Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Dharam Veer vs Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited on 5 September, 2022
1 OA No.1837/2015
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench: New Delhi
OA No.1837/2015
Order reserved on: 23.08.2022
Order pronounced on: 05.09.2022
Hon'ble Mr. Anand Mathur, Member (A)
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J)
Dharam Veer,
S/o Sh. Chiranji Lal,
Aged about 35 years
Group D
Department: BSNL
Designation: Casual Labour
Nature of grievance: Promotion
R/o 8465, Arya Nagar,
Paharganj, New Delhi-110055.
... Applicant
(By Advocate: Mrs. Rani Chhabra)
Versus
1. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
Thru. General Manager,
Corporate Office, 102-B,
Statesman House,
New Delhi-110001.
2. Assistant General Manager (LE),
Corporate Office, 102-B,
Statesman House,
New Delhi-110001.
3. The Chief General Manager,
BSNL, Northern Telecom Region,
Kidwai Bhawan, New Delhi.
4. The Assistant Director General (Pers.IV),
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
Government of India Enterprises,
Corporate Office, 102-B,
Statesman House,
New Delhi-110001.
... Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. R.V.Sinha with Mr. A.S.Singh)
2 OA No.1837/2015
ORDER (ORAL)
By Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J) The present OA has been taken up for hearing pursuant to order of remand dated 27.07.2016 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in WP(C) No.6164/2016, whereby the Hon'ble High Court was pleased to pass following order(s) :-
"9. In view of Section 20, the contempt petition was not entertained being barred by limitation. We may also notice that it is the same Single Judge who opined that a fresh cause of action accrued in favour of the petitioner. The Single Judge observed that if at all it gives rise to any cause of action in favour of the applicant against his non-regularisation, it is only a fresh cause of action which can be agitated by him in an independent writ petition. Thus, for the Tribunal to say that since the High Court was of the opinion that there was delay, the OA could not be entertained by the Tribunal.
10. Accordingly, we remand the matter back to the Tribunal. The Tribunal shall take an independent view as to whether there was delay in filing the OA or not; when the cause of action accrued; whether the petitioner had spent time in other proceedings; and whether the time spent is to be deducted or not and subject to objections which are raised by the respondents. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter.
11. Resultantly, present writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 31.5.2016 is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Tribunal for fresh hearing. The Tribunal will decide the matter in accordance with law. Pleas of both the parties are kept open.
12. Writ petition stands disposed of."
2. At the time of admission, this Hon'ble Tribunal passed the following orders dated 19.05.2015, which is reproduced as under:-
3 OA No.1837/2015
"Heard.
2. Learned counsel for the applicant would submit that in the earlier round of litigation, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Writ Petition No.11774/2004 vide order dated 26.10.2005 had given some benefits to the applicant, but then thereafter some of the portion of the reliefs, which have been made available to him, have been withheld by the respondents in citing Uma Devi's judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court. She would say that this judgement was rendered after this date, and therefore, it would not be applicable in this case.
3. Issue DASTI notice to the respondents returnable on 29.05.2015.
4. In the meanwhile, status quo will be maintained as on today."
3. The facts emerging from the present Original Application are as under:-
3.1 The applicant was initially engaged by the respondents as a casual labourer in the Office of Delhi Transport Office (DTO), Paharganj, New Delhi, w.e.f.
October, 1995. He continued to work as a casual labourer without any break in service up-to October, 2001. The applicant claims that the Telegraph Unit (Centre), Sub-Divisional Engineer, Central Telegraph Office, which was the Head Office of DTOs, used to maintain a common seniority list of part-time casual labourer working in all the DTOs.
3.2 Further, as per the OA, the DTO Office at Paharganj, where the applicant was working, was closed in the year 2001 and he was, thus, declared as surplus w.e.f. October, 2001. It is also claimed that other 4 OA No.1837/2015 labourers, employed in separate DTOs which were also closed down, were re-employed in other offices, whereas the applicant was denied re-employment. The applicant thereafter made a representation to respondents no.3 and 4 seeking re-employment and also bringing to their notice the instances of Mr. Naresh Kumar and Ms. Gudi, who had been given re-employment. Since the request of the applicant was not acceded to, despite the applicant informing the respondent and giving instances of similarly situated persons such as Mr.Naresh Kumar and Ms.Gudi, he filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court, being W.P.(C)No.11774/2004.
3.3 The said writ petition was allowed vide order dated 26.10.2005 in WP (C) No. 11774/2004, operative portion of which reads as under:
"11. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the respondents have acted in a discriminatory manner while denying the applicant re-engagement and the benefit of the treatment as full-time worker pursuant to the policies.
