply affidavit was filed by the respondents on 8.8.1991. Allotment of land on ownership basis, as prayed would amount to discriminating large number of employees.
70. Besides other grounds on which it may not be possible to grant reliefs claimed in the petition in mandatory form, the main ground on which the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this petition is the fact that on 4.6.1985 the petitioner had been duly informed by the respondents that it may not be possible for the Corporation to transfer its land to the society for construction of houses and flats. Not only that this decision was duly conveyed to the petitioner but it was again reiterated on 12.7.1985 that in view of the provisions of Section 200 of the Act, allotment of municipal land is not permissible. The petitioner society had also moved DDA for allotment. As per the stand taken by the DDA allotment was made vide letter dated 16.11.1976. The petitioner society was required to deposit a sum of Rs. 5,000/- as earnest money by 30.12.1976. Instead of depositing the said amount the petitioner society asked for allotment of 15 acres of land instead of 2 acres. This request was also duly considered by the DDA but was turned down. Through letter dated 25.6.1977 the petitioner society was informed that members can be adjusted by making allotment in Budella where sufficient land was available for allotment to society. The society was again required to deposit a sum of Rs. 5,000/- within the stipulated period as per the letter dated 25.6.1977. This amount was also not deposited by the petitioners. As the petitioner society failed to deposit the requisite amount, there is no case made out for grant of any relief to the petitioner society.
71. In C.W. 4034/92 facts as have emerged from the affidavits exchanged are such on the basis of which no direction can be issued for quashing the conferment of right on respondent No. 5 and thereby issuing direction against the respondents to make an order of transfer in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner had surrendered quarter No, 119 at Nimri Colony of his own volition and had shifted to Rajpur Road, Delhi on 4.8.1980. It was done at his own request. Quarter No. 119, Nimri Colony was allotted to respondent No. 5. On the date of decision of the writ petition of Kalyan Samiti Nimri Colony (C.W. 203/72) the petitioner was not in occupation of the quarter in question. It was in occupation of respondent No. 5 and while implementing the judgment respondent No. 5 was conferred ownership right. There is neither any equity nor . any right vesting in the petitioner to seek direction, as prayed for in the petition.
72. In view of the above, appeal and writ petitions except C.W. 4164/92 are dismissed with no order as to costs. C.W. 4164/92 filed by Municipal Corporation of Delhi is allowed. Impugned order passed by the appellate authority on 1.8.1992 is set aside. Resultantly, the order of the Estate Officer dated 14.5.1987 is upheld.
73. While appeals and petitions were entertained in some of the cases dispossession of the allottees from municipal quarters were stayed, in some cases on conditions and in other cases without conditions. As a result of dismissal of the appeals and the writ petitions the orders of stay stand vacated. In order to avoid any hardship to the occupants as regards payment of damages/use and occupation charges, it is directed that in case the physical vacant possession is voluntarily surrendered by the occupants to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi within a period of three months from today without any let or hindrance, the allottees whose allotment stood cancelled or had come to an end will be liable to pay only normal use and occupation charges failing which they will be liable to pay damages at the current market rate for the entire period during which they remained in occupation after the allotment ceased to be operative.
74. Any dues withheld by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi of the occupants, if any, will be released within a period of two months after the delivery of physical, vacant and peaceful possession of the municipal quarter(s).