12. For the reasons indicated above, the respondents are directed to offer a suitable post to the applicant within a period of three months from today and grant the same treatment as was given to Sh. Naresh Kumar, Smt. Guddi whose instances having discussed above.
13. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above."
4. Pursuant to the order passed on 26.10.2005, the applicant was re-employed initially as a part-time casual 5 OA No.1837/2015 labourer and thereafter as a full time casual labourer but he was not regularised.
5. It is the case of the applicant that since he was not regularised, he made several representations to the respondents to comply with the directions contained in the order dated 26.10.2005 passed in W.P.(C)No.11774/2004.
6. Vide communication dated 13.06.2013, the applicant was informed that it would not be possible to regularise him in view of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, 2006 (4) SCC 1.
7. The applicant thereafter filed a contempt petition, being Cont. Case (C) No.740/2013, in the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi vide order dated 14.10.2014 dismissed the contempt petition on the ground that the contempt petition has been filed by the applicant after a period of six years. The Hon'ble High Court, however, noticed that the communication dated 13.06.2013 is a fresh cause of action, which has accrued in favour of the petitioner, and the same cannot be said to be contempt. The applicant thereafter filed OA No.1837/2015 (instant OA) before this Tribunal, which 6 OA No.1837/2015 was dismissed on 31.05.2016. The operative portion of the order dated 31.05.2016 reads as under:
"11. However, having considered the matter in Contempt Petition preferred by the applicant before the Hon'ble High Court and ruled as above, the Hon'ble High Court was clearly of the opinion that whatsoever might have been the merits of the case, the delay of seven years could not have been condoned. Once the Hon'ble High Court has taken a position, it is not for the Tribunal to rule otherwise as it amounts to modification of the order of the High Court for which this Tribunal is not competent."
8. On remand by the Hon'ble High Court, as stated in foregoing paragraph, the matter was taken up for final hearing.
9. During the course of hearing, Mrs. Chhabra, learned counsel for the applicant, has again reiterated that earlier this Tribunal has failed to take into consideration the contempt petition which was dismissed on account of limitation and it is not that the High Court has held that the claim of the applicant had become stale. Counsel further submits that the cause of action had accrued in favour of the applicant on 13.6.2013. Thereafter the applicant filed contempt petition. After the contempt petition was dismissed, the applicant approached the Tribunal and the Tribunal has not taken the above factors into consideration. The learned counsel urged that it is the case of the applicant that since he was not regularised, he made several representations to the respondents to comply with the directions contained 7 OA No.1837/2015 in the order dated 26.10.2015 passed in W.P.(C) No.11774/2004 which are final and binding between the parties. She also urged that the DTO Office at Paharganj, where the applicant was working, was closed in the year 2001 and he was, thus, declared as surplus w.e.f. October, 2001. It is also claimed that other labourers, employed in separate DTOs which were also closed down, were re-employed in other offices, however, the applicant was denied re-employment. The applicant thereafter made a representation to respondents no.3 and 4 seeking re-employment and also bring to their notice the instances of Mr.Naresh Kumar and Ms.Gudi, who had been given re-employment. Since the request of the applicant was not acceded to despite the applicant informed the respondent giving instances of similarly situated persons such as Mr.Naresh Kumar and Ms.Gudi, he filed a writ petition in the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, being W.P.(C)No.11774/2004 wherein directions were passed. It is not disputed fact that pursuant to the order passed on 26.10.2005, the applicant was re- employed initially as a part-time casual labourer and thereafter a full time casual labourer but he was not regularised.
10. Per Contra, Mr. R.V.Sinha, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the present OA is not 8 OA No.1837/2015 maintainable as there is no infirmity in the impugned decision of the respondents. Learned counsel further submitted that the cause of action accrued in favour of the applicant in the month of March, 2007, and not in the year 2013, as claimed by the applicant. He further relies upon the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in BSNL, Jammu Vs Teja Singh in Civil Appeal No.292/2009 decided on 16.1.2009, Post Master General, Kolkata Vs Tutu Das, 2007 (5) SCC 317 and Official Liquidator Vs Dayanand & ors, (2008) 10 SCC 1 and submits that in light of said decisions no relief of regularisation can be granted.
11. We have also carefully re-examined the order of remand dated 27.7.2016 passed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, the order dated 26.10.2005 passed in W.P.(C) No.11774/2004, the order dated 14.10.2014 passed in Cont. Case (C) No.740/2013, and the order dated 31.5.2016 passed by the Tribunal.
12. Perusal of the records reveal that in so far as the applicant in present case is concerned, it is not disputed that he was initially engaged by the respondents as a casual labourer in the Office of Delhi Transport Office (DTO), Paharganj, New Delhi, w.e.f. October, 1995. He continued to work as a casual labourer without any 9 OA No.1837/2015 break in service upto October, 2001. Further as per the OA, the DTO Office at Paharganj, where the applicant was working, was closed in the year 2001 and he was, thus, declared as surplus w.e.f. October, 2001. It is also claimed that other labourers, employed in separate DTOs which were also closed down, were re-employed in other offices, however, the applicant was denied re- employment. The applicant thereafter made a representation to respondents no.3 and 4 seeking re- employment and also bringing to their notice the instances of Mr.Naresh Kumar and Ms.Gudi, who had been given re-employment. Since the request of the applicant was not acceded to despite the applicant informing the respondent and giving instances of similarly situated persons such as Mr.Naresh Kumar and Ms.Gudi, he filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court, being W.P.(C)No.11774/2004. That it is pursuant to the order dated 26.10.2005, the applicant was re-employed and continued to work and he was re-engaged initially as a part-time casual labourer and thereafter a full time casual labourer but he was not regularised. After the matter was remanded back for fresh consideration of the claim of the applicant, he is being continued to be re- engaged in terms of Interim Order dated 19.5.2015 passed by this Tribunal.
10 OA No.1837/2015
13. In this light of the matter, we are of the view that merely because the applicant was re-engaged pursuant to order dated 26.10.2005, and was continued to work and is being continued to be re-engaged in terms of Interim Order dated 19.05.2015 of this Tribunal cannot give rise to seek relief of regularisation as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Hon'ble Apex Court in BSNL, Jammu Vs Teja Singh in Civil Appeal No.292/2009 decided on 16.1.2009, Post Master General, Kolkata Vs Tutu Das, 2007 (5) SCC 317 and Official Liquidator Vs Dayanand & ors ( 2008) 10 SCC 1.
14. In BSNL , Jammu Vs Teja Singh ( Supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"A Constitution Bench of this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. vs. Umadevi (3) and Ors. [2006 (4) SCC 1], has categorically held that keeping in view the constitutional scheme of equality, as contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, regularisation or permanent continuance of temporary, contractual, casual, daily-wage or ad hoc employees in public employment dehors the constitutional scheme is impermissible in law. By way of one time concession the Constitution Bench, however, held as under:
"53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where regular appointments (not illegal appoints) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa (1967 1 SCR 128), R.N. Nanjundappa (1972 1 SCC 409) and B.N. Nagarajan (1979 4 SCC 507) and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases abovereferred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their 11 OA No.1837/2015 instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme."
We may notice that the law in this behalf has been laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court, stating:
"43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end and the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wags or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. The High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularisation, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms 12 OA No.1837/2015 of the constitutional scheme. Merely because an employee had continued under cover of an order of the court, which we have described as 'litigious employment' in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitle to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates."
In view of the said decision of the Constitution Bench, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the 1989 regularisation scheme having not been enforced in the case of the respondent, it did not come within the purview of the exception carved out by the Court in paragraph 53, of Umadevi as quoted above. The view of the Constitution Bench in Umadevi (supra) has been reiterated by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Official Liquidator vs. Dayanand and Ors. [2008 (10) SCC 1], stating that the High Courts shall give effect thereto, opining:
"90. We are distressed to note that despite several pronouncements on the subject, there is substantial increase in the number of cases involving violation of the basics of judicial discipline. The learned Single Judges and Benches of the High Courts refuse to follow and accept the verdict and law laid down by coordinate and even larger Benches by citing minor difference in the facts as the ground for doing so. Therefore, it has become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to the constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have grave impact on the credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation. It must be remembered that predictability and certainty is an important hallmark of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country in the last six decades and increase in the frequency of conflicting judgments of the superior judiciary will do incalculable harm to the system inasmuch as the courts at the grass roots will not be able to decide as to which of the judgments lay down the correct law and which one should be followed.13 OA No.1837/2015
91. We may add that in our constitutional set-up every citizen is under a duty to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions. Those who have been entrusted with the task of administering the system and operating various constituents of the State an who take oath to act in accordance with the Constitution and uphold the same, have to set an example by exhibiting total commitment to the constitutional ideals. This principle is required to be observed with greater rigour by the members of judicial fraternity who have been bestowed with the power to adjudicate upon important constitutional and legal issues and protect and preserve rights of the individuals and society as a whole. Discipline is sine qua non for effective and efficient functioning of the judicial system. If the courts command others to act in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and rule of law, it is not possible to countenance violation of the constitutional principle by those who are required to lay down the law.
92. In the light of what has been stated above, we deem it proper to clarify that the comments and observations made by the two-Judge Bench in U.P. SEB v. Pooran Chandra Pandey (2007 11 SCC 92) should be read as obiter and the same should neither be treated as binding by the High Courts, tribunals and other judicial foras nor they should be relied upon or made basis for bypassing the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench."
15. In the case of Post Master General, Kolkata Vs. Tutu Das, 2007 (5) SCC 317, the Hon'ble Apex Court further held as under:-
"12. What was considered to be permissible at a given point of time keeping in view the decisions of this Court which had then been operating in the field, does no longer hold good. Indisputably the situation has completely changed in view of a large number of decisions rendered by this Court in last 15 years or so. It was felt that no appointment should be made contrary to the statutory provisions governing recruitment or the rules framed in that behalf under a statute or the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India.
13. Equality clause contained in Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India must be given primacy. No policy decision can be taken in terms of Article 77 or Article 162 of the Constitution of India which would run contrary to the constitutional or statutory schemes.14 OA No.1837/2015
Xxx xxx xxx
17. Submission of Mr. Roy is that the respondent has been discriminated against inasmuch as although the services of Niva Ghosh were regularised, she had not been, may now be noticed.
18. There are two distinctive features in the present case, which are:-
(i) Equality is a positive concept. Therefore, it cannot be invoked where any illegality has been committed or where no legal right is established.
(ii) According to the appellant the respondent having completed 240 days, does not fulfil the requisite criteria.
A disputed question of fact has been raised. The High Court did not come to a positive finding that she had worked for more than 240 days in a year.
19. Even otherwise this Court is bound by the Constitution Bench decision. Attention of the High Court unfortunately was not drawn to a large number of recent decisions which had been rendered by this Court.
20. The statement of law contained in para 53 of Uma Devi (supra) cannot also be invoked in this case. The question has been considered by this Court in a large number of decisions. We would, however, refer to only a few of them.
21. In Punjab Water Supply and Sewerage Board v Ranjodh Singh & Ors [2006 (13) SCALE 426] referring to paragraphs 15, 16 and 53 of Uma Devi (supra), this Court;
"A combined reading of the aforementioned paragraphs would clearly indicate that what the Constitution Bench had in mind in directing regularisation was in relation to such appointments, which were irregular in nature and not illegal ones."
16. In State of Haryana and ors. etc. etc. vs Piara Singh and ors. etc., (1992 AIR 2130), the Hon'ble Apex held as under:
"26. So far as the employees and workmen employed by Statutory/Public Corporations are concerned, it may be noted that they have not issued any orders akin to those issued by the Punjab and Haryana Government. Even so, it is but appropriate that they adopt as far as possible, keeping the exigencies and requirements of their administration in view, the criteria and principles underlying the orders issued by their Government in the matter of regularisation and pass appropriate orders. In 15 OA No.1837/2015 short, the Statutory/Public Corporations in Haryana will follow the orders contained in the letter dated 6.4.1990 referred to above, as supplemented by the orders in the Notification dated 28.2.1991, where as the Statutory/Public Corporations in Punjab shall follow the criteria and principles stated in the affidavit of Sri G.K.Bansal, Under Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Department of Personnel referred to in para 22 above. These directions shall not, however, apply to these Statutory/Public Corporations functioning within these States as are under the control of the Government of India. These Corporations will do well to evolve an appropriate policy of regularisation, in the light of this judgment, if they have not already evolved one, or make their existing policy consistent with this judgment to avoid litigation."
17. In the case of the Official Liquidator Vs Dayanand & ors (2008) 10 SCC 1, the Hon'ble Apex Court, emphasised as under:-
"53. In paragraph 25, the Constitution Bench specifically referred to the conclusions recorded in paragraphs 45 to 50 of the judgment in State of Haryana vs. Piara Singh (supra) and observed:
"26. With respect, why should the State be allowed to depart from the normal rule and indulge in temporary employment in permanent posts? This Court, in our view, is bound to insist on the State making regular and proper recruitments and is bound not to encourage or shut its eyes to the persistent transgression of the rules of regular recruitment. The direction to make permanent--the distinction between regularisation and making permanent, was not emphasized here--can only encourage the State, the model employer, to flout its own rules and would confer undue benefits on a few at the cost of many waiting to compete. With respect, the direction made in para 50 (of SCC) of Piara Singh is to some extent inconsistent with the conclusion in para 45 (of SCC) therein. With great respect, it appears to us that the last of the directions clearly runs counter to the constitutional scheme of employment recognised in the earlier part of the decision. Really, it cannot be said that this decision has laid down the law that all ad hoc, temporary or casual employees engaged without following the regular recruitment procedure should be made permanent."16 OA No.1837/2015
18. In recent decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court , in CP (Civil) NO. 404/2019 in Civil Appeal No. 10511/2011 The Workmen through the Convener FCI Labour Federation Versus Ravuthar Dawood Naseem, held as under:-
"23. In the present case, as noticed earlier, no specific direction has been given to the Corporation to regularise the concerned workmen only in the Departmental Labour System. Furthermore, the Departmental Labour System is now a dying cadre and the policy of the Corporation at the relevant time entailed regularisation of such workmen only under the Direct Payment System (DPS). Thus understood, no contempt action can be initiated on the basis of general direction to the respondents to regularise and departmentalise the concerned workmen. For, it is not possible to hold that intrinsic in the general direction was to ordain the respondents to regularise and departmentalise the concerned workmen under the Departmental Labour System in the teeth of the extant policy of the Corporation in force since 1991 regarding regularisation against Direct Payment System (DPS).
24. Reverting to the decision of this Court in Anil Ratan Sarkar (supra), it was a case in which crystal- clear direction was given to the management to treat the concerned employees at par with another set of specified employees. Further, despite six rounds of litigation, the management kept on taking defence of its bona fide understanding of the situation, which came to be deprecated. Had it been a case of clear direction by the Tribunal, the High Court or this Court, and an attempt was made to interpret, or so to say, misinterpret, such direction, to regularise the employees concerned under the Departmental Labour System, and if such direction was not to be complied with by the respondent Corporation, the situation could have been viewed differently being a contempt action. In the present case, it is not a moonshine defence as was the finding recorded in the reported decision."17 OA No.1837/2015
19. In yet another case, i.e., Civil Appeal No. 4134 of 2022 (arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 2946 of 2020) Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak vs. Bhavnagat Municipal Corporation decided on 18.05.2022, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"Normally, and as a model employer, on accepting the said decision, the respondent-Corporation should have uniformly applied and granted the benefit to all its similarly situated employees affected by the order dated 28th October 2010. This would have avoided unnecessary litigation before the courts, as was held in State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others:
"22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.
22.2. However, this principle is subject to well recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.
22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of 18 OA No.1837/2015 regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence."
20. In view of the above well settled principles of law as laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court, the present Original Application is devoid of merit in so far as plea of regularisation is concerned.
21. In peculiar facts and circumstance of the present case, this Tribunal cannot lose sight of the fact that the applicant was initially engaged by the respondents as a casual labourer in the Office of Delhi Transport Office (DTO), Paharganj, New Delhi, w.e.f. October, 1995 and he continued to work as a casual labourer without any break in service up-to October, 2001 ( i.e. for period of 6 years) and pursuant to the order passed on 26.10.2005, he was reengaged initially as a part-time casual labourer and thereafter a full time casual labourer till date ( i.e. for period 15 years from 2007), hence in exercise of powers under Rule 24 of 1992, based on equity , justice and good conscience ends of justice would be met by passing following directions:-
19 OA No.1837/2015
a) applicant shall have no vested right to seek regularisation/absorption as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court as aforesaid decisions dehors the Rules/Regulations.
b) applicant shall be allowed to continue to the existing arrangement and/or not be replaced by any other contractual employee till such time the vacancies against which the applicant is working are fulfilled as per RR's/Scheme.
c) applicant shall be given benefit of age relaxation / experience, in the event, there is any special drive for absorption / regularisation for any post for which the applicant is entitled to as per RR's / Schemes.
d) applicant not be entitled to have their pay fixed in the regular scales and other monetary benefits at par with regular employees working under the respondent /department so long as he continued to be engaged in present arrangement.
e) It is made clear that applicant shall not be entitled to take benefit his continuation to present arrangement in future for regularisation except for the extent indicated herein above.
f) The department shall have a right to dispense with the service of the applicant in accordance with law/ 20 OA No.1837/2015 rules/regulations on account of any departmental action, if any.
22. In view of the above, the OA is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Manish Garg) (Anand Mathur) Member (J) Member (A) /sd